

Global Democracy: For and Against

**Ethical theory, institutional design,
and social struggles**

Raffaele Marchetti



Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Global Democracy: For and Against

The book defends the case for the expansion of the democratic model to the global political sphere. Concentrating on the participatory deficit of international affairs, it examines the nexus between the phenomenon of international exclusion and the political response of global democracy.

This distinctive position is developed through a critical survey of the principal theories for and against global democracy. The main rival narratives (realism, nationalism, civilizationism, and liberal internationalism) are rebutted on grounds of failing democratic principles of inclusion. Based on a notion of interaction-dependent justice, these theories arguably provide a crucial ideological support to the exclusionary attitude of the current international system. Going against these exclusionary paradigms, the book defends a model of cosmo-federalism that is all-inclusive, multilayered, and rooted.

The text adopts an interdisciplinary perspective that combines three areas of scholarship: international political theory, international relations, and political sociology. Within them, a number of contemporary controversies are analyzed, including the ethical dispute on global justice, the institutional debate on supranationalism, and the political discussion on social emancipatory struggles. From such an interdisciplinary perspective is derived an engaged text that will be of interest to students and researchers concerned with the key political aspects of the discussion on globalization and democratic global order.

Raffaele Marchetti is a lecturer in international relations at LUISS Guido Carli University, Italy.

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First published 2008
by Routledge
2 Park Square Milton Park Abingdon Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data

Marchetti, Raffaele.

Global democracy—for and against: ethical theory, institutional design and social struggles / Raffaele, Marchetti.

p. cm.—(Democratization studies; 12)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Democracy. 2. Globalization. 3. Civil Society. I. Title.

JC423.M3558 2008

341.2 1—dc22

2007042184

ISBN 0-203-92880-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 10: 0-415-43719-9 (hbk)

ISBN 10: 0-203-92880-6 (ebk)

ISBN 13: 978-0-415-43719-6 (hbk)

ISBN 13: 978-0-203-92880-6 (ebk)

**For Carlo and Graziella,
who made all of this possible**

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Acknowledgments

This book is the result of a long, multidisciplinary journey that has reshaped my political understanding of the world. During this journey I have incurred a number of crucial debts that I want to acknowledge here.

Eugenio Lecaldano and Daniele Archibugi guided me during my final dissertation for my Laurea degree in philosophy in Rome. David Held and Paul Kelly supervised me during my PhD in international political theory in London. Finally, Donatella della Porta and Mario Pianta accompanied my post-doc work on political sociology and global politics in Florence. The guidance of these mentors was invaluable in the structuring of the arguments that follow. Without their guidance I would most likely have ended up on a very different path. I am very grateful to their intellectual and practical generosity.

Challenging discussions of my work with a number of other scholars have helped me greatly in further developing the arguments presented here. Thus am I also indebted to Rainer Bauböck, Luigi Bonanate, Elisabetta Brighi, Garrett W. Brown, Anna Caffarena, Luigi Caranti, Leonardo Ceppa, John Charvet, Christine Chwaszcza, Fred Dallmayr, Keith Dowding, Jay Drydyk, Cécile Fabre, Alessandro Ferrara, Antonio Franceschet, Bob Goodin, Kim Hutchings, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Fritz Kratochwil, Tony Lang, Sabina Leonelli, Ori Lev, Lucio Levi, Andrew Linklater, Terry Macdonald, Sebastiano Maffettone, Bice Maiguashca, Tony McGrew, Lorenzo Mosca, Rolf J. Olsson, Steffi Ortman, Vittorio Parsi, Gianfranco Pellegrino, Fabio Petito, Thomas Pogge, Giuliano Pontara, Alex Quiroga, Veronica Raccah, Nick Rengger, Liza Schuster, Nicola Short, Courtney Smith, Andy Strauss, Olga Tribulato, Tiziana Torresi, Christien van den Anker, Robert van der Veen, Peter Wilson, Duccio Zola, and a number of anonymous referees.

Irene Caratelli and Lea Ypi have been particularly generous with me. They have read with patience and competence the entire manuscript and provided me with excellent comments that went at times far beyond my own understanding of the arguments I present here. I am very much indebted to both of them.

Beyond the named persons, there remain a great number of people to thank: these include my family, friends, teachers, colleagues (especially those

at the Political Theory Seminar of the Department of Government and the International Relations Theory workshop at the Dept. of International Relations at the LSE; those at the Department of Social and Political Science at the EUI; and those at the Center for the Study of Human Rights at LUISS), and my students at LUISS and John Cabot University. The discussions with all of them have contributed significantly to the refinement of my ideas. They are too many to thank individually, but they are there as evidence to me of the single major methodological principle I have learnt through my research: open discussion.

More than ideas go into bringing a book to publication. Thus I wish to thank the editors of the Routledge Democratization Series, Peter Burnell and Peter Calvert, for being supportive of this publication and providing challenging comments that have helped me improve both the content and the style of this book.

Dorothea Kast has provided much more than linguistic support. Discussing the revision of my writings with her, I realized so much not only about the style and form of my expression, but also about the general structure of my way of thinking. I am most profoundly grateful to her professional copy-editing.

During my research I have benefited from a variety of financial support, without which this study could not have been developed. They include a scholarship for specialization in a foreign university sponsored by Università di Roma La Sapienza (2000–1), two research studentships sponsored by the Department of Government, LSE (2001 and 2003), a research grant sponsored by the Italian National Research Council-CNR (2003–4), and a Jean Monnet Fellowship sponsored by the European Commission (2005–6). Additional travel and accommodation bursaries have been provided under different circumstances by BISA, the British Academy, European Commission, Ford Foundation, Harvard University, Irmgard Coninx Foundation, ISA, Leverhulme Fund, LSE, and LUISS University. The European project Garnet (Jerp 5.2.7) provided funds for the editing of this book.

An earlier draft of this research with the title “Global Governance vs. World Federalism: An Institutional Dispute within Cosmopolitanism” was awarded with the 2005 Lawrence S. Finkelstein Award for Best Graduate Paper on International Organization by the International Studies Association-ISA. I thank the Finkelstein committee for their recognition and support.

Finally, I would like to express my most profound gratitude to Irene Caratelli. She has been an equally extraordinary companion in life and colleague at work. She has been good enough to sustain me in the difficult moments and celebrate with me the happy ones. Sharing with her this intellectual exploration has been a unique privilege for which I feel extremely lucky.

As usual, while acknowledging these debts, I keep all the responsibility for what is written in the following.

Part I

Globalization and the democratic deficit

If either of the two options has a better claim than the other, not merely to be tolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced, it is the one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a minority. That is the opinion which, for the time being, represents the neglected interests, the side of human well-being which is in danger of obtaining less than its share.

(Mill, 1859; reprinted 1962, 175)

Introduction: pushing democracy beyond borders

Either democracy is global or it is not democracy. That is the fundamental message of this book. Any political system that applies allegedly democratic principles within a limited scope is either a hypocrisy or an illusion. As will be discussed at length in the following chapters, the ideal of democracy requires the creation of a system in which all citizens have a voice in the formulation of norms and decisions that have a public scope. In particular, such an ideal requires a system to be framed on different layers, each of them allowing for the maximum participation of all citizens. By contrast, a system that allows for public actions that do not undergo citizens' political scrutiny and yet have a public impact does not qualify as democratic. And this is the current situation at the international and transnational level. Vast sections of the world's population have, in fact, no say in transborder decisions that (often profoundly) affect their lives. From a democratic perspective this lack of voice is not acceptable, and it is just this kind of institutional discrimination that this book challenges.

This book is intended as a study in international political theory. It aims to formulate concrete proposals for reforming the international institutional system, but it does so on grounds of a normative analysis of the legitimate bases on which a political system should be built. While for the most part accepting the core principles of democratic theory, this study aims at enlarging their scope of application to all of humanity; nobody should be excluded. Unlike the other traditions of global democracy, which were mostly motivated by the search for peace, this research is guided by a consideration of democratic justice.¹ According to this perspective, true political justice is

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fundamentally entrenched in a procedural and multilayered democracy, within which all individuals can advance their claims and complaints in order to defend their freedom of choice. More specifically, deploying a consequentialist (i.e. goal-based) and all-inclusive reading of democracy, this study proposes that the concept of democracy be upgraded and applied globally in the form of a cosmo-federal system in which citizens are directly enfranchised in each institutional level.

This research aims to refocus the discussion of global democracy on the crucial pathology of political exclusion. Transnational exclusion occurs when an actor is deprived of his/her entitlements to influence public decisions at the international and global level. This kind of exclusion is here considered to be the key deficit of the international system and thus the component that must be addressed in order for the international political system to regain legitimacy. An analogy may help illustrate this point. Suppose the activity of a private club pollutes a river that passes through the club's grounds. The members of the club argue that it is their right to allow this as long as the club governing body accepts it. That is one side of the story. The other side of the story concerns the citizens of the area surrounding the club. After passing through the club the river is in fact polluted and the neighboring citizens cannot take a bath, go fishing or simply enjoy the river any more. They complain about their well-being, and more generally about their health, which has been damaged by the activity of the club. Their children will face an even worse situation in a few years' time because of the cumulative effects of environmental depletion.

In a situation like this, any democrat would be ready to defend publicly the citizens' right to protest and impose restrictions on the club. The democrat would not accept as valid that decisions taken by a limited group could significantly affect the life prospects of those outside the group without the latter having the legal opportunity to contest the outcomes. Since the non-members suffer from the consequences of actions that have a public effect, then, a democrat would reason, they should be politically entitled to voice their concern and vote for a law to protect the environment and preserve their quality of life. At the local and national level this logic would be fully endorsed by any democrat; i.e. were the private club and the surrounding citizens in the same national jurisdiction, the non-member citizens would certainly be granted institutional power to block the polluting activity of the club members. Were, however, the club in one country and the surrounding people in another, the situation would be entirely different; and far fewer so-called democrats would be ready to protest. A national boundary is thus enough to invalidate democratic justice. At the international or global level, the situation is in fact very different and activities such as those of private clubs are most of the time allowed. Still too few, for instance, are those people who believe that a state should not be allowed to pollute the world's atmosphere. Still too many tolerate the fact that individuals worldwide do not have a voice to complain about global environmental issues. The environmental case is

just one clear instance among many of the democratic limits of the current international system. It is a case of what I call transnational exclusion.

As a response to the current international political fragmentation, which generates political exclusion, the alternative political project offered here envisages a cosmopolitan system in which all world citizens are included within a scheme of direct representative participation under an overarching authority that governs the democratization of world affairs. The pursuit of the democratic ideal in terms of scope is thus implemented in this proposal through a reworked notion of citizenship as global, multilayered, and all-inclusive. In essence, this entails an expansion of the domestic model of democracy to the transnational level, structured on several layers that take into account different jurisdictional boundaries as coordinated through a world federalist system. Only through the radical project of stretching the paradigm of democratic inclusion to encompass the whole of mankind, together with recognizing the legitimacy of multiple political allegiances, can the inhuman mechanism of partial inclusion as exclusion-generator be avoided. If the phenomenon of illegitimate political exclusion is to be avoided, the authority to define jurisdictional boundaries needs to be reallocated, from groups with a circumscribed scope, to a public democratic mechanism which is global in kind.

This book is meant to articulate a criticism of this exclusionary situation. It is intended both as a normative investigation of the logic that sustains the democratic ideal at the global level, and as a political proposal for the reform of the current institutional structures that systematically deprive individuals of their legitimate entitlement to participate in public life. In a novel bridging of divergent strands of contemporary cosmopolitan research, this study focuses on the need to include globally marginalized actors by shining a light on the institutional side of transnational exclusion. There are three such strands. First, there is the original international political theory/international ethics research on cosmopolitanism of the 1970s and 1980s – i.e. *moral cosmopolitanism* (e.g. Singer, 1972; Beitz, 1979; Goodin, 1988; Pogge, 1992). Second, there is the subsequent international relations/political science research on global institutions of the 1990s – i.e. *institutional cosmopolitanism* (e.g. Archibugi and Held, 1995; D. Held, 1995; Archibugi *et al.*, 1998). And third, there is the more recent sociological research on global inclusion of the 2000s – i.e. *social cosmopolitanism* (e.g. de Sousa Santos, 2002; Tarrow, 2005). Ethical theory, institutional design, and social struggles represent the three key dimensions of any viable political project. Consequently, any theoretical reflection that does not grapple with all three equally will inevitably miss an important aspect of the bigger political picture. This study is committed to critically articulating the phenomenon of transnational exclusion and to proposing an alternative project for global democracy, keeping a multidisciplinary perspective that includes all three of these dimensions. Reinterpreting the cosmopolitan ideal in the light of marginalized people and translating newly acknowledged subaltern claims into an

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inclusive institutional design, this study bridges these dimensions of cosmopolitan thinking and thus advances the discussion on global democracy.

The viability of this interdisciplinary project requires the revision of a number of first principles so that the limitations determined by methodological nationalism can be overcome. Corresponding to the aforementioned strands of cosmopolitanism, three are prominent among these principles: moral agency, multilevel dimensionality, and rootedness. The principal challenge political exclusion poses for international political theory is thus played out on the interpretation of these latter notions.

The major distinguishing characteristic of the version of global democracy presented here consists in its consideration of *moral and political agency* as mutually dependent and operating within a universalistic and all-inclusive conception of responsibility and vulnerability. The strength of this theory is the flexibility of its paradigm, which allows it to respond more strongly than others to social and political reality. This is a particular strength in these times of radical transformations. Our world system increasingly attenuates the relationship between those who take decisions and those who bear the costs of those decisions. This has the double effect of broadening the possibility for cooperation (e.g. the improvements in transportation and communication) and impoverishing the moral ties of disapproval. In the past, the effects of actions were principally circumscribed by a defined territory; most people influenced, for good or bad, the lives of a limited number of other people. The situation is now different, with many of the actions/omissions we implement often having an (unintentional) relative impact on thousands of others. Even if these effects are imperceptible when taken singly, they often become decisive when combined with the effects of thousands of similar actions. Consequently, insofar as local possibilities acquire a global dimension, our moral responsibility is revealed to encompass a far greater field of inclusiveness. The moral question must, therefore, evolve into the following: in what way is my action part of a complex set of actions of different agents, organized by public rules, which taken together affect others? (Arendt, 1971; Parfit, 1984, sections 28–9; Hardin, 1999). Hence the concept of global agency, with its correlate of negligence, becomes a crucial component of any international political theory.

Accordingly, the present proposal of global democracy includes consideration of both sides of the equation of global ethical concern. *Choice-makers*, i.e. those who have the power to decide and carry out an action which produces consequences, are made responsible through a precise method of multiple accountability based on the capacity to influence the outcome. *Choice-bearers*, i.e. those who suffer the consequences of others' actions are, by contrast, identified as potentially vulnerable and as a result protected (Goodin, 1985; D. Held, 2002). According to the normative ideal of democracy, and in opposition to that of Hobbesian realism, a mechanism of congruence should be established between choice-makers and choice-bearers, in which the latter can impose on the former a duty of accountability concerning their actions. Since

there can be multiple agents on both sides, an ethical-political theory based on impartiality cannot in fact be complete when it fails to identify clearly the moral position of every agent involved in the situation under scrutiny (O'Neill, 1996, 131–2; 2001). In presenting a comprehensive reading of the issue of international agency, this study challenges its rivals by offering a consistent version of interlinked political responsibilities and social vulnerabilities.

The politically most relevant consequence of this comprehensive conception of moral-political agency is its insistence on the institution of cosmopolitan citizenship.² Against state-centric logic, this study holds that the concept of citizenship is not linked to the notion of a sovereign state, insofar as it can be unfolded and spread out over a number of different political spheres. Consequently, no normative obstacles impede the expansion of the traditional notion of *polis* to the entire *cosmos*. It is through this new interpretation of the meaning of political membership that a comprehensive understanding of political responsibility can be consistently linked with social vulnerability. The ideal of political responsibility can only be fully realized through the conceptualization of an all-inclusive system of political membership, which, avoiding exclusion, imposes on each political agent his/her correct burden of responsibility, or alternatively alleviates him/her from the condition of social vulnerability. Once some basic social and political entitlements are identified, the agent, i.e. the one in the position to influence the outcome concerning the potentially vulnerable, needs in fact to be made responsible, and in case of failure to comply with his/her duties, needs to be sanctioned proportionately. This legal setting, though, has to be complemented by a multilayered political system which enables responsibilities to be enforced through a net of intermingled and subsidiary duties.

In this way, the issue of global moral agency also directly informs the second significant characteristic of this version of global democracy, namely that concerning *multilayered dimensionality*. As individual and social existence is increasingly spread over a number of different domains, a common socio-political framework is needed to bring together this diffusion of engagement. This can be achieved through neither the traditional intergovernmental system nor the recent global governance arrangements. For reasons that will be explained later, both of these institutional solutions generate transnational exclusion at their foundations and thus deny the democratic assumptions on which they claim to be built. The failure of these frameworks fragments the social and political existence of individuals, and therefore renders any pursuit of a good life most likely self-defeating. The only solution to this issue of exclusion consists in the creation of a center of federal democratic power able to coordinate and govern global affairs. Once the recognition of multiple and yet integrated political actions is accepted, then the issue of jurisdictional boundaries and equilibrium arises. The system proposed here claims as one of its virtues the capacity to balance properly the complex inter-jurisdictional tension – the tension between the different levels of political action – through the use of a single, all-inclusive principle of justice. In a

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highly pluralistic world the only legitimate exclusion is self-exclusion, and that can only be warranted after an all-inclusive mechanism with which to draw jurisdictional boundaries has been established. With this all-inclusive mechanism in place, the normative content of political action at both the individual level and the state level is consistently integrated with that at the regional and global levels of interaction.

Global multidimensionality however must not and need not fall into a hidden defense of current transnational power positions. Any global project today in fact risks supporting the predominant trend of western-centric institutionalism, with its correlate of insensitivity or even exploitation of other cultures and social institutions. A genuine project for global democracy is needed first and foremost for the excluded and ostracized individuals at home in the weaker parts of the world. This is the third key challenge of international political theory: *rootedness* within a global political project. Within current global circumstances, global democracy constitutes a revolutionary project that aims to be true to the democratic principles that are widely, if not unanimously, accepted worldwide. It is a project that intends to give a legitimate voice to the voiceless, and thus a voice to subaltern social actors. In this vein, the framework of global multidimensionality has to be coupled with a strong tie to local emancipatory politics. The transition from the desirability to the feasibility of the normative objectives needs to pass through the integration of institutional and social components of global democracy. In being all-inclusive, global democracy has thus to be simultaneously multilayered and rooted. Articulating the feasibility of this is the challenge ahead of this study.

A further overall remark concerning the degree of this proposal's comprehensiveness must be made before proceeding. In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is important to stress from the beginning that the theory elaborated in this study does not aim to be a comprehensive theory of the good life; it does not aim to tell people how to live. On the contrary, it aims to clarify the normative weaknesses of the current political system and to propose an alternative scheme of public rules. In this vein, the question with which it is engaged is not metaphysical, but *political*. It is about how we are to live together given that we have different ideas about how to live, and not about what is the right idea of a good life. In this regard, this book outlines a theory and a political framework within which each individual can participate agonistically in the elaboration of public rules on an equal standing, while maintaining differing ethical perspectives on the meaning and values of life. The present perspective remains fundamentally pluralistic in that it recognizes that different individual life projects cannot be reduced to a single political project. Hence, politics (and especially world politics) is intended as the place of the agonistic encounter of different world views.

In more concrete terms, it is a proposal to dispute the power positions which characterize the international social reality by redefining the legal institutional setting. Its ultimate institutional objective consists in providing to every human being an equal opportunity to influence the public decision-making and

frame-setting (i.e. the institutional meta-rules that organize the concrete decision-making) processes, and so maximally preserving his or her own freedom of choice. In this regard, it is different from phenomenological and post-modern directions of research insofar as it firmly believes in the unique value of political institutions to resist and redress social inequality. Even more, it holds that some form of democratic participation is necessary for any viable project of critical theory, in that without the support of such an egalitarian participatory structure no dialogue aiming at genealogical self-investigation can hope to be freed from power relationships; indeed, be a dialogue at all. A minimal democratic structure is necessary to frame the basic mode of the relationship, be it political or cultural, from which any phenomenological enquiry is to be carried out. Failing such egalitarian and all-inclusive structure, no viable principle of respect for otherness can be identified, and without these grounds for recognizing difference, an undifferentiated acceptance of any alternatives, including those based on power positions, remains as the only possible attitude. Global democratic institutions are thus needed both to reinterpret critically the current international system, and to redress practically part of its illegitimate inequalities.

The book is divided into four parts. The first part expounds the foundations of democracy, together with the main democratic failures at the transnational level. The second part elaborates the key component of the project of global democracy through a theoretical engagement with the three dimensions and phases of cosmopolitan thinking: ethical (from the 1970s), institutional (from the 1990s), and social (from 2000 on). The third part analyses the main opponents of global democracy (namely realism, nationalism, and internationalism). Finally, the fourth part weighs the arguments for and against global democracy in order to draw out the best argument in support of a truly global form of democracy, as based on the theory of world federalism.

In more detail, the plan of the book is as follows. Chapter one, on democracy and transnational exclusion, introduces the theory of democracy through a survey of its fundamental notion of democratic inclusion, and identifies a democratic gap at the global institutional level. Chapters two, three, and four reconstruct a viable discourse for global democracy. Each of them engages with a different disciplinary literature, and thus each uses a different language and style. Chapter two, on ethical cosmopolitanism, presents the principal ethical aspects of cosmopolitanism. Deploying a version of choice-based consequentialism, the text envisages a universal, and yet plural idea of ethico-political agency. Chapter three, on institutional cosmopolitanism, builds further on the argument for an extension of democratic principles beyond existing borders. In this regard, the central argument in support of global democracy is identified as the right to participation in the decision-making and frame-setting processes at each level of political deliberation. Chapter four, on social cosmopolitanism, analyses the third, sociological wave of cosmopolitan thinking. The main claim advanced here regards the

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issue of inclusion of subaltern actors in global politics and the need to acknowledge the relevance of place-based politics. Chapters five and six dispute the principal rival theories of global democracy. Chapter five, on political communities, analyses the first anti-global democracy paradigm, as constituted by realism, nationalism, and civilizationism. Chapter six, on liberal internationalism, examines the second principal paradigm, as constituted by the theory of democratic peace and cosmopolitan governance, that opposes a genuine global democracy. Both paradigms opposing global democracy are fundamentally rebutted on account of their “exclusive inclusiveness.” Finally, Chapter seven, on cosmo-federalism, presents an innovative interpretation of global democracy and global citizenship, based on the paradigm of world federalism. It builds on the analysis developed in Chapters two, three, and four on the three dimensions of cosmopolitan thinking, but it also deploys a set of arguments stemming from the critical engagement with the theories against global democracy.³

Notes

- 1 For recent works on global and transnational democracy see Holden, 2000; J. Anderson, 2002; Morrison, 2003; Gould, 2004; D. Held, 2004b; Kuper, 2004; Erman, 2005; Weinstock, 2005; C. Barry and Pogge, 2006; Dryzek, 2006; Chatterjee, 2007; Jacobs, 2007; Archibugi, 2008; Tannsjo, 2008.
- 2 See Pogge, 1992; D. Held, 1995; Goodin, 1996a; Sen, 1996; Linklater, 1998a; Hutchings and Dannreuther, 1999; Dower and Williams, 2002; Sassen, 2002.
- 3 I consider this text not only as a study in itself, but also as a tool for others to develop arguments much beyond those that are included. This is why, while using different languages according to the different disciplinary “dialects” I engage with, I have tried to keep the language as plain as possible so that the text remains accessible to any kind of reader, from a person simply interested in this topic, to a student or a scholar. But I have also taken particular care to complement the text with a rich bibliography (always with the original publication date first, in order to indicate the historical progression) so that readers can easily refer to more studies and possibly have a wider and deeper understanding of the debate beyond my personal interpretation.

1 Democracy and transnational exclusion

The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; the man for whom each country is as his native soil is already strong; but only the man for whom the whole world is as a foreign land is perfect.

(Hugh of St Victor, quoted in Dallmayr, 2003b, 1)

Democracy is the governing principle of political organization of our times. Most countries have adopted constitutions and charters that are explicitly based on the idea of democratic government. The rhetoric of democracy dominates public discourse even more strongly.¹ No one would dare to declare him/herself undemocratic; at the same time accusations of democracy being limited, of there being a democratic deficit or undemocratic institutions are almost a daily routine. People are ready to take to the streets to protest and reclaim democratic institutions; sometimes they are ready to die for them. In scholarly debates too, the principle of democracy is undeniably hegemonic and few are the intellectuals attempting to launch a criticism of it. Democracy is unquestionably the paradigm of contemporary politics.

Yet this high regard does not prevent many from recognizing the need to upgrade and improve the implementation of the democratic principle. Such internal critiques do not aim to dispute the foundations of the democratic paradigm; rather they accept the ultimate principle of democratic control of public life and strive to reflect critically on the way it is put into practice. These critiques aim to show a different way of fulfilling democracy. Typically, they focus on the limitations of current democratic practices and offer alternative ways to operationalize democracy. They can be broken down into two sets: those critiques that focus on the local, or national, level of democracy, and those that focus on the global level of democracy.

The deficits of democracy are identified at the local level in terms of public detachment or private manipulation. Here democracy is seen as deficient because it is unable to keep alive the active participation of citizenry, a failure that generates a continuous drift toward private life and public disenchantment. Current democratic forms are accused of being incapable of preserving the genuine channeling of individual preferences into public institutions. Instead, the commercialization and media manipulation of democratic

systems are increasingly stressed as the main factors in depriving political institutions of their original source of legitimacy, i.e. public interests. Democracy is thus seen as in a serious state of decadence at the local and national level.

As a response to the democratic limitations that affect public life locally, a number of alternatives have been formulated in the last decades that are centered on the need to re-imagine more genuine forms of participation. These alternatives come from different perspectives, but tend to be based on a few major political theories. Prominent among them are the following two: participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. While overlapping on a number of points, these two interpretations of democratic theory focus on different aspects to be reformed. Participatory democracy aims to envisage a political system in which individuals and local communities regain their entitlement to take active and direct part in public life. Concrete suggestions within this perspective are, for instance, the experiments of participatory city council budgeting (with citizens actually taking part in the council's decisions on public spending and then monitoring its implementation) or citizens' committees (with citizens that self-organize locally to protest and resist public decisions affecting their quality of life). Deliberative democracy, conversely, frames a system in which the formulation of political decisions is a genuinely public process. Its epistemic focus generates proposals for experiments such as deliberative days: days when selected citizens gather to acquire information, freely discuss the content of specific policies and then take a decision based on informed consent.

These problems affecting local democratic life are of high importance because they highlight a key point in democratic theory. The critics of local democratic deficits argue that if these limitations cannot be overcome then the entire democratic ideal has to be rebutted. Were genuine participation not possible at the local level, then democracy would remain a mischievous hypocrisy; or rather, a convenient myth in the hands of powerful social actors who through it are granted relative public consent. Rather than imposing their will with force, these powerful actors would prefer to have a mechanism through which to manipulate the final outcome to their benefit. Hence, the discussion on the limits of democracy at the local level remains key for the future of democratic life. Yet this is only one of the two main dimensions that are in dispute within democratic debate.

The other set of democracy criticism concerns the application of the democratic principle globally. Democracy was born locally and yet if it is not applied globally it risks self-defeat. This is not so clear in the example of the Greek *polis*, a classical example of one of the first forms of public participation in public decision-making. The Greek *polis* fits the conventional image of democracy as a system that is territorially defined in a reciprocally exclusive way, i.e. *polis*, *comuni*, or states are democratic domestically and yet independent from one another. However, this domestic understanding of democracy has come under increasing criticism in recent decades because of

its inadequacy when faced with the international, transnational, and global challenges of today. From environmental problems to migratory flows, from financial capital to homeland security, it is easy to find issues that cannot be tackled domestically. Traditional forms of democracy are thus considered seriously unequipped for survival in a global context.

As a response to such global democratic deficits, a number of alternatives have been proposed that are centered on the idea of a more comprehensive and multilayered citizenship. Almost every kind of normative political theory has tried to reformulate itself in less territorially limited terms and the broad notion of cosmopolitanism has played a prominent role in this transbordering tendency. Individual political identity has thus been reconsidered within a more complex matrix in which local, national, international, and global aspects are combined to shape a more consistent political system. Politically, the growing recognition of the human rights paradigm and a few experiments (still on a regional scale) of post-national institutional arrangements, such as that in the European Union (EU), have provided interesting instances of what a more cosmopolitan world could look like (Eleftheriadis, 2001; Beck and Grande, 2004; Delanty, 2005; Eriksen, 2006).

This book concentrates on the global deficits of democracy. While considering the local deficits of the democratic system equally important, the present perspective focuses on the global dimension on the assumption that any local reform would be hopeless without a corresponding global transformation of political life. At the same time, it fully acknowledges that any global reform without a local strengthening of democratic life would be untenable and destructive of social bonds. Local and global democratic reform agendas are thus not mutually exclusive or in opposition. On the contrary, they need to be simultaneously developed in order to rescue the democratic ideal from its gradual depletion. What is argued in this book should then be intended as of a piece with a wider project, both local and global, for reforming the democratic ideal in the twenty-first century.

Democracy: citizenship, participation, and institutions

In contrast to political ideals that grant ultimate power to a special person or group, democracy is a normative model of political organization in which all members of the political community are entitled to an equal share of public power. Etymologically, the word democracy derives from a Greek compound formed by the words *demos* meaning people, and *kratos* meaning power. Minimally intended, democracy refers to a twofold meaning of power: power *of* the people or power *to* the people. These meanings represent the two fundamental ways of interpreting the discourse on democracy that underpins both public and scholarly discussions: analytical and value-laden. When we refer to power of the people we usually formulate an analytical statement with a descriptive content on how we think the political reality is. Conversely, when we refer to the power to the people we usually formulate a value-laden

statement with a prescriptive content on how we think the political system should be.

There are, and have been throughout history, differing definitions of democracy (D. Held, 1996). A classical distinction is that between the democracy of the ancients and modern democracy (Constant, 1819; reprinted 1988; Sartori, 1987). While the former is a system in which (a proportion of) individual citizens take direct part in the decision-making process of public law, in the latter all citizens indirectly participate in the political process through representation. A major historical change, the passage from city-states to larger territorial states, imposed the need for the adoption of the representative model, which provided the best feasible solution to the problem of a sudden and intense increase in population and territory. However, a different kind of attachment and allegiance to public institutions resulted from the different institutional setting. Underpinning both versions of democracy however, remains, the fundamental principle of isogony, according to which citizens are ultimately equal and are entitled to equal rights and duties, i.e. equal power within a political system.

Almost all schools of thought have weighed in on the intense debate about the ultimate justification of the democratic principle. The core of the debate concerns both the substance and relationship between the two principles that are considered the twin ground on which any democratic system has inevitably to be built: the principles of liberty and equality. The principle of liberty, for instance, has been variously interpreted to include the conception of freedom from (negative freedom) or freedom to do (positive freedom) (Pettit, 1997). Similarly, the debate surrounding the principle of equality concerns the issue of “equality of what?,” thereby including options such as resources, welfare, entitlements, etc. (Dworkin, 1981). Finally, the balance between the two principles has also been discussed, with left political positions giving priority to equality and right political positions giving priority to liberty (Bobbio, 1994; reprinted 1996). Beyond the normative disputes on last principles, a key common position of democratic theories rests on the primacy of the notion of citizenship.

Citizenship, understood as the set of legal entitlements allowing for the acquisition of full membership, represents the core element of democratic political theory. In a democracy, these entitlements are based on a fundamental principle of equality and reciprocity, and are impartially guaranteed to every member of the polity, insofar as membership within the collective exercise of self-governance is usually recognized as the minimal precondition of democratic life. Conventionally, three different sets of citizenship rights can be distinguished according to their scope: civil, political, and socio-economic rights (Marshall, 1950).² These entitlements, which are based on a fundamental principle of equality and reciprocity, are impartially guaranteed to every member of the community. The acquisition of this set of rights is, thus, considered crucial to effective participation in social and political life, the possibility of which represents a key condition for individual freedom (Kymlicka and Wayne, 1994; Delanty, 2000, chapters 1–2).

The concept of collective autonomy follows from the idea of equal citizenship. Much as agents at the individual level enjoy a fundamental right to autonomy, i.e. freely to choose their destiny, so at the collective level groups are entitled to take autonomous decisions over their future. This entails, consequently, that a legitimate exercise of political self-determination and self-legislation needs to be based on equal citizenship, insofar as only by equally and simultaneously retaining the status of legislators and subjects can citizens remain free to determine their fate. Since the key mechanism for democratic legitimacy relies on the *congruence* (alternatively referred to as equivalence, reflexivity, or symmetry) between rulers and ruled, all voices must have equal access to the decision-making and frame-setting processes. Only through this mechanism can individual autonomy and collective self-determination be preserved. This institutional device does not, however, only promote values such as equality or freedom but also cultural flourishing.

Accordingly, state self-government is to be interpreted as an instrumental good that is indirectly conducive to individual autonomy through collective self-determination. The public domain has particular significance for the quality of life of individuals, insofar as society largely shapes individuals' moral and personal identity in a process in which personal choice is combined with personal discovery. In more existential terms, culture can be seen as what remains when all the rest is lost. So much so that without a "Lebenswelt" (lifeworld) in which to affirm their identity, individuals' lives would be fragmented and disoriented; their choices would be made without knowledge of their wider context and would be most unlikely to be conducive to satisfaction (C. M. Frost, 2001). At the same time, a critical perspective is also crucial. Having at one's disposal several contexts of choice in addition to one's original context is even more beneficial to the possibility of individual freedom (Sommer, 2004), for the encounter of different identities is not a zero-sum game (UNDP, 2004, 2). That is to say, societies are also intended instrumentally as providers of contexts of meaning, and thus as an essential prerequisite for individual autonomy (Kymlicka, 1995). Accordingly, political attachment is regarded more as a resource than a constraint. Consequently, while it is wrong to endow the political community (e.g. the nation-state) with a special ethical primacy (Miller, 1995, 1997), it would be equally unwise to imagine that it could be entirely discounted, as some misguided cosmopolitans are tempted to claim (Monbiot, 2003, 12, and 43). The ethical significance of collective bodies always derives from their capacity to enrich the lives of their individual members (R. M. Hare, 1957; Elfstrom, 1989, 31–5). In order to obtain a genuinely mutual flourishing of individual and collective politics, a democratic form of participation to public life is, however, necessary.

At the domestic political level, participation as expressed by the congruence between choice-bearers and choice-makers is guaranteed through a variety of democratic institutions. Primary among them is an elected parliament where citizens can express their voice through pluralistic representation. The

establishment of such a public and impartial institutional body through which individuals can form and propose their political agenda for society constitutes the premise of democratic life. At the core of this is the issue of political representation.

The claim connecting democracy and representation is that under democracy governments are representative because they are elected: if elections are freely contested, if electoral participation is widespread, and if citizens enjoy political liberties, then government will act in the best interest of the people.

(Manin *et al.*, 1999, 29)

When elected politicians mirror the composition of the electorate to the greatest degree, the electorate has thus the best chance of having its interests protected (Mill, 1861; reprinted 1991, section III). A government is compelled to be representative (with representation here intended as likely congruence between interests and strategies to achieve a preferred outcome) through two kinds of political mechanisms: mandate and accountability. In both cases the principal political instruments in the hands of citizens are elections and the set of information that puts citizens in the position carefully to screen the conduct of politicians. While the mandate operates prospectively on the basis of the electoral choice of policy programs, accountability relies on outcomes being retrospectively sanctioned by voting.

Democratic accountability is best seen as a relation between the past acts of those who exercise public power and their future personal liabilities. Its core site is the degree to which our rulers, in a democracy, are effectively compelled to describe what they are doing while ruling us, and to explain why they take this to be appropriate: to give us . . . reasons for their actions.

(Dunn, 1999, 335)

In addition to the tools of mandate and accountability, a third crucial component for a working democratic system depends on the vitality of civil society. This is intended as the forum, different from the state and the economy, where ideas and political inputs can emerge through collective and public discussion (Ferguson, 1767; reprinted 1995; Tocqueville, 1835; reprinted 1968; Cohen and Arato, 1992; Habermas, 1992; reprinted 1996). Without such a public forum, the political system would remain empty and at the disposal of particularistic preferences. All this is widely recognized as the fundamental formal requirement for the legitimacy of a democratic government. That a considerable number of current national political systems worldwide are shaped in such a manner attests to a general recognition that this is the requirement of any legitimate government. And yet, the debate on democracy is constitutively open-ended on account of democracy's dynamic nature.

The model of democracy, or more accurately democratization, in fact outlines a dynamic rather than a static system. Rather than depicting a stationary system, the model of democratization sets the main principles according to which future political projects should be conducted and present/past political actions assessed. Based on the ideal of equality, the process of democratization entails a tendency toward the continuous spreading and strengthening of the entitlements to an equal portion of political power. Historically speaking, the process of democratization has occurred at a different pace in different countries. Sometimes it has been violent, sometimes it has had relapses. Today, the majority of countries have a free (relatively democratic) character.³ And yet, the democratic frontiers have moved deeper and wider, confirming the “endless” character of the democratization process.

As noted, the contemporary debate on democracy concentrates particularly on two macro-deficiencies of extant democratic systems: those deficits at the bottom and at the top of the current representative systems. On the one hand, representative democracy is accused of being unable to convey the original claims of people because of its state apparatus and bureaucracy, which dilute the bond between citizens and decision-makers. A major response to this local deficit has been reformulation of the deliberative model of democracy (e.g. the aforementioned participatory budgeting of city councils). On the other hand, representative democracy is accused of being incapable of dealing with global problems insofar as its territorial grounding does not allow for transnational issues to be dealt with properly. A major response to this transnational deficit has been the reformulation and regional or global implementation (e.g. European Parliament) of the cosmopolitan model of democracy.

In principle, the democratic correspondence between decision-makers and decision-bearers should be *public* – universal and all-inclusive – in order to guarantee complete autonomy to the individual. Such a congruence should cover all the relational dimensions in which individual life is embedded, i.e. one should be in the position to self-legislate within the entire range of activities with which one is involved. Having the possibility of choice at the individual level and at the national level is ineffective if it is not complemented by the equivalent possibility of having a voice in decision-making processes at the international level. A case such as the spread of infectious diseases clearly shows how ineffective a national or local policy can be when it is not integrated within wider international action. Given the high level of transnational mobility of the HIV virus, any medical program to fight this infectious disease would remain ineffective if not implemented globally. A partial implementation of the principle of universal congruence in an interdependent environment in which agents interact on multiple levels and in different domains is, for the most part, self-defeating in terms of guaranteeing democratic autonomous agency.

Until recently, domestic socio-political life has been the dominant influence on citizens' lives (with the notable exception of transborder phenomena such

as wars, commerce, or religions) and consequently the focus of politics has concentrated mainly on institutions with a similarly limited scope. However, given the current global transformations affecting almost all aspects of citizens' lives (D. Held *et al.*, 1999), state-only democracy and its subsequent intergovernmental institutions have come under increasing pressure for their incapacity to guarantee individual and collective autonomy. Hence, a serious democratic deficit characterizes current international affairs. An enlargement of democratic institutional arrangements to the global level is, therefore, needed in order to preserve the democratic congruence between choice-bearers and choice-makers, thereby ensuring individual freedom and equality. With the recognition of normative interdependence strictly linking democracy, human rights, and peace as the three faces of the freedom of choice, inclusive democracy at the global level becomes an urgent international issue (Boutros-Ghali, 1995; Annan, 2002).⁴

So far the ideal of democratic theory has been presented here as pointing to comprehensive implementation. However, before expounding the normative and political considerations underpinning the project of global democracy, it is necessary to examine the principal factual characteristics, the "anatomy" of the present international institutional arrangements and their political deficits in terms of transnational exclusion. It is thus time to address the current implementation of democratic theory in our time in order to understand its actual dynamics and to locate its practical limitations. Only by highlighting its current limited implementation can the way to a full reformulation of the democratic theory at a global level be open.

Failing democracy: transnational exclusion

Political history can be interpreted as a long journey marked by battles for the equal right to participate in the decision-making process of political life; that is, for political enfranchisement. Indeed, the description of the development of political life over the centuries coincides for a significant part with the description of the fight for the inclusion of those political subjects who were kept apart in a subaltern status. Differences of social class, ethnicity, gender, and skin have for a long time represented insurmountable barriers set up to exclude people from political and social power. Social categorizations of ethnic and religious minorities, indigenous peoples, women, the elderly, homosexuals, the young, the poor, and, by proxy, future generations, were used as exclusionary mechanisms to maintain a condition of political deprivation. These ostracized individuals consequently suffered a disadvantaged and profoundly unjust life in comparison to those endowed with full political membership. With lives thus almost invariably characterized by a high degree of social vulnerability, those so dispossessed were motivated to advance claims to redress their political entitlement. And so they fought for political inclusion (Bobbio, 1990; Walzer, 1993; Dryzek, 1996; Goodin, 1996a; Habermas, 1996; reprinted 1998; Young, 2000; Marchetti, 2005b).

“Foreignness” constitutes another typical category of exclusion. Unlike those categories previously mentioned, and despite the intense criticism under which the priority traditionally granted to fellow citizens over aliens has recently come, it is a category that is still powerfully effective in discriminating between included and excluded individuals. In fact, the very idea of a self-defining group implies exclusivity, i.e. the existence of public characteristics effectively delimiting the boundaries of a community. Every such society needs to assume a selecting criterion in order to self-define its jurisdictional constituency, thus simultaneously keeping out non-members. The demarcation of group identity entails drawing a line between those who are *in* and those who are *out*, between those individuals who are recognized as equal and those who are treated unequally. Such a mechanism of limited inclusion creates a system of social exclusion shaped according to differing spheres of justice, the thresholds of which depend on the scope of application of the principle of impartiality (Walzer, 1981; 1985, chapter 2; Walker, 1993; Goodin, 2003b, chapter 10). The degree of impartiality that each group applies in its relationship with aliens thus represents a good indicator of the degree of inclusion of non-members.⁵

Transnational exclusion occurs when an actor is deprived of his/her entitlements to influence public decisions at the international and global level. At the moment, this is nowhere more visible than on the edge between national and international political jurisdictions concerning political participation. Increasingly, decisions taken in one country affect people in other countries who do not have the ability to express their consent because of their subaltern status as non-fellow, ergo disenfranchised, citizens. The fracture between socio-economic reality, which is transnational in its effects, and the political system, which is still fundamentally anchored to a community-based model, is widening. Actions and consequences are tightly linked across borders, and yet those who bear the effects of decisions taken abroad are not typically entitled to have a political voice in the process (Falk, 1995; D. Held, 1995; McGrew, 1997; Dussel, 1998; P. Gentili, 1999; Bello, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002, 18–22; Cutler, 2003; Monbiot, 2003).

A state-based political system remains an unsatisfactory framework for the self-determination of transborder interests such as those embodied by non-national or transnational political agents including as migrants, people of transborder religions, minorities, and workers (Scholte, 2004, 22). Both in cases where decisions taken in a given country have border-crossing consequences, and in those where decisions taken at the international level have correspondingly international effects, usually the individual consequence-bearer does not have significant power to register his or her “transborder consent” (or, indeed, dissent). Assuming s/he has the power to register her/his consent at the domestic level (which is rarely the case), s/he nevertheless does not have a voice at all in the domestic decisions of other countries and has a tenuous, transborder voice in international fora, even when they are public. In public international organizations, the only political voice available to

her/him is through the double representation offered by national parliaments, which (if so entitled) subsequently elect international representatives with national mandates and varying degrees of power.

Two observations can be made on this state of affairs. On the one hand, this double representation produces an almost insurmountable barrier to engage in public international life. Much more than in the domestic case, citizens struggle to grasp what is going on in international institutions, for they lack the information and entitlements through which these institutions can be made accountable to national constituencies. Moreover, should one come from a poor country, s/he can in fact expect to have an especially weak voice in intergovernmental organizations. On the other hand, even in those rare cases in which an effective channel of political accountability can be established between international delegates and national constituencies, a structural problem remains in terms of the exclusion of transborder interests. Regardless of their political orientation, international representatives have, in fact, a necessarily limited perspective, for they have a national mandate that for the most part precludes the possibility of supporting a transborder or global perspective. Minorities within different states, for instance, are structurally excluded from representation at the international level, although they could potentially count as relevant actors if aggregated globally.

An example, concerning the construction of a nuclear power station, can help in clarifying the case of exclusion of transnational interests. Let us assume that three countries (A, B, and C) need to decide whether to build a nuclear power plant (NPP) in an area that is in the territory of country A, but on the border with countries B and C. NPP is a joint project, so that costs and benefits will be shared equally among the three partners. Further “unrealistic” characteristics of this case are that in addition to being equally shared between countries, the benefits and risks of such a power station extend equally within countries since their populations are equal (100 citizens each) and equally distributed over their territories. Risks and benefits extend only to the present generations of the three countries in a temporally and spatially self-enclosed system, in which there are no other previous constraints or economic incentives for accepting or rebutting the project since the countries are equally and sufficiently developed. The three countries thus recognize that the issue at stake is such that it has to be decided through an international agreement.

Given these assumptions, two overall approaches are available for deciding on the issue of the NPP: intergovernmentalism or cosmopolitanism. Roughly speaking, according to the intergovernmental method, voting is nationally based and then aggregated. According to the cosmopolitan method voting is, instead, directly aggregated from the beginning. Hence, if we adopt the intergovernmental decision-making process and voting, the final decision would be in favor of building the nuclear power station, for two countries out of three will be in favor of NPP. If we adopt the cosmopolitan strategy instead, the final decision would be against NPP, for the overall majority of

citizens involved express a negative preference. In this latter case, the two minorities of countries A and B would be taken into consideration in aggregate terms since they represent a significant transnational interest. In contrast with intergovernmentalism, a cosmopolitan voting procedure thus allows for transnational exclusion to be avoided. The results are such that those who are in a minority according to one method could be a majority according to the other. Table 1.1 visualizes hypothetical voting on the construction of the NPP.

Table 1.1 Intergovernmental and cosmopolitan vote counting

	Yes	No
Citizens of country A	55	45
Citizens of country B	55	45
Citizens of country C	30	70
Intergovernmental counting	2 (winner)	1
Cosmopolitan counting	140	160 (winner)

Using these observations as a starting point, one can argue that current international affairs are characterized by a high degree of exclusion and disenfranchisement. Were this international scenario of multiple disenfranchisements translated into a domestic setting it would not be tolerated by any version of democratic theory. Any democrat would be ready to accept the principle that any citizen should be entitled to have a voice on the decisions concerning public issues, above all those that affect her/him. Accordingly, the democrat would not accept that decisions taken, for instance, by a private club with restricted membership could significantly affect the life prospects of the non-members without the latter having the legal possibility to contest the outcomes. However, this is the common understanding and the usual practice of international affairs – even though a vast part of the discussion on international political theory rests on the assumption of democratic principles. Citizens do not have substantial institutional entitlements to channel their transborder interests on “non-passport issues” in order to influence public international decisions, whether they are taken either by another state or by an intergovernmental institution. This incongruity is possible because politics conventionally works on a double supposition that yields huge social consequences in international affairs. On the one hand, national decisions are to be respected to the extent that they are the product of democratic self-determination within sovereign jurisdictions (inward looking) and, on the other, international decisions taken by intergovernmental organizations are to be observed since they are ultimately taken to be the indirect expression of the same democratic self-determination (outward looking). Leaving aside their practical implausibility, such state-centric suppositions remain highly illegitimate according to the perspective presented here, because they warrant and preserve a political system that excludes structurally relevant political subjects from political agency.

The dichotomy of political exclusion vs. political engagement illustrates a core component of international political theory in that it highlights a crucial element of political insufficiency in the current political arrangements at the international level. From a normative perspective, the inclusion of vulnerable agents into public and impartial decision-making processes at the international level represents a unique chance to improve the democratic legitimacy of the entire political system, both domestically and globally. The widely accepted creed of democracy remains in fact fundamentally flawed unless it is complemented by an international dimension of democratic participation. Until a criterion is found that allows for the justifiable delimitation of membership according to constituencies that effectively reflect public interests, rather than partial or private boundaries, no democratic regime can be truly democratic. On the other side, however, addressing the democratic deficit at the international level alone will not solve all domestic problems regarding democratic representation. Deficiencies in the democratic ethos and procedures inside national structures would still adversely affect democratic practice as a whole (Goodin, 2003b). While the domestic practices of democracy are not the object of the present study, this research maintains that a project of global democratization could facilitate the resolution of some of them (e.g. the domestic treatment of migrants). The study principally argues that a major international democratic deficit remains a key characteristic of the current political system, and that this system needs to be revised in order to end the resulting unjust exclusion of a vast portion of the world population from transnational decision-making processes. Doing so would improve the overall implementation of the democratic ideal.⁶

So far, transnational exclusion has been discussed mainly in its politico-institutional sense. The practical dimensions of transnational exclusion are, however, multiple. Transnational social exclusion concerns the increasing pattern of inequality and poverty on the global scale. Transnational economic exclusion is concerned with the marginalization and exploitation of weak economies by powerful multinational companies and states. Transnational cultural exclusion pertains to the imposition of a single cultural standard worldwide and the shadowing of alternative cultures. Transnational communicative exclusion refers to the denial of access to the global public sphere and global media. Transnational gender exclusion points to the absence of women from the relevant global stages, and so on and so forth. These are just a few of the many important aspects of transnational exclusions. This study, however, focuses on the political and institutional dimensions of transnational exclusion on the assumption that the other aspects of exclusion derive from the current political arrangements and can only be redressed through a fair restructuring of the global political system.

Having clarified the general contours of the present investigation, the next sections examine the two political dimensions that are most significant with regard to the issue of exclusion and that thus most crucially demand to be

contested in the name of global justice: normative exclusion and institutional exclusion.

Normative exclusion: interaction-dependent justice

The ground for the high level of reciprocal exclusion that currently characterizes the international domain is built, to a large degree, on the prevailing model of interaction among sovereign states. Despite some recent movements toward tighter intergovernmental coordination through forms of multilateralism and global governance, the fundamental structure of international relations remains anchored to the Westphalian model of independent self-contained states with sovereign jurisdictions. This paradigm, which became dominant in part as a reaction against the increasing instability brought on by the decline of the universal powers of the middle ages (i.e. the Church and the Empire), envisages no duties beyond borders except for those generated from modes of interaction. Thus, according to this perspective, all international duties are fundamentally functional imperatives for self-regarding coordination. This still remains true despite the intensifying recognition of the legitimizing status of the human rights regime, which is based on a different universalistic axiom that, were it effectively accepted and enforced, could potentially destabilize the system at its foundations.

Interaction-dependent justice is the normative paradigm underpinning such a model of international reciprocal exclusion. A model of justice is interaction-dependent if its prescriptions arise from and apply only to the interaction of the agents under consideration. A duty of justice, in this vein, has its normative source in the intercourse occurring between agents and it is only relevant for them, for where no intercourse occurs, no duty of justice applies. Consequently, no externally originated duties or external agents are taken into primary account in the normative assessment of the situation. In particular, the intercourse is typically determined within the context of a bounded state, and those members who (or aspects of humanity which) exist outside this context are accorded only the meager benefits deriving from the thin principle of beneficence. A highly counter-intuitive stance derives from this, according to which the moral agent is under no duty of justice to create *ex novo* an interaction in at least two crucial cases. That is, justice does not bind the moral agent to *build up* a relationship either a) to help other needy agents, or b) to promote a better overall outcome regardless of his or her personal benefit. In both cases, rather than a strict duty of justice, only a thin and imperfect obligation of beneficence applies, with its correlate of conditional blame and guilt. Since ethics always applies to actions or omission between agents, the establishment of new relationships constitutes a critical issue. Do the duties of justice extend to the duty to enter into an interaction – e.g. help those in need – or do they only kick in once this is established? Anticipating a famous example that will be discussed later, does a duty of justice to help a child drowning in a pond exist only if the rescuer happened to be at the same

time the perpetrator, or does it exist regardless of the causal connection between the two persons? This determination is what really marks the practical distinction between interaction-dependent and interaction-independent normative theories.

The set of principles embedded in the interaction-dependent normativity is of paramount importance for it represents a (if not the) principal component of both ethical and legal theories of western liberal justice. Doubtless this paradigm has greatly contributed toward the reduction of domestic social and political exclusion, for it grounded the stance that has enabled many political movements to advance their emancipatory claims within the borders of the nation state. Liberal societies have reached a high level of inclusion thanks to the adoption of this non-discriminating principle of closed impartiality. The inclusion of women in national voting provides a clear case in point. At the international level, however, the situation is upside-down in that the very same principle of national inclusion reveals its closure clause, losing any further progressive force to include excluded individuals. It is, in fact, used for excusing transnational exclusion, for it normatively legitimizes the preservation of such a state of subalternity and vulnerability. The very same reason that allowed, for instance, for the enfranchisement of woman in national elections (i.e. non-discrimination coupled with social interaction) nowadays prevents foreigners being granted political entitlements, in that they are considered to be external to the national socio-economic system: they do not pay taxes, they do not go through the army call-up, etc. An examination of the interaction-based theories of justice is thus of extreme importance when the issue of transnational exclusion is at stake, both for their failure to respond to, and their indirect contribution to the warranting of, such discriminatory situation.

Part III, which considers proposals against global democracy, examines and disputes two of the most compelling and influential interaction-dependent theories of justice – the contextualist and the universalist theories of justice. It argues that contextualist theories are unresponsive to others' demands for justice insofar as they maintain that not sharing the governing cultural and political background precludes inclusion in the realm of ethical and political consideration. Conversely, while universalist interaction theories are acknowledged to have a more inclusive approach toward non-members, they are found still to exclude all those agents with whom no intercourse occurs. Through the distinction between justice and beneficence, in fact, they draw the threshold of impartial treatment toward foreign people to a point that, despite universally prohibiting exploitation, still allows for significant exclusions. Both variants thus remain insufficiently attentive to the universal claims of aliens. Hence, they constitute the primary normative background on which current political exclusion at the transnational level is built. While more on the specific variants of interaction-dependent theories of justice will be provided in Chapters five and six, in the next section the discourse on the institutional correlate of transnational exclusion is introduced.

Institutional exclusion: from Westphalia to global governance

Transnational exclusion is embedded within the current international institutional framework. This is composed of different components, including states, international organizations, and private actors. In order to understand its significance for the concerns of this study it is necessary to explain the historical formation of the international system. The international correlate of domestic state institutions is conventionally known as the state system. Arising almost simultaneously with the state itself, the state system was grounded on the institution of classic sovereignty and international law. Rarely a stable system, a distinct rupture was marked in the middle of the twentieth century with the establishment of the United Nations: a remedial institution constructed on an inherently deficient juxtaposition of classic, liberal, and cosmopolitan elements (D. Held, 2002). In recent decades a strengthening of multilateral political engagement has paralleled and at times challenged the United Nations' order, creating a new system of global governance. The mushrooming of intergovernmental (e.g. the G7/8 meetings) and (semi) private agencies (e.g. the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers – ICANN, or the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication – SWIFT) have put under pressure, if not supplanted, the traditional UN-centered international system, creating alternative mechanisms of global governance.

Reflecting as it does its origins (conventionally fixed with the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648), the modern states system is centered on the absolute sovereignty of a state within its territory. In opposition to the medieval “two Suns” convention, i.e. the Pope and the Emperor – (Alighieri, 1310–13; reprinted 1985), the cardinal principle of sovereignty, which differentiates territorial political units in terms of juridically and morally exclusive domains, has decisively characterized international politics for more than three centuries, generating a number of secondary – utterly relevant – norms of the catalogue of international law. Among them, the following derivative principles stand out as particularly significant for the interest of the present study: a) no superior authority is recognized above the state (which produces an international system completely dependent on states' consent), b) formal equality of status granted to each state, with the *de facto* control over territory as the only accepted principle of legitimacy, c) indifference of international organizations to domestic political organization, i.e. the relationship between citizens and state is entirely relegated to national law, d) non-intervention, and e) the right to self-defense (Bodin, 1576; reprinted 1967; Grotius, 1625; reprinted 1925; Hobbes, 1651; reprinted 1968; James, 1986; Crawford and Marks, 1998, 73).⁷

Neutrality concerning domestic political organization is perhaps the crucial principle on this list, which can be regarded more as a *modus vivendi* than as a full moral code. Whereas the right to self-defense or the consideration of states as equals mirrors some important, but possibly secondary, distinctions

in comparison with the domestic domain of democratic law (the public use of force through law and the voting system based on the principle “one person, one vote” respectively), the indifference of classical international law to the internal political arrangements of independent states is of key importance to the issue of democracy. The “domestic analogy” is here a source of confusion, for it leads to the argument (in a liberal mood) which states that individuals should be free to organize their internal political system according to their preference. A corrective for this misinterpretation, however, is to recall the centrality of individuals in democratic theory, and the consequent importance of an institutional framework designed to protect individual freedom at each level of political action. This brief comment suffices here, as the issue will be dealt with in detail later; for now, what is needed is to examine further how classical international law developed in the twentieth century.

A first major change in the legal-institutional framework of international society occurred with the creation of the League of Nations in 1920, following the First World War. The pact of the League amended a number of international rules to the limited rules of coexistence of the state system. It imposed, for instance, limits to the unilateral use of force, a new idea of collective security, and the procedure for majority voting – in that unanimity of the Council of the League did not include the votes of the countries involved in the dispute to be conciliated. This marked a fracture of the absolute sovereignty of the classic system, yet the League failed to deliver a legitimate and effective political framework, for reasons related to the continued centrality of state institutions. In this regard, the covenant of the League was not concerned with any alternative mechanism of self-defense other than war, which was assured by the great powers since it lacked an armed force. The covenant also lacked juridical supremacy over other international treaties. And last but not least, it was characterized by a low level of membership, and hence lacked *de facto* universality. All these were major factors preventing the League from managing the international system effectively, leaving the mainstream tradition of a classical international law of states still largely in place until 1945.

The second and more radical change in the international legal framework emerges with the foundation of the United Nations in 1945, in the aftermath of Second World War (Ziring *et al.*, 2000). Aiming to maintain international peace and security, and to foster cooperation on international problems and human rights (art. 1–3), the UN charter contains a number of innovative principles of international law that impose a radical shift in the international normative praxis toward a confederal model. A first major step in this direction, based on the idea of collective security, consists in the expropriation, in favor of the UN, of the absolute right of states to resort to the use of force (art. 2). This led to the subsequent crisis in the classical institutions of international law concerning self-defense. A second important deviation from classic international law is the adoption of a majority vote (albeit one qualified by the non-procedural voting of the security council, giving veto power to the five permanent council members) (art. 18 and art. 27.3). Finally, a further relevant modification of the previous

international practice resides in the acknowledgement of the legal supremacy of the UN charter over any other subsequent international treaty (art. 103).

Three principal dimensions of change concerning international norms can be identified within these moves. The first regards the content of norms, in that the UN charter supports a more extensive scheme of cooperation to safeguard peace and security, to solve common problems, and to sustain common values. The second domain of change pertains, conversely, to the justification of norms, and is related to a number of internationally agreed-upon core principles (such as human rights and self-determination) underpinning a broad notion of a global public good. Finally, the third change affects the issue of implementation, through the use of more effective mechanisms recognizing the failure of the previous soft compliance attitude (Hurrell, 2001, 38–9). The new legal system generated by these changes has seriously affected the authority of state sovereignty, as understood within the classic model, and has opened up the way for a further dramatic change which disputes at its roots the entire domestically circumscribed practice of democracy.

In the last decades, a third major shift has occurred in the international legal-political framework concerning a substantial increase and intensification of mechanisms of global governance (Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 1984, 1989; Czempiel and Rosenau, 1992; Ruggie, 1993b; Rosenau, 1997). The model of embedded liberalism – a combination of free trade and national political systems (Ruggie, 1983) – in the age of globalization has provoked a rising need for wider and deeper international cooperation, which has eventually led to the establishment of new mono-functional, intergovernmental institutions and networks (Slaughter, 2004; Zürn, 2004). A continuously growing net of political norms and legal rule-making with a low degree of democracy have increasingly characterized the normative side of contemporary international society, eroding the legitimacy of both the state and classic international law. Recently, however, this model of international embedded liberalism has shown signs of decadence under the pressure of international liberalization (Ruggie, 1995; Bello, 2002, chapter 1). The initial fervor in support of this internationalist extension of the domestic liberal paradigm to multilateral intergovernmentalism has failed to tackle properly the global problems of our current era. Poverty, global social contestation, and transnational violence represent just a few examples providing evidence of the need for yet another revision of the political theory underpinning the current international system. For these reasons, a return to international ethics is much needed in order to enable political projects to be at the same time more legitimate and more effective (Booth, 1991, 535–9; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 916). An important step in this direction consists, then, in the examination and critical re-evaluation of the deficiencies of the current system.

Among the characteristics of the present system of global governance,⁸ the following are most relevant with respect to the previous normative considerations on transnational exclusion. First, such governance covers a wider scope since it directly concerns a multilayered rule system wherever it is

based, be it global, transnational, regional, or national (D. Held and McGrew, 2002, 8–13). Second, despite being broader in scope, it is more limited in terms of inclusiveness and participation, since it concerns only given issue-areas and the agents therein involved (Krasner, 1982, 185). Third, in being multilateral (i.e. including three or more actors), it entails generalized principles of conduct and diffuse reciprocity (Keohane, 1986a; Caporaso, 1993, 53–6; Ruggie, 1993a, 11). Moreover, it is polyarchic since it includes diverse authorities, often on unequal formal standing, such as states (which, however, maintain a degree of primacy according to the model of executive multilateralism), sub-national groups, and transnational special interests and communities, including both private and public bodies (Rosenau, 1992, 284–5). Global governance thus implies a change with reference to the concept of international agency, insofar as the sovereign state loses its status as the uniquely recognized actor, and with reference to the institutional framework in that the UN system has become integrated with a number of other multilateral governance structures.

Beyond the different interpretations of global governance, a major normative question arises concerning the legitimacy of these global institutions and their relation to democratic theory, insofar as they attribute different political power to different agents, thus generating exclusion. Greater world interdependency increases the necessity of having international institutions to regulate the interaction between diverse international actors, and in so doing stimulate cooperation, which could not be achieved through uncoordinated individual calculations of self-interest in a heterogeneous sphere of political action. In this sense, the value of international regimes of global governance rests also on the increase in the level of efficiency of international relations exchanges that they can bring about. Despite their effectiveness, however, a normative fundamental demand arises which concerns the issue of democratic participation. While implementation of international policies was conducted at the governmental level, it was sufficient for hegemonic actors to bargain with the states and disregard the issue of legitimacy. Now the question of legitimacy has reacquired importance, since policies have a broader scope (in that they need to be enforced in greater depth within states), and consequently compel the need to deal with different kinds of political actors beyond the traditional governmental ones (Woods, 2000, 217). Hence, the dilemma consists in the simultaneous need for intrusive implementation of common policies, and for enhanced legitimacy in terms of the political consensus necessary to attain efficacy in a complex social world characterized by global transformations. In recent years this democratic challenge has generated intense discussion that is currently at the center of public debates.

The political debate on globalization

One of the most heated debates on the current political agenda concerns the social consequences and political control of what is usually referred to as

globalization. There is no doubt that ethical consciousness around the world has been altered by the global transformations of the last decades. The social and political life of nearly every citizen in almost all countries has been dramatically affected by the blurring of national borders, which in the past have effectively limited relationships among individuals. Individuals now find themselves in a social situation in which most of their actions carry the potential to have tremendous impact stretching across national frontiers into other parts of the world – either directly or as one of thousands of similar actions by others elsewhere. In this process, characterized by the intensification of flows of interaction and by the ever greater entwining of the local and global, economic concerns have undoubtedly taken the lead, but the realms of society, law, and culture are also experiencing radical mutations that increasingly into dispute the legitimacy of traditional canons of conduct (Ruggie, 1995; UNDP, 1999; D. Held and McGrew, 2000; Lechner and Boli, 2003). The traditional “triangle” formed by society, economy, and politics has become drastically unbalanced because politics still remains predominantly anchored to the traditional territorial paradigm, while the other two sectors of public life are undergoing ever more global transformations. The boundaries between the international and the national dimensions for what concerns law, economy, security, culture, communication, and public opinion have become blurred, but the same is not true of politics.⁹

The year 2001 was a signal year¹⁰ in this changing context. Both the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the first gathering of the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre strongly reaffirmed the need to discuss again the terms on which the current political system is built. From the different World Fora¹¹ to the United Nations General Assembly, from the national to the regional parliaments, the issue of the effects of increased global interconnectedness, with its unchecked intrusiveness in the daily life of virtually every citizen, occupies the center of public debate. The responses to these new global circumstances vary. On the one hand, the reaction to increased interdependence has often been negative, characterized by an attempt to protect local prerogatives against the competition of powerful external agents. Evidence of this attitude can be seen across a wide spectrum of political phenomena, including the US/EU protectionist positions in some key areas of the negotiation rounds of the World Trade Organization, the widespread rise of right-wing nationalistic parties, the Islamic movements in defense of traditional values, the isolationist stance of groups such as the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (Landless Peasants Movement) in Brazil, or the openly anti-globalization view of the influential newspaper *Le Monde Diplomatique*. On the other hand, a number of equally at-odds positions can be distinguished among those who claim to foster a more global approach to politics. They comprise among others: neo-liberal support of global capitalism (Bhagwati, 2004; M. Wolf, 2004), the neo-imperialist ambitions of the US (R. Kagan, 1998; Cox, 2004), liberal-democratic reformists advocating a more democratic global governance (Keohane, 2001; D. Held, 2004b), and those advocating the

radical alternative of “globalization from below” – of transnational solidarity outside the current global market system (Mittelman, 2000; Desai and Said, 2001, 65–75; Pianta, 2001, 188–90).

Underpinning the debate between the different views on the phenomenon of globalization is the issue of democracy (as well as human rights) in its various interpretations: various in terms of both scope (local, national, or global) and method (participatory, deliberative or representative). Whereas isolationists, for instance, advocate self-contained communities under the assumption that real democracy is only feasible at the local, participatory level, supporters of globalization argue, conversely, that a global capitalist system represents the unique basis for an effective democracy in which the individual can pursue his or her entrepreneurial activities in unconstrained competition with minimal, representative institutions. Those holding to traditional political thought have been reluctant to recognize global phenomena as such, for a long time almost ignoring the political discussion on the new forms of democracy and concentrating mainly on the individual and domestic domains of justice. Even theories of liberal democracy, based as they are on the principles of self-governance, consent, representation, and popular sovereignty, have been at a loss to offer a viable response to global phenomena until very recently. However, over the last thirty years, this traditional bias privileging domestic agendas has become a crucial focus of criticism within the debate, on international political theory.¹² In this debate cosmopolitan theories have played a leading role in stressing the key relevance of the expanding scope of moral agency, and thus political responsibilities. Today no conception of political theory can afford to ignore the global dimension of the socio-political system and the correlate demands for its democratization. The perspective of cosmopolitanism has become central to normative discussion on international relations.

The origins of the revival of cosmopolitanism date back to the mid-1970s, after a long period of academic silence on ethical issues. The dramatic events of the two world wars, together with a scientific turbulence stirred up by such developments as logical positivism, annihilated normative thought (especially Anglo-Saxon) until the 1970s. Moral philosophy had retreated into meta-ethical theory, while political theory had lost faith in normative ideals, preferring sociological description, “scientific” Marxism, and economic analysis. Overall, there was scant intervention on concrete political issues, as scholars dropped prescriptive politics in favor of neutral discussions on the meaning of ethics, or technical economical debates. To this was added the international stalemate of the cold war and the grip of the realist school on the field of international political theory; all motives enough for a persistent reluctance to deal with international normative issues. With few exceptions, such as the work of Bertrand Russell and Richard Marvin Hare, this situation lasted until the end of the 1960s, when a new sense of practical commitment awoke part of academia.

It was at the beginning of the 1970s that the normative debate on political

philosophy, reinvigorated by John Rawls' work, started challenging the abstract theorization of previous meta-ethics (Rawls, 1971). Within this trend, cosmopolitan ethics produced its first incisive formulations. In opposition to realist assumptions, according to which politics means pursuit of national interest regardless of universalistic ethics, moral and political philosophers started to claim the relevance of transnational ethical considerations (Aiken and La Follette, 1974; V. Held, 1974; Beitz, 1979). One of the first signs of this was the resolution of the American Philosophical Association against the Vietnam War (1967).¹³ Besides warfare (Walzer, 1977), world poverty represented the other principal topic of interest for the resurgence of international ethics (Singer, 1972). The extreme condition of deprivation of vast sections of the world population provoked an intense debate both inside and outside academia. Further, the establishment of global justice as a central issue in the international agenda was facilitated by a number of international factors, including increasing claims of poor countries, along with the discussion on the New International Economic Order; nationalism, self-determination, and the end of the colonial system; war and nuclear deterrence; the oil crisis and the end of the international monetary system based on the Bretton Woods agreements; and the growing global economy and foreign investments by multinational corporations. More recently, other global issues have been included in the global agenda, including: transnational organized crime; demography, migration, and trafficking in people; environmental degradation and the fate of future generations; the spread of infectious diseases; war and the export of democracy; and cyber crime. From these issues the discussion has widened enormously, so much so that almost every school of political thought has since offered a recipe for global justice. From these mainly ethical discussions, the debate moved in the 1990s toward more political considerations. The cosmopolitan project then developed its institutional correlates and started to present a comprehensive proposal for reforming the international system. The fall of the "Iron Curtain" and the increasing pressure of global transformations on state structures gave credibility to a project that had been kept dormant for many centuries.

Today, almost forty years after its re-emergence, and in light of our experience of globalization during that time, what observations can be made on the strengths and weaknesses of cosmopolitan thinking? Starting with the former, the capacity to accompany and facilitate the profound revolt against *realpolitik* in the academic and political debate remains a crucial achievement of cosmopolitan thinking. Cosmopolitanism has offered key conceptual tools to interpret current political circumstances and to propose alternative arrangements. However, with the passage of time we are also able to identify a number of significant limits in cosmopolitan scholarship that need to be overcome in order to formulate a stronger proposal for global democracy.¹⁴ Beyond the realist-style critiques, three principal types of relatively sympathetic criticisms have been advanced. From a normative point of view, cosmopolitan proposals have been seen as too universalistic and "modern" (or

more pointedly, western-centric and colonialist) for they have not been sufficiently sensitive to cultural pluralism (Zolo, 1997; Miller, 1998; Zolo, 1998; Kymlicka, 1999; Pagden, 2000; Erskine, 2002; Mignolo, 2002; Calhoun, 2003; Dallmayr, 2003a; Appiah, 2006). From an institutional point of view, they have been considered too centralized, in that they have not been attentive enough to the claims of rooted social actors (Thaa, 2001; Cochran, 2002; de Sousa Santos, 2002; Patomäki, 2003; Bond, 2004b; Osterweil, 2005). Finally, from a more political perspective, cosmopolitanism has also been accused of being too much embedded within neo-liberal globalization and thus too supportive of predatory capitalism (Gray, 1998; Chandler, 2001; Gower, 2001; Chandler, 2003; Mouffe, 2005). The next chapters begin from here. They will engage with these different critical perspectives and try to reconstruct a viable argument for global democracy based on a non-exclusionary version of cosmopolitan thinking.

Conclusions

This chapter has drawn the principal boundaries of this study. It has surveyed the recent debate on the political control of global transformations and identified the transnational democratic deficit as the key normative issue discrediting current socio-political trends. The political issue of transnational exclusion, in particular, has been recognized both in its empirical aspects and in its normative foundations. As a result, reforming the current international political system – an irregular combination of the classic state system, UN intergovernmentalism, and global governance – in order to create a more consistent system of global democracy becomes a priority. If the phenomenon of transnational exclusion is to be eluded, current institutional arrangements need to be profoundly reformed. Exploring the institutional possibility of such reform is the central task of this book. In order to provide a robust ground for such a proposal, the chapters that follow present a number of normative considerations which are needed to link the discourse of global democracy firmly to that of global justice. In particular, Part II (Chapters two, three and four) reconstructs the political discourse of cosmopolitanism according to its three main trends, thus providing a reasoned justification for the project of global democracy. Part III (Chapters five and six) is, by contrast, devoted to confuting the two main paradigms that oppose the idea of global democracy. Finally, Part IV (Chapter seven) outlines a consistent model of global democracy that would be able to elude transnational exclusion.

Notes

- 1 The only alternative model of government that has a moral and ideological appeal is the Islamic state, which has, however, an appeal only for some societies. At the same time, there are plenty of intellectuals who defend a fully democratic version of it.

- 2 In recent years, there have been strong advocates for a further cultural component of citizenship, relying on the possibility of identification with a communitarian identity (Kymlicka, 1995, 2003). According to this position, the concept of nationality remains strictly related to that of citizenship, as in David Miller's theory (Miller, 1988, 1993, 1995). In opposition to this, the present study holds that the notion of citizenship can be detached from that of nationality. Finally, a fifth component of citizenship relates to issues such as environment protection and animal rights.
- 3 The population of the world as estimated in mid-2005 is 6,457.7 million people, who reside in 192 sovereign states. The level of political rights and civil liberties as shown comparatively by the Freedom House Survey is as follows. Partly free: 1,157 million (17percent of the world's population) live in 58 of the states. Not free: 2,331 million (36percent of the world's population) live in 45 of the states. Free: 2,968 million (45percent of the world's population) live in 89 of the states (Freedom House, 2006). For a discussion of the methodologies used to measure democracy see Landman, 2003.
- 4 See also Franck, 1992; Halperin and Lomasney, 1993; Bobbio, 1995; 1999, 337; Rich, 2001. During the 1990s, the UN Human Rights Committee and then the Human Rights Commission expanded interpretations of existing human rights conventions to incorporate democracy. The right to vote in a free and fair process was finally recognized by the Commission as a fundamental human right in 2000.
- 5 Accordingly, exclusion is maximal when impartiality is minimal. An extreme case of partiality is given by the Nazis' attitude toward some of their victims, who, deemed to be *Untermenshen* (under-men), were denied moral standing (O'Neill, 2000, 193).
- 6 In diametrical opposition to transnational exclusion is the phenomenon of "safe havens". While transnational exclusion represents all those actors who would like to be included in the international and global political system and yet are disenfranchised, the phenomenon of de facto safe havens concerns all those actors who want to escape a formal political system of which they are a part, and find a place to hide in order to carry out illegal activities. Islands or small states where international justice is barely effective are obvious safe havens for illegal actors (e.g. terrorists, pedophiles, money launderers, etc.) who wish to continue their activities. But often a safe haven is secured simply by crossing national frontiers. Frequently, illegal actors become legally just by moving their activities over the border. Despite increasing attempts at inter-jurisdictional cooperation, the prerogatives of national legal jurisdictions or mere administrative inefficiency are usually enough to prevent a full transnational enforcement of legal sanctions against such crimes as the laundering of bribes or embezzled funds. Although it is symmetrical to the issue of transnational exclusion, the issue of safe haven will not be discussed here for reasons of space. The same argument applies to both cases – i.e. their democratic illegitimacy and the subsequent need for a global system of democracy able to tackle them – but since the instance of exclusion is more dire it is selected as the case study for the rest of the book.
- 7 A point of clarification is due on the issue of reciprocity within the states system. It has long been held that the norm of sovereignty implies that of reciprocity, and that therefore respect for reciprocity is part of the practice of sovereign statehood (Wight, 1977, 135; Keohane, 1988, 383; Miller, 1995, 2000). From the present cosmopolitan perspective, such a view represents, instead, clear evidence of the normative inconsistency of an unregulated system of supposedly equal states. As argued by Kelsen (following Hobbes), without the hypothesis of a supranational principle, the very essence of international order, i.e. the idea of a community of states endowed with equal rights despite their diversity in territorial, demographic and power terms, is logically inconceivable (Kelsen, 1920; 1952, 586). Where no

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superior authority exists with the power and legitimacy to grant and guarantee equality between the sub-parts, only a strategically contingent recognition is possible.

- 8 This remains valid despite the strong pressure toward unilateralism of the current US Administration.
- 9 This remains true despite the long-standing discussion in international relations (IR), especially in foreign policy analysis, of the inside/outside dimension of national politics (Walker, 1993). Such discussion in fact, does not take into full account the debate on globalization, remaining focused on structural characteristics of national and international politics.
- 10 While 1992 was also a crucial year at the international level, 2001 saw a more urgent need to search for a more democratic framework to govern global affairs.
- 11 Most significantly the World Economic Forum (held in Davos), the World Social Forum (held in Porto Alegre and elsewhere) and the World Public Forum (held in Rhodes).
- 12 For overall surveys of this debate see Ellis, 1986; Beitz, 1988; Luper-Foy, 1988; C. Brown, 1992; Giesen, 1992; Nardin and Mapel, 1992; J. Thompson, 1992; C. Brown, 1997; Graham, 1997; Mapel and Nardin, 1998; Beitz, 1999a; Jones, 1999; Caney, 2001; Coicaud and Warner, 2001; Pogge, 2001; de Greiff and Cronin, 2002; Caney, 2004; Maffettone and Pellegrino, 2004.
- 13 See *Journal of Philosophy*, 64 (1967), 1: 28.
- 14 For a survey of recent criticisms of cosmopolitan thinking see Breckeridge *et al.*, 2002; Archibugi, 2003, 2004.

Part II

For global democracy

French, British, American and Indian citizens are usually thought of members of democratic regimes. Political systems qualify as democratic as long as a number of conditions are met domestically; these include the rule of law, public accountability, free elections, and a multi-party system. The assumption that a democratic regime's practice of democracy is rightly circumscribed by its national boundaries is, however, being increasingly questioned in the contemporary debate on international political theory. Many scholars maintain that within a more comprehensive reading of democratic theory the domestic perspective loses its standing as the unique site of democratic legitimacy. If democracy means egalitarian participation in the decision-making and frame-setting processes that generate the norms regulating public life, and as a result of global interdependence public life is no longer limited by national boundaries, then a truly democratic regime cannot but be multilayered, i.e. spread on different institutional levels including the local, national, regional, and global. If public decisions concern actions with transborder consequences, then a transnational political voice also has to be granted to the individuals and other social actors who are affected by those consequences. And yet that voice is currently denied. Global democracy is intended as a solution to this international democratic deficit.

Part II presents a normative revision of cosmopolitan thinking as a first stage of the construction of an adequate response to the issue of transnational exclusion identified in Chapter one. In order to do that, the democratic theory so far developed here needs to be reconsidered, particularly for what concerns its limitations when applied globally. The theory of cosmopolitanism is the appropriate conceptual tool for this task. The next three chapters examine the three main phases of cosmopolitan thinking to date. Chapter two begins with the phase of international political theory and the ethics of international affairs (1970s and 1980s), which was the initiator of the ideas of moral and institutional cosmopolitanism in opposition to realist thinking. Chapter three examines the second phase (1990s), which is centered on the scholarship of international relations and political science, and in which institutional proposals on cosmopolitan democracy have been developed. Finally, Chapter four addresses the third phase (2000s), that of political sociology

studies on the issue of global inclusion, which is producing formulations on subaltern and rooted cosmopolitanism. Through the examination of these three different and at times divergent strands of cosmopolitan thinking, this study constructs an original formulation of political theory based on a consequentialist, all-inclusive, and cosmopolitan democracy.

2 Ethical theory for global democracy

All-inclusive cosmopolitanism

Una es más auténtica mientras más se parece a lo que ha soñado de sí misma.¹

(Agrado, quoted in Almodóvar, 1999)

From Plato's *Republic* (390–47 BC; reprinted 1974) to Rawls's *Theory of Justice* (1971), political theory has always been characterized by the predominant consideration it gives to the domestic sphere of socio-political interaction. This stubborn concentration on the individual and domestic domains of justice has doubtless contributed to the reluctance of political thinking to address inter-community normative issues, and has thus helped in generating the phenomenon of international political exclusion. Although modern theories of political philosophy have suggested a number of different combinations of legitimate relationships between the individual and the state, they have largely failed to expand their arguments to the wider vision necessary to realize an inclusive theory of international political justice. The repeated challenges that recent global transformations have made to this limited perspective, however, have put increasing pressure on both the traditional socio-political structure of the nation-state and the conventional political concepts underpinning it. Arguably, the tenaciousness of this limited focus has contributed to the intensification of the debate surrounding international ethics in the last thirty years, with universalistic theories contesting the conventionally assumed exclusivity of the binomial individual-state.

Within this context, the significance of cosmopolitan theories since the 1970s consists in the emphasis they put on both the moral importance of political action at the global level and the need to reshape the balance between the incipient political framework at the global level and the other established levels of political analysis. Holding to the terms within which this debate has been framed, this chapter aims to provide the core argument underpinning an all-inclusive version of consequentialist cosmopolitanism. It presents a reworked consequentialist argument on individual well-being that, in view of the epistemological constraints pertaining to interpersonal comparisons of utility, concentrates not on utility, but instead on the core ideals of freedom of choice and control over the political system. On this basis, a non-exclusionary

cosmopolitan conception of global justice is outlined that deploys on different political levels a single criterion of justice – the principle of the maximization of world well-being – implemented indirectly through a number of individual guarantees via rights.

This chapter begins by setting out the epistemological foundations and a renewed consequentialist conception of well-being as centered on the notion of freedom of choice. In order to clarify this normative stance, a number of normative comparisons with major theories of cosmopolitan justice, including utilitarianism, contractarianism, autonomy-based theories, as well as the capability approach, are outlined. From this, the chapter then proceeds to a presentation of the fundamental rationale of the conception of global justice from the consequentialist cosmopolitan perspective, which in its all-inclusiveness recognizes a double universal entitlement concerning the guarantee of vital interests and political participation.

Consequentialist cosmopolitanism: definitions

The normative theory underpinning this proposal consists of a combination of an ethical theory of choice-based consequentialism and a political theory of cosmopolitanism. Their common ground consists in three key principles that are also shared by a vast number of contemporary normative theories: *individualism*, *egalitarianism*, and *universalism*.² While the first holds that the unique or most relevant agents to be taken into account in the normative exercise are individuals, the second maintains that individuals should fundamentally be considered as equals in all relevant aspects, and the third claims the scope of moral consideration to include all humans, wherever they live. While the two theories of consequentialism and cosmopolitanism will be discussed at length in what follows, it is perhaps useful to provide a short, introductory definition of the two terms.

Consequentialism is a theory of justice according to which “whatever values an individual or institutional agent adopts, the proper response to those values is to promote them” (Pettit, 1993a, 19).³ Such a view, which prioritizes the good over the right, is traditionally opposed to those theories that give precedence to motives or a priori laws, as in the typical classic deontological maxims *Fiat justitia, pereat mundus* (let justice be done, though the world perishes) or *Fiat justitia, ruat caelum* (let justice be done, though the heaven falls). The goodness of outcomes – and therefore the rightness of actions insofar as they affect outcomes – is then assessed by the degree to which they secure the maximal quantity of a determined good, the greatest benefit to all concerned (Hardin, 1988, xv). Accordingly, a course of action has to be chosen on the basis of likely consequences, and the agents’ responsibility is understood in terms of the agents’ capacity to influence the outcome of any given situation in terms of the promotion of goodness. A typical application of the theory of consequentialism can be found, for instance, in many

policies associated with the welfare state, according to which the good (i.e. individual welfare) is enhanced through redistributive practices.

Cosmopolitanism is a theory of justice according to which the scope (not only the form) of justice is taken to be universal, as no discrimination is justified when considering the ultimate entitlement of every citizen to control his or her destiny (Caney, 2004).⁴ Individuals are entitled to rights (and allocated duties) that have an ultimately universalistic nature, i.e. they are transcultural and valid in any political and social context, because individuals are considered in part to be world citizens. Humanity is thus considered as a single ethical community – *cosmopolis* (*cosmos*: universe; *polis*: city),⁵ or as belonging to a single polity. Against group-based theories such as communitarianism and nationalism, which typically recognize the political priority (at times even absolute) of a discrete community, cosmopolitanism holds that a proper account of the moral personality cannot but be universalistic and all-inclusive, and that all individuals thus have an equal entitlement to political recognition. This means that the coexistence of global and national/local principles of justice is possible, provided a global ordering is established, i.e. national boundaries remain secondary when issues of global justice arise. A typical application of the theory of cosmopolitanism can arguably be found in the Geneva Convention for Refugees, according to which asylum is granted to fleeing individuals as citizens of the world.

Epistemological foundations: limits on interpersonal comparability

Consequentialist cosmopolitanism is distinguished from other theories of justice by a fundamental epistemological consideration concerning the limitations on interpersonal comparisons of utility. The issue of comparability (i.e. of whether or not it is possible to compare the relative benefit/satisfaction each person receives from a specific good) is highly contentious both in moral and economic theory, especially after the dramatic influence of logical positivism on Anglo-Saxon philosophy and social sciences in the 1930s.⁶ While moral theories such as utilitarianism and contractarianism have generally accepted the possibility of comparing and/or aggregating the utility of different persons for the sake of redistribution, economics has shown a more ambivalent (and rather skeptical) attitude toward this possibility, most of the time limiting its consideration to the ordinal criterion of Pareto optimality.⁷ According to the perspective espoused here, if the profound fact of cultural pluralism at the international level is to be respected, interpersonal comparisons have to be considered legitimate only at a minimal level.

Traditionally, the possibility of comparing different persons' utilities, intended as descriptive analysis, has been proposed according to three distinct methods: behaviorism, introspective welfare comparison, and introspective "as if" choice. While the first focuses directly on a person's observable state and relies on the observation of common behaviors such as physical or verbal body expressions, the second and third methods deploy a

mental experiment: to put oneself in another's shoes, roughly speaking. The welfare comparison reflects on hypothetical questions about expediency, such as "would I feel better off as person A in situation *x* or as person B in situation *y*?" The "as if" method, conversely, generates counterfactual situations in which even normative considerations can be included as factors influencing the choice between two different personal situations (Sen, 1982a, chapter 12).

Possibly the most influential critic of interpersonal comparisons of utility was Lionel Robbins. Robbins argued in 1935 that no comparison is scientifically viable in that "introspection does not enable A to measure what is going on in B's mind" (L. Robbins, 1935, 140; 1938), and thus that the act of comparing needs to be considered an essentially normative exercise.⁸ While this argument on the inaccessibility of others' minds is explicitly intended only to apply to the methods of introspective comparison, the very same observation undermines the method based on behavioral observation when it is applied cross-culturally. Drawing on anthropological studies of the last century, it is not difficult to find cases where strikingly different cultural interpretations have been made of similar behaviors, notably the ritual meaning of death-related actions or, more prosaically, the diverse understandings of social ties in different communities (Hatch, 1983; Cook, 1999).

A counter-argument to this anti-comparative and anti-paternalist stance points out that if the possibility of utility comparison is denied at the *inter*-personal level, it must also be denied at the *intra*-personal level. It continues by claiming that the logical extension of the proposed invalidation of interpersonal comparisons is that, insofar as all choices are based on a generalization of the past without which no long-term personal integrity can be conceived, the very notion of rational self-interested choices itself should be denied (Parfit, 1984; Gibbard, 1986, iv). To be sure, at the personal level we necessarily rely on some sort of interpersonal comparisons of utility (Little, 1957, 54; Davidson, 1986, 195); however, one has to respect the difference between private actions and public responsibility. What I contest is the viability of such interpersonal comparisons of utility as sufficiently reliable tools for public policy in an international context of differing systems of social meaning. In the self-regarding sphere of action, individual fallibility is a private matter of concern, while in the political sphere, the fact of pluralism constrains public policy, and especially international public policy, to respect individual choice in recognition of diversity. In this latter instance, the reliance on imprecise approximations should be reduced as much as possible to protect differences.⁹

An all too scarce consideration of these insurmountable epistemological difficulties has been one of the major flaws of much of ethical theory, and of utilitarianism in particular. The revised consequentialist proposal advanced here allows for the avoidance of these problems, insofar as it envisages an agent-relative interpretation of well-being, which in being epistemologically undemanding produces a strong liberal and anti-paternalistic international

political theory. From the point of view of consequentialist cosmopolitanism these epistemological constraints cannot be legitimately overcome in a project of international ethics, which must take into account both the fundamental pluralism of social meanings and the fundamental demand for equality which so determine contemporary international affairs. To be sure, pluralism is here simply presumed as one of the major tests for international ethics, in that as no definitive comparison can be effected, no definitive dissimilarity can be determined either. All that can be determined is that neither an absolute homogeneity nor an absolute heterogeneity can be identified. It is this indeterminacy that shapes the operationalization of consequentialist cosmopolitanism. Consequently, since diversity cannot ultimately be proven, the requirement to respect and guarantee individuals' own conceptions of a good life rests on and constitutes the prescriptive content of a normative pluralism that accommodates the demands of a presumed empirical pluralism. Only at a very minimal level concerning the vital interests of individuals, as will be explained later in this chapter, can an interpersonal and transcultural ground be found which allows for effective comparisons to be used in public policy. For the rest, an alternative political strategy has to be individuated as a valid means for international ethics to deal with value indeterminacy. In what follows, an alternative account of well-being as freedom of choice is thus presented, which, while maintaining its independence from the traditional account of interpersonal utility comparisons, adopts an epistemologically viable metric that allows for interpersonal comparisons of capabilities for the purposes of political justice.

Normative foundations: well-being as freedom of choice

Consequentialist cosmopolitanism, as a goal-based ethical theory, aims at the promotion of the good, which is assumed to reside in a comprehensive conception of individual well-being. It consequently defines the right after the good. Accordingly, an action-guiding principle is warranted only insofar as it complies with the test of universalizability, i.e. can be expected to produce the best outcome in terms of the good, i.e. the maximum general well-being. On a more profound, meta-theoretical level, then, the ultimate foundation of the consequentialist approach per se relies on a principal consideration: simplicity. Differing from deontological theories, which purport both to honor and promote values, the objective of consequentialism is only to promote those values that foster well-being.¹⁰ In comparison with non-consequentialist theories, consequentialism scores better in terms of simplicity since it does not need any further argument to justify honoring the value above that of promoting it. Thus, "where consequentialists introduce a single axiom on how values justify choices, non-consequentialists must introduce two" (Pettit, 1993b, 238). Moreover, the non-consequentialists need to endorse ad hoc justifications to identify those values that are to be honored rather than promoted.¹¹ This single value justification, in association with the epistemological

constraints examined in the previous section, bears a number of important consequences on the formulation of the theory of consequentialist cosmopolitanism as a proposal for international ethics.

This axiological foundation leads the theory toward the three aforementioned assumptions of contemporary ethical discourse: normative *individualism*, *egalitarianism* (alternatively interpreted as the anonymity condition), and *universalism*.¹² Consequentialist cosmopolitanism relies on these terms. It embraces normative individualism in that it considers the single human agent the principal recipient of the good,¹³ but it also implies universal egalitarianism, insofar as the aforementioned epistemological constraints impose respect for each individual sphere of action as a potential generator of well-being. This last consideration brings us to the core factor distinguishing the political element of consequentialist cosmopolitanism: freedom of choice as the metric for well-being.

As determined by respect for epistemological limitations, the consequentialist justification illuminates a crucial issue of the political theory proposed here, i.e. the ground on which the assessment of the political principles should be made. According to consequentialist cosmopolitanism, due to the unavailability of reliable interpersonal comparisons of well-being, this indicator of well-being can only be indirectly and causally identified in the individual capacity for choice between different life options. Underpinning this is the best-judge principle, according to which each person should be free to decide on matters that primarily affect her/him alone, for the best judge of what is good for a person is always that person himself. Accordingly, this theory maintains a *prima facie*, agent-relative theory of the good, in that it holds that only when agents are in a position freely to choose their preferred course of action through a process of informed and effective personal deliberation, can genuine well-being presumably be attained. The goodness of an action is its choiceworthiness. Personal choices, rather than some specific theory-laden conception of the good, are thus taken to be the best (albeit indirect) expression of the individual's interests, i.e. what will make the individual generally better off. In this vein, "human development is first and foremost about allowing people to lead the kind of life they choose – and providing them with the tools and opportunities to make these choices" (UNDP, 2004, v).¹⁴ Of course, the causal connection between a person's autonomous choice and that person's well-being cannot but be empirically subject to exceptions. However, despite the fact that such relations can only attain the status of a reasonable presumption with statistical force, and not scientific certainty, the strength of the present point is no less, in that a reasonable presumption suffices for the role the metric has to play in this argument.

This combination of the consequentialist principle with the recognition of epistemological constraints generates a new version of consequentialism which is distinct from other teleological theories in offering the potential for simultaneous inclusion of agent-neutral and agent-relative values, without

the addition of further normative principles. Following the path first explored by Sen, consequentialist cosmopolitanism claims to offer a proposal which is able to respond critically to a number of the major attacks made to the consequentialist paradigm in the last thirty years. Such a task is delivered by the differentiation of central features such as criterion of right and decision procedures, or second order and first order principles, uniquely through the deployment of the consequentialist principles and epistemological considerations. In this sense, while the consequentialist criterion of the good here adopted remains grounded in the universalist and objective agent-neutral principle of well-being promotion – the maximization of social welfare – because of inevitable epistemological constraints the decision procedure of the theory (i.e. the specific applicative principles) relies “restrictively” on subjective agent-relative mechanisms – individual rights to promote freedom of choice.¹⁵ Accordingly, the coexistence of a second order consequentialist principle – the final arbiter – and different *prima facie* non-consequentialist, agent-relative, and procedural principles as first order rules (the intermediate applicative rules), is envisaged (Jackson, 1991). This allows a complex system to be based on a single principle. Hence, through this indirect normative strategy, consequentialist cosmopolitanism remains on an axiologically “simple” basis, which being consistent is more easily defensible.¹⁶

Thus, unlike in most other contemporary theories of justice, well-being is not directly individuated here in such specific elements as happiness, preference satisfaction, income, wealth, or other kind of resource, since such elements are assumed to be not measurable in a trustworthy way and thus not viable social tools for political public policies. Instead, consequentialist cosmopolitanism identifies well-being indirectly in the presumed outcome, the unspecified by-product of the agent’s freedom of choice, where, more analytically, choice is identified as the opportunity to choose among each subset of the set of alternative options.¹⁷ This opportunity, intended as the capability¹⁸ to choose freely à la Sen, is characterized by two principal features: content and context independence (Pettit, 2001a, 5–6). The value of the capability of choice has to be content-independent, i.e. decisive regardless of which of the relevant options is preferred, in that we would otherwise be obliged to think that freedom means adapting our preferences appropriately (Berlin, 1969, xxxviii). Additionally, the capability to choose also has to be context-independent, i.e. decisive regardless of the parametric decisions of the other agents, in that freedom would otherwise be dominated by the goodwill of those around us (Pettit, 1997, section I.2). Context-independence refers here to specific actions carried out by individuals, not the overall institutional structure, this latter having a great influence indeed on individual options. As such, capacity for choice is something strongly shaped by the social-institutional arrangements. According to this, individuals’ potential to choose depends on the scope of the set of choices effectively available: principally, the existence of the wanted goods, relevant information and the relative social power of the agent (Dowding, 1992). These consequentialist considerations

lead to the general prescription to maximize the individual capacity of choice as the most effective – and epistemologically sound – strategy to achieve the promotion of general well-being.¹⁹

The present description of the capability to choose freely is also consistent with the kind of republican freedom as individual (non-dominated) power of choice recently re-elaborated by Pettit (1997, 2001a). In his view, freedom as non-domination represents a third type of liberty, which integrates both freedom as non-interference (negative freedom), as in Bentham (1781; reprinted 1988), and freedom as self-mastery (positive freedom), as depicted by Berlin (1958).²⁰ Freedom of choice has then to be interpreted not simply as non-actual interference, but as the absence of mastery-by-others. An agent is free to choose among his life options when he is not exposed to the arbitrary power of the dominating party, i.e. when the others are unable to interfere arbitrarily and at will in his own affairs (Pettit, 1997, 22). Since it is possible to be dominated without being interfered with, the freedom required for the individual pursuit of genuine well-being has to coincide with being in the position to enjoy non-domination – or escape coercion – in *any* circumstance.

Freedom as non-domination is, however, just one face of the consequentialist interpretation of freedom of choice, which remains a goal-oriented normative theory and therefore yields an instrumental interpretation of freedom. In this sense, freedom of choice is indeed a crucial component of the model of consequentialist ethics here presented, but this is because it is necessary for promoting individual well-being, not because of its independent value. Before developing this point further in the next section in comparison with other contemporary theories of justice, however, an objection which is directed at the core of the relation between freedom of choice and well-being needs to be examined.

This objection to a choice-based notion of well-being stresses that the link between well-being and personal choice is only contingent, that well-being is not achieved (or achievable) through free choice, or vice versa, that choices are not conducive to (or motivated by the pursuit of) well-being.²¹ Were this remark valid, a consequentialist argument should readdress its focus directly on well-being or on other strategies concentrated on more significant phenomenological aspects of well-being. My response to this begins by delineating a distinction between a) cases in which the agent autonomously makes a choice of not choosing or of apparently self-harming, and b) those cases in which the agent is not capable of choosing freely. From this, different considerations follow which rebut the objection in opposite ways. While in the case of a) the value of freedom of choice is restated through the disputation of restricted and unjustified notions of, respectively, free choice and well-being, which violate the epistemological constraints on the interpersonal comparability of utilities, in b) the value of freedom of choice is confirmed through the failed practical implementation.

In particular, four challenging personal cases can be considered in the analysis of the two subsets of the objection. The first subset consist of a1) a

person with masochistic and suicidal preferences, and a2) a person with moral motivation and ideological (externally motivated) reasons, which could lead him to die as a consequence of non-choice, as in the cases of heroes, martyrs, Socrates or Jesus. The second subset comprises b1) a person who has to face so many options that she remains paralyzed and unable to choose, as in the story of Buridan's ass and the donkey incapable of choosing (Sen, 1997, 765), and b2) a child or a mentally ill person who is not able to choose autonomously (Sen, 1985, 204). As we will see, the relation between well-being and free choice in each of the four cases remains ultimately constant – thus valid – despite the *prima facie* variants.

Considering a1), the masochist thinks that in choosing self-harm or, at the extreme, suicide, he achieves his well-being (nothing changes, of course, if it is somebody else who harms the masochist, since we suppose the consensual relation between the two). To oppose this by maintaining that such is a case of free choice which is not conducive to well-being, one has first to offer an alternative, substantive conception of well-being, and second to impose it on the masochist, without his consent. This is only possible through interpersonal utility comparisons, but since we have denied the epistemological plausibility of such a possibility, any attempt to circumvent it remains an ideological imposition that is detrimental to the promotion of well-being. Equally, considering a2), we can imagine a religious fundamentalist, a civic hero, or a radical philosopher who chooses to renounce doing something which could promote his/her well-being or, at the extreme, save his/her life, but only at the cost of disowning his/her own principles. Think for instance of the case of Jehovah's Witnesses, who flatly refuse blood transfusions for religious reasons. This is a typical case of choosing not to choose, in which the agent autonomously assumes an attitude that would seem to be the exact opposite of well-being-seeking choice-making. After more careful observation, however, it can be discovered that such virtuous conduct is (and indeed can only be) valued by contrast to the possibility of not so acting. Fasting is valuable only insofar as individuals have the opportunity to eat; it is the choice of not eating that makes the act right. The well-being of these persons is dependent on their capability to choose (or not to choose) according to their value. Again, denying them the possibility of so choosing and acting would require an unjustified interpersonal assumption on well-being, and would thus be an ideological imposition, which is detrimental to well-being promotion.

The b) cases are different, in that they are not cases of extreme assessments of the value of freedom of choice or well-being, but cases of failed practical implementation of the capability to choose freely. Considering b1), we have to resolve a situation in which a person faces a decision between two or more options without knowing which one to prefer. Although either of the two options would be beneficial to her well-being, just with slightly different degrees, she is so undecided as to which to choose that she is incapable of arriving at any conclusion. Circumstance like these are indeed quite frequent

and invite the admission that at least in these cases we should not consider free choice to be an effective conductor of well-being or, the other way round, that well-being is more easily achievable through devices other than free choice. Similarly, b2) presents the case of those who are not capable of autonomous decision-making, e.g. a young child or a mentally ill person. Despite the scientific difficulties in the exact assessment of mental illness, I assume that a broad consensus can be taken for granted on the possibility of considering a specific kind of mentally ill person as incapable of autonomously choosing for her/himself. The same applies, more uncontroversially, to young children. Now, on the provision that the agents under scrutiny are not able to choose, and so are not capable of deciding for themselves about their future, both b1) and b2) are cases in which freedom of choice, I admit, is not the best strategy to achieve well-being. Thus, for these special cases, other strategies focused only on the well-being aspect (rather than well-being and agency freedom) have to be identified. These, however, constitute failures only of pragmatic implementation; they not only do not confute the general validity of the principle of freedom of choice, but rather confirm it in that they are based on the principle of freedom of choice itself.

Having responded to a number of oft-mentioned objections to the value of freedom of choice, I can now proceed to present the other elements of the consequentialist cosmopolitan theory of justice. I will delineate them through a comparison with other contemporary theories of justice in order to draw more clearly the boundaries of the present proposal.

Alternative theories of cosmopolitan justice

The core of this consequentialist proposal for global justice is individual freedom of choice. As mentioned, the capability to choose freely is fundamentally valued for its contribution to individual well-being and thereby to the maximization of world welfare. This *prima facie*, agent-relative theory of the good, which is based on the unique capability of the individuals to choose their preferred life options, has then to be articulated through the coupling of a consequentialist appeal to the promotion of well-being with an acknowledgement of the epistemological constraints on interpersonal comparability. The general prescription deriving from these considerations consists then in the duty to maximize the individual capacity of choice. This use of an extended and indirect version of consequentialism is what most characterizes the ethical proposal of consequentialist cosmopolitanism against competing cosmopolitan theories such as autonomy-based theories of justice, utilitarianism, contractarianism, and Sen's and Nussbaum's ethic.

The recognition of the instrumental value of freedom of choice as an agent-relative feature of consequentialist reasoning marks a profound difference from theories which foster freedom on the grounds of autonomy *per se* (Kant, 1797; reprinted 1991; Berlin, 1969; Raz, 1986, chapter 5; Carter, 1995, 1999; Carter and Ricciardi, 2001). These theories maintain an intrinsic and

absolute value for personal self-determination. It is not what is directly or indirectly generated by the process of autonomous choosing that counts, but the fact of the process in itself. In opposition to this, from the consequentialist view, autonomy is granted only a vicarious, indirect, and non-specific value which ultimately resides elsewhere: in individual well-being, regardless of the specific actions that may produce that welfare, and a fortiori in the overall welfare thereby on balance promoted. More specifically, autonomy is primarily valued not for its essential contribution to well-being, but rather because there are no better working alternatives for public policy decisions. The priority accorded to autonomy is thus an inevitable result of taking seriously the epistemological constraints on utility comparability, on the presumed incommensurable diversity of human nature, and the recognition of the consequentialist value of individual well-being.²²

In opposition to utilitarianism, consequentialist cosmopolitanism as a political theory endorses the view that it is possible to provide welfare to individuals only indirectly through the empowerment of their capabilities (Narveson, 1972; Brittan, 1988, chapter 2; Hardin, 1988, chapter 3; Brittan, 1990; Reeve, 1990; Hardin, 2003). This stance is notably distinct from both classical and contemporary utilitarianism insofar as it denies the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility and subsequently upends the institutional need for the crucial device of aggregation. This amounts to more than simply moving from decision procedures to a criterion of rightness, as fostered by most indirect utilitarianism (Brink, 1986, 421, 425), in that what is denied is not our efficacy in calculating and impartially pursuing utility but rather the very epistemological viability of aggregating utilities. Thus, the political rules prescribed by a consequentialist cosmopolitan system should not be considered as redistributive technical devices based on declining marginal utility, but as means to promote each individual capacity for the pursuit of well-being separately. In fostering the individual capability to achieve free choice, such rules aim therefore only at the provision of assistance to each individual in search of an enhanced quality of life, and thus imply respect for the publicity requirement and for the separateness of persons, as advocated by Rawls (1971, section 30).

However, in opposition to resourcist contractarianism (Rawls, 1971, 1982), consequentialist cosmopolitanism holds that a focus on commodities as the primary condition for well-being enhancement represents a limited strategy that does not respect pluralism. The identification of a set of resourcist goods, which are deemed to be either intrinsically or instrumentally good in the pursuit of any other end, shows a serious theoretical limitation in that it does not take into account the social, cultural, or genetic diversity of human agents, and their subsequently different capacities to take advantage of such resources. In so doing, the resourcist approach does not treat the recipient agents equally. By contrast, consequentialist cosmopolitanism focuses on the minimal capability of the individual to choose freely among different life options; however, in that, it includes a consideration of the agents' potential

to make effective use of the goods at their disposal. In this respect, the present theory follows the teaching of Sen's theory of capabilities.

While it traditionally belongs to the deontological domain of ethical discourse related to autonomy, the notion of freedom of choice has recently expanded its domain to include the consequentialist paradigm. In the antinomy between procedure and outcome (or input and output legitimacy), self-determination through personal choices has conventionally been associated with the first rather than with the second element. This affirmation remains valid overall even if we take into account relevant exceptions such as John Stuart Mill.²³ Recently, Sen has proposed a reinterpretation of the relation between two cardinal concepts at stake here – well-being and freedom – that has significant relevance for the issue of the agent's choice as considered in consequentialist cosmopolitan theory. A sympathetic yet contrastive comparison with Sen's theory is thus much in order.

While choice-based consequentialist cosmopolitanism and the capability approach proposed by Sen are representatives of the consequentialist paradigm, they are distinct from other major variants such as utilitarianism in that they are agent-relative and thus centered on individual freedom of choice. Traditional consequentialist theories such as utilitarianism are characterized, as discussed, by an agent-independent structure that takes into consideration final states of affairs rather than how they are generated by the various actors. This allows for public aggregation but also for the well-known criticisms on the separateness of persons. Against this, the two theories under consideration here are animated by a different normative objective: "to square the circle" by combining consequentialist evaluation with a number of apparently (or traditionally considered to be) deontological intuitions related to the respect for agent-relativity, such as rights and personal values.

Despite these similarities, consequentialist cosmopolitanism and the capability approach are nonetheless distinct in that they are based on two different foundational strategies and epistemological assumptions that produce different, and yet compatible, normative justifications of the primacy of freedom of choice as embedded in a consequentialist framework. While the former warrants the centrality of freedom of choice through the combination of the consequentialist principle with some constraining epistemological requirements, the latter combines the consequential evaluation with an account of positional objectivity, i.e. the parametric dependence of observation and inference on the position of the observer. Both theories reach similar conclusions recognizing the importance of agency freedom, but the normative strategy of the latter suffers a number of weaknesses which renders its justification less stable. By contrast, consequentialist cosmopolitanism claims to offer a more consistent consequentialist ethical approach, which is able to accommodate some of the criticisms raised against Sen's version of consequential evaluation, and is thus better suited to the challenges of global justice. In what follows, I first briefly sketch Sen's theory and then present two criticisms.

Sen's approach to the consequential evaluation of public schemes of justice is based on the notion of functioning capabilities. Functionings represent central elements of the state of a person. They include things like "activities (as eating or reading or seeing), and states of existence or being, e.g. being well nourished, being free from malaria, not being ashamed by the poverty of one's clothing or shoes" (Sen, 1985, 197–8). These functionings are central in the measurement of how well off people are. But more importantly it is the individual capability to attain a certain set and level of functionings that counts as the indicator of the agent's overall quality of life. Public schemes of justice should thus be arranged in such a way as to promote maximally the functioning capabilities of individuals (Sen, 1980, 1982b, 1985, 1988, 1992; Nussbaum and Sen, 1993; Nussbaum, 2002).

Two interdependent normative notions are central to the capability approach: well-being and agency. Beginning from the notion of well-being, Sen expands his reasoning to include the recognition of agent-relative values such as freedom, motivations, and rights. In particular, Sen's starting point consists in the observation that the primary feature of a person's well-being is the functioning vector that he or she achieves (as opposed to other traditional components of well-being such as happiness, desire fulfillment, opulence, or command over primary goods). From this minimal description of the functioning vector, the argument moves toward the inclusion of the role of agency, in that it takes into account the individual ability to achieve valuable functionings. The shift of attention from the person's actual functionings to functioning capability has thus the effect of, *inter alia*, taking note of the positive freedoms in a general sense (the freedom "to do this" or "to be that") that a person can enjoy. As Sen points out:

The supplementation of well-being by well-being freedom, in the case of responsible adults, involves a refinement in the assessment of the well-being aspect of a person. But well-being freedom is only a specific type of freedom, and it cannot reflect the person's over-all freedom as an agent; we have to turn to the notion of agency freedom in that context. It is hard to see how any part of this plurality (involving both well-being aspect and the agency aspect of persons) can fail to have some *intrinsic* importance.

(Sen, 1985, 205, italics added)

Well-being and agency are, in Sen's account, embedded in the "consequential evaluation" which he "sees as a discipline of responsible choice based on the chooser's evaluation of states of affairs" (Sen, 2000a, 477). Three different issues characterize consequential evaluation: a) situated evaluation as opposed to the invariance requirement, b) maximizing framework as opposed to optimizing, and c) non-exclusion of states' components as opposed to arbitrary limits (e.g. utilities). It is Sen's theory of consequential evaluation, and in particular the first point according to which a person need not ignore the

particular position from which she is making the choice, which will largely occupy the remainder of this section.

The first limit of the capability approach concerns the problem of impartiality among different points of view, which causes us to ask why we should judge as right each agent-relative point of view. On this, it will be observed that Sen's theory legitimizes the promotion of different goods to different agents in an *intrinsically* agent-relative way, and in maintaining the intrinsic rightness of this relation, it is vulnerable on the issue of impartially judging the interpersonal rightness of this activity. The second limit regards the substantive account of human nature – and the correlated biased interpretation of human flourishing – offered by the capability approach, especially that in Martha Nussbaum's version. It is on this point that it will be clarified how the capability approach, in being theory-laden and content-specific, is condemned to be partial and thus inapplicable at the global level.

According to Sen's interpretation of consequentialism, namely the discipline of consequential evaluation, social rules should aim to promote maximally a comprehensive outcome. The latter has to be understood as opposed to a (more traditionally intended) culmination outcome, à la utilitarianism.²⁴ Utilitarian welfarism in fact imposes on consequentialism a number of arbitrary restrictions that require states of affairs to be judged exclusively by their utility potential. This is most commonly appealed to as the invariance requirement, according to which any moral consideration should be objectively related to the resulting state of affairs and not depend on personal variables. Against this, Sen is keen to recognize that the interpretation of a state of affairs has to be informationally richer in order to be intuitively respectful of our common sense. A state of affairs is in fact arguably composed not only of utilities related to that state of affairs (ultimate outcomes as utilitarian want), but also of actions in general and agents' own actions and values in particular, e.g. motivations, processes of choice, realization of freedom, and fulfillment of rights and duties. In this sense, restricting the interpretative focus on outcome utilities is arbitrarily limited and thus unjustifiable. Hence, the consequentialist evaluation is offered as a technique to interpret normatively social reality in a manner free from arbitrary limits. In order to keep the consequentialist evaluation as open as possible, then, the recognition of evaluator relativity and positional objectivity plays a crucial role.

The parametric dependence of observation and inference on the position of the observer is, for Sen, an unavoidable constraint that has to be taken into account. As much as “what we can observe depends on our position vis-à-vis the object of observation” (Sen, 1993b, 126), any moral observation should also be understood as primitively dependent on the position occupied by the evaluator, in that “the goodness of a state of affairs depends intrinsically (not just instrumentally) ... on the *position* of the evaluator in relation to the state” (Sen, 1983, 114). And yet this does not deny the possibility of reaching an interpersonal consensus. It is possible, from Sen's point of view, to produce a “transpositional assessment drawing on but going beyond different

positional observations” (Sen, 1993b, 130). Objectivity is thus to be identified in observational claims that are both position-dependent and person-invariant. “Position-relative impersonality requires that parametric note be taken of the respective *positions* of the different persons, but not of the exact personal *identities* involved” (Sen, 2000a, 486). In opposition to the utilitarian agency invariance restriction, Sen proposed an authorship invariance, which is claimed to be impersonal, as ethics requires, but not im-positional. This is, however, problematic.

The first limit of the capability approach resides exactly in the assignment of intrinsic value to the agent-relative perspective. As has already been said, Sen maintains that “when the restriction [i.e. evaluator neutrality, RM] is relaxed but otherwise the hegemony of outcome morality is maintained, I shall call the approach ‘consequence-based evaluation’” (Sen, 1982b, 30). This move is motivated by the recognition that a morality which insists that “after killing his wife Desdemona Othello must regard the state of affairs to be morally exactly as good or as bad as others – and no worse than that – would seem to miss something about the nature of moral evaluation of states” (ibid.). While this is a fair point on the need to take into account a personal evaluator point of view, a further problem remains unsolved: what kind of role does this point of view have in moral reasoning, if the hegemony of the outcome has to be maintained? In particular, how is this personal evaluator point of view related to the impartial perspective in the service of justice; that is, the perspective that compares different points of view to assess the value of the overall outcome?

Assuming that “a consequence-based morality is evaluator neutral if there is a universal good that all agents are required to promote; and it is evaluator relative if different agents are assigned different goods” (Regan, 1983, 93), two divergent prescriptions could be correspondingly recommended from a consequentialist perspective. Either every agent has the duty to promote the good as comprehensively intended from an impartial point of view (which *also* includes personal evaluations) or he has the duty to promote the good from his point of view (which includes *only* personal evaluations). Alternatively expressed, these duties could be intended as demanding that personal evaluation be taken into account in, respectively, an *instrumental* or *intrinsic* way.

If the second interpretation of the duty is accepted, then a problem arises as to how to judge the justice of each agent-relative point of view from a third party perspective, i.e. how to judge impartially different points of view. A consequentialist perspective is in fact dependent on the single evaluation of the overall outcome (however intended, comprehensively or as culmination). According to consequentialism, we should decide the principles that govern our actions through the consideration of the overall value of the good (e.g. an informationally rich interpretation of well-being with personal attributes) promoted by their implementation. The notion of goodness is thus the ultimate basis for assessing actions and principles. Now, if intrinsic value is

assigned to each personal evaluator perspective, no single ultimate value can be identified and consequently no overarching evaluation of different perspectives is feasible. If reasons of autonomy and those to promote the overall good are considered incommensurable, the possibility of accounting for moral requirements is ruled out.²⁵

Such a response to this dilemma has been given by the contractarian theory, one consistent with the assignment of intrinsic value to individual perspectives. According to deontological contractarianism, in fact, no overarching evaluation can be offered of the state of affairs, insofar as only agent-relative reasons on a singular basis can be provided by individuals. In this regard, what is considered is not the overall value of the resulting state of affairs but the reasons that individuals have for accepting or rejecting these principles. This means that we have to consider only the ways in which these principles affect individuals with their personal reflective attitude, not their impact on the promotion of impersonal values. This amounts also to an incapacity to compare interpersonally the reactions of the reciprocally independent individuals without the appeal to either an external or a minimally overlapping principle. Similarly, Sen's theory assigns the promotion of different goods to different agents in an *intrinsically* agent-relative way, and in maintaining the intrinsic rightness of this relation, it fails on the side of impartially judging the rightness of this activity.²⁶

Scanlon has raised a similar point on the issue of impartiality that invites a different consequentialist answer:

Contractualism thus naturally employs position-relative reasons, but does not require position-relative evaluation of the overall state of the world. This enables it to avoid a prima-facie problem that arises for a position-relative consequentialist theory. If the consequentialist idea of acting for the best is to provide a single standard of right action, it seems to require a single idea of what is best as its evaluative basis. There is thus a puzzle about how to formulate consequentialism on the basis of multiple, position-relative evaluative standpoints. Perhaps it becomes the view that what morality requires is for each person to act for the best, as judged from his or her position. I will leave open the question of how this is to be worked out.

(Scanlon, 2001, 49)

Another way of interpreting the issue of impartiality consists in focusing the attention on the single agent rather than on an impartial point of view. If we take this position, it is fair to ask "why should each agent act on his own point of view instead of some other?" (Regan, 1983, 105). Or put another way, why should the single agent maximize the good from his point of view? Sen fails to offer a substantial account of why different agents should maximize the good according to their point of view simply because it is their interpretation rather than somebody else's (ibid., 103). Again, the lack of an external

and overarching point of view allows neither for, as already said, impartial resolutions of disputes between different points of view, nor impartial assignment of agent-relative duties according to consequentialist ethics.

Hence, Sen's theory is on shaky ground for what concerns the impartial assessment of different points of view, in that it relies on an intrinsic assignment of value to agent-relative evaluation. The consequentialist cosmopolitan proposal presented here is distinctive in that the ultimate good it prescribes remains objective – the maximization of the condition of world welfare – but can only be promoted through the maximization of individual – i.e. agent-relative – capacity for choice. Thus, the present proposal, in being only epistemologically and *instrumentally* agent-relative, offers a consistent twofold response that includes both agent-relative and agent-neutral considerations, through an indirect method of identification of individual welfare.

The other limit of the capability approach I want to discuss concerns an intercultural problem. Despite the minimal point of departure, i.e. the recognition of the diversity of human beings and the consequent importance of the capacity for freedom to be realized, the conclusions at which the capability approach arrives are culturally thick and thus yield problems on the intercultural side of justice. This culturally thick characteristic is more evident in Nussbaum's theory than in Sen's (Nussbaum, 1993; Sen, 1993a), but the point I want to raise applies to both, though in different degrees, and yields decisive normative disadvantages within the context of a world assumed to be profoundly multicultural.

Sen's and Nussbaum's theory of capabilities proposes a substantive account of human nature – and a correlated biased interpretation of human flourishing inspired by Aristotle (Crocker, 1992; Carter, 2001, 67–9; Donatelli, 2001, 116) – which in being theory-laden and content-specific is condemned to being partial and thus inapplicable at the global level. While a common neutral ground can be determined in the evaluative space concerned with the vital capacity of individuals to pursue their personal choices and projects, Sen's and Nussbaum's further political ambitions to regulate and institutionalize individual entitlements beyond such an elementary level are destined to be flawed. The aim to identify a thick set of individual entitlements – beyond a minimal endowment – related to universal capabilities runs into trouble in that this task requires objectivity in a domain where objectivity is not available.

In contrast to this, exercising epistemological self-restraint, consequentialist cosmopolitanism focuses only on a number of vital interests in terms of opportunities for choice. In a world of incomparable differences, consequentialist cosmopolitanism's promotion of a minimal international standard, promising only the guarantee of politically vital capabilities, is better equipped to comply appropriately with the task of global justice, in that it is able to offer a more widely acceptable set of guarantees for individual freedom and pluralism. Respectful of our limited epistemological capacities, the strategy of consequentialist cosmopolitanism promises to be almost as

emancipatory as Sen's and Nussbaum's proposal, and yet is consistently more defensible against charges of paternalism and ethnocentrism.

Having outlined a number of normative comparisons with the major competing theories of justice currently advanced, it is now time to expound the remaining content of the consequentialist theory of global justice in closer detail. I begin in the next section by providing further elements concerning the full reading of freedom of choice, intended as the normative basis for a universal metric of justice.

Consequentialist global justice

For its contribution toward the promotion of individual well-being, freedom of choice represents a crucial component of consequentialist ethics that needs to be universally protected and enhanced. As will be shown, this is to be pursued through a set of profound institutional reforms on several levels of political action worldwide. Before presenting these, however, it is important to stress here the political principles that underpin this social-political project. The normative structure of consequentialist cosmopolitanism, as a system of international political theory, involves the following three sets of principles (although only the first two are under scrutiny in this chapter): a) the *ultimate* consequentialist principle, i.e. the maximization of conditions for world well-being through the guarantee of freedom of choice; b) the *intermediate* principles, each referring to a specific applicative level, which contribute to the design of the political structure and institutions²⁷ of a consequentialist global political system, such as, for example, the "human rights regime" and the principle of state self-determination; and finally, c) the *immediate* rules of action which derive from this consequentialist political structure, for instance, policies to guarantee the protection of human rights.²⁸ Given the ultimate consequentialist norm, the decisive criterion of validity for intermediate principles rests in the assessment of their long-term impartial socio-political performance with reference to the choice-based metric here adopted.

The metric adopted by consequentialist cosmopolitanism refers to a fundamental political entitlement of each individual to achieve and develop the status of independent choice-maker: simply, to pursue the life he or she likes (Sumner, 1996, chapters 6–7).²⁹ In particular, in order to guarantee each individual his or her personal capability to choose freely and thus to pursue his or her own well-being, a number of specific social and political rights are needed. They can be grouped in two principal categories: vital interests and political agency. A first set of rights concerns those *vital interests* that form an inevitable prerequisite for any other meaningful choice. They can be formulated in a transcultural way and should consequently be implemented universally and considered as absolute trumps to protect agents' autonomy. The second set of legal entitlements concerns, instead, the possibility of *political participation* in the public decision-making processes at each level of political action.³⁰ These two types of rights are instrumentally understood (in opposition

to autonomy-based approaches à la Raz) as the primary material conditions of interest formation and realization, and consequently as the basis for personal entitlements within which individuals form and pursue their own well-being (Gray, 1983, iv, 2; Hardin, 1986; Kelly, 1990, 75; Riley, 1998; Ferrajoli, 2001). These two conditions of free choice are deemed to be fundamental to the enhancement of the individual capacity to control his or her life, and subsequently to promote his or her well-being, and are considered consequently as universal entitlements to be granted to each individual as citizenship prerogatives.

More precisely, a number of vital interests can be analytically deduced as objective priorities to be guaranteed in order to allow each individual to develop and choose freely among life options. Health, education, and security³¹ constitute the minimal elements necessary to enable the individual capability for free choice-making; they are therefore equally the prerequisites for playing an active role in the political system, and thus, in the ultimate analysis, in one's own life (Shue, 1980, 71; Habermas, 2002, 199–202; Nussbaum, 2002, 128–30). These are “basic interests, which must be respected or served if a minimally acceptable condition of life, in any setting, is to be possible” (Lyons, 1977, 126), inasmuch as one's potential well-being primarily depends on having the social assets to avail oneself of these vital interests.³² “Persons enjoy significant autonomy to the degree that their choices are not entirely dictated by an effort to secure their basic needs” (Raz, 1982, 115). Such primary capabilities, constitutive of a person's autonomous being, represent a basic element for any well-being evaluation (Sen, 1992, 39) and are therefore claimed to be universal in kind, although their specific interpretations are necessarily culturally determined and must take into account the social inclusion/exclusion variable (Goodin, 1996a). This suffices here to outline the component of vital interests; the other component – political participation – will be the focus of the rest of this chapter.

Vital interests and political participation then represent the dual metric of consequentialist global justice, insofar as they indicate the two sub-components of the universal right toward independent choice-making. In order to maximize the individual's capability of choice, in fact, it is essential both to empower him or her with the appropriate skills and entitlements and to protect his or her autonomy from others' arbitrary interference. These are factors that can profoundly affect individual capacity for free choice; they can affect elements such as the range of available options presented, the expected payoffs that the agent assigns to those options, and the actual payoffs – the outcomes – that result from the choice (Pettit, 1997, 53). Since they are so crucial for the capability of the individual to choose, they are to be considered as prerequisites for the very possibility of choice, and so as imperatives from a consequentialist perspective that aims at maximizing well-being through individual freedom of choice. They can thus be denominated as fundamental goods, in that they represent a good that a person has instrumental reasons to want, no matter what else he aims at; a good that is required for any other

value to be pursued. Using terminology à la Sen, the lack of such goods can be interpreted as deprivation of basic capabilities. A key response to this deprivation consists then in the granting of a political entitlement to participate in a democratic system.

Two social principles are inherently entwined with the notion of freedom of choice and the capability for self-determination as presented so far: responsibility and vulnerability. From a political point of view, they play a crucial role as normative considerations that shape the political system according to a bidirectional relationship. The first principle affirms that freedom means fitness for *responsibility*, and that in order to enjoy fully the value of freedom one needs to be ready to be held responsible for the consequences caused by her or his action (Sen, 2000a; Pettit, 2001b, chapter 1). The second maintains, conversely, that freedom means avoidance of *vulnerability*, and that in order to enjoy fully the value of freedom one need not be held under the sway of external factors that could deprive one of opportunities (Goodin, 1985). Clearly, these principles shed light on two interdependent normative claims, and yet they are often considered disjunctively at the international level. In this vein, it is common international thinking to consider responsibilities ending at the borders of one's own state and vulnerabilities abroad as not counting as evils to be repaired. In opposition to this, as implicitly required by the adoption of the freedom of choice ideal, consequentialist cosmopolitanism holds a universal and reciprocal consideration of these two principles.

As a consequence, the characterization of moral agency here envisaged is centered on the double recognition of the role of both choice-maker and choice-bearer. These two categories are the inevitable tools enabling a concrete normative and political implementation of the principle of responsibility and vulnerability. *Choice-maker* is here intended to mean the agent who is in the position to choose, decide, and carry out actions producing consequences to others. The *choice-bearer*, conversely, is the agent who bears the burden of the consequences of the action chosen, decided, and carried out by somebody else (D. Held, 1991, 201). When these two categories are conceptualized as universal agents they produce an enlargement of the traditional notions of responsible and vulnerable agents. This in turn identifies new vulnerable political subjects and allocates special responsibilities beyond those traditionally charged to states or individuals.

A key concern of consequentialist cosmopolitanism is the scope and form of the political system and the correlative method of assessing different institutional schemes in relation to freedom of choice. Since, in the ultimate analysis, the subject of cosmopolitanism is humanity at large, the best moral code and subsequently the best institutional setting is one in which full compliance would produce the highest increase in world well-being conditions, i.e. in global terms, impartially assessed. Since the latter refers to the well-being functions of every person, the morally ideal world is then identified as that which maximizes, through a scheme of public rules, the capability of choice of all humanity. This entails an enlargement of the traditional sphere of moral

consideration toward the recognition of global issues as fully political problems and of humanity as the political subject.

An all-inclusive global system

A major characteristic that distinguishes consequentialist cosmopolitanism from other international political theories is its consideration of the link between responsibility and vulnerability which determines the double universalistic conception of moral agency in terms of choice-maker and choice-bearer. This feature marks the strength of consequentialist cosmopolitanism as an inclusive paradigm, able to adhere more strongly than others to social and political reality in a time of radical transformations. Until recently the effects of actions were mostly contained within a defined territory: most people could influence (and be influenced by) the lives of a limited number of other people. The relationship between responsibility and vulnerability was thus far more obvious, and one could, for the most part, reasonably expect to maintain the integrity of this relationship through domestic democratic political channels. The present situation is quite different: through intensifying the level of global interaction, the current world system stretches the limits of the relationship between choice-makers and choice-bearers, with the effect of loosening the moral and political ties of accountability. Such circumstances consequently compel us to confront demands for inclusive moral responsibility and envisage new political mechanisms of social liability. Since social action is spread over distinct and yet overlapping spheres of conduct, democratic legitimacy, as based on the congruence mechanism, is only possible through the recognition of the political system as multileveled and all-inclusive.

A prominent characteristic of the current socio-economic situation at the global level is that political representation is notably lacking among the abundant channels of action: this is the phenomenon of transnational exclusion. Collective agents, such as multinational corporations (MNCs) or international organizations, have a decisive and protean capacity to intrude in states' domestic politics and individuals' lives. And while individuals also "have a multitude of new points of access to the course of events" (Rosenau, 1992, 285), unlike the collective agents mentioned, individuals are on the whole denied direct political access to institutions which could provide an opportunity for their public expression of dissent/consent. In this, they are denied the right to self-determination. The lack at each level of political action of a corresponding channel of access to political representation becomes strikingly apparent when juxtaposed to the asymmetrical power of influence wielded by the other international agents. General awareness of this unequal control over the fate of the world social system is becoming increasingly acute, and consequently provoking a growing discontent in a considerably large sector of civil society (Smith and Johnston, 2002; Tarrow, 2005; della Porta, 2007). Hence, a convincing concept of global political agency which offers the capacity to redress the erosion of the right to self-legislate in a multilayered

world constitutes a particularly urgent element of any proposal on international political theory.

The response of consequentialist cosmopolitanism to the multiplication of diverse social actions dispersed geographically and institutionally on different levels consists in the identification of a unified, multilayered focus on guarantees covering the key domains of action: individual, state, regional, and global. Only through the simultaneous guarantee of these four kinds of rights can individual freedom of choice be preserved and world well-being maximization pursued. Of these four, the rights concerned with global political participation are the most contested and most denied by the current political system. They are therefore the most promising in terms of the opportunity for well-being promotion. Within this set of global rights, the entitlements concerning world citizenship represent a crucial step toward overcoming the established system of agency and implementing a cosmopolitan model. This new model of citizenship, rather than supplanting all other social ties, instead engenders a more consistent political way of addressing the phenomena that affect one's life, and subsequently provides an effective means to align one's personal with one's political identity. In this regard, the suggestion advanced by the present version of cosmopolitanism is distinct from other like-minded proposals in that it concerns the establishment of new institutional mechanisms in which subjects can expect public and political recognition for their actions through all-inclusive forms of accountable, transnational citizenship, and so avoid transnational exclusion.

The principle of democratic congruence, however, encounters tenacious resistance from all corners when extended at the global level. While among democratic states it is widely recognized that in the domestic sphere of political action all citizens should have a voice in public decisions, the limits of international accountability are still equally confused and contested. The legal entitlements of the single agent to take part in decision-making and frame-setting processes at international level are extremely limited, and the cause of a great degree of exclusion. Indeed the extent to which an agent can hold another accountable, i.e. the extent to which the choice-bearer agent who suffers costs can demand punishment of and compensation from the choice-maker agent, forms the subject of a heated dispute on the scope of international norms (Kutz, 2000; Keohane, 2003, section II; Keohane and Nye, 2003; D. Held, 2004a; Grant and Keohane, 2005). Attesting to the scope of the dilemma posed by this issue is the patent failure of a straightforward principle of affect to resolve it. The appeal of such a principle is of course its alleged objectivity: its supposed disregard for the specific interpretation of the role of the choice-maker agent.³³ However, since an action's consequence could affect, with different intensity, an almost infinite number of agents (one need only to think of the potential claims of future generations), if the legitimacy of an action were to depend on prior consultation for consent of all affected parties, human engagement would become paralyzed under the charge of responsibility. An interpretative, political filter is needed in any

case. Thus simply from a practical standpoint the mere fact of being affected cannot constitute valid grounds for a legal or even political claim.

A more political principle has to be adopted, one that grants to *all* citizens as members of the public constituency in each level of political action, including the global, a political voice and the power to make the choice-makers accountable. This global political entitlement has to be intended as twofold: both as positive claims of proposition and as negative claims of contestation. This second dimension of cosmopolitan agency is particularly relevant in an age in which transnational social movements and global civil society at large are carrying out contentious politics in a political vacuum, thus not having a precise, single political institution to hold them to account.³⁴ At the global level of action in particular, the strategy of consequentialist cosmopolitanism consists in the creation of a political system characterized by a universal constituency, which in granting rights of political participation to all citizens, is able to identify both responsible and vulnerable agents, and consequently to implement a sanctioning system on several levels. This universal characterization of the institutional requirements for global democracy lays the ground for the next chapter, which will deal more specifically with the challenges of cosmopolitan institutional design.

Conclusions

This chapter has presented the principal ethical and political aspects of consequentialist cosmopolitanism against the principal theories of justice that have supported the cosmopolitan ideal from the 1970s and 1980s onward. Aiming to meet the ethical challenges of current international affairs in terms of political inclusion, this chapter began by pursuing a more subtle conception of the political good, which in being aware of the epistemological constraints on interpersonal comparisons of utility allows for the recognition of pluralism through respect for individual choices. Through a number of critical comparisons with alternative theories of justice (utilitarianism, contractarianism, autonomy-based, and the capability approach) the ethical and political aspects of the theory of consequentialist cosmopolitanism have been outlined.

Freedom of choice forms the normative core of the consequentialist cosmopolitan criteria for assessing the international institutional framework, insofar as only through maximizing the individual capacity for choice can the maximization of social well-being be pursued. According to this, a fair political system should provide both the general legal-political framework – i.e. institutions and rights – and the personal practical capabilities needed to put individuals in the condition freely to choose what they think is best. This political endowment, to which each individual is entitled, is composed of two principal components: a set of rights concerning vital interests intended as fundamental prerequisites for any possibility of choice, and the set of rights related to the institution of citizenship. This provides a precise metric serving

as a universal measure able to reinterpret consistently the issue of responsibility and vulnerability in the domain of global ethics. Following from this, a notion of political agency in terms of choice-makers and choice-bearers is developed in order to deal exhaustively with the issue of responsibility and vulnerability at the global level.

These ethical-political principles, however, would provide for only an incomplete political project, if left to stand on their own. Without the recognition of their roles within a wider system of international political theory encompassing crucial aspects of international political action such as multi-layered and collective dimensionality, these normative principles would most likely fail to address the issue here at stake – transnational exclusion. The guarantee of vital interests and political participation to individuals plays a crucial role here, as has been made clear, but they can indeed be interpreted in several ways and generate correspondingly different institutional frameworks. In this regard, for a theory of global justice to be viable two elements need to be accommodated and consistently integrated: universality and multilevel dimensionality. This chapter aims to prove the case for an ultimately universal consideration of ethical-political agency in order to offer an alternative to all those theories that limit the scope of normative consideration to within the borders of a given community. Conversely, in opposition to straightforward theories of radical cosmopolitanism, according to which no intermediate or national level of political consideration needs to be taken into account, the next chapter makes the case for a multilayered interpretation of global justice. In order to proceed along this way, it is necessary to move the discussion from the ethical discourse of cosmopolitanism to that of institutions. With this the analysis moves to the second historical phase of cosmopolitan thinking, that of cosmopolitan democracy, which began in the 1990s.

Notes

- 1 Translation: A person is more genuine the more he or she resembles that which he or she dreams of him or herself.
- 2 For broader references to the specific schools of international political thought/international ethics for and against global justice see the following. Capabilities approach: Sen, 1981; Nussbaum and Sen, 1993; Sen, 2000b. Contractarianism: Rawls, 1971; Beitz, 1979; Richards, 1982; Gauthier, 1986; B. Barry, 1989; J. M. Buchanan, 1995; D. Held, 1995; Rawls, 1999; Scanlon, 1999; Kuper, 2000; Pogge, 2002b. Deliberative approach: Apel, 1992; Habermas, 1998; Dryzek, 1999; Apel, 2000; Bohman, 2001, 2006. Feminism: R. Grant and Newland, 1991; Groom and Halliday, 1994; Hutchings, 1999. Law of nature: Midgley, 1975; Finnis, 1980. Marxism: Berki, 1971; Nielsen, 1983; Guevara, 2002. Nationalism and republicanism: MacIntyre, 1984; Tamir, 1993; Walzer, 1994; Miller, 1995; Viroli, 1995; Canovan, 1996; Dagger, 1997. Neo-Hegelianism: Taylor and Gutmann, 1994; M. Frost, 1996). Neo-kantianism: Doyle, 1983; O'Neill, 1986a; Hurrell, 1990; Archibugi, 1995b; Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann, 1997. Post-modernism: der Derian and Shapiro, 1989; der Derian, 1995. Society of nations: Bull, 1977; Wight, 1977; Hoffmann, 1981; Nardin, 1983; Bull, 1984; Zolo, 1997.

- Theory of rights: Shue, 1980; Gewirth, 1982; R. J. Vincent, 1986; Bonanate, 1994; Bobbio, 1995. Utilitarianism: Singer, 1972; J. E. Hare and Joynt, 1982; Goodin, 1985, 1988; Elfstrom, 1989; Ellis, 1992; Pontara, 1998; Singer, 2002; Goodin, 2003a; Cullity, 2004; Marchetti, 2005d.
- 3 For an introduction to consequentialism see Scheffler, 1982; Slote, 1985; Pettit, 1993b, 1993c; Hooker, 2000.
 - 4 For an introduction to cosmopolitanism see Heater, 1996; Archibugi *et al.*, 1998; Jones, 1999; Breckeridge *et al.*, 2002; Moellendorf, 2002; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002; Caney, 2004; Tan, 2004; Brock and Brighouse, 2005; Hayden, 2005.
 - 5 Beyond the straightforward etymological derivation from the Greek words *cosmos* and *polis* suggesting an expansion of the concept of *polis* to the entire globe, it is worth considering the other Greek meaning of the word *cosmos* that is related to the idea of beauty and order (see for instance the derived word *cosmetics*). If we consider this second meaning, we can then argue for the necessity of a truly global justice not only as a requirement of justice, but also as a wider hermeneutical requirement towards the (re)creation of a harmonious world, a world of beauty. I am indebted to Olga Tribulato for pointing out this enlightening semantic connection.
 - 6 The debate on the issue of comparability has been intense over the years. For a general survey see Elster and Hylland, 1986; Elster and Roemer, 1991. Major protagonists of the debate have been: Pareto, 1896–7, bk II; Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, 16; Arrow, 1951, 9; Harsanyi, 1955; Little, 1957; Sen, 1970; Jeffrey, 1971; Hammond, 1977; R. M. Hare, 1981; Narens and Luce, 1983; Davidson, 1986; Gibbard, 1986; Harsanyi, 1987; Sheng, 1987; Hausman, 1995.
 - 7 A situation is Pareto optimal when a movement from one allocation of goods to another cannot be made in such a way as to make at least one individual better off without making any other individual worse off.
 - 8 Before Robbins, Jevons had argued along similar lines: “Every mind is thus inscrutable to every other mind, and no common denominator of feeling seems to be possible. But even if we could compare the feelings of different minds, we should not need to do so; for one mind only affects another indirectly” (Jevons, 1871, 21). Compare also Griffin: “What is needed for comparability is something less than such strong assumptions about fairness but something more than simple matters of fact. ... So interpersonal comparisons are value judgments in this sense: they are part and parcel of a complex normative exercise” (Griffin, 1986, 120; see also Scanlon, 1991).
 - 9 Sen identifies at least five sources of variation or classes of differences concerning well-being: 1) personal heterogeneity; 2) environmental diversity; 3) variations in social climates; 4) differences in relational perspectives; and 5) distribution within the family (Sen, 2000b, 70–1). Additionally, Pogge suggests a sixth one: 6) socially caused heterogeneity (Pogge, 2002a).
 - 10 “A good will be a goal for an agent or agency if and only if the task is to promote the good: to maximize its expected realization. ... A good will be a constraint for an agent or agency, on the other hand, if and only if the task is not necessarily to promote it, but to bear witness to its importance or to honor it” (Pettit, 1997, 97–8).
 - 11 Harsanyi, 1979; R. M. Hare, 1981; Kupperman, 1981; Riley, 1988; Goodin, 1990; Pettit, 1993b, 1993c; R. M. Hare, 1999; Hooker, 2000; Hooker *et al.*, 2000. Similarly, Sen argues the following in support of consequential evaluation: “In contrast with consequence-independent deontology, or trade-off-barred deontology, broad consequential evaluation has considerably more reach and range, in being able to accommodate diverse moral concerns that have claims to our attention. In comparison with permissive kinds of deontology, broad

- consequential evaluation can claim to have, at least, a more explicit – and somewhat more integrated – framework of judgment evaluation” (Sen, 2000a, 480).
- 12 The first two steps, nicely combined in the Benthamite expression “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”, are deemed uncontroversial in analytical ethical theory (Pettit, 1993a, 23–5). Their origins date from the Greek concept of isogony (i.e. equality of birth), passing through the Christian conception of brotherhood equality later embodied in the law of nature.
 - 13 With respect to individualism, two additional assumptions of the theory of consequentialist cosmopolitanism concerning freedom and identity should be made explicit. Moral agents are considered free from strict causal determination and so able to make deliberate and independent moral choices. Natural determinism is thus rejected. Moreover, agents are primarily considered to be individuals and, only secondarily, collective agents such as states or international organizations. “Sub-individual” selves are not included in the category of possible moral agents, in that they are deemed to be too locally biased in their cultural self-image, and subsequently not viable for a project of international ethics. Thus, disaggregation of personal identity as a chain of contingent selves à la Parfit is also rejected, and a normative (rather than ontological) individualism explicitly recognized as a starting assumption of this project.
 - 14 Mill aptly captures the point with the following metaphor: “Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing” (Mill, 1859; reprinted 1962, 188). Some years before, Kant used the same metaphor of the tree to express a similar, though not identical, concept. “Trees in a forest, by seeking to deprive each other of air and sunlight, compel each other to find these by upward growth, so that they grow beautiful and straight – whereas those which put out branches at will, in freedom and in isolation from others, grow stunted, bent and twisted” (Kant, 1784; reprinted 1991, 46).
 - 15 For similar consequentialist strategies that have highly influenced my views see Sen, 1982b; Pettit and Brennan, 1986; Hardin, 1988; for the original discussion of such indirect strategy to be found in Butler, see Butler, 1726; reprinted 1983, section sermon XII, section IV. 31.
 - 16 To the objection that such a double strategy endorses the deception of self and others, in that in implementing a principle in a specific agent-relative way one cannot genuinely pursue the agent’s good but only instrumentally and deceptively so, a response based on Hare’s two-level theory can be offered (R. M. Hare, 1981). No deception is implied in having a two-level moral life in which we ordinarily apply first order common principles that are nevertheless backed by second order moral considerations to which we appeal in difficult life circumstances. Love and friendship are no less genuine, despite the fact that we at times consider them in light of universal moral principles.
 - 17 For other points of view on the concept of choice, see: Broome, 1978; Dworkin, 1982; Sen, 1985; Scanlon, 1988; Sen, 1988; Reeve, 1990, 115–117; Dowding, 1992; Carter and Ricciardi, 2001. Note that the characterization of well-being as freedom of choice meets the three criteria commonly required on any conception of well-being, as expressed by Scanlon, in that it represents a general consensus, allows for the fact of individual variation in taste and interests, and is result-oriented (Scanlon, 1979, 655–6).
 - 18 In the rest of the text, the terms capacity and capability (of choice) are used interchangeably, despite the existence of minor differences that do not affect the central thrust of the notion as deployed here.
 - 19 The notion of well-being as freedom of choice is here intended principally as the normative basis for a political principle fostering emancipation and autonomous

self-development of individuals, and in this sense it has to be understood as a minimal social project. Beyond that, however, I am inclined to think that such a principle has to be connected to the ultimate ideal of *aesthetic* self-creation as full employment of individual capabilities. This connection is not part of the present study.

- 20 According to Pettit, both liberties have limited political significance. The traditional understanding of negative freedom – being alone by others – which focuses on uncoerced choices thanks to the absence of external obstacles (intentional intervention plus coercion of a credible threat), cannot distinguish between unimpeded and undominated choices (allowed by the dominator’s goodwill). On the other side, positive freedom, conventionally seen as self-mastery and positive control of one’s own actions and life, instead, cannot collectively accommodate the liberal values of individualism in that it fosters a populist attitude which endangers minorities.
- 21 On this, Sen maintains that “a person’s choice may be guided by a number of motives of which the pursuit of personal well-being is only one. The well-being motivation may well be dominant in some choices, but not in others. Moral considerations may, inter alia, influence a person’s ‘commitment’. The mixture of motivations makes it hard to form a good idea of a person’s well-being on the basis of choice information only” (Sen, 1985, 188). See also Sen, 1977.
- 22 Despite a fundamental difference concerning the ultimate justification of individual freedom, the consequentialist characterization of freedom of choice overlaps with the conditions identified by Raz for autonomy. In his account, they are: 1) appropriate mental abilities; 2) an adequate range of options; and 3) independence. From these, Raz determines a set of political duties intended as guarantees of: 1) support for the development of personal abilities; 2) the creation of an adequate range of options for choice; and 3) non-coercion and non-harm (Raz, 1986, 371, 407–8; 1994, chapter 1).
- 23 In his attempt to renew the utilitarian tradition, Mill tried to couple the focus on utility maximization with sensitivity to personal liberty.
- 24 A political example offered by Sen himself helps to understand the interpretative limits that can be imposed by a reading exclusively focused on culmination outcome. “If, for example, a presidential candidate were to argue that what is really important is not just to win the forthcoming elections, but ‘to win the election fairly’, then the outcome recommended is a *comprehensive outcome*, which includes a process consideration (not just the culmination outcome of winning the election – no matter how)” (Sen, 2000a, 492).
- 25 A similar argument is developed by Griffin, 1982, 331–75; S. Kagan, 1984, 241–2; Brink, 1986, 432.
- 26 In a more recent article Sen has taken a clear position from an impartial spectator point of view à la Smith (Sen, 2002), but it is interesting (and bizarre) that this clear statement is not explicitly and conceptually phrased using the capability terminology. Until this theoretical link is made explicit, the impartiality problem so far exposed remains.
- 27 More particularly, institutions are defined as general patterns or categorizations of activity made up of persistent and connected clusters of (formal and informal) norms. These principles and rules, organized into stable and ongoing social practices that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations, are a central ingredient because of their capacity and potential to promote reform and cooperation (Keohane, 1988, 383, 393; Goodin, 1996b, 22; Hurrell, 2001, 38; Parekh, 2003, 11; Koremenos *et al.*, 2001).
- 28 This study does not concentrate on this third set of rules. However, a brief consideration of this more frequently applied set is worthwhile here. The strategy of concentrating on individual freedom of choice fits well with the general requirements

of public policy-making, as interpreted by Goodin (Goodin, 1990). Public decisions have to be general in character for reasons grounded in necessity and desirability. Concerning the first, public officials have only imperfect information in comparison with private individuals: “they know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices” (ibid., 142). But in order not to rely on the assumption that all individuals are equal in all respects, governors need to limit their action to the minimum and leave as much scope for freedom as possible. This focus on freedom of choice is not just out of necessity, it is also desirable from a consequentialist point of view. Thus, laws that are general in form and therefore minimal allow a greater degree of latitude for the individual to organize his future toward the reduction of uncertainties; moreover, when rules are few in number and general in form citizens are more likely to internalize social norms – which would also reduce the cost of law enforcement.

- 29 The interest in achieving the capability of freedom of choice in order to develop one’s own conception of the good overlaps with the third Rawlsian high-order interest, which in his theory is closely connected with democratic citizenship. This is an interest “to protect and advance some determinate (but unspecified) conceptions of the good over a complete life” (Rawls, 1993, 74; 2001, 192).
- 30 A point made clear more than fifty years ago by Reves, recently reiterated by the cosmopolitan scholars. Reves asserted: “Democratic sovereignty of the people can be correctly expressed and effectively instituted only if local affairs are handled by local government, national affairs by national government, and international, world affairs by international, world government” (Reves, 1947, 126). See also Pogge, 1992, 58; D. Held and McGrew, 2000, 33.
- 31 On such a minimal level a broad consensus can be traced among different schools of thought. See: Doyal and Gough, 1986 for human needs; Elfstrom, 1989 for basic wants; Scanlon, 1979; Rawls, 1982; B. Barry, 1998, 148 for primary goods; Shue, 1980; Miller, 1999 for basic rights; and Sen, 1980, 1993a; Nussbaum, 2002; Sen, 2004 for capabilities. Moreover, detailed accounts of these three elements can be found in numerous publications of international organizations such as the World Bank, United Nation Development Programme, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- 32 In a formulation different from but consistent with the proposed one, Barry identifies basic interests as “things that everybody would wish to have or avoid having, and would give up almost anything else to have or avoid” (B. Barry, 2001, 284–6; 2003, 19).
- 33 Three principal interpretations are available on the issue of agent’s accountability: 1) the individual difference principle, according to which the agent is accountable for a harm if he made a difference to its outcome, i.e. without the agent, the outcome would have been different; 2) the control principle, according to which the agent is accountable for an event if he had control over its occurrence, i.e. he could have prevented it; and 3) the autonomy principle, according to which an agent is accountable for the harm another agent causes, if he induced or coerced that agent into performing that act. For a detailed discussion of these interpretations see Kutz, 2000.
- 34 This global scenario becomes more evident when compared with the European scenario. Here contentious political activism can address a specific organization, the European Union, and thus increase the potential impact of its protest.

3 Institutional design for global democracy

Multilayered cosmopolitanism

I can choose only a strategy, not an outcome.

(Hardin, 2003, 1)

Left to stand on their own, the ethical-political principles underpinning the normative proposal of cosmopolitanism set forth in the previous chapter would offer an incomplete picture for a political project. Without the support of an institutional framework specifically fitted to the global context, such a project would inevitably suffer from the weaknesses – inefficacy and exclusion – which traditionally affect modern political thought as a discipline of self-contained jurisdictions based on domestic interaction. Recognition of this was the main driver pushing for the development of the second phase of cosmopolitanism in the 1990s, which is characterized by an increased institutional sensitivity. In the same vein, to remain true to its first universalistic principles, consequentialist cosmopolitanism needs to provide a multilayered and yet unified scheme of political justice as embedded in a multilevel institutional structure. Setting out this alternative approach and indicating its full international development form the task in hand.

In order to develop the institutional side of the current proposal, this chapter engages the debate that began in the 1990s around cosmopolitan democracy. This second phase of the development of cosmopolitan thinking witnessed a transition from purely ethical-philosophical writings (though of ethics applied to international affairs) to scholarship which was clearly engaged with international relations and political science. This step was necessary to respond to the realist-style criticism that accused the early phase of cosmopolitanism of providing ideals without action-guiding principles that could be adopted for reforming international institutions. To this accusation, political science scholars of cosmopolitan inspiration replied with the formulation of several models of cosmopolitan democracy. Beyond the normative debate, political events also provided an opening for the development of institutional cosmopolitanism. The end of the stalemate of the cold war and a favorable framework of international political opportunities added further positive circumstances for the emergence of the proposals for cosmopolitan democracy.

This chapter draws up the institutional framework of consequentialist democracy as centered on the freedom of choice and its political correlate of participatory rights. A methodology for comparing different institutional schemes of justice is developed based on proximity to the ideal of universal individual entitlements concerning vital interests and multilayered political participation. Criticizing rival reasoning, a consequentialist theory of global democracy is then illustrated as centered on the parity of participation in social and political life, i.e. inclusion in the community of those who are entitled to make justice claims on one another. This has a twofold meaning: as public participation in the decision-making and norm-setting processes, but also in public processes of contestation, which ought to be institutionally channeled, thereby offering back to citizens the sense of social and political empowerment. This institutional framework fundamentally serves a moral aim: the avoidance of transnational exclusion. To this issue is inherently connected that of international liability. The topic of national and international responsibility thus occupies much of the central part of the present discussion, and is considered in those of its multiple aspects at the centre of the current debate: individual demandingness, institutional duties, and collective liability in non-ideal circumstances. Finally, details on the multilevel political structure of consequentialist cosmopolitanism are presented, together with a discussion of the relationship between social theory and censorial jurisprudence for what concerns the issue of drawing jurisdictional boundaries.

Consequentialist democracy: procedural participation from a global perspective

When embedded in a democratic framework, the principle of freedom of choice is bound to a political participation that entails several applicative dimensions along different spheres of political actions. Much as agents at the individual level enjoy a fundamental right freely to choose their destiny, so at the collective level groups are entitled to take autonomously decisions over their future. This entails, consequently, that a legitimate exercise of political self-determination and self-legislation needs to be based on equal citizenship, insofar as only by equally and simultaneously retaining the status of legislators and subjects can citizens remain free to determine their fate (Rousseau, 1762, book I, section vi; Mill, 1861; reprinted 1991). In order to maximize the opportunities to exercise freedom of self-determination, i.e. to make the social outcomes systematically responsive to the choices of all affected citizens, the key mechanism for democratic legitimacy relies, as noted earlier, on the congruence between rulers and ruled.¹ In addition to this, democratic procedures also provide room for public contestation in case the standard procedures of congruence fail to deliver (Tilly, 2001). To that end, the principles of democracy and the maximization of freedom of self-determination rely on the voting criterion of a simple majority, which allows for the greatest possible degree of individual liberty and self-determination compatible with the

existence of the social order. In fact, “if an order could not be changed by the will of a simple majority of the subjects but only by the will of all (that means, unanimously), or by the will of a qualified majority (for instance, by a two-thirds majority vote), then one single individual, or a minority of individuals, could prevent a change of the order” (Kelsen, 1945, 286–7; see also Bobbio, 1999, 410–14). This, in fact, maximizes the combined results of two crucial input elements: inclusiveness of interests and responsibility of governors (Lijphart, 1999; Kaiser *et al.*, 2002).

Following from this, the present proposal develops a principle of inclusive democracy granting political power within the decision-making and frame-setting processes of public rules to *all* citizens of the world, regardless of whether or not they are directly affected by a determined set of actions. As in the (conventional) domestic model of democracy, citizens are included in the political structure as members of a *public* constituency, rather than as stakeholders of particular interests, and consequently elect their representatives with a general or non-constrained mandate. Independent from whatever particular stake they may have, individuals are entitled to take part in all public decisions via delegation because these choices deal with public or general interests. These interests may or may not directly affect them, but whether in a public or general capacity, they are interests on which all individuals should be in the position to have a voice of consent/dissent. While room for exception should be left open for those disputes entailing partial interests where specific actors have special status, such as labor agreements, the general principle of universal inclusion should be kept firm as the fundamental ground of democratic practices. Consequently, within the proposed system, agents, qua political agents, cannot simply withdraw from their responsibility on grounds of a low degree of interaction; they cannot abandon the forum of international accountability by hiding behind the veil of exclusionary interaction. For underpinning this system is not only a principle of harm avoidance, but also one of well-being promotion. The commitment to action remains independent from the level of social connectedness, in that it imposes an obligation toward others even in cases of non-contact (non-interaction and non-harm).²

Contrary to the interaction-dependent theories described in the first chapter, the consequentialist imperative determined in this study identifies a major social vulnerability in the fact of political ostracization, and consequently demands the recognition of a duty to improve the fate of deprived foreigners even if interaction were only possible but not yet developed. A universal duty to cooperate toward the promotion of political interaction-cum-inclusion is identified, insofar as this interaction is assumed to deliver a twofold benefit as based on two different kinds of circumstances. On the one hand, exclusion from a profitable interaction means a net loss of opportunity to take advantage of the potential freedom gains thereby generated, which are usually divided among the interacting agents only. On the other hand, ostracism also implies the absence of power to influence the outcomes of this interaction, the

externalities (indirect or unforeseeable, present or future) of which are often to be borne even by the non-interacting parties. Thus the duty of cooperative interaction exists in the form of a duty to build up relations in order to create and facilitate channels of cooperation, and in the form of reducing the degree of exclusion present in both the economic and political spheres of international affairs. Grounded on these observations is the subsequent identification of the political objectives with the need to ensure the possibility of inclusion for those who have not been able to partake in advantageous interactions, and the need to close the gap in representation for those suffering from political exclusion. In order to tackle both phenomena, the first political action must be to minimize the political distance between the decision-making centers and all the actual/possible agents bearing the public consequences of those decisions. In response to such international lacunae this proposal insists on a concentration on legal entitlements to enfranchisement and political participation, as embedded in an appropriately framed system of multilayered political accountability in which individuals are empowered to realize their freedom of choice. This aspect is nowhere more evident than in the prioritization of procedures of the proposed institutional-political framework.

According to the present perspective, a strong accent needs to be placed on the centrality of the procedures of representative participation. The outcome of an unformalized political process (not authorized by a general agreement and not arranged in formal hierarchies) should in fact not take precedence over institutional procedures. The issue concerning the priority between output legitimacy (acceptance created by system effectiveness) and input legitimacy (acceptance created by democratic procedure) represents a highly contentious topic in the current international discussion (Dahl, 1994; Scharpf, 1997; Zürn, 2000). Surprising as it may seem, from a consequentialist point of view political predominance has to be granted to input legitimacy, for only by focusing on this can individual freedom of choice and political participation be guaranteed. At the level of international institutions, what counts in this version of consequentialism is correct political structures and institutional procedures rather than substantive outcomes, since the latter cannot be universally and legitimately compared (see the discussion in the previous chapter on the epistemological limits of interpersonal comparability).

According to the present consequentialist and proceduralist version of democracy, the content of justice tends to overlap with the content of democratic decisions, properly taken. This version resembles the traditional republican understanding of politics in which no absolute notion of collective justice is present, but it is rather a matter of public discovery. Individuals do not have a legitimate notion of justice from the beginning. They need to engage in discussion with the other members of the polity in order to understand what is politically right. Each individual is thus bound to participate in public procedures that, through a sophisticated mechanism, lead to the best approximation to justice. With this, the individual can still argue that single

public decisions are unjust in that they are taken by a fallible public body that claims no more than approximation to justice. But at the same time, the state has sufficient authority to use force in order to impose compliance with the law.

The concentration on institutional guarantees of freedom of choice and autonomy – primarily in terms of individual substantive rights and procedural rights to participation – should not be mistaken, however, for a drift toward deontologism. Such a strategy in fact relies on an indirect method that is grounded in the recognition that “the chief reason society cannot simply judge the rightness of particular outcomes by their utilities is that, even at egregious costs, institutions for doing so would be [epistemologically] unreliable” (Hardin, 1986, 47, my insertion). When the severe limits to information and public cognitive capacities are taken into account, there is no inconsistency in envisaging the coexistence of a second order consequentialist principle (the final arbiter) and different *prima facie* non-consequentialist, agent-relative, and procedural principles as first order rules (the intermediate applicative rules). In this case, the latter are warranted as long as they are presumed to produce – indirectly – a maximizing outcome in the long term, regardless of any deontological, *a priori* or essentialist principles of justice.

The consequentialist selection of the most appropriate institutional framework for a project of global democracy is accordingly based on the assessment of the institutional performance of the different frameworks in relation to the criterion of participation.³ In particular, the method adopted to compare feasible alternative institutional schemes is one that measures procedural and participatory guarantees of the primacy of freedom of choice, rather than direct outcomes.⁴ Differently from other methods of comparison which make extensive use of some sort of interpersonal utility comparisons, the present account is committed to valuing bundles of goods, i.e. legal-institutional entitlements, only indirectly with reference to their contribution to the individual achievement of free choice-maker status. In this, such a conception is not purely recipient-oriented, in that it takes into consideration the causal relation between the institutional scheme and (indirectly through the capability to choose) individual benefits. According to consequentialist cosmopolitanism, alternative institutional schemes should be assessed in terms of the access they accord their participants to the status of free choice-maker. In order to assess the political system best suited to pursuing this goal we have to investigate which institutional setting would best promote freedom; which institutional framework would facilitate the situation in which there is more freedom of choice enjoyed than would otherwise be the case. Since the capability to achieve freedom of choice depends on the guarantees of both vital interests and political participation, these are the two principal variables on which the assessment of alternative institutional frameworks needs to be developed. Such guarantees provide the metric, or “currency,” through which the individual shares supporting comparative judgments about the justice of institutional schemes are defined in consequentialist cosmopolitanism.

The preferred institutional framework should thus be one that reduces the constraints on participation in the decision-making in all the vastly diverse political units dispersed throughout the vertical and horizontal dimensions of social action. In particular, this dual metric of vital interests and political participation entails the combined use of two distinct indexes to measure freedom of choice. The requirements of these two indexes must be satisfied simultaneously and no internal trade-off is allowed for moral and epistemological reasons. The ultimate criterion of justice consists then in the *proximity* of these guarantees to the ideal institutional setting described in this section, i.e. the most secure vital interests possible and the most direct political participation possible according to a principle of subsidiarity. While for vital interests the capability index adopted by the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is a valid candidate (UNDP, 2003, 237–40),⁵ for political participation more traditional measures of freedom such as those provided by the Freedom House could be deployed initially, subject to improvement (Freedom House, 2006). More specifically on the criterion of participation, the two sub-criteria of an optimal framework are decentralization, in order to maximize opportunity, and centralization, in order to avoid exclusion (Pogge, 1992, 58, 64–5; 1995).

A consequentialist analysis of the effectiveness of the institutional framework in ensuring that individuals are actually free to choose and pursue their own ends is even more necessary when envisaging a multilayered system, as problems and conflicts of coordination can arise between differing prescriptions and guarantees at different levels of political actions. Before examining in a more detailed way this notion of multilayered political participation, a delineation of the correlated issue of international responsibility is due.

International responsibility

Consequentialist cosmopolitanism envisages a system of political obligations in terms of guarantees for a set of political entitlements grounding freedom of choice. The normative basis of this consists in the promotion of well-being through freedom of choice, whereas the political devices deployed are determined in terms of accountability. This is due to the double conception of political agency on which this proposal is based, i.e. a conception determined by the opposition of choice-bearers as vulnerable and choice-makers as responsible. It is upon the ground of the consequentialist principle of responsibility – according to which responsibility for the state of the world falls on the agent in proportion to his capacity and position to effect it – that different actors are singled out each time for their effectiveness in producing positive outcomes. Thus, the understanding of consequentialist cosmopolitanism on the issue of agents' responsibility that it is multiple and by degrees. It entails the identification of both individuals, such as citizens, and general collectivities, such as governments, as responsible, depending on their capacity at each political level to influence the final outcome of any course of action in which

they are involved. At the global level, responsible agents are principally international institutions, within which cosmopolitan citizens are embedded. At this level, in fact, many actions (such as the protection of billions of individual rights) can only be carried out by collective agents rather than by mere individuals.

As a consequence of the identification of responsibility with the agent (individual, collective, or multiple) who is in the best position to effect the promotion of well-being, the conception of duties here expounded also responds to the vexed objection of overdemandingness conventionally raised against consequentialism (Smart and Williams, 1973; S. Kagan, 1984). According to this, consequentialism would demand too much from the moral agents and in so doing would not grant legitimate private room for the individual pursuit of personal interests. In demanding sacrifices which are ordinarily considered meritorious but not strictly required, consequentialism would become supererogatory. In response to this, consequentialist cosmopolitanism maintains that an important part of the total normative burden at the international level is borne by collective institutions, whose net of responsibilities, on the one hand, promises to be more effective than (even coordinated) individual actions, and on the other, alleviates much of the moral workload which usually oppresses the single agent.

Institutions, and a fortiori, international institutions, are key actors in delivering international policies regarding the establishment and the preservation of freedom of choice, whereas individuals are most of the time incapable of promoting significant reforms and are left with only the possibility of resistance. Without public institutions, the individual moral burden would indeed be unbearable in that individuals would be endlessly called upon to redress evil situations without having the appropriate capacities and power to do so. Conversely, within institutions, the agent's duties are reduced to the iterative obligation to comply with the partial task (part of a wider scheme of collective coordination) assigned to him. In this way, the moral negligence often blamed on individuals for what concerns collectively caused harm (May, 1992, chapters 5–6) is rebutted and an institutional responsibility is assigned to the effect that the whole problem is addressed through a distribution of liabilities. A key contribution of consequentialist cosmopolitanism is exactly this: that it offers the practical means to address the enlarged field of moral responsibility it recognizes and yet legitimately refuses the moral megalomania according to which a single individual is made directly responsible for the fate of the entire world (Shue, 1988, 696–7).

So far, the model of ideal-theory presented would seem complete. However, while on the side of ideal-theory this could be enough, the real (non-ideal) international social environment exacerbates a number of further moral dilemmas and calls for them to be addressed. The individual alone is again incapable of accommodating such moral demands in a non-ideal world. Collective agents, i.e. political institutions, are thus needed to comply with such international moral duties. In a perfect world, an ideal one,

individuals would take their share of responsibility in terms of support for public institutions, and for the rest would be free to pursue their particular interests. So far, so good, but international reality is not ideal. The situation is such that international institutions, when they exist, are deficient and often incapable of delivering effective measures for the promotion of well-being. The lack of appropriate institutions (e.g. the lack of a world migratory organization lamented by the former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan) and scarce compliance with the existing ones (e.g. the non-compliance with the obligation to fund the United Nations agencies) form the two major problems to be faced at the international level. These generate extra duties on the moral agents. In facing these problems, the further challenging problem arises as to what kind of responsibility an individual in such non-ideal circumstances bears, and if this amounts to overdemandingness.

Despite being for the most part concentrated on presenting a project of global justice as ideal-theory, the present proposal needs nonetheless to take a position on the issue of non-ideal theory for at least two crucial reasons. First, non-ideal theory partially overlaps with the domain of ideal theory (see the discussion on the site of distributive justice below) so that the latter cannot be fully understood and justified without an examination – however cursory – of the former.⁶ Second, applied ethics such as global ethics needs to take into consideration actual circumstances to avoid projects which would otherwise be socially sterile. Hence, global ethics has to elaborate a normative stance on the issue of international responsibility in the present circumstances that needs to address the objections of overdemandingness in a non-ideal situation. Three intertwined dichotomies are at stake in this debate on international responsibility: monism/dualism; ideal/non-ideal theory; and individual/collective responsibility. In this section I will only discuss the first two, whereas the third will be examined in the next section.

To begin with, a note of clarification on the specific meaning of public institutions in play in this particular discussion is required. Unlike the general definition of institutions adopted earlier by this study, according to which both formal and informal clusters of stable norms were included under the term institution, the following discussion has a narrower focus which targets formal public institutions only. This coincides with Rawls's definition of institutions as "a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, power and immunities, and the like" (Rawls, 1971, 55). Rawls's discussion, however, applies only to certain kinds of public institutions that bear a particular importance in terms of individual life-prospects. He holds that "the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" (*ibid.*, 7).

One way to tackle the issues of overdemandingness and non-ideal theory is through the dispute as to whether the principles of justice that apply to institutions and to individuals are different in kind or not (respectively, dualism or

monism).⁷ This issue is relevant for the public debate on justice for reasons that refer ultimately to the possibility of a society being just if the normative function of public institutions is respected, regardless of the behavior of the individuals beyond the reach of that function. On this, while philosophers such as Rawls and Pogge maintain the individual principle of justice to be different from the institutional principles (dualism or pluralism), others, such as Cohen and Murphy, deny it (monism), though from distinct perspectives. Consequentialism and the present proposal tend to favor the latter position.

Rawls holds that individuals have a twofold (natural) duty: “to support and comply with just institutions that exist and apply to them” and (alternatively or simultaneously, depending on the circumstances) “to further just arrangements not yet established” (Rawls, 1971, 115, 333–7). The intuition underpinning this position is that once they have managed to establish, or are fully committed to establishing just institutions, individuals can legitimately pursue other objectives independent from those for which the institutions are envisaged. Beyond complying with their fair share of duty under an institutional scheme, they should be let free to advance their ends within the overall framework of coercive structures. This dualist stance has a certain degree of reasonableness while we remain in the domain of the ideal-theory as full-compliance, as agreed above, but it becomes much more controversial when non-ideal conditions form the social-political background of the case. International affairs present a situation of non-ideal theory, both because of the lack of adequate international institutions and because of the high level of non-compliance with the existing ones.

Two examples will help to make the case clearer. Suppose, first, that there is a general consensus on the evil of world poverty (but suppose, falsely, that such poverty is not life-threatening) and that the recognition of this moral observation consequently generates an international duty to alleviate it. Under these circumstances two principal poverty reduction strategies are conceivable as related to the present discussion: either a direct attack on poverty through the beneficent actions of individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or an indirect long-term plan to foster an appropriate international institution-building process. Which strategy should be prioritized? (Singer, 1972, 1977; Murphy, 1998). The second case is similar. Suppose a situation arises of partial compliance with an existing institutional practice. Suppose an institution exists that, with full compliance by its members, would be effective in reducing poverty. But also suppose that some of the members free-ride. Should the remaining “good” members compensate for the burden left uncovered (i.e. do more than their fair share)? How binding is their residual responsibility when others have already defaulted? (Goodin, 1985, 140–1; Goodin and Pettit, 1986, 675; Pogge, 1995).

Both cases show the limits of an intrinsically dualist approach. In the first case a dualist would suggest going for the long-term institution-building process. In the second, he would agree that the good member should abstain from compensating for the burden left by the free-riders. In both cases, such

considerations would be generated by a reasoning that does not take into account the promotion of well-being in a consequentialist manner. In fact, it is at least possible that the total amount of well-being, defined as freedom of choice, produced by dualist strategies would be inferior to that produced by the corresponding alternatives. This relates to a fundamental problem the intrinsically dualist approach runs up against on account of the inevitably necessary continuous upgrading of the systems of justice. It is possible to imagine that the situation in which the individual can promote well-being more through individual than institutional action is due to the missed opportunity to upgrade of a non-ideal situation towards an ideal one. Following this, the need for continuous political revision of public institutions can be seen as a matter of maximal urgency in order to reallocate responsibility among agents in an optimal manner (Goodin and Pettit, 1986, 673). Non-ideal situations in fact occur not only because human societies are moving only slowly toward more just forms of social organization, but also because social reality is continuously changing and producing new unjust situations. Assuming this, an intrinsically dualist position is brought up short by its incapacity to guide the necessary upgrading mechanism which inevitably has to deal with non-ideal situations.

These observations about the limits of an intrinsically (or non-instrumental) dualist position lead by contrast to the consequentialist solution, according to which the ultimate and trumping principle guiding the selection of alternative policies has to be the promotion of well-being. Dualism and its institutional correlate are acceptable, but only as first order principles to be assessed by the ultimate consequentialist norm. Dualist institutionalism, thus, can be warranted only under the condition that its deployment is more conducive to the promotion of well-being than alternative courses of action. When institutions can be established to right an unjust situation, the solution of consequentialist cosmopolitanism consists in the prescription of a rule that universally guarantees a set of rights to the protection of vital interests together with those of political participation. When appropriate institutions cannot be immediately created, however, a sensitive balance has to be struck between normative principles and empirical considerations, and most probably short-term actions *coupled* with long-term political projects. In both cases, acknowledging the distinction between vital and secondary interests and the centrality of the dual metric of justice presented above, individuals are required to sacrifice their secondary interests to the extent of promoting collective actions to tackle others' deprivation of vital interests and political participation. In this sense, ideal and non-ideal theory must be consistent, but nevertheless remain distinct.

In this section, a characterization of the institutional aspect of consequentialist international responsibility has been presented with particular focus on individual duties in both ideal and non-ideal circumstances. The next section completes this presentation through the examination of the consequentialist method of assigning individual and collective responsibility to different

international political agents. Unlike the cases discussed so far, in this case the focus is on the extent to which the individual can be blamed for actions or omissions of the collectives to which he belongs, rather than the collective body in its entirety.

Cosmopolitan political agency

Not everything in our moral existence refers to individual actions. A great number of morally relevant consequences are in fact the result of actions taken or omitted by collective agents. This is true above all where consequences with an international dimension are concerned. Despite the decisive cause of any moral act ultimately being singular – i.e. caused by an individual step – the responsibility of certain kinds of actions is not assigned to individuals *uti singuli*, but *uti universi* – i.e. a corporate body.⁸ In such cases of corporate responsibility, the reward or punishment is conferred on the collective entity and no individual is considered guilty as a single, private agent, though he can still be affected by the collective reward/punishment in an indirect way as a member of the group. This is exemplified in instances of state warfare or corporate bankruptcy. In such cases legal liability is typically associated with the public and collective agent rather than any specific individual, and yet in the ultimate analysis, it is the individuals who pay the price, and receive the punishment. This being the case, a normative question arises as to that extent to which this conventional association is plausible from a moral point of view. Conversely, to what extent is this association a refined rhetorical tool to exempt one from individual responsibility or, baldly stated, to wash one's hands? In this section, the credibility of this ethical distinction is investigated with reference to the case of international or cosmopolitan political agents. The core issue under scrutiny is thus the determination of individual vs. institutional responsibility. First, the dichotomy of the individual vs. the collective is examined; then the components of collective agency are analyzed in the forms of responsibility and accountability.

The notion of political agency necessarily entails two distinct aspects of the concept of moral agency – the individual and the collective. Not surprisingly, the differing acceptance of the validity of these aspects is especially stark when responsibility is considered transnationally. While the extension of the concept of individual moral agency from the domestic to the international domain is, from a normative point of view, rather straightforward – e.g. in the case of human rights – the distinctly collective and institutional aspects of moral agency appear, at least *prima facie*, more controversial. Thus, while cosmopolitan citizenship as regards the issue of refugees is commonly accepted as imbued with transnational ethical-political value, the status of international or cosmopolitan institutions as full moral agents is much more contested. According to Lewis, an especially certain ethical principle is that no one can be responsible for the conduct of another. From this he concludes that if insurmountable difficulties in attributing responsibility to the individual

arise, then rather than revert to the “barbarous” notion of collective or group responsibility we should give up altogether the view that we are accountable in any distinctively moral sense (Lewis, 1948, 3).⁹ This position is highly dubious.

At the international level, the point of contention concerns the viability of the domestic analogy as a mechanism for attributing responsibilities to collective agents (Suganami, 1989). An argument against this possibility is that, states or international organizations have often been seen as bodies with a special moral status, which conventionally allows for exemption from standard norms of action – as in the realist tradition of thought. Clarifying the moral status of institutions – be they states or international organizations – is, however, of extreme importance in the global domain, since a number of morally determined international actions can only be delivered by collective bodies, such as intergovernmental or supranational institutions. Environmental crises, international migratory flows, and humanitarian interventions are all examples of situations requiring cooperative institutional management rather than individual commitment. The apportioning of moral responsibility toward protection of the vulnerable at the collective level therefore forms a major priority on the normative agenda of global politics.¹⁰

In opposition to most realist assumptions on governmental moral agency, consequentialist cosmopolitanism claims that it is indeed viable to assign moral agency, and corresponding responsibility, collectively to institutions, beyond the traditional individual attribution. The first step in this assignment consists in the clarification of the general notion of collective moral agents through the individuation of the principal features of institutional agency in the capacity for moral deliberation and action, and the condition of effective freedom to exercise this capacity (O’Neill, 1986b, 2001). More specifically, the following characteristics have to be met by collectivities or institutions in order to qualify as moral agents. A collective agent, also referred to as a conglomerate collectivity,¹¹ has an identity that is more than the sum of the identities of its constitutive parts, i.e. it is not exhausted by the aggregate of the identities of the members, and therefore extends over time and conceives of itself as a unit. This agent also has an internal organization and/or a decision-making structure with differently defined roles and an executive function that allows for the allocation of power within the organization. And finally, this collective agent holds to different, often more stringent, standards of conduct than those standards that apply outside the collective body (French, 1984, 13–16; Erskine, 2004, 26).

This restricted definition of collective agents has been adopted for its particular political relevance, in that it allows including political organizations, such as states and international institutions, to be included in the moral exercise of allocating responsibilities. Notwithstanding their social relevance, random collections of individuals (e.g. bystanders around the pond where a man is drowning) are, for the moment, excluded from consideration for their minimal applicability to the determination of the political context (V. Held,

1970). Thus, only cases of conjunctive, rather than disjunctive, collective responsibility are discussed here. Quite the opposite of the case of bystanders, in fact, the institutional cooperation of individual agents acting as a political organization represents a key distinguishing factor here.¹² Once these characteristics are identified in any political institution under scrutiny, precise political responsibility can be assigned more effectively.

Collective political responsibility can be broadly understood by pointing to a fundamental dichotomy between *atomistic* and *structuralist* or organic interpretations of social organization, according to which either single individuals or the entire group are, respectively, made nominally accountable for a group's actions (S. Wolf, 1985, 269–70). While in the first case responsibility leads to the indictment of an individual perpetrator (e.g. a specific public officer) according to a notion of exact and direct liability, a further specification can be elaborated concerning the second case, which, in going beyond a strictly legalistic and individualistic model, enlarges the current social dimension of political responsibility. The structuralist interpretation of social organization can be specified in two sub-meanings of collective responsibility: *separatim* and *collegialiter*. When culpability is assigned *separatim*, it refers to non-direct actors being held accountable through a vicarious and distributive liability. That is, the sum total of members' responsibilities – including the proportional recognition of special institutional roles – is assigned to the whole collective, on the grounds of a previous authorization from the members. This kind of responsibility assumes that all the members may be held liable even though not all of them are personally and directly at fault, in that this is considered a burden associated with group membership. If anyone wants to avoid such a burden he need only opt out of the group, possibly seeking asylum in another (Feinberg, 1968, 683; Warner, 1991, 62–9; E. Kelly, 2003). Conversely, when culpability is assigned *collegialiter*, it is apportioned in a non-distributive and corporate way to the entire collectivity or institution, intended as distinct from and superior to its individual components. In this case, the collective institution, and not its individual members, is blamed and obliged to make reparations or accept punishment, despite the fact that it is the combined actions of individuals that produces the faulty result in question (French, 1974, 282–5; Erskine, 2001, 70–4; 2003, 2004).

An example may help clarify the distinction between the concept of *separatim* and *collegialiter* within the structuralist interpretation of collective responsibility. Imagine a concert by a famous jazz trio at a jazz festival. The concert is very enjoyable but is unfortunately brought to a premature end by the lead musician. During the concert, a number of people began to take pictures of the trio and the lead took these actions to be a breach of the agreement he “signed” with the public before the concert started. He had, in fact, before the concert began, asked the public not to take any pictures or make my video-recordings. He was very firm and despite the fact the public could not effectively reply to such a request, we assume the “agreement” was valid

for the sake of the example. Now, according to a separatim interpretation, each individual member of the of the audience is considered responsible – not for what he individually did (taking or not taking the picture), but because he was part of the audience attending the concert. If an assigned collective responsibility is unfulfilled, then each individual has to be penalized, in this case by missing the rest of the concert and wasting part of the price of the ticket. According to the collegialiter interpretation, conversely, the public as such is considered responsible. In cases of non-compliance with the duties related to the assigned responsibility, the punishment should be collective. In this case, the festival itself should be penalized (e.g. by paying a penalty fee to the lead musician), but the concert should have continue or at least the public should be reimbursed.

With regard to this, consequentialist cosmopolitanism fosters a third, alternative understanding of institutional responsibility, in which moral responsibility is multiple, by degrees, and crucially embedded in democratic reflexivity. This entails the identification of both “non-acting” vicarious members – such as citizens (or jazz fans) – and general collectivities – such as governments and other political organizations properly structured (or the organizers of the jazz festival) – as responsible, depending on their capacity to influence the final outcome of each course in which they are involved.¹³ At the global level in particular, responsible agents are principally international institutions within which cosmopolitan citizens are embedded. While the stress on the capacity to influence the social outcome, rather than a priori criteria, characterizes the present approach as consequentialist, the framing of moral agency and political responsibility on several layers of social actions, including the global, represents a defining characteristic of the cosmopolitan project. At least from Kant onward, the idea of enlarging the domain of political liability (and not merely political power) to a field which is neither domestic nor interstate has been at the core of supranational models of world organization. The identification of the extant interdependence of global issues, global agents, and global responsibilities is consistent with this idea and brings clarity to it.

Within this delineation of collective responsibility, the centrality of democratic reflexivity should also be stressed because it relates to the political character of institutional moral agency. Intended as a normative ideal, democratic congruence remains central in order to distinguish a political association from an economic enterprise. In fact, a number of significant features can be identified that mark the difference between these two kinds of collectives. While in the economic corporation the main (single) motive for participation is self-profit, bound within an exclusive and hierarchical structure, in the political-democratic collective other motives can also be individuated, including a (perhaps thin) sense of solidarity embedded in an impartial and inclusive institutional structure. It suffices here to dispute claims that the model of the state and that of private corporations have a common identity, and also to serve a warning on the excessive use of this parallel when shaping

the model for collective moral agency (contra French, 1984; Runciman, 2000; Erskine, 2001).

From what has been argued, a dual transnational duty can be identified, which is charged to a number of political agents depending on their capacity to accomplish the objective of that duty. These agents include supranational institutions, supranational collective bodies, states, and individuals. An initial duty consists in the obligation to create the political opportunities within which the system of consequentialist cosmopolitanism can be pursued. This obligation consists in trying to establish or reform international institutions so as to make them able to tackle effectively the global problems for which they were created, e.g. global poverty, nuclear containment, transnational organized crime, demography, migration, environmental degradation, the spread of infectious diseases, war, global economy, and cyber crime (V. Held, 1970; Shue, 1980, 60; Goodin, 1985, 136–9; Erskine, 2004, 39–40).¹⁴ Such institutions would thus be endowed with the practical capabilities necessary to comply with their mission. Hence, the case for considering them as moral agents would be even clearer. As Wolf has argued:

the point is that although organizations lack the capacity to be motivated to adopt moral goals and constraints, they have the capacity to be guided by them. Since they have this capacity, there seems no reason not to insist that they exercise it.

(S. Wolf, 1985, 282)

From this initial duty arises a second that applies only in cases concerned with already existing international institutions. In such cases, there is an obligation on the relevant members of the institution to take an active part in the decision-making process of the organization (in a minimal sense at least, i.e. voting), and subsequently to comply with its decisions.

In order to clarify the substance of this second duty, however, it is necessary to tackle the issue of accountability. It is only through the correct normative framing of this theme that a viable institutional guarantee of democratic congruence can be individuated and appropriate mechanisms for the division of ethical-political labor can be unfolded. In this respect, the coupling of the procedural argument with that on democratic participation as a tool for welfare promotion leads to the identification of representation – through direct elections – as a fundamental requirement for institutional accountability. Only through the minimization of the distance between those who take the decisions and those who bear the consequences of those decisions can the individual's capacity for free choice be maximized. The respect for the will of individuals is in fact directly proportional to the proximity of individuals themselves to their representative. But not only are a limited mandate and the possibility of close scrutiny essential to the effective implementation of individuals' choices; it is also fundamental to oblige the violator of the institutional mandate to give account of his wrongdoing, and eventually to be punished proportionally.

In this regard, the present consideration of accountability complements the issue of responsibility presented above. A traditional dilemma concerning the issue of accountability of institutions relates to the possibility of implicating the right parties, and only them, as responsible for any specific action produced by the institution, while at the same time recognizing the normative value of majority voting as liability creator. In this case, it has to be noted, the relationship under scrutiny is not that of empirical causality, but that of normative imputation, which establishes a link between a fact and a criminal category, and between a crime and a responsible party. On the issue of imputation, as linked to that of political agency, the response of a consequentialist approach consists in stressing the importance of democratic participation and procedures.

A duty to partake in the decision-making process is the normative tool that allows for the clarification of the imputation within collective organizations in terms of causal responsibility for the outcome (Goldman, 1999).¹⁵ If the institutional channels for democratic congruence are guaranteed, then every member of the institution becomes responsible for the final decision taken by the representative assembly, in proportion to the voter/representative ratio. In this sense, the individual should be ready to bear the cost of the collective decision, in so far as he is a full constitutive member of the collectivity. From another point of view, this means that no easy excuse can be legitimately advanced for completely refusing one's co-responsibility for a specific public decision, if this decision is taken through a fair and democratic process of deliberation. Individual disclaimers such as "Not in My Name" during a war conflict are to be rebutted if not accompanied by a proactive oppositional engagement in the political life of one's own country.¹⁶ In this latter case, the protest could be seen as a political struggle to influence the next elections, under the assumption that participation through voting is fulfilled. And yet, it seems difficult to find convincing political grounds, except those of ultimate collective fallibility, on which to criticize the decisions taken by a qualified majority through fair and democratic procedures. Conversely, if no democratic procedure is established, then no individual-as-part-of-a-collective responsibility can be imputed, and only individual liability can be attributed for specific actions or deliberation, as in the case of an oligarchic or tyrannical regime.

Having examined a number of aspects of the institutional proposal of consequentialist cosmopolitanism, it is now time to move the discussion on to the presentation of the political structure as shaped by consequentialist principles. The next sections thus present more details on the multilayered political structure of the system envisaged. As an introductory step, a discussion on the key issue of the drawing of jurisdictional boundaries needs to be developed first.

Drawing jurisdictional boundaries: an all-inclusive method

The problem of jurisdictions represents a key, controversial challenge for any kind of multilayered political system,¹⁷ and a fortiori for any theory of

democracy pursuing completeness.¹⁸ It consists of the question of who is entitled to decide on which issues, i.e. on the boundaries of the group endowed with decision-making power, democratically exercised. Obviously, this problem (conventionally referred to as the boundary problem, the problem of inclusion, the problem of membership, or the problem of constituting the demos) constitutes a logical priority for the specification of the democratic rules that are adopted for determining the right decision-making procedures. This problem is as crucial to any democratic theory as it is under-explored in the literature. A number of commentators go so far as to deny the possibility of solving the problem (basically, leaving the solution to history), and more modestly limit the applicability of the democratic principles to decision-making issues. Current increased international interdependence, however, puts such tacit understanding of the problem under pressure and calls for a reassessment of the entire traditional democratic structure. The wave of interest in global democracy has thus as a side effect caused a light to be turned on this fundamental problem, and in particular on the problem of multilayered and intermingled political systems. How should the legitimate demos in a complex system, that is *de facto* operating across boundaries, be determined?

The problem of drawing jurisdictional boundaries as applied to the case of global democracy requires finding an appropriate mechanism to be found for determining the following key elements: a) which institutional sub-units and level of action should be recognized and endowed with authority in any specific circumstance, b) how the different levels of political actions are interlinked, c) which level has priority over the others, and d) where exactly the boundaries between the different domains of action should be drawn. The first element that needs to be highlighted from the present perspective is the determination of the layers as grounded on a criterion of ethical-political relevance in terms of the effect on freedom of choice, i.e. each level is distinguished by its impact on a specific sphere of freedom of action. While at the state level all those actions are included that primarily affect individual freedom of choice as collectively expressed through state policies, at the global level the actions at stake are all those having a world scope that transcends national boundaries. Of course, spillover effects and overlapping boundaries always exist, but a differentiation between primary and secondary jurisdictional priorities can be depicted as a way of marking normative boundaries. In this sense, a relatively clear-cut distinction between jurisdictions can be delineated, though it is one that inevitably remains subject to political revision through public debate, and that while maintaining difference, still maintains such jurisdictions as interlinked. For it is correct to contest the traditional demarcation of boundaries associated with the primacy of state sovereignty in recognition of the international and transnational dimension of political justice (Goodin, 2002), but it is equally misleading to suggest an unqualified decompartmentalization – that no boundaries can be drawn at all and that every action has to be considered a global event, as if it were a butterfly-wing beat in the theory of chaos.

A major challenge for international political theory consists in outlining a jurisdictional design able to be sociologically significant – i.e. able to include relevant impact factors of current life interaction – and yet normatively consistent – i.e. ultimately universal and non-exclusionary in kind. Given the current social structure, it is plausible to reckon that major aspects of individuals' life projects are anchored in a multilayered set of social domains. And yet, while there are people whose lives are increasingly (or fully) transnational, there are still many who spend most of their life in their place of birth, having only limited contact with the world at large, despite being to some degree affected by decisions taken abroad. Imposing a radical and global change on such a social reality, in order, for instance, to implement a straightforward scheme of global redistributive justice, would be, not least, incredibly costly in social terms. A better strategy, then, consists in shaping a political system able to trace social interaction, as it is currently structured, and to bridge the widening gap between responsibility and vulnerability. Rather than recommending epistemologically dubious, large-scale redistribution, political theory needs rather to figure out institutional settings that allow for full democratic congruence between choice-makers and choice-bearers. As is often the case, it is a matter of diversifying the empirical focus so as to cover the multiplicity of social reality, while at the same time unifying this diversity through axiological principles in order to avoid fragmentation and ethical indeterminacy. Only by guaranteeing the conditions for free choice in each current sphere of socio-political action can the best opportunities for personal development be offered and world well-being maximized.

A right system should avoid both under-inclusion (i.e. excluding those who are entitled to take part) and over-inclusion (i.e. including those who are not entitled to take part) (Goodin, 2007). While examples of the former can be found throughout this book, examples of the latter should be considered to include all those situations that we usually depict as authoritarian, in which an upper institution intervenes with a lower one, infringing the principle of autonomy – e.g. a central government intervening in the specific decisions of local authorities. Jurisdictional boundaries have to be drawn in a way that matches in each specific case the relevant demos and the relevant individuals. Traditional state-based systems are failing in this respect because they are sometimes over-inclusive and most of the time under-inclusive. In order to reduce the gap between the current mismatch and the ideal matching of decision-making to the right demos, a system has to be envisaged that is able to draw jurisdictional boundaries that avoid the evil of exclusion. Once the universalist and all-inclusive character of the political principles in use is ascertained, the remaining task of accommodating multilevel dimensionality has to be pursued through the categorization of the principal levels of political interaction, which are deemed to be the most critical domains in terms of individual capacity of choice. What is key is to keep this partition normatively consistent through the deployment of a single principle of justice – the maximization of world well-being through freedom of choice – differently applied

at the various levels of political action through the principle of political participation.

With regards to the problem of jurisdictions, this study envisages an all-inclusive political authority entitled to draw jurisdictional boundaries on top of the jurisdictional scale. This is basically supported by two kinds of argument. On the one hand, individuals should be entitled to have a voice on public decisions that have a general political impact on their society. Globally speaking, the granting of political entitlement to all individuals regardless of their nationality derives from the cosmopolitan perspective according to which the whole of humanity is considered as a single polity with responsibilities and vulnerabilities accordingly apportioned. On the other hand, an all-inclusive system is also needed in order to solve disputes over the interpretation of jurisdictional boundaries. It is, in fact, only through an all-inclusive world system that the drawing of jurisdictional boundaries can be implemented democratically and the problem of political exclusion avoided. Exclusion is considered legitimate only when its boundaries are collectively decided through an all-inclusive procedure. Only self-exclusion is legitimate. As much as an individual preserves his or her freedom while being at the same time ruler and ruled, so equally he/she preserves his or her political inclusion while being at the same time included and self-excluded. As has already been recognized in the domestic context, only when an individual is entitled to participate in the delineation of jurisdictional boundaries can he/she feel not excluded, for he/she has a valid and publicly recognized voice to claim inclusion in a relevant jurisdictional domain. When this is not the case, any individual or group could be excluded by more powerful actors claiming they are the only relevant agents in the jurisdictional interaction at stake.

It is too easy to recall the thousands of protest mobilizations currently carried out by global activists on both specific and global issues from which they feel excluded (J. Smith *et al.*, 1997; della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; della Porta, 2007). These mobilizations very much resemble the struggles for inclusion carried out not so many years ago at the domestic level by women and black activists. When using the slogan “you eight, we six million” against the G8 in Genoa, global activists claimed to speak for a much more inclusive constituency that remains systematically ostracized by the current institutional arrangements. Similarly, the issue of transnational migration also suggests the need to envisage a more inclusive system of decision-making. Migrants feel structurally excluded and continuously claim the right of a balanced mechanism through which their entitlements could be weighed with those of the residents in a more legitimate way (Marchetti, 2008b). In order to guarantee fair participation in decision-making and frame-setting processes at the global level, a prior institutional step is thus necessary in order to guarantee all-inclusive participation in the drawing of jurisdictional boundaries. This is the key mechanism to avoid transnational exclusion and it is the key argument in disputing competitor cosmopolitan theories of global democracy, as shown in the next section.

Alternative methods for drawing jurisdictional boundaries

As has been argued, the criterion for drawing jurisdictional boundaries is key to any proposal for global democracy insofar as it entails the legitimate allocation of competence on the different institutional levels. The question here is the following: Who has the right to decide on which issues? This question remains central for understanding the ideological bases of transnational exclusion and for redressing them. In the ultimate analysis, all competitor theories fail to address adequately the issue of transnational exclusion, in that they rely on a notion of political justice that is interaction-dependent (see Chapter one). They systematically exclude all those individuals and groups that are not part of a predetermined interaction. It is thus of fundamental importance to address them carefully. Beyond the non-globalist/contextualist positions that are discussed in Chapter five, three principal alternatives occupy the current debate on global democracy: the all-inclusive model; the stakeholder model; and the political autonomy model. I will discuss the last two in contrast to the proposal for an all-inclusive model of global democracy that I presented in the previous section.

The method for drawing jurisdictional boundaries that is promoted most in the current debate on global democracy is the all-affected method (Pogge, 1992; D. Held, 2002; Keohane, 2003; D. Held, 2004a; Goodin, 2007). This method is based on a principle of interaction-dependent justice according to which only those who are affected by a decision (the impactees) should be entitled to have a say in it. And conversely, all affecting political actors should be accountable to the affected individuals. Regardless of territorial boundaries, this method entails the application of the principle of political participation to different constituencies, be they local, national, or transnational. Hence, while on the one hand this method goes beyond the current state system by enlarging the sphere of political consideration, on the other it remains exclusionary, in that it is based on the idea that only those who are part of a determined interaction should have a voice; for where no intercourse occurs, no duty of political justice applies.

The principle of reciprocity forms the basis of interaction-dependent versions of justice. Moral agents are not, according to this view, charged with positive obligations of beneficence (which remain in the domain of supererogation), but rather they are simply under a negative duty of non-harm and non-interference. Beyond such a strict duty of non-harm and the relative duty of compensation, individuals are not recognized as having any further “natural” obligation except for that of reciprocity, which applies in the case of voluntary cooperative practices. Were they to enter into a social relationship in order to pursue an advantage, this voluntary step in their personal interest would then compel them to comply with a fairness principle of justice. If an agreement is stipulated, one has a duty to keep to it, but there is no duty to stipulate it *ab initio*. In line with the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* (meaning “agreements must be respected”), the principle of

reciprocity maintains that “if one benefits from some co-operative practice, one should not be a ‘free rider’ by taking the benefits while failing to do one’s part in sustaining the practice when it is one’s turn to do so” (B. Barry, 1991; reprinted, 2005, 530). Still, no duty of justice exists to enter into a cooperative practice. Since the principle of fair play and reciprocal justice is conditional, according to this perspective, the most one “can say about a society that does not have such a scheme is that it suffers from collective irrationality in that it is passing up a chance to do itself some good” (*ibid.*, 531).

Correlated to the all-affected method is the model of stakeholder democracy, according to which all agents holding a relevant stake as members of a specific social interaction are entitled to participate in the political decision-making (Pogge, 2002b; Macdonald and Macdonald, 2006; Young, 2006; Bauböck, 2007b). Pogge, in particular, holds that the duty of justice toward every other person, which can be discharged merely by not cooperating in the imposition of an unjust institutional scheme, is conditioned on the contingent presence of social interaction and consequently does not exist with respect to the plurality of self-contained communities (Pogge, 1992, 51; 1998; Dobson, 2006). Pogge admits that prior to any trading there would still be fairly weak duties of morality in terms of beneficence, but he is firm in maintaining that there would be no duties of justice (Pogge, 2000, 166–7). Another similar version of the stakeholder model is that based on human rights, recently re-elaborated by Gould (Gould, 2004, 174–80; 2006). According to this model “people at a distance are to be regarded as affected by a decision if their human rights are affected, where these include economic and social, as well as civil and political, rights” (Gould, 2004, 178). This would envisage a number of interlinked and possibly overlapping communities that would stretch across borders and be delimited by the interaction related to human rights.

According to the present perspective, this interpretation of democracy has to be rebutted on the grounds of both a number of specific objections (outlined in the next paragraph) and a general argument. According to the general argument, democracy is interpreted as a system that allows for the participation of all its members on the ground of the public component of political decisions. It is not only because I have a specific stake (mostly generated by a causal relation) that I am entitled to vote in a democracy; it is also because the political system is in place to formulate and take decisions that have a public value. Political decisions may or may not directly affect me, and yet I should still be entitled to have a say on discussions and decisions that have general consequences that affect the public. In national democratic systems, citizens are enfranchised not only, as the stakeholder model would argue, because parliament takes decisions that affect them, but also because parliament takes decisions with a public value that may or may not directly affect them. MPs, in fact, have a general mandate that allows them to vote on a number of non-specific issues. By contrast, a hypothetical stakeholder system should consistently envisage an almost infinite number of political bodies with a

determined mandate to decide only on the specific issues for which they have been delegated. Were this not the case, the system would be over-inclusive, i.e. including also those that are not entitled to be so included. All of these stakeholder characteristics remain, however, far from being aligned with our more profound intuitions on the principles of political justice. The atomistic foundation of the stakeholder model should thus be rebutted, for it is based on a self-regarding attitude that is unable fully to grasp the characteristic of impartiality at the root of political justice. Only by recognizing the public component of any political decision, beyond the bargaining between private interests, can the value of political entitlements be comprehensively understood and consequently associated with an all-inclusive model of democracy.

Beyond the previous general consideration, there three more specific, and fatal, objections to the all-affected/stakeholder model: two are internal and one is external.¹⁹ First, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to specify who is affected by any kind of action. The principle risks running aground on indeterminacy. Chaos theory's description of the butterfly effects is an extreme, yet illuminating, example of the indeterminacy of effect. Furthermore, if the possible effects of omitted decisions are also taken into consideration, the situation becomes then even more difficult. But even when a more moderate view is adopted and some kind of determinate relations can be assumed, two issues remain unsolved. On the one hand, the causal relation can only be established *ex post*: the question of Who is entitled to vote on a decision cannot be determined until after that very decision has been taken. On the other hand, the issue of interpretation still remains open. Who has the authority to resolve conflicting interpretations on whether and what kind of interaction is taking place? Non-institutional, social contestation cannot be a viable criterion, for it too easily runs the risk of being influenced by social and economic power. If no specific and legitimate causal relation can be established, no political responsibility and accountability can be determined, and consequently no common jurisdiction can be defined. Second, actions provoke differential effects: some people are more affected than others. Since the extent of influence is different, then in principle the more affected should be entitled to a weightier voice – perhaps differing voting power or multiple votes. Common jurisdiction could be established, but the very principle of equality would be disputed and the democratic ideal would collapse. Third, and more important from the present perspective, the all-affected principle fails to deliver a non-exclusionary system in that the “non-caused” and “non-directly caused” victims would be excluded.

The example of an independent island clarifies this latter objection. According to the all-affected/stakeholder model, no obligation of justice would exist for external, wealthier communities to help improve the condition of a deprived island if this was fully independent in causal terms. No common jurisdiction could be envisaged with such an island, since the key element of interaction between the richer communities and the deprived island would be missing. The citizens of the island could starve, and yet the

richer citizens would have only a Samaritan-style duty – a supererogatory duty with no corresponding right – if they did not causally provoke such situation. According to such an exclusionary perspective, in fact, the moral and political agent is under no duty of justice to create *ex novo* an interaction in at least two crucial cases: Justice does not bind the moral agent to build up a relationship either a) to help other needy agents, or b) to promote a better overall outcome regardless of his personal benefit. In both cases, rather than a strict duty of justice, only a thin and imperfect obligation of beneficence applies, with its correlate of conditional blame and guilty. Ultimately, this attitude equates to indifference to the injustices not immediately occasioned by the moral agent in question. To use the famous case of a passive bystander seeing a child drowning in the pond: this attitude is the equivalent of the passive stance, the *justly* walking away attitude.²⁰

The other major method for drawing jurisdictional boundaries refers to the principle of political autonomy (Charvet, 1999; Habermas, 2004; reprinted 2006, section 7.I.5–7; Nagel, 2005; Christiano, 2006; Habermas, 2006; Ypi, 2007). According to this more “continental-Hegelian” position, the jurisdictional boundaries of democratic states are key, and any further step toward upper multilayered democracy requires strict conditions to be met. In sum, despite the existence of some sort of global principles of justice, boundaries should remain as close as possible to the current ones, for individuals already enjoy a status of citizenship that guarantees them rights and duties within the national institutional framework. Moral cosmopolitanism, in this limited view, does not thus entail institutional cosmopolitanism. Different reasons are provided for this. Nagel, following Rawls, formulates a political conception according to which justice is understood as a specific associative virtue embedded in established social institutions that are able to both guarantee rights and impose obligations. Sovereignty and equality remain two intertwined notions that cannot be untied. Christiano argues in favor of the conservation principle, as based on two sub-arguments: the state is the only current entity with a capacity to judge the justice or injustice of a social and political order in an egalitarian way (the capacity for justice argument); and modern democratic states constitute a common world for their citizens, i.e. a world in which most fundamental interests are intertwined (the common world argument). Habermas maintains that the analogy of the state of nature does not apply to the systems of states, in that a viable legal institutional framework is already in place. A world domestic politics based on respect for human rights should instead be favored, without this implying the creation of a world state. Finally, Ypi maintains that polities as associative contexts are needed in a non-ideal world, for they provide two key elements: mechanisms that can impose mutual political constraints upon members (popular sovereignty); and a basis for mutual agreement which progressively educates citizens to a voluntary concern for cosmopolitan goals (civic education). Only with the transformation of world society can a truly multilayered system be established according to principles of global and cosmopolitan justice.

In response to the political method for drawing jurisdictional boundaries, two kinds of consideration can be developed with regard to the need for a multilayered system and a global demos. To begin with, the global democracy proposal does not entail deleting the traditional bases of social and institutional political life at the domestic level. It only implies an addition of further levels of political interaction (i.e. enlarging the scope of responsibility and accountability) that need to be consistently combined with the lower, traditional levels. The state as a locus for political justice would remain an important component in the overall political system. Most public services, from the administration of legal justice to the provision of welfare support, would most likely still be managed through state infrastructures. And yet, some competencies would be moved up to the higher levels to respond to the need for transnational justice. For instance, a clear case that can hardly be handled by the political community perspective is that of failed/failing states. It is in cases such as these that a supranational authority remains decisive for tackling urgent social and political problems through genuinely humanitarian interventions. In order to create such a system, we thus need to re-frame the political structure on several layers. A multilevel system is fundamental for the project of global democracy. But it is perhaps not enough if not complemented by its social correlate. Together with a multilayered institutional framework, a viable project of global democracy also needs a global demos. The impossibility of such a demos is, as a matter of fact, a major charge in the criticisms of the project of global democracy leveled from the political perspective.

The political autonomy perspective underpins the traditional objection to global demos: that a system of global democracy would not only be unacceptable because it overlooks state institutions as the locus of justice, but also because it is missing its social component – because there is a lack of a global demos, allegedly a necessary social basis for any project of (international) democracy (Thaa, 2001; Kratochwil, 2007). Once again, this point can best be made by presenting the two extremes of the challenge being considered here. While any political theory needs to track social reality in order to confront the problems of the “people,” it also needs critical distance in order both to identify the circumstances of injustice and to propose political methods to right them. If political theory is to be viable, it needs to strike an appropriate balance between these two objectives: it must be neither too mired in social reality, nor too ethereal and divorced from individuals’ sensitivity. In accordance with this, two considerations can be developed. On the one hand, historical evolution in terms of the increase in social and political democratic interaction beyond borders and the subsequent increase in civil awareness compared with the past is indisputable. Not that today’s interaction is by any means fully democratic, for the fracture between individual political awareness and individual social and economical actions is still extremely evident, but there is growing recognition of injustices at the international level. The emergence of global civil society and global public opinion is increasingly

evident (Albrow, 1996; Meyer *et al.*, 1997; Anheier *et al.*, 2001; Ruggie, 2004). On the other hand, principles of consequentialist justice require a revision of those intermediate political principles that do not maximize the general/universal promotion of well-being. Consequently, a political project of adaptation should be envisaged, one with a two-fold objective: promoting a better outcome in terms of freedom of choice, universally intended, and fostering a change in political attitude concerning international issues of justice. With particular reference to the latter, participation in political life produces, as noted by Mill (1861; reprinted 1991, chapter 3), a new political awareness and creates new social attitudes. In this sense, taking a more direct and active part in the decision-making processes of international institutions through voting could indeed generate a new global political thinking based on the awareness of being part of a wider shared system extending over several layers.

The objection that an international or even global demos is lacking has consequently to be rebutted for at least two fundamental reasons, one normative and the other socio-political, which relate to the issue of transnational exclusion. First, while it is plausible to admit the importance of a civic democratic culture in sustaining an institutional set-up, it is equally or even more important to recognize the normative necessity of such public/political structure in order to close the democratic gap between choice-makers and choice-bearers. This structure is of fundamental importance at the international level in order to protect vulnerable agents and guarantee the independence of different weak actors, who would inevitably succumb in an unregulated anarchical space dominated by hegemonic players. Second, without entering into the endless political science debate on whether the individual comes before public institutions or vice versa, it is important to stress that participation in public political life crucially educates individuals to a civic attitude that recognizes public interests. The development and flourishing of a demos can then be understood most often to be a consequence, rather than a cause, of public institutions. Hence, the creation of international democratic institutions could have a notable “pedagogic” and civic role to play in the maturation of more consistent ethical and political habits in individuals, allowing them to themselves as part of a heterogeneous, multilayered, and global demos (Weinstock, 2001). This suffices here to challenge the political methods of drawing jurisdictional boundaries along state lines.

Having disputed the two predominant methods of drawing the limits of political communities on the grounds of transnational exclusion, I can now proceed to unfold further the multilayered aspect of the project of global democracy.

A multilayered global system

In line with the focus on freedom of choice, the basic consequentialist cosmopolitan political proposal for what concerns the institutional levels of

political interaction consists in a fourfold political focus on institutional guarantees and rights, as the means for implementing the maximization of world well-being. These are: a) at the individual level, the protection of a set of minimal universal interests insofar as they work as individual socio-political capabilities freely to determine one's own personal life, plus the political rights guaranteeing participation as a citizen of public life in each sphere of political action; b) at the state level, the protection of a set of collective interests as the foundation of a state's capacity for free self-determination; c) at the regional level, the protection of a set of collective interests related to regional identity and political autonomy; and d) at the global level, the protection of a set of international means that are needed to rule global phenomena. According to consequentialist cosmopolitanism, only through a simultaneous and consistent implementation of such multilevel legal-institutional guarantees can a political system satisfy the criteria of legitimacy in terms of the maximization of general well-being, and offer an adequate and viable political response to a multilayered social reality.²¹

Subsidiarity constitutes an important point with regard to the relationship between different institutional levels, in so far as it allows for coordination and dispute-solving among the competing claims to competence. This principle "regulates authority within a political order, directing that powers or tasks should rest with the lower-level sub-units of that order unless allocating them to a higher-level central unit would ensure higher comparative efficiency or effectiveness in achieving them" (Føllesdal, 1998, 190). The principle of subsidiarity often entails a necessity condition, i.e. it allows central unit action only when sub-units cannot achieve the desired result on their own. Underpinning this norm is the normative recognition that decisions should be taken as close as possible to the individual whose freedom of choice is affected, i.e. the participation of the individual in the decision-making process should be as direct as possible. This means that political decisions should be kept as "low" as possible, and be moved up to the national and global level under a condition of minimal intervention, i.e. only when this is necessary to tackle effectively the scale and effects of the problems at stake, and so to allow procedurally for wider democratic participation of the different actors involved. At the same time, however, an ultimate authority has to be established to allocate competencies. This authority must be placed at the top of the jurisdictional scale in order to solve disputes and facilitate coordination. It is, in fact, only through an all-inclusive world system that the drawing of jurisdictional boundaries can be implemented democratically, avoiding the problem of political exclusion.

Conclusions

Through a critical engagement with the international relations/political science literature that formed the debate on cosmopolitan democracy from the 1990s on, this chapter has examined the bases on which a global

democratic model can be reconstructed in an age of global interdependence. The last two chapters have offered a cosmopolitan response to the original recognition of the lack of an adequate response to the exclusionary challenges raised by current international affairs. An all-inclusive model of democracy has to be implemented, through new institutional devices concerning transnational responsibility, jurisdictional boundaries, and political participation.

The limited vision of many political theories, both communitarian and cosmopolitan, has been criticized and remedied through the adoption of an inclusive perspective that encompasses significant aspects of political action in the contemporary world that those theories overlook. Consequently, a new political approach has been suggested that recognizes the most powerful and the most neglected international agents as fully global political agents, entitled to differing degrees of responsibility and relative power at all levels of political decision-making, including the global sphere. In envisaging the relevance of international institutions where transnational social actors can be at once accountable and accounted for, the present version of cosmopolitanism suggests ways to re-establish the congruence central to any democratic form of politics between decision-makers and decision-bearers at each level of political action. Only through such multilevel politics can the possibility of individual choice receive an impartial hearing, and thus the way opened for the maximization of world well-being. Only where this reflexivity is truly global can the phenomenon of international political exclusion be eliminated.

A comprehensive treatment of global democracy, however, cannot ignore its social dimension. As noted in the reply to the objection to the ostensible lack of a global demos, the social component of the project of global democracy remains a critical part of this cosmopolitan innovation. The social dimension of the present political project thus needs to be expanded in order to reveal it as a viable political project and to warn against the ambition of abstract universalism. In order to address this set of issues, the discussion moves next to the more recent wave of cosmopolitan studies that arose at the turn of the millennium, especially within the discipline of political sociology.

Notes

- 1 Pateman, 1970; Dahl, 1971, 1; D. Held, 1995; Dahl, 1998, chapter 5, section 5; Przeworski *et al.*, 1999, 4; Sen, 2000b; Goodin, 2003b, 1.
- 2 Accordingly, global interdependence should be seen as a supporting factor for any cosmopolitan argument, one perhaps contributing to the uniscriminatory and decompartmentalized promotion of well-being through the diffusion of knowledge and practical capacities needed for a project of international political theory, but not one that constitutes an a priori requirement for a consequentialist rationale of global justice.
- 3 In particular, a legitimate institutional framework is arguably composed of three principal factors: participation, accountability, and fairness (Franck, 1990, 1992, 1995; Manin *et al.*, 1999, 47–9; Woods, 1999; Rich, 2001; Charnovitz, 2003; Cohen, 2006; Marchetti, 2006b). A good institution encourages an elevated degree of egalitarian participation, aiming at the inclusion of all the different

categories of citizens, insofar as this empowers people with an effective capacity to influence outcomes which affect their lives. A legitimate institution also cultivates a practice of accountability, both vertically through elections and horizontally through an appropriate institutional design and governmental structure. Accountability mechanisms typically include: clear assignment of responsibility for institutional performance, fair and transparent voting procedures and decision-making mechanisms, and the publicity of decisions. Last, but not least, a legitimate institution implements procedural fairness, which relates to both impartial and predictable processes: processes that are clearly specified, non-discretionary, and internally consistent.

- 4 This discussion on the comparison of institutional schemes of justice is much indebted to Pogge's and Pettit's work on this issue (Pogge, 1992, 1995; Pettit, 1997; Pogge, 2002a; 2002b, chapter I). The present perspective is however distinct from theirs in its different consideration of the interaction-factor, as discussed in a later section of this chapter. For institutional design see also Goodin, 1996c; Hardin, 1996. Beyond the moral attributes and the "goodness to fit," a number of general principles can be identified as desirable for any institutional setting, which include revisability, robustness, sensitivity to motivational complexity, publicity, and variability (Goodin, 1996b, 39–43). On a more fundamental level, David Hume's theory of the formation and preservation of the legitimacy of the state constitutes a particularly significant background component of the present theory (Lecaldano, 1991; P. Kelly, 2003; Rosen, 2003, chapter 3). In contrast to the social contract stance, Hume defends a representation of the state according to which its ultimate legitimacy rests on its social performance in terms of the provision of benefits enjoyed by citizens (Hume, 1740; reprinted 1973, book III, section 2, chapters 7 and 8; 1748; reprinted 1870; 1751; reprinted 1979, book V).
- 5 See also Sen, 1992.
- 6 For an examination of the difficult relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory, which here is discussed only briefly here, see Phillips, 1985; Apel, 1992, 63–72.
- 7 This is, in brief, the academic debate *on the site of distributive justice* (Rawls, 1971; Pogge, 1992; Rawls, 1993; G. A. Cohen, 1997; Murphy, 1998; G. A. Cohen, 2000; Murphy, 2000; Pogge, 2000; Nagel, 2005).
- 8 This is still consistent with the general assumptions of analytical ethics, universal personalism, and valuational solipsism, in that the ultimate point of moral reference remains the individual both as well-being recipient and as final single judge (Pettit, 1993a, 22–30).
- 9 This individualistic stance on responsibility connects with the ontological position of *eliminativism*, according to which ascribing judgments, intentions, and general mental properties to social groups represents just a summative and metaphorical way to ascribe them to the individual members of the group (Quinton, 1975; Bratman, 1999). For a more sympathetic discussion on the importance of *We* see Searle, 1995; Toumela, 1995; Rovane, 1997; Pettit, 2001b, chapter 5.
- 10 Despite the domination of the individualistic paradigm, the literature on collective moral responsibility has grown, particularly in legal studies since the Second World War. For an initial reading see Gomperz, 1939; Kelsen, 1945, 355–63; Jasper, 1947; reprinted 1961; Lewis, 1948; Feinberg, 1968; V. Held, 1970; French, 1972, 1974, 1984; Goodin, 1985, 134–44; Stone, 1985; D. F. Thompson, 1985; Jackson, 1987; May, 1987; May and Hoffman, 1991; May, 1992; Postema, 1995; Runciman, 1997; Goldman, 1999; Kutz, 2000; Erskine, 2001; O'Neill, 2001; Arendt, 2003; Erskine, 2003; E. Kelly, 2003; Erskine, 2004; Miller, 2004; Marchetti, 2005a; Pettit, 2007.
- 11 The varying membership characteristic is in contrast with the other principal type of collective body, the aggregate collectivity. In this, a change in membership will always entail a change in the identity of the collective.

- 12 This institutional characterization is consistent with the general procedural sensitivity of the present version of consequentialism. It is thus intended to be distinct from the kind of description usually deployed for assigning collective responsibility which refers to diffused solidarity and common values, such as in the case of families or mobs (May and Hoffman, 1991, 2–3).
- 13 Analytically, four cases of responsibility are possible when an organization (O) and one or more agents (A) are at stake (Stone, 1985, 244). With regards to misconduct that has occurred in an organizational setting, responsibility can lie with: 1) O but not A; 2) both O and A; 3) A but not O; 4) neither O nor A. The present proposal has analytical potential to cover all of these cases, since it allocates responsibility to different agents – choice-makers – depending on their capacity to influence the social outcome imposed on the victims – choice-bearers.
- 14 Underpinning this duty is the consequentialist approach to the issue of omission. From a goal-based perspective no fundamental distinction can be made between a positive action and a negative omission. They both produce consequences that affect the overall social outcome, and they must both be taken into consideration in the moral assessment of the circumstances. Clearly, this is in contrast with those legalistic approaches that grant innocence to those agents who have not positively committed a voluntary offence.
- 15 This remains valid despite the phenomenon of the so-called “donkey vote” (i.e. being legally obliged to vote, the elector chooses the easiest option: the first candidate of the list), which can anyway be tackled through different “deliberative” strategies, as elaborated by Fishkin (Fishkin, 1991; Fishkin and Laslett, 2003).
- 16 For a different view see Arendt, who attributes metaphysical responsibility also to the opposition (Arendt, 2003, 149 and 157–8).
- 17 For discussion of the boundary problem applied to global democracy see Goodin, 2002; Pogge, 2002b; Keohane, 2003; Gould, 2004; D. Held, 2004a; Kuper, 2004, chapter 3; Fraser, 2005; Agné, 2006; Christiano, 2006; Tan, 2006; Bauböck, 2007a; Marchetti, 2008a.
- 18 For a discussion of the boundary problem applied to the general theory of democracy see Dahl, 1979; Whelan, 1983; Shklar, 1991; Goodin, 2007.
- 19 While here the principled dimension is discussed, further objections to the institutional correlate of this model will be provided in Chapter six, especially in the section on cosmopolitan governance.
- 20 Goodin has recently interpreted the all-affected principle in an expansive “possibilistic” way, i.e. so as to grant virtually everyone everywhere a vote on virtually everything decided anywhere (Goodin, 2007). While according to this extreme interpretation the all-affected principle fully overlaps with the all-inclusive principle, Goodin’s proposal remains an exception among scholars holding the all-affected principle. The balance, however, still remains in favor of the all-inclusive principle for Goodin’s proposal cannot offer viable responses to the objections raised above against the all-affected model in relation to the indeterminacy, differential impact, and lack of recognition of the public value of political decisions.
- 21 From a different perspective but on the same normative point, O’Neill has argued repeatedly and forcefully on the importance of institutionalizing the relationship between right-holder and duty-bearer. Institutions *must*, not just can, be established in order to make sense of the political category of rights (O’Neill, 1996, 131–2).

4 Social struggles for global democracy

Rooted and subaltern cosmopolitanism

Caminar preguntando¹

(Zapatista motto)

In its first thirty years (1970–2000), contemporary cosmopolitan thinking managed to gain unexpected recognition. In terms of ethics, the resurgence of applied normative thinking was effective to the point that it became essential for any serious moral scholar to confront the universalistic prescriptions of cosmopolitanism. The abstract theorizing of meta-ethics was soon abandoned in favor of more political engagement. In institutional terms, the cosmopolitan prescription has also been well received. From more theoretical suggestions to practical and policy guidelines, a cosmopolitan sensibility is now increasingly appreciated both at the regional (European) and global level. If we look back to the 1960s when abstract meta-ethics dominated the field of ethics, and hard-core realism dominated political science, the change could not be more evident. With many theoretical factors contributing to this change, including the affirmation of the theory of interdependence in international relations, toward the end of the 1990s applied universalist principles and projects for institutional reform at the international level became an important point of reference for public discussion.

At the turn of the millennium, just when cosmopolitan thinking was becoming complacent about its achievements, a powerful new wave of criticism arose, this time from its “left inside.” Sociologists managed to elaborate a substantial critique of cosmopolitanism in terms of its alleged social deficiencies. Cosmopolitanism was accordingly accused of colluding with western capitalistic domination, and of being too elitist, disembedded, rootless, and thin to remain a viable global political project. And it is not by chance that these criticisms were formulated just when the “parallel” project of globalization was beginning to show its internal flaws under the lenses of engaged scholars and activists. Because of its closeness to the globalist paradigm, it was difficult for cosmopolitanism to avoid ending up in the same dock as the accused, though with some extenuating considerations denied to the

neo-liberal hyper-globalists. A critic ironically suggested the following of cosmopolitans:

They – we – imagine the world from the vantage point of frequent travelers, easily entering and exiting polities and social relations around the world, armed with visa-friendly passports and credit cards. For such frequent travelers cosmopolitanism has a considerable rhetorical advantage. It seems hard not to want to be a “citizen of the world.”

(Calhoun, 2003, 90)

These criticisms were pitiless, though they remained on the whole sympathetic. They did not elaborate a destructive critique, but rather an internal warning that pointed to the limits and biases of cosmopolitan thinking. It was a challenge demanding that the cosmopolitan project be developed to reconsider the social bases that have shaped it and add new issues that are important for a viable democratic project.

In this chapter, I examine and engage constructively with such arguments. The first two sections analyze a couple of typical images that are often referred to when criticizing the social shortcomings of cosmopolitanism. Through the analysis of these cases I want to prove that it is at least possible to conceive of being rooted and yet not parochial. From this first step in the process of developing multiple identities, I then proceed to analyze the desirability of such complex characterization of social and political agency toward forms of rooted cosmopolitanism. The sections that follow elaborate a number of different socio-political conceptions of subaltern, rooted, and thick cosmopolitanism. Here, being cosmopolitan necessarily and normatively also requires being rooted. A brief historical reconstruction of the emergence of this ideal introduces the section on the specific political principles underpinning this version of cosmopolitanism. The main political goals and strategies are finally presented together with a number of conclusions that sum up the historical and theoretical trajectory of cosmopolitan thinking in its first forty years.

Criticizing cosmopolitan rootlessness (I): the cosmopolitan Jew

A cosmopolitan person need not necessarily be rootless as much as a rooted person need not necessarily be provincial. Were this accepted by the critics of cosmopolitan theories, the discussion would be greatly advanced. Such is not, however, the case. Most criticisms attacking the project for global democracy, in fact, point precisely to the alleged deficiencies of cosmopolitanism in terms of social attachment. In particular, the cosmopolitan is described as a disembedded individual who would not be able to take active part in the political dynamic of his or her place of residency, and would not be willing to share the burden of a collective social enterprise. She or he would not, accordingly, have solidaristic ties and could thus not

contribute to the flourishing of democratic institutions. In order to dispute these misguided objections to cosmopolitanism, this chapter will engage with the sociological discussion on cosmopolitanism and construct a version of rooted cosmopolitanism that is able to rebut such allegations. As a way of introducing the argument, two exemplary cases will be discussed in order to show that it is indeed possible to be rooted and yet non-provincial (the case of the cosmopolitan Jew), and to be rooted and non-partial (the case of the football fan).

The rootless character of cosmopolitanism has often been associated with a number of social “foreign” minorities (e.g. migrants, gypsies, etc.); among these an especially tenacious and powerful association has been maintained between Jewish communities and a dubious cosmopolitanism.² According to this critical association, the Jew is depicted as the disembedded cosmopolitan par excellence.³ The Jew is caricatured as a bourgeois without patria, as an individual who is not socially or politically attached to the place where she or he lives. Looking beyond these ridiculous stereotypes, what is interesting to note is that throughout European history “the Jew” (much like today’s cosmopolitans, according to some critical commentators) has invariably played the role of the Other: a stranger, extraneous, foreign, an alien body who has become part of a supposedly homogeneous community.

While often deployed in a negative sense (i.e. the other as parasite), this characterization of the Jew can, however, also have a positive interpretation. Accordingly, the “Jew” can also be described as the positive epitome of otherness (Morris-Reich, 2004). The Jewish people’s “structural” migrations associated with the experience of the diaspora generated by necessity a complex social and political identity, with multiple loyalties shaped by different cultures (usually at least by their Jewish identity and the cultural identity of the place where they happen to live) (M. Cohen, 2003). The case of Rome is typical in this regard. There it was the Jewish community which best preserved the traditional Roman dialects and traditions. And yet they coupled such rooted attachment to a specific place, Rome, with a broader allegiance to their Jewish heritage.

Thanks to their “minority status,” and similarly to other minorities, some of the Jewish communities scattered all around the world managed to formulate a balanced combination between their non-local, Jewish identity and their local, non-only-Jewish political allegiance. Contrary to the stereotypical criticisms reported above, such a balance of multiple identities can provide a first stepping-stone toward the development of a rooted cosmopolitanism. While the addition of the “transnational” Jewish identity to the local one constitutes in fact a first move toward overcoming the limitations of a provincial interpretation of local culture, this means neither the necessary abandonment of local attachments, nor fully accepting a consistently cosmopolitan perspective. Looking at history, one sees a minority of Jewish intellectuals as path-finders in developing a notion of hybrid identity that comes very close to a cosmopolitan attitude. As suggested by

Hollinger with reference to the American Jewish liberal intelligentsia of the 1940s:

The “cosmopolitanism” to which I refer is the desire to transcend the limitations of any and all particularisms in order to achieve a more complete human experience and a more complete understanding of that experience. The ideal is decidedly counter to the eradication of cultural differences, but counter also to their preservation in parochial form. Rather, particular cultures and subcultures are viewed as repositories for insights and experiences that can be drawn upon in the interests of a more comprehensive outlook on the world. Insofar as a particular ethnic heritage or philosophical tradition is an inhibition to experience, it is to be disarmed; insofar as that heritage or tradition is an avenue toward the expansion of experience and understanding, access to it is to be preserved.

(Hollinger, 1975, 135)

The example of non-parochial Judaism has considerable value within the current context of global transformations, which have altered traditional attitudes toward national identity and questioned traditional meanings of national allegiances. The increase in social and cultural interchange is a fact. Not only does information cross borders more and more, but people also increasingly do the same. Multicultural societies are the result of this intensified interchange. While this new mode of life “side by side” has doubtless created tensions, there is an overall tendency toward the recognition of multiple “passports” and complex identities. Increased multiculturalism requires, however, a reconceptualization of the issue of citizenship and a fortiori of multiple identities. In order to align our social experiences (increasingly international/transnational) to our political entitlements (still predominantly national), we need to expand a number of key political concepts, including citizenship and identity.

A cosmopolitan approach is needed in order to combine a universal attitude toward justice with a sensitivity to cultural differences. This cosmopolitan challenge is conventionally conceived within the terms of the debate around the dichotomy between rootless vs. rooted cosmopolitanism. In this debate, rootless cosmopolitans are considered to be those individuals who in being universalistic are unable to feel any attachment to a particular culture. Rooted cosmopolitans are conversely considered to be those individuals who, while having a universalistic moral attitude, are also able to have deep allegiances. According to the latter position, cosmopolitanism can only be conceivable as dependent on a profound recognition of identity and respect for cultural differences. Moreover, it is only through passionate reflection on one’s own culture that an individual is able to encompass a more universal outlook.

In the current context of overlapping worlds, non-parochial liberal Judaism, with its notion of multiple identities, offers a viable framework

theory for the reconceptualization of citizenship toward cosmopolitanism. Similarly to other equally discriminated against minorities that had to come to terms with multiple identities, part of Jewish thinking engaged in a struggle against provincialism, developing a refined formulation of non-parochial rootedness. The historical experience of the diaspora has provided for many interesting cases of cross-fertilization in modern Jewish political thought. Being embedded in more than one culture, Jews have become accustomed to dealing with plural loyalties. It is thus not by chance that cosmopolitan thinking itself is very much intermingled with Jewish thought, and that so many current cosmopolitan scholars are of Jewish origin. Because of Jewish history, social conditioning, and philosophical endeavour, the liberal-cosmopolitan-Judaism hybridization offers a significant paradigm for rethinking social and political identity in a globalized world.

Criticizing cosmopolitan rootlessness (II): the football fan

Another paradigmatic example offered in accusations of cosmopolitans' disembeddedness can be found in a very different context: football. David Miller has used a football metaphor which powerfully represents a typical accusation against universalist and cosmopolitan theories. In it, the cosmopolitan attitude as an impartial spectator is associated with the sterile attitude of a football fan incapable of allegiance to any team. As Miller describes it:

A cosmopolitan philosophy that seeks to preserve national attachments and loyalties cannot be a public philosophy, in the sense of a set of principles to which the population at large subscribe, each knowing that the others also subscribe. Were it to become public in this sense, it would destroy the attachments it seeks to preserve, for people would no longer see their 'compatriots' as having any special moral claim upon them, and they would know that this attitude was reciprocated. Admittedly they might still participate in mutual aid practices with a restricted scope, but these would be regarded as purely conventional means of discharging duties that were at bottom universal. They [the cosmopolitans] would be like spectators at a football match who cheer for one or the other side to make the game go better, without really caring who wins the match.

(Miller, 1997, 72)

Miller's analogy is based on an implicit conjecture according to which a football fan would have to choose between two extreme attitudes: either he is for a team as in a profound and uncompromising relationship, or he is inevitably destined to unspecified empathy. In the first case, his support would strongly shape his football and personal identity, so much so that he would respect impartial rules strategically and would not properly recognize and respect the opposing team. In the second case, his identity would be borderless and his agonistic motivations strengthless; because he would respect impartial rules

for the sake of impartiality, he could only recognize two antagonistic teams without being able to express any biased support.

This reading of the attitude of football fans, although radical in its extremes, is nevertheless helpful in illustrating a different topic – a nationalistic reading of cosmopolitanism – insofar as concrete examples are no less useful than formal theoretical representations in order to grasp the practical meanings of a philosophical proposal. While for Miller this football analogy explains what is wrong with cosmopolitanism, namely its anemic sentiment, this section counter-argues that football allegiances, genuinely intended, explain aptly what is right with cosmopolitanism, namely the appropriate balancing of feelings of identity against impartial rules.

According to the nationalistic view epitomized by Miller, and as in the football case, only two alternative international attitudes seem possible: either you are (for) your country or you, as a cosmopolitan, are unable to enjoy the possibility of special attachments. Despite having recognized elsewhere the possibility of secondary allegiances (Miller, 1988), in the football example Miller disowns this thinking, in specifying that what was possible for a true nationalist is now not allowed any more for a true cosmopolitan. Multiple personal and moral identities are accepted in the case of the earlier writings, although with reservations, whilst in the more recent work they appear like an unrealistic caricature. Whereas in the national case fundamental but not exclusive allegiances can allegedly be developed, cosmopolitans are depicted as individuals condemned to renounce all their identities, except, perhaps, the very rationally mimicked aspects of impartiality seen as necessary.

The association of cosmopolitanism with the idea of a detached agent, better described by the term *flâneur* (Tester, 1994), is not new (we have just examined how the same kind of criticism has been used many times against the cosmopolitan Jew) and constitutes a recurrent theme of particularistic attacks against universalistic theories of justice. In this light, cosmopolitans are described by many as people disconnected from collective experiences and with transferable identities, often oriented toward mere consumption and, to that end, desirous to exploit the social benefits deriving from group ties. The correlate extension of this analogy to the case of football equates the cosmopolitan with a cool consumer spectator, who needs hot-blooded traditional supporters in order to enjoy some degree of vicarious, virtual attachment, in a way that is not very different from social parasitism (Giulianotti, 2002, 38–40). In sum, this association implies that cosmopolitans are self-contradicting individuals, deprived of any social resources in terms of special attachments to imagined collective bodies such as cities, football teams, or nations (Walzer, cited in Carlehenden and Gabriels, 1997, 120).

This section aims to counter this position by pointing out the capacity of cosmopolitanism to include a multiple conception of agency, which allows for the respecting of impartial rules and at the same time the recognition of particularistic ties, both at the level of politics and football. An incomplete

understanding of the sentiments behind national identity is at the root of the political difficulties suffered by this kind of contextualistic objection to cosmopolitanism. This misconception is most evident in the football analogy, according to which, as mentioned above, only two alternatives would seem available to the football fan: either she or he is (all for) his or her team, or she or he does not feel any special empathy. Such binomial antinomy is considered from the perspective of this chapter to be too interpretatively rigid, insofar as it does not allow for a full range of personal and political identity. As a result, a major flaw in the nationalistic position can be identified in the unwillingness to recognize the other team/nation as well as common impartial rules, which are intrinsic elements for any conception of identity being substantive.

When examined in the light of the football metaphor, the contextualistic argument reveals hermeneutic inaccuracies concerning the role of impartial rules in relation to the understanding of sentimental identity and moral agency. Not entirely unlike moral life, soccer can be interpreted as a complex game where players' and spectators' reality is shaped by a number of different factors reciprocally constraining them, including team interest, personal interest, and impartial rules. Football success rests, then, on the ability to balance these entwined elements through a scale of different degrees of support, and to produce a final combination consisting in the maximization of stability and uncertainty of results. However, such an outcome is not possible without a framework of impartial regulations and enforcing power, much as a game without rules is utterly inconceivable.

A father watching his child playing in a football match undoubtedly supports his child's team, but at the same time he would admit that in certain circumstances it would be right for the opposing team to win. It is very hard to find people ready to be there for their team no matter what. They can be strongly, or even passionately, in support of their team, but they would always be prepared to accept a superior and impartial principle of justice, i.e. in this case football association rules and referees, provided they are honest in their interpretation of the norms. Fans accept such principles of justice, even if they are against their team's interests. No football supporter would be proud, after a moment of peaceful reflection, of his team winning through cheating, let's say by bribing the referee or using illegal substances.⁴

A fundamental difference marks the various degrees of support. From complete indifference to complete partiality, a wide range of options is available for football passion. Partiality disrespectful of rules is a foolish passion, for it will never allow for the full satisfaction of a victorious outcome, since the value of victory rests on the recognition and respect of the other, which is available only through observing common rules (Dixon, 2000). Clearly, if one respects impartial rules it does not mean that one cannot be passionate about one's team. The exact opposite is actually true: one can be passionate only in respecting rules. In synthesis, the argument consists in the following steps: 1) if one loves a team, one wishes its victory; 2) a meaningful victory is

only possible through the recognition and respect of the other team; 3) such recognition is not possible without a contest structured around common rules; 4) hence one cannot be fully for a team without respecting impartial rules.

When the previous argument is applied to the political scenario, nationalistic positions are revealed to be internally flawed in the relation between moral agency and impartiality. Similarly to the football case, if a virtuous development of national identity is to be attained, as is recommended in Miller's theory, social ties and loyalties at community level cannot be dissociated from respect for common rules and recognition of other communities. When a country is only constrained by national interests (or values) and plays according to its own rules (i.e. Realpolitik style), patriotism can in fact easily mutate into self-defeating jingoism, insofar as the elevation of a country's standing relies on the recognition that national success must be attained within a shared system of rules.

Such common rules, however, have to possess special characteristics, insofar as they purport to provide an impartial, normative framework of action for different communities with distinct ethical values. They need to be overarching and neutral in comparison with local ethical norms; thus they must be universalistic and yet sensitive to difference, since partiality can only be guaranteed through impartiality (Pogge, 1994; Kelly, 1998; Habermas, 1998; reprinted 2001; Kuper, 2000). In the face of this normative challenge, Miller's theory is incapable of delivering an appropriate answer, inasmuch as it anchors moral norms to a localized conception of values and identity, instead of legitimizing social identities through the screening imposed by impartial and common rules.

In proving that identity and rules are both necessary but distinct components of social interaction, the case of football provides an illuminating analogy on the limits of contextualistic objections and the corresponding advantages of cosmopolitanism. The rejection of strict nationalism amounts by contrast to a defense of a more comprehensive conception of identity and political agency characterized by multilevel sentiments – including local ones – and respect of impartial rules. According to this, national identities are considered as embedded in a wider international net of reciprocal recognition among equals, and people's national attachment is considered more as an unchangeable resource than a constraint. In this regard, cosmopolitanism represents, in the context of world relations, a necessary and inevitable meta-game that single states and other transnational actors need to play through reciprocal recognition and respect for a superior system of laws. In accordance with this line of argument, claiming absolute priority for one's own nation/team is to be criticized (and not only as far as football is concerned), and the false contradiction between loving one's own nation/team and simultaneously paying respect as an active spectator to the rules of the game is unmasked. The desire to participate in a fair contest (including the possibility of detrimental sanctions) is thus understood as beneficial to national/football

identity and sentiments, insofar as this represents the only opportunity to enrich one's own self-image through the recognition of the other. Finally, the attitude of a true, winning supporter is revealed to be much closer to cosmopolitanism than to nationalism.

In opposition to the original, increasingly accepted common-sense assumption, according to which cosmopolitanism inevitably entails the loss of thickness in personal identity and social loyalties – an assumption exemplified by Miller's analogy but also by the notion of politics as structurally embedded in the vernacular (Kymlicka, 2001) – this section has responded by arguing that such common sense when applied either to politics or football represents a nonsense. First, it has been shown that respect for other collective bodies (states and soccer teams) and common impartial rules is a necessary hermeneutic step for the generation of any robust social identity. Second, evidence has been given that cosmopolitanism fosters a system which takes into account these two cardinal objects of respect with an eminently pluralistic intention. Only through such a political structure can differences and partiality in fact be defended and any substantive allegiances protected against illegal, powerful competitors. In sum, while it may well be the case that some alleged cosmopolitans (as well as some alleged nationalists) act more as *spectators* than participants in (political) life, it may also very well be the case that the opposite is true. A genuine cosmopolitan can indeed be a rooted *participant* in any social and political interaction. Furthermore, as this section suggested, this type of cosmopolitanism constitutes the only viable hermeneutic avenue to appreciate fully one's own identity by comparison with the "other" by way of respecting common rules.

Subaltern, thick, and rooted cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism need not fear being circumscribed by the limits of detached cosmopolitanism, or aligned with the false images of the rootless cosmopolitan Jew or lifeless football fan. From 2000 onward, a sophisticated body of work, mainly (but not exclusively) coming from sociologists and social movement theorists, has provided a robust restatement of cosmopolitan thinking in terms of social cosmopolitanism. This third wave of cosmopolitan thinking was generated as a reaction to the first two phases: in opposition to the first ethical phase, which it accused of being too abstract and thin (being linked only to the idea of common humanity), and in opposition to the second institutional phase, which it accused of being too close to a western, dominating agenda and too far from grassroots experience (i.e. resembling the global governance model). In response to these limits, this later version suggests new ways of conceptualizing the socio-political nexus that remains more inclusive and locally rooted. Rather than starting from a normative question of justice (ethical cosmopolitanism's question: *What does global justice imply?*) or a formal question of institutional design (institutional cosmopolitanism's question: *Which institutions best serve global justice?*), here

the starting question is *Who needs cosmopolitanism? Who is the genuine actor of cosmopolitanism?* The answer is: the excluded people of the world. This marks from the beginning a stark divergence from previous cosmopolitan thinking toward a more socially considerate reflection. What emerges is a third fundamental component for a viable project of global democracy that combines the aspiration to achieve transnational and global justice with attentiveness to local struggles and realities as they actually exist.

It is highly significant that social cosmopolitanism emerged from an antagonism towards previous cosmopolitan theory. A number of oppositional claims on specific key problems with cosmopolitanism are of particular concern to social cosmopolitanism. They are the following: a) the domination problem, according to which cosmopolitanism is considered too close to neoliberal capitalism; b) the cultural problem, according to which cosmopolitanism is understood to rely on too minimal a set of abstract prescriptions that are far from popular experience; c) the motivational problem, according to which cosmopolitanism fails to connect norms to practices; and d) the political problem, according to which cosmopolitanism fails to champion the claims of local groups, remaining too attached to élites.

In response to this critical focus, this new version of cosmopolitanism presents itself as subaltern, thick, embedded, and rooted. It claims to be subaltern because it focuses on those voices that come from minorities, often from the south of the world, and not from the western centers of global governance (de Sousa Santos, 2002, chapter 9, section 6; de Sousa Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito, 2005). It is thick because it is imbued with solidaristic principles of social justice, and is, not minimalist in terms of liberal non-harm (Breckeridge *et al.*, 2002; Delanty, 2006; Dobson, 2006). It is embedded because it is inserted within a social context characterized by intense mutual obligations and feelings of attachment to a comprehensive political experience, rather than referring to loose institutional relationships (Erskine, 2000, 2002; Appiah, 2003; Fine, 2007). Finally, it is rooted in that it emerges from local practices and remains tightly connected with political struggles from below, in opposition to élitist management (M. Cohen, 1992; Ackerman, 1994; Falk, 2000; Tarrow, 2005).

In contrast to the supposedly constitutive *flâneurisme* of cosmopolitanism, social cosmopolitans highlight the inevitability of relying on local factors for building up a viable political community. Social cohesion and solidaristic ties are needed for any political project. Any political struggle needs to be embedded within local factors, within local struggles, to be effective and able to mobilize people. Social and political bonds are key elements for generating local and particularistic mutual obligations, which in turn are the true bases for eventual political solidarity, be it local, national, or transnational. The traditional side of communities is important, but this does not mean falling back on a blind acceptance of customs. Previous cosmopolitan thinking developed a problematic denigration of traditions, customs, and all that is related to local conservatism, including ethnicity and religion. Social

cosmopolitanism conversely triggers a new understanding of the social. Pre-given traditions are a fundamental social bond, although they are not the only binding elements. Market interactions may create new bonds (though with an insufficiently cohesive outcome), and above all political projects are able to reshape social identities and create new solidaristic ties. Political visions remain the key component for reforming actual societies toward more democratic systems, but they can only work if they are embedded and engage critically with local traditions (Ferrara, 1999, 2008). Accordingly, the democratization process cannot be imposed from above (and a fortiori cannot be coercively imported), but it has to grow out of the *Lebenswelt* (lifeworld) – it has to empower individuals within traditions, not against them.

In this vein, cosmopolitanism entails an original and innovative reformulation of traditions and identity in the light of positive influences coming from outside. External influences are regarded positively, provided they are not imposed coercively. Cross-fertilization and hybridization are the only genuine dynamics of intra- and inter-group cultural interaction. A result of this understanding of social dynamics is the revision of the idea of identity. Multiple identities are encouraged, provided they do not cut grassroots linkages. On the one hand, the risk of violence is always present when closed identities feel threatened (Sen, 2006). On the other, an open attitude of revision (reaffirmation and denial) constitutes a fundamental prerequisite for facing the social challenges both at the local and transnational level, and formulating democratic alternatives based on the idea of pluralism. Consistently with this, borders should not be abolished, but left porous. Freedom of movement should be allowed, provided it is respectful of local traditions and does not threaten the bases of political communities.

A cosmopolitan framework built from below would serve as a facilitator of egalitarian and reciprocal encounters (Dallmayr, 2001a, 2003a, 2005). It would provide the necessary overall framework for a potential reciprocal enrichment rather than for a homogenizing process. Such increasing interaction could eventually lay the ground for the emergence of a global demos, but this is regarded as a long-term process that needs to be aware of the risk of losing contact with the grassroots level. A global market may not be the key element for creating a global demos, though it could certainly contribute to it. Equally, global institutions built exclusively from above would generate a low political attachment with even lower political participation. The end result would be global politics by élites. In opposition to this, social cosmopolitans maintain that the only way to construct a global polity is from below. Only by beginning from the local can transnational solidarity be built through the formation of transnational and overlapping communities. Unity within locally rooted diversity: this is the model of global democracy that the social cosmopolitanism defends.

This conception of social cosmopolitanism has particularly flourished within social movement theory. A key figure in such theorization is the

Portuguese sociologist and World Social Forum activist Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1995; 2002; 2005; 2006, chapters 2–3). Focusing on excluded and subaltern social actors, de Sousa Santos describes a political project that is epistemological and cultural at the same time (Spivak, 1988; B. Robbins, 1992). Using a broad conception of power and resistance (Galtung, 1971), he points to a new kind of sociology that is able to denounce the absence and underline the emergence of new social actors. The traditional principle of equality is now coupled with the principle of recognition of difference as a cardinal axiom of political justice. And global social justice is formulated so as to include global cognitive justice, which is in turn related to epistemological and cultural preconditions of knowledge. Politically speaking this means supporting new social movements' initiatives such as the World Social Forum, which is then interpreted as an insurgent cosmopolitan politics, able to sustain a genuine epistemology of the south. Within this counter-hegemonic project of resistance, rebellion and nonconformity are preferred to traditional strategic options of reform or revolution, and radical democracy becomes a form of demo-diversity. Social cosmopolitanism is then envisaged to function as an emancipatory discourse for contemporary subaltern struggles (Gidwani, 2006).

In order to unfold further the key tenets of social cosmopolitanism as emancipatory politics, it is necessary to develop a closer examination of its political principles, objectives, and strategies. The following sections are devoted to this task.

Rooted political principles

The model of social cosmopolitanism can be understood as structured around five paramount principles: place-basedness, participation, autonomy, diversity, and solidarity. It is worth analyzing each concept in turn.

Place-basedness crucially opposes the models of social cosmopolitanism to mainstream interpretations of globalization. Contrary to the universalizing perspective, which regards the local as provincial and regressive, this principle maintains the importance of localism as an unavoidable and critical resource for social and political life. Rather than accepting mainstream stereotypes of dangerous nationalism and bigoted regionalism, the place-based paradigm reaffirms the local and the present as the essential elements for a real political emancipation, even as it also recognizes the need to keep open a lively dialogue with the external to ensure cross-fertilization. In this sense, culture plays a relevant role in that it is only through a process of cultural development and self-awareness that collective subjectivity can flourish. Without falling back on self-enclosed localism, rooted micro-politics – from indigenous movements in the Amazon forest to neighborhood associations in Florence – is thus seen not as an escape hatch, but as a key process for the reorganization of the space from below (Dirlik and Prazniak, 2001; Osterweil, 2005; Gibson-Graham, 2006).

Participation in the model of social cosmopolitanism is non-hierarchical and horizontal public engagement. Here the critical targets are all indirect forms of political representation, which social cosmopolitans accuse of eroding the political trust between the elected and the electors, or, in the most radical interpretation, of hiding the deception of one class ruling the rest. Contrary to this supposedly élitist pattern, a model of democratic participation is reasserted in which the active engagement of the entire citizenry is expected at all levels and thus genuinely collective decision-making is implemented. In more technical terms, the principle of participation is often associated with the deliberative turn in political thinking, according to which, beyond the central value of inclusiveness, the other principal criteria to be met include orientation to the public good, decision by consensus (thereby implying the possibility of preference transformation through argumentative public discussion), and transparency. This input-oriented process is supposed to generate in turn better information, higher solidarity, greater engagement and democratic skills, and enhanced trust in public institutions. In this new conception of politics, public institutions are then seen more as facilitators of self-organized open spaces from below, than as traditional economic and political leadership from above. In contrast to previous left-wing ideologies, political parties are for the most part mistrusted, while self-organized civil society is called to take as active part in politics. Also innovative is a different interpretation of politics, according to which self-organization is directed toward changing society rather than taking power and controlling of the state (Pateman, 1970; Mouffe, 1993; Dryzek, 2000; Holloway, 2000; Polletta, 2002; Fung and Wright, 2003; della Porta, 2005).

Autonomy also crucially distinguishes the model of social cosmopolitanism from its alternative paradigms. In opposition both to anonymous processes of globalization, and to naïve romanticism and local power positions, the autonomy principle asserts the legitimacy of communal authority. Highlighting the pleasures, productivity, and rights of communities, local sovereignty remains grounded on a deep conception of democracy that rejects distant authority. Self-determination is claimed to be able to offer sound solutions to social requirements through a revolution in everyday life where social aims are focused on taking advantage of cultural heritage and traditions rather than seizing power. In many instances, autonomy is interpreted as part of a long process of decolonization, which entails the struggle against any form of domination, be it intimate, practical, or ideological. The principle of autonomy is mainly twofold, for it entails both political independence (almost inevitably passing through violent confrontation) and economic independence. Concerning the latter, it defends the strengthening of local economies as representing more democratic, sustainable, and economically effective ways of production. Food sovereignty – reoriented toward community needs rather than global market imperatives – forms part of the ideal hereby implied. This at times indigenous, autonomist, anarchist, autarchic, and environmentalist perspective thus aims at what has been called global

de-linking (Amin, 1985; Lang and Hines, 1993; Hines, 2000; Bello, 2001, 2002; Starr and Adams, 2003).

Diversity constitutes the fourth crucial component of social cosmopolitanism. It counters the allegedly homogenizing process of globalization that would create a single societal model in which individuals would be deprived of their cultural specificity and reduced to anonymous consumers. In opposition to the single capitalist interpretation of space, time, and values, pluralism is here pursued through a dual process. While local cultures are reaffirmed from below, universalizing globalism is critically deconstructed without falling into the equally hegemonic perspective according to which any partial or plural alternative remains incomplete and deficient in something. A different political epistemology is required, one that is not in need of a centralized and unified point of reference (Osterweil, 2004, 188). The image envisaged here is thus not a single project, but rather a plurality of cultural projects, a movement of movements – “a world in which many worlds fit” – as the Zapatistas would say, which is not predetermined. Just as in the discussion of individual freedom of choice in the previous chapters, here also complex pluralism is inevitable once the point of departure is from below and without a central plan. And as in the case of freedom of choice, here also such diversity is considered as a source of mutual learning and value rather than as an obstacle. Once this myriad of identities is networked, a new kind of globalism is revealed in the form of a subaltern cosmopolitanism (de Sousa Santos, 2005; Tarrow, 2005, chapter 3).

Solidarity, finally, stresses the importance of transnational collaboration in overcoming local political difficulties. The key factor underpinning the possibility of solidarity is the development of a new systematic and global interpretation of socio-political problems, which requires collective action. The recognition of world interdependence constitutes the turning point for nurturing a process of problem generalization in which local issues are no longer circumscribed by the vernacular. Following from the acknowledgement of the interlinking of global and local, the principle of solidarity aims to generate a sense of group collective identity, and thus of shared fate, which would enhance inter-local coalition building to promote global change. In opposition to the neo-liberal logic of individual atomization, local groups would consequently feel they are not alone in their effort and, if they act together, would be able to have an impact on their lives (J. Smith *et al.*, 1997; Brecher *et al.*, 2000; J. Smith, 2002).

These principles underpinning the model of social cosmopolitanism are mostly in symmetrical opposition to the characteristics of neo-liberalism. Accordingly, place-basedness stresses the denial of the neo-liberal place-less perspective. Participation contrasts delegation and private authority. Autonomy opposes the principle of unification. Diversity rejects the idea of singleness, whereas solidarity reflects the social incompetence of neo-liberal atomization. These five principles draw the normative framework of the model. In order to complete the examination of social cosmopolitanism, the

study now needs to unpack the more political implications of these five principles. The following section thus delineates the social cosmopolitan political structure.

Challenging alternative political objectives and strategies

In opposition to previous cosmopolitan thinking, which it accuses of supporting an unquestioned belief in the superiority of liberal democracy (Tully, 2003; Mouffe, 2005, chapters 5–6), social cosmopolitanism holds a more pluralistic and participatory notion of democracy. Institutional cosmopolitanism focuses more on formal politics, but without effective mechanisms for political participation and accountability, it runs the risk of being ineffective. In this it reveals its fundamentally ethical (rather than political) perspective (Chandler, 2003). Social cosmopolitanism, instead, is more focused on social processes and civil society (Urbinati, 2003), as the sphere of anti-coercive and self-organized politics. According to the model of social cosmopolitanism, politics is not conceived primarily as having an impact on political institutions or as the acquisition of power. It consists rather in a project focused on the micro-level and aiming to change society and the economy locally through grassroots processes (Holloway, 2000). In a sense, then, this kind of politics is not global by definition. And yet, if one steps back for a wider view, a strategy can be detected which recognizes that starting from below does not preclude a broader change in global relationships. This strategy from below challenges traditional top-down and institutional political paradigms. In contrast to mainstream politics, proponents of this position argue that keeping focused on the grassroots remains the most effective strategy for impacting on the political system at large and thus on society. The main point of dispute remains therefore the identification of the means to enact and enhance the capacity to impact on politics, rather than the overall political objective in itself. The strategy and procedures count more than the final goal. This discussion echoes the old domestic debate on the formation of the nation-state. In that case, the opposition was also between those holding to a grassroots strategy (change from outside the institutions) and those supporting instead an institutional perspective (change from within). In this “global” case, the opposition is between place-based and universalizing globalism.

The more institutional positions within cosmopolitanism maintain the need for either reforming or creating new international/national institutions able to influence global politics. Those proposing to focus political struggle on the transnational institutional level are motivated by the assumption that for a societal change to occur the relevant political framework needs to change too (even if only enacted from above), especially in a context characterized by global powers (D. Held, 1995). Social cosmopolitanism maintains, conversely, that this universalizing reading reflects a biased and limited understanding of political processes, for it takes it for granted that political change has to be brought about through institutional, peaceful, centralized,

and, in the case of global politics, mostly transnational means. Universalizing globalism fails, from the point of view of social cosmopolitanism, for not giving appropriate consideration to an alternative conceptualization of politics according to which what counts equally are the internal process and the sources of political change. In this respect, universalizing globalism remains self-defeating, because it ignores forms and processes of organization that are key prerequisites for successful political struggle (Cochran, 2002; Patomäki, 2003; Bond, 2004b; Osterweil, 2005, 24–5).

The first step toward the implementation of the social cosmopolitan political project consists of fierce opposition to the actual institutional arrangements of global governance. The most immediate political objective of actors espousing social cosmopolitanism is, in the present international circumstances, a strenuous politics of resistance to neo-liberalism, both in its ideological forms and in its institutional structures (Tarrow, 1998; Gills, 2000; Gill, 2002; Armstrong *et al.*, 2003). The current socio-political scenario has to be interpreted as a conflict. Social movements and civil society organizations are seen as key actors in a fight against power structures that can at times take the form of direct action beyond current legality. Despite some minor reformist views, the bulk of social cosmopolitan logic tends toward “abolishing rather than polishing” institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. These institutions are considered to be so embedded in a system of power organized from above that the possibility of reforming them properly and democratically is seen as minimal. Hence, and contrariwise, the political aim remains threefold: stopping the widening of institutions’ competencies in the short-term, reducing their scope in the mid-term, and closing them down in the long-term.

The social cosmopolitanism political perspective does not preclude, however, positively envisaging democratic institutional structures, even at the international level (Falk, 1995; Rikkila and Patomäki, 2001; Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004). These are admitted and actually encouraged, provided they are constructed from below, for coordination between the differing place-based political projects is key in at least two senses. On the one hand, it is needed for strategic reasons, for only through inter-group collaboration can an alternative model of politics be established and the challenging resistance of the current power system be overcome. On the other hand, solidarity – i.e. a principle recognized with both intra- and inter-group validity – needs institutional support to be implemented. For such institutional mechanisms to be legitimate, democratic control from below remains essential. While the previous phase of resistance was conflict-ridden, this second phase of political change would lead to a more peaceful situation. In this, citizens and groups, trained to civic virtue through local democratic participation, would solve local and transnational socio-political conflicts with a consensus-based method. Accordingly, this positive project suggests the implementation of a scheme of de-globalization – namely de-structuring and de-linking the places

of politics and production from global-chaining – in order to regain democratic control from below through transnational networking (Pianta and Marchetti, 2007; Marchetti and Pianta, 2008). In accordance with the principle of autonomy and self-determination, this thus does not mean autarky, but rather the subordination of external relations to the logic of internal development, i.e. reorienting foreign policy from global decisions to local self-determination, and production from export to local consumption (Amin, 1985; Bello, 2002; Bond, 2004a, 186–7).

The actual content of each political project to be developed from below is not predetermined, for it is left to the self-determination of each group, much as each individual is granted freedom of choice. Even in those cases in which there is an “import” from outside (e.g. a downscale shift of a global project such as the many local Social Fora), this can only be justified provided it fits with and accommodates local political projects. From this point of view, social cosmopolitanism offers a sort of politics without ideology, a *caminar preguntando* (walk while questioning) as the Zapatistas would say. Underpinning this position is the refutation of the universal ambition of ethical and institutional cosmopolitanism based on the idea of thinness. Some institutional cosmopolitans tend to fall back into a thin position insofar as they are motivated by the determination to resist critiques from communitarians and post-modernists (Dobson, 2006). In order to disprove the claim that cosmopolitanism is a western-centric project mantled with a universalistic cover, some thin cosmopolitans argue that of all the defenses of social voices, cosmopolitanism is the most promising in terms of impartial inclusion (Linklater, 1998b). It is against universalistic pretenses such as this that Osterweil notes:

globality as a total or universal project is never complete. First, because it is impossible to *see* ‘the global’ as a totality if we acknowledge that we are always gazing from a particular place, body, or moment: One can refer to ‘the global’ solely departing from concrete places/spaces that are themselves particular, and partial, takes on the global. For as anthropologist Bruno Latour notes there can be no abstract ‘non-place/everyplace’ that is not itself based on a concrete ‘someplace’: every universal can always be traced back to a particular, and as such, claims to universality always involve attempts at universalizing a particularity while necessarily negating others.

(Osterweil, 2005, 25)

From the consolidation of this multitude of differing projects, which are interlinked among each other but never achieve the status of a singular global entity, a new image emerges: that of subaltern and rooted cosmopolitanism. This diffuseness and global rootedness leads to a process increasingly involving more and more parts of the world (de Sousa Santos, 2005; Tarrow, 2005). The exclusionary logic of neo-liberal globalization would thus be

reversed by the struggle of transnational social movements against transnational exclusion.

A complex, bidirectional global system

Social cosmopolitanism constitutes a warning of the greatest importance to any project of global democracy. The risk of succumbing to the illusion of speaking in the name of humanity and ending up with an élitist project that, while apportioning minor changes, preserves the logic of the current political situation, is high. It is especially high for all those cosmopolitan perspectives that collapse into forms of governance. At the same time, however, the social project from below that social cosmopolitanism envisages is also not without hidden dangers. Self-governing civil society may not be enough, insofar as at the global level citizens would only be represented through global civil society organizations, which are not necessarily participative and inclusive for what concerns their internal and inter-organizational forms. With a civil society only approach, more traditional forms of political representation would be left out, and so also the more inclusive mechanisms so far available to include individuals in political life. When more emphasis is put on the legitimizing functions of civil society and human rights rather than on the democratic practice, then advocacy and unruly social interaction rather than parliamentary politics result. While this could definitely unmask some of the hypocrisies of the current international institutional system, it does not offer sufficient countermeasures to the social exclusion caused by social and economic power. Strong actors could too easily impose their will on weaker agents in political, social, and cultural terms, and exclusion would be simply postponed or translated, but not eliminated. The issue of power also remains central within the internal dynamics of grassroots social movements.

A more consistent project of global democracy needs to combine an institutional aspiration modeled in formal electoral terms with a social aspiration in terms of participation from below. While on the one hand, an all-inclusive system cannot but be based on formal enfranchisement on several institutional layers, as shown in Chapters two and three, a system that remains sensitive enough to social struggles cannot but be open to inputs from grassroots organizations. New institutional and social mechanisms need to be envisaged in order to square the circle and allow for both these fundamental democratic requirements to be met. What is needed is a balanced combination of formal institutions and social emancipatory activities. This is the task of a consistent cosmopolitan project for global democracy, which will be addressed in Chapter seven with the formulation of the model of cosmo-federalism.

Conclusions

Social cosmopolitanism is an ideal model of global politics, denouncing the current exclusionary system of international affairs, and by contrast stressing

the need for its reconstruction on truly democratic bases. International exclusion from global decision-making processes has been depicted by social cosmopolitanism as the result of “global apartheid.”⁵ Indeed such exclusion at times even entails a securitization pattern according to which protesters are criminalized because they are seen as destabilizing actors. It is against such a depraved state of affairs that social cosmopolitanism and the many components of transnational social movements espousing it throw accusations of illegitimacy at the present international system. What these activists claim is a political voice, i.e. enfranchisement in global affairs from which they are excluded. From this perspective, their struggles are enormously important for they suggest in *primis* a reshaping of public designations of legitimate social and political actors. They propose new international norms, envisage a new political configuration, and practice political alternatives that force the current system to transform through fierce contestation, in terms of both criticism and resistance. They pursue the ideal of a global democratic system legitimized from below.

What lessons can be learnt from the forty-year-long trajectory of cosmopolitan thinking, from its ethical origins to its social reformulation? Many instructive points can be deduced from it. Here I will point to three that are crucial for a viable democratic project in the twenty-first century. First, claims of global justice based on a universalistic aspiration cannot be legitimately denied by the appeal to national and cultural differences. More particularly, I have shown that the principle of freedom of choice remains the most viable in order to guarantee a set of rights that preserves pluralism. Second, claims for participation in politics through public institutions in each sphere of social interaction cannot be legitimately denied by the appeal to national jurisdictions. More particularly, I have shown that the principle of all-inclusiveness in the decision-making and frame-setting processes at the transnational and global level remains key for a consistent democratic system. Third, claims for the inclusion and autonomy of subaltern actors cannot be legitimately denied by the appeal to the alleged superiority of any single cultural or political model. In particular, I have shown that an intense and plural social flourishing is essential to any sustainable political project aiming at including and emancipating all individuals among all peoples, considered equally. I will try to combine these points in Chapter seven of this book when I reformulate the cosmopolitan proposal along the lines of cosmo-federalism: a system that allows for both formal political participation and social emancipatory practices. Before doing that, however, I need to engage more with those views that traditionally oppose the idea of global democracy: the ideals of political community and international liberalism. This is the task of the next two chapters.

Notes

1 Translation: walk while questioning.

2 This section partly draws on Marchetti and Raccach, 2006.

- 3 The argument of this section applies to the case of liberal cosmopolitan Judaism, not to the case of mainstream political Zionism and the case of the state of Israel, which is by definition non-pluralistic and non-inclusive, i.e. non-cosmopolitan.
- 4 One of the most famous cases in this respect is the episode, which has come to be known as “the hand of God,” of the Argentinean player Diego Armando Maradona, who scored an “illegal” goal against the English team in the 1986 World Cup. Beyond the shallow pride provoked by that event in many people, the assumption of this note is that pride gained through cheating cannot be considered consistent with the profound logic of a real success and thus should ultimately be assessed as a pyrrhic victory. And to turn around an analogy frequently made to justify poor sportsmanship, all is not fair in war either. No citizen would in fact be proud of a victory obtained through illegitimate war actions, such as crimes against humanity and disproportionate countermeasures.
- 5 The phenomenon of “global apartheid” is defined by Washington-based Africa advocates Salih Booker and Bill Minter as “an international system of minority rule whose attributes include differential access to basic human rights, wealth, and power” (Booker and Minter, 2001, cited in Bond, 2004a, 4).

Part III

Against global democracy

So far this study has reinterpreted the cosmopolitan tradition through an engagement with the cosmopolitan literature that has formed a forty-year-long interdisciplinary debate. While cosmopolitanism has a much older history dating back to the cynic and stoic cosmopolitans in classical Greece, the previous section limited its focus to the contemporary debate for its more comprehensive relevance to the three dimensions under examination: the ethical, the institutional, and the social. Although contemporary cosmopolitanism is rooted in its classical and modern ancestors, it emerged above all in reaction to the limits of the prevailing models of international politics. The contemporary debate cannot be fully understood if it is not considered in relation to the traditional antagonists of cosmopolitan thinking: the ideal of political communities and liberal internationalism.

The ideals of political communities and liberal internationalism today represent the two major paradigms for thinking normatively about international politics. And both of them fundamentally oppose the project for global democracy. A study of these hegemonic paradigms is thus of the highest importance for any project of global democracy aiming to challenge their status in public opinion and scholarly debate. Historically speaking, the models of political communities and liberal internationalism represent earlier stages of the debate on international political theory. In their original forms as realism and idealism, they actually established the internationalist political debate at the beginning of the twentieth century. That was the period in which the first chairs in the discipline of international relations (IR) were created, and with them the disciplinary autonomy of international studies. Like cosmopolitanism, realism and idealism have deep roots – realism dates back as far as classical Greece, and idealism dates back a few centuries – but again it is their contemporary debate that is of greatest relevance to this study.

Theoretically, both belong to the family of interaction-dependence (see Chapter one) in that they warrant the application of ethical and political obligations of justice to a delimited scope. The examination here begins with the contextualist theories, (realism, nationalism and civilizationism), because of the two sets of interaction-dependent theories, they diverge

farthest from consequentialist cosmopolitanism. The examination then proceeds to the scrutiny of the universalist theories of interaction-based justice (democratic peace theory and cosmopolitan governance) – the most challenging alternatives in the field of international ethics to the project of global democracy.

5 Political communities

Why do you kill me? What! Do you not live on the other side of the water? If you lived on this side, my friend, I should be an assassin, and it would be unjust to slay you in this manner. But since you live on the other side, I am a hero, and it is just. ... Three degrees of latitude reverse all jurisprudence; a meridian decides the truth. ... A strange justice that is bounded by a river! Truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other side.

(Pascal, 1660; reprinted 1995, *pensées* 293–4)

Realism, nationalism and the civilization discourse are the dominant paradigms, together with liberal internationalism, for normatively interpreting international affairs. Although they rest on different axiological assumptions, they are here considered together here for two reasons: first, they all rely on a contextualist interpretation of the interaction-dependent theory of justice, and thus they limit the scope of applicability of the principle of justice to their political units of reference. Second and consequently, they are all against the idea of global democracy, fostering instead the principle of autonomy of their political units. In order to make a solid case for global democracy, these theories need to be carefully analyzed and challenged. That is the task of this chapter.

Realism (and its institutional correlate, statism) and nationalism have alternated as the dominant paradigm of international relations throughout western, and later world, history. Liberal internationalism did intervene in this historical succession, at times overlapping with one or other of the two schools of thought, but it remained relatively marginal. Statism became a key reference in the West after the Westphalian treaty in 1648. That year symbolically marked the end of the previous political system, based on the idea of two empires. The state was conceived as opposed to the transnational claims of the church/emperor and the overlapping authorities of nobles, kings, and clerics of medieval origin. In this sense, the modern state was characterized by clearly demarcated boundaries with almost complete sovereign authority. And it was originally associated with the dominium theory, roughly speaking similar to a theory of property and ownership. The king had complete authority over his subjects: they belonged to him, and he had the power to grant them their political existence.

One century later, between the French revolution in 1789 and the Congress of Vienna in 1815, sovereignty began to be strongly associated also with cultural communities and self-determination. Nationalism and the notion of nationhood gained public acceptance. This conception of national sovereignty, although it is historically an addition to the old Westphalian statist principle, caused turbulence in international affairs. In general, given the overall system of international affairs, the principle of national sovereignty proved to be more destabilizing than that of state sovereignty, as it resulted in an increase in the number of existing states and the liberation struggles of revolutionary groups (Barkin and Cronin, 1994). After the Congress of Vienna, statism and the notion of the balance of power regained prominence, and kept it until the end of the First World War when nationalism (this time coupled with idealism) and the principle of national self-determination were robustly restated, bringing about another increase in the number of states. After the Second World War, realism and its later variant, neo-realism, managed to re-establish themselves as the points of reference in IR theorization until the 1970s.

Over the last forty years, the decline of realism and the simultaneous multiplication of normative theories for interpreting international relations have led to a much more complex theoretical and political scene. Nationalism has reacquired importance; the old idea of empire has been resuscitated with an alternative meaning and change of fortune, in association with the neo-conservative trend; the civilization paradigm in both its dialogical and clash variants is increasingly important; and, as this book argues, the project for global democracy remains an ultimate normative reference. This chapter disentangles and normatively evaluates three major component of this debate: statism, nationalism, and civilizationism.

Interaction-dependent contextualist theories

As already noted, despite being profoundly different in other respects, realist, nationalist, and civilizational theories are here considered jointly on account of their reliance on the interaction paradigm, and the subsequent international consequences of their exclusive inclusiveness. Sharing a group-limited focus – the state in the case of realism, the cultural community in the case of nationalism, and the macro-region in the civilizational approach – these theories draw the boundaries of justice according to a conventionalist paradigm. From their contextualist perspective, justice in any given society is determined by the socially defined, and thus shared, beliefs as to the meanings of the goods to be distributed among members of the community (Walzer, 1985). In this way, both statist realism and nationalist/civilizational communitarianism hold that the limit of thick duties of justice is the horizon of domestic interaction. Their prescriptions toward non-members vary from a thin obligation of beneficence, to a set of traditional *modus vivendi* principles of non-harm and non-intervention, and even to a license for aggressive and

expansionist policies. The issue of inclusion/exclusion is at its clearest here, for the normative paradigm of political communities lies in the notion of limited inclusion as meaningfully contrasted with the political outranking of non-members. As aptly noted by Brian Barry, following from this the idea of global justice yields the intrinsic risk of generating global injustice and exclusion (B. Barry, 1995b).

In international political terms, the state and nation paradigms provide the normative basis for the two principal interpretations of the principle of sovereignty, which is in turn considered to be a constitutive and ordering rule of international organization. Following a traditional definition, according to which sovereignty is “the institutionalization of public authority within mutually exclusive jurisdictional domains” (Ruggie, 1986, 143; see also Krasner, 1999), the state paradigm recognizes this domain with reference to territory, the nation with reference to the population. Using this conventional categorization, the following sections examine the two paradigms of realism and nationalism, together with the more recent reformulation of the civilizational approach.

Realism

Realism constitutes the model par excellence for managing interstate relations. Its historical development is marked by a series of classical formulations that began with Sun Tzu (6th century BC; reprinted 1993) and Thucydides (411 BC; reprinted 1959), and continued over many centuries through Augustine (426; reprinted 1998), Machiavelli (1513; reprinted 1988), Botero (1589; reprinted 1956), Hobbes (1651; reprinted 1968), and Clausewitz (1873; reprinted 1976). Throughout its history, realism has had as major rivals all those theories that advocate the overcoming of state borders: primary among them is the universalistic theory of the Law of Nature,¹ but also, from the sixteenth century, are the various projects for international peace,² and the cosmopolitan tradition in its different strands.³ This doctrinal rivalry continued for many centuries but it was only in the twentieth century that realism managed both to be reformulated in more scientific terms and to be recognized as hegemonic thinking.

Realism imposed itself as the central paradigm in international political theory almost from the emergence of the discipline of IR at the beginning of the twentieth century, in part as a reaction against the idealist and utopian international thought produced in that period by a heterogeneous group of scholars with an idealist inspiration (Niebuhr, 1932; Carr, 1939; Schmitt, 1950; reprinted 2003; Morgenthau, 1960; Aron, 1962; reprinted 1966; Waltz, 1979; Oppenheim, 1993).⁴ Idealism’s set of beliefs is comprised of the belief in reason, progress, and the harmony of interests, faith in public opinion, willingness to strengthen international law and to establish both a permanent judicial organ and a certain degree of international government, and finally an attitude broadly in favor of the promotion of the general welfare (Hobson, 1915; Woolf, 1916).⁵ Realism evolved against these beliefs –

especially after the Second World War, when it managed to consolidate its doctrinal hegemony thanks to the institutional roles held by a number of its scholars such as Acheson, Dulles, Kennan, Morgenthau, and Kissinger in the US Administration, in particular in the US Department of State. This dominating position continued unchallenged until the beginning of the 1970s when a new sense of practical commitment arose in both public opinion and academic circles, and the current cosmopolitan discussion began.

Table 5.1 Main assumptions of realism

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- A reading of history teaches that people are by nature sinful and wicked. They instinctively search for power and aim at dominating others.
 - The possibility of eradicating the instinct for power from politics is an utopian aspiration.
 - Under such conditions international politics is a struggle for power, “a war of all against all” (Hobbes).
 - The primary obligation of every state in this environment – the goal to which all other national objectives should be subordinated – is to promote the “national interest,” defined as the acquisition of power.
 - The anarchical nature of the international system necessitates the acquisition of military capabilities sufficient to deter attack by potential enemies.
 - Economics is less relevant to national security than military might and is important primarily as a means to acquiring national power and prestige.
 - Allies might increase the ability of a state to defend itself, but their loyalty and reliability should not be assumed.
 - States should never entrust the task of self-protection to international organizations or international law.
 - If all states seek to maximize power, stability will result from maintaining a balance of power, lubricated by fluid alliance systems.
-

Based on Kegley, 1995, 3–4

The three cardinal concepts of realist thought can be summarized as follows. First, political generalizations are deduced and validated from historical experience through epistemological research that claims axiological neutrality. History is the only avenue through which to achieve political wisdom and it is an avenue that is potentially interpretable in an objective way. But description is not the only aim of the analysis. Realists also pursue the objective of prediction and prescriptions to the advantage of the governors. Their instruments are the exempla, analyzed through not logical but historical judgment. Thus they work not from theory to practice but, as a sort of praxeology, from the interpretation of specific situations to the formulation of predictions based on experience and maxims for action. From this derives not a project of emancipation, but merely a principle of responsibility that is anti-ideological and conservative, since it is based on the recognition of the immutability of human nature as characterized by force and fraud, ambition and envy, suspicion and deceit. What realists prescribe is not an idealistic eschatology, but rather a demonology of politics correlated by technical-pragmatic suggestions (Portinaro, 1999).

Second, international political reality is interpreted with a state-centric approach which privileges conflicts rather than common interests among international actors. States rather than individuals, nations, or international organizations are the key units of analysis for realism. Conflict remains central and is traditionally understood as deriving alternatively from two main ontological situations. State competition is sometimes interpreted anthropologically as deriving from the fundamental nature of human beings, which is self-seeking (natural realism à la Hobbes); at other times state competition is seen as deriving from the anarchical structure of international relations (structural realism). Despite overlapping in a number of authors, these two explanations remain fundamentally distinct.

Third, the core of political theory is anchored to a number of flexible notions, such as power, national interest, and security. With their variant meanings, these few concepts of universal applicability serve both to formulate the theory and to help the politician. Power, in particular, remains a key element in the realist struggle to survive the antagonistic forces of the political environment. Power is analytically intended as

control of the man over the minds and actions of other men. . . . [P]olitical power is a psychological relationship between those who exercise it and those on whom it is exercised. This power confers to the first the control over the actions of the second through the influence over their minds. This derives from three factors: expectation of benefits, fear of punishment, and respect or love for men and institutions.

(Morgenthau, 1960, 47)

The reference to competitive power creates by contrast a focus on potential threat. Wise statesmen will primarily and almost exclusively focus on other states that could constitute an effective threat to their pursuit of power. And more importantly, they will interpret the actions of those states not on the simple basis of their announced policies or on the assumption that they will behave morally, but rather on the premise that they are seeking rationally to increase their power. Power and hostility are thus reciprocally implied. As Morgenthau put it: “fight for power is temporally and spatially universal, and it is an empirical fact which is undeniable” (*ibid.*, 55). The competitive character of the international environment in fact remains, regardless of the normative ideals of the actors thereby involved. In this scenario, when equality is present, a conflict will most likely arise which if overcome will lead to hierarchy and a structure of domination. Understanding this negative, conflicting, and competitive interpretation of social and political reality is crucial to understanding the realist analysis of politics correctly.

In line with the negative interpretation of human nature, realists share a common disdain for modern ideologies of human equality such as liberalism, as realists interpret inequality as a constitutive component of society.⁶ Given a choice between impartial justice and personal or national interest, the

realist scholar (like to the paradoxical football fan examined in Chapter four) is always for the second, though sometimes this may be dissimulated. The demands of justice are considered to be only weak ideologies serving weak actors. “Justice only exists, if it exists, by grace of the powerful, and the weak rely upon it at their peril” (Forde, 1992, 72). Moral skepticism is here coupled with moral relativism: no universal value is applicable transculturally. Morality can only be used instrumentally as a rhetorical justification of power politics. In this regard, realism is not only a science of politics, but also, ambiguously, an art of politics. In a dialectic of truth and deceit, realism is on the one hand the exposition of reality beyond appearance, but on the other it is also a defense of the virtues of dissimulation and secrecy. The issue of *arcana imperii*, according to which states hide institutional secrets, is fully accommodated here.

Based on a negative anthropology of power and hostility à la Hobbes, the realists’ ultimate political objective thus remains the preservation and increase of national power to the detriment of other states and non-fellow citizens. In such an environment, characterized as it is by the absence of any significant co-operative international structures, the governor has special moral agency. As noted, according to the domestic dis-analogy, the duties charged to the government are different from those applying to the citizens within a politically organized society. They cannot afford to follow a cooperative approach, because the social context does not allow for that. In this political environment it is in fact useless and indeed imprudent to pursue moral ideals. “Moral assessments (such as those on human rights or global redistributive justice) are relevant every time state’s representatives are about to decide on something different from national interest, and yet compatible with this” (Oppenheim, 1993, 59). In this vein, the state is ultimately intended instrumentally as a condition for the promotion of national interests. The general aim of national politics should be the preservation and increase of national power, intended variably to include: geography, natural resources, industrial power, military capability, population, national character, national morale, quality of diplomacy, and quality of the government. Key means to promote national interest thus remain either expansion or balance of power. The decision on which one to follow depends on the specific power capabilities of any nation and of the international context.

If politics is primarily intended as the fight for survival of the collective in an anarchical system, then foreign policy takes primacy over domestic affairs, and consequently war becomes a principal concern. War constitutes an intrinsic element of politics, or, famously, the continuation of politics by other means (Clausewitz, 1873; reprinted 1976). In complete opposition to the Humean virtuous circle, a dynamic of growing power creates a vicious circle between a scarcity of resources, hostility, fighting, hegemony, and tyranny. A typical example of this is the escalation of rearmament that generates the dilemma of nuclear security. In an endless push to externalize domestic conflicts and manage international competition, states are obliged to have

a proactive role in international affairs. In this sense, and aware of the risks and structural conflicts of human circumstances, realists argue for the primacy of strategic actions, based on the consideration of a “triple frustration of the action” in the international scenario: unpredictability of the result, irreversibility of the process, and anonymity (thus irresponsibility) of the actors. A perennially aggressive attitude is the inevitable result.

The space for international organizations and cooperation thus remains very limited. In denying the reasonableness of the moralizing attitude of cosmopolitan thought, realist thought holds that as effective neutral and super partes international organization is inconceivable unless three very unlikely conditions are fulfilled: if it is empowered with a power sufficient to discourage any aggressor, if a shared conception of collective security and international law arises, and if a genuine interest in subordinating one’s own political interest to the common good of international security emerges. Since these conditions are a very remote possibility, no illusion should be held as to effectiveness of international mechanisms of impartial justice and cooperation. Moreover, for realism, political unity presupposes the real possibility of an enemy, and therefore of an antagonist political unity. For one state to exist, more than one needs to exist; consequently a world state is inconceivable, since the political scene is intrinsically a pluriverse (Schmitt, 1932; reprinted 1996). A system of global democracy thus remains very far from being feasible and desirable according to realist orthodoxy.

From the cosmopolitan perspective, however, realism can be criticized on a number of distinct grounds. On a more political level, it can be accused of failing to reveal adequately the relevance of interdependence and of multi-layered transnational politics, which have caused the locus of politics to move away from residing uniquely in the state. As a consequence, state sovereignty is also less significant than it was in the middle of the twentieth century (pace Hirst and Thompson, 1996). In addition, realism is unable to provide a sound account not only of mutations in international history which are not directly motivated by the search for power politics, such as democratic peace, but also of all those nationalistic movements where identity and culture are most prominent. Beyond these, however, the most significant objections to realism come from the normative perspective. To begin with, realism can be criticized for not explicitly recognizing its hidden normative bases, and thus for not sufficiently justifying them. As mentioned, realism claims axiological neutrality, but it is now increasingly acknowledged that its negative anthropological vision is just one out of many readings and definitely not a very convincing one in normative terms. Moreover, international law, human rights, and democracy are increasingly reckoned as legitimizing principles for any political system, together with (and possibly more than) simple control of territory. Finally, realism compartmentalizes humanity in impermeable entities, generating the phenomenon of transnational exclusion that has been described in Chapter one. These considerations suffice here to reveal the realist position as one of the major supporting ideologies of the current level of

transnational exclusion. If these criticisms are accepted, then a completely different international behavior has to be recommended to international and transnational actors. Cosmopolitanism aims to fill this gap, providing alternative guidelines to statesmen.

Nationalism

Realism does not exhaust the range of normative options within the contextualist category of interaction-dependent theories of justice. Its counterpart, nationalism, represents another source that has contributed almost equally to the establishment of the present exclusionary system of international relations. The rationale for exclusion deriving from the community-based theories of political justice is in fact almost as old as the realist argument, and almost as influential, with such thinkers as Aristotle (4th century BC; reprinted 1988), Rousseau (1762; reprinted 1987), Hegel (1821; reprinted 1991) being the principal philosophical references. After the long-term realist hegemony attending the Cold War, nationalism resumed a politically relevant place in the late 1980s, and exploded in the 1990s, in part as a response to a threat felt to be posed by universal liberalism and its correlate of dis-embedded or unencumbered individual rights (MacIntyre, 1984; Tamir, 1993; O'Neil, 1994; Taylor and Gutmann, 1994; Walzer, 1994; Miller, 1995; Viroli, 1995; Canovan, 1996; M. Frost, 1996; Dagger, 1997; Moore, 2001).⁷

While the term "state" represents a legal concept describing a social group that occupies a defined territory and is organized under common political institutions and effective government, "nation" depicts a social group that shares a common ideology, common institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity. In this sense, then, a nation can be seen as a community of sentiment or an "imagined community." While the exact content of this sentiment – i.e. what constitutes a nation – remains highly controversial, a significant component of its definition is certainly multidimensionality. Until recently the definition of nationality was provided by some sort of tangible elements, including common language, territory, religion, or even more vividly by blood, skin, or race. This was stronger in the case of racist ideologies linking nationalism to unique hereditary genetic traits. Under the pressure of fierce criticism, the definition has been redirected to the psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all non-members in a vital way. Beyond the defining characteristics, what remains relevant here is nationalism's exclusionary clause to effect the delimiting of the boundaries of the national community.

Two principal conceptions of nation can be distinguished, a western and a non-western notion (A. Smith, 1991). The western conception entails a compact, well-defined territory, in that people and territory must belong to each other. The territory must be the historic land, the homeland where several generations have exerted their influence. It is exclusive to its people, and consequently denied to aliens. In addition, a nation also refers to the idea of

patria: a community of law and institutions with a single political will to express common sentiments, which relies on an overall sense of equality and reciprocity among members of the community. Finally, a western nation is imbued with common values and traditions: a common culture and a civic ideology, which includes common understandings and aspirations, sentiments, and ideas. A non-western conception of nation, instead, refers more to the idea of ethnicity. The genealogy is crucial in that emphasis is put on the ethnic community of birth and native culture. Individuals do not have the options of choosing their community, for they are ineluctably and organically members of a community of descent (as opposed to territory). The community is thus seen as a super-family of brotherhood. The idea of popular and democratic mobilization is also associated with this conception of nation in that the accent is more on the people than on the law. Vernacular culture, language, and customs (as opposed to law) provide the common ground for establishing the rules of conduct. Today, Smith argues, every nationalism contains components of both models (civic and ethnic).

According to Smith, national identity involves some sense of political community, which in turn implies, at least, a definite social space and a fairly well demarcated and bounded territory with which the members identify and to which they feel they belong, as opposed to other nations. In general, a number of specific features can be identified for every nation, as opposed to any other collective identity. A nation is supposed to be a territorially bounded unit of population, with its own homeland. Its members share a common mass culture and common historical myths and memories, and have reciprocal rights and duties under a common legal system. A nation, finally, possesses a common division of labor and system of production with mobility across the territory. While Smith's and others theories are important to understanding the phenomenon of nationalism, they provide little help toward the normative evaluation of it. For this, we need to turn to a more normative literature.

Table 5.2 Main assumptions of nationalism

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- The key aspect of life refers to the collective identity within a cultural-political group.
 - National identities are constructed through a long and complex historical process.
 - National identity refers to: a homeland, a set of domestic shared beliefs, a distinct identity embodying historical continuity and a duty to preserve and develop it, a common public culture, and common legal rights and duties for all members.
 - Genuine multiple allegiances are not possible.
 - Nationality grounds circumscribed obligations to fellow-nationals (contextualistic ethics).
 - Nationality justifies aspirations to political self-determination.
 - Nationality entails reciprocal non-interference and compliance with international covenants.
 - Transnationalism slackens the solidaristic ties, which are necessary for an effective social project.
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Based on A. Smith, 1991; Miller, 1995

Prominent among normative scholars engaged with the idea of nationality is David Miller. His conceptualization of nationality is based on five constitutive elements: 1) a set of domestic shared beliefs, 2) an identity embodying historical continuity and a duty to preserve and develop it, 3) an active agency identity, 4) a geographical space, and 5) some differentiating element such as a national character shaped by a common public culture. In other words, for Miller, to have a national identity entails thinking of oneself as belonging to a community constituted by mutual beliefs, extended in history, active in character, connected to a particular territory, and distinguished from others by its members' distinct traits. In addition, Miller's theory of nationality generates three cardinal claims concerning national identity: it is properly part of personal identities; it grounds circumscribed obligations to fellow-nationals; and it justifies aspirations to political self-determination (Miller, 1988, 1993, 1995, 2001).

Nationality should, consequently, be valued for two principal reasons, according to Miller. National identity is constitutively good, insofar as it is endowed with an ethical value which crucially contributes to the full development of personal identity, so much so that without it a fundamental part of our moral agency would be lost. Furthermore, national identity is also instrumentally good as a provider of the social conditions needed for the implementation of domestic social justice. Losing such identity would slacken the solidaristic ties that are necessary for an effective social project. At the basis of this lies Miller's concept of particularistic ethical obligations, which originates from the intrinsic value of the modes of relations within the community and is centered on the concept of loose reciprocity, built on the possibility of identification and on the sense of membership. According to this contextualistic theory of ethical identity, the contents of justice are culturally shaped, so much so that in order to understand properly a moral code it is first necessary to identify three principal localized elements: goods, principles, and contexts (Miller, 2000, 168–71). Hence, moral values are fundamentally localized and no normative universal interpretation of them is available, except in the case of an empirical (rather implausible) appeal to an intercultural overlapping consensus. From this contextualistic point of view, the scope of justice remains limited within the border of the socio-political community.

Beyond Miller's interpretation, nationalism has been assigned normative value from a number of other different angles (C. M. Frost, 2001). Among them, the following theories have been the subject of significant contemporary debate: the theory of remedial rights, according to which nationalism through secession is taken as a necessary tool to avoid cases of widespread human rights violation (A. Buchanan, 1996, 1997); the dysfunctionalist theory, according to which nationalism helps us to cope with the demanding economic and social conditions of modernity (Gellner, 1983); the social trust theory, according to which shared nationality tends to foster relationships that enrich our moral and political lives by boosting the essential ingredients

of trust, which in turn is key for distributive justice (Tamir, 1993); the self-esteem theory, according to which the nation is key for securing identity and belonging, which are in turn essential to well-being (Margalit and Raz, 1990; Taylor, 1997); and the autonomy-based theory, according to which societal cultures provide a way of making choice meaningful, and are therefore essential to individual autonomy (Kymlicka, 1995). While based on different normative assumptions, all of these positions, similarly to Miller's arguments, grant legitimacy to the delimitation of the scope of political justice to the national community.

By adopting this kind of normative interpretation, two main enemies of nationality can be identified at the international level. The first foe, intrinsic and philosophical, is represented by universalism in its cosmopolitan version, because of its alternative theory of identity and ethical-political prescriptions. The second enemy, instrumental and political, is the transnationalization of market politics, which causes the diminishing power of the state in relation to the world market system (Hobsbawm, 1998). This has not only detrimental economical consequences on citizens' welfare, but also negative social effects, insofar as it is assumed to weaken the social cement which is based on a national sense of solidarity and is necessary for liberal regimes to flourish. With this declared antagonism, Miller's theory fosters a defense of national claims at the international level (Miller, 1998, 1999). Based on a reiterative principle of national autonomy, a normative theory of international relations is subsequently advanced that includes traditional principles of international law, such as reciprocal non-interference and compliance with international covenants.

These normative defenses of the principle of nationality require a serious response from a cosmopolitan perspective, beyond the comments on Miller's metaphor of the football fan reported in Chapter four. The prescriptive image of international relations envisaged by nationalist scholars remains problematic from a number of different aspects. First, the contextualist theory of ethical values cannot consistently provide a stable model for inter-community interaction, since no overarching regulative principle can be identified through this approach. If no superior principle can be individuated nor any superior political structure firmly established, then when conflicts arise no ultimate solution can be peacefully found. Second, the international principles that these scholars suggest remain admittedly rather ineffective at managing increasingly complex international problems. Miller himself, for instance, recognizes that from his nationalist point of view, in a world situation characterized by global transformation, it is an insidious task to elaborate normative solutions for the organization of a firm international order where multiple agents interact on multiple levels. See in this regard the case of confederate bodies such as the European Union, which are condemned, according to Miller's position, to remain provisional (Miller, 1994, 146), or the conflicting cases of intermingled national identities (Miller, 1997) and migration flows (Miller, 2003). Beyond these flaws, a major

problem remains that condemns the theories of nationalism to normative failure: the issue of transnational exclusion. In a world in which interaction is so intense and individuals are so profoundly affected by decisions taken abroad, this lack of reciprocity, clearly exemplified by the lack of common political institutions, is unacceptable. All the positions so far surveyed confirm the intrinsically exclusionary character of nationalist theories, which renders them fundamentally consistent with the realist position on the specific issue of inclusion/exclusion.

Civilizationism

While the civilizational paradigm slowly emerged as a significant model of global politics only in the last few decades, it nonetheless constitutes a further robust member of the theoretical family of political communities. Incipient attempts to recognize the centrality of the notion of civilization in international affairs occurred in the late nineteenth century, with the establishment of the Parliament of the World's Religions (1893), and in the first half of the twentieth century, with the creation of the World Congress of Faiths (1936); but it was only in the 1970s and 1980s that a clear recognition of the civilizational factor as a key component of international relations emerged. It was doubtless the publication of Huntington's famous article on the "Clash of Civilizations" in 1993 (Huntington, 1993; *Foreign Affairs*, 1996) that turned what had originally been a predominantly religious discussion into a fully fledged political debate. The events of 9/11 only boosted the attention given to Huntington's thesis.

In reaction to Huntington's thesis, a number of political statements and theoretical formulations in terms of dialogue among civilizations have been developed not only in academia, but also in public discourse and in institutional discussion. In academia, Dallmayr and others offered a robust foundation for the dialogue of civilizations in hermeneutic terms (Dallmayr, 2003b). In the public political domain, the backing of the idea of a dialogue of civilizations by the centennial meeting of the Parliament of the World's Religions (in 1993) (Küng and Kuschel, 1995), the former Iranian President Khatami (Khatami, 1998; *Petito*, 2007), and the World Public Forum–Dialogue of Civilizations (World Public Forum, 2004), offered a concrete space for interaction. The UN's institutional backing – with the designation of 2001 as the year of the Dialogue of Civilization (Picco, 2001; United Nations, 2001), and with the Spanish and Turkish co-sponsored initiative on the Alliance of Civilizations (2004) that generated a United Nations High-Level Group on this topic (United Nations, 2006) – was also key in the consolidation of this discourse. Today, civilization is firmly established as a key concept for an interpretation of global politics within the idea of political communities and beyond a limited state-based perspective.

Table 5.3 Main assumptions of civilizationism

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- The key aspects of human life are cultural and religious.
 - Cultural difference are irreducible.
 - Political power is interpreted as being managed by intellectual and religious élites.
 - Politics focuses on the high institutional level of exchange and dialogue among the élites.
 - The relationship between civilizations may entail both clash and dialogue.
 - The world is inherently multipolar. No global institutions with ultimate authority can be conceived.
 - In global politics, civilizations are embodied in macro-regions that may compete or cooperate.
 - A mutual coexistence should be aimed at for allowing the flourishing of different cultural and political traditions.
-

The civilizational model is centered on the primacy of the cultural and religious bond. While acknowledging the relevance of other traditional human bonds, such as economic and political bonds, the discourse on civilizations recognizes the cultural and religious aspect of human life as predominant. The model makes primary reference to civilizations as key actors in the political system. Accordingly, political power is interpreted as being managed in a decentralized way by intellectual and religious élites. Religions and macro-regional bodies are seen as key players in a political system that preserves pluralism and heterogeneity. Within the political and economic context of globalization, characterized by a high degree of political and economic exclusion, the perspective of civilizations offers grounds for a conservative rejection of current global transformations.

The model of the clash/encounter of civilizations is centered on the notion of civilization intended as the ultimate cultural reference, beyond any other local and national element. Civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity. While the notion of identity is reinterpreted as multilayered, civilizational identity is acknowledged as the ultimate, most encompassing layer. Civilizations are accordingly interpreted as double-natured. While externally civilizations present themselves as monolithic, internally they allow for moderate pluralism. Civilizations are relatively stable social references, though they may overlap, include sub-civilizations, and change over time. As a matter of fact, civilizations have arisen and fallen throughout history. What is interesting within the clash/encounter of civilizations approach is that with the recognition of the West's loss of centrality comes also the recognition of other non-western civilizations' full status as antagonists/dialogical companions.

According to the thesis of the clash of civilizations, the key mode of the relationship between civilizations is conflict and competition. While states remain important actors in global politics, conflicts will spring up between civilizations through the fault lines, i.e. those states that are on the border or even divided between two civilizations (torn countries). Civilizations need not necessarily collide, but history proves that this is the most likely outcome.

Remaining anchored to history, the thesis of the clash of civilizations claims to be purely descriptive. Accordingly, the reasons for conflict will thus be more related to cultural aspects than to ideological or economical factors. Key factors contributing to conflict principally relate to the fact of irreducible cultural differences. Civilizational divergences are basic and irreconcilable. Since they are less mutable they are also less prone to compromise. Globalization also contributes to civilizational tension for a number of reasons. On the one hand, globalization increases the awareness of the other; this allows for the rediscovery of one's own identity but also generates opportunities for conflict. On the other hand, economic modernization is blending long-term local identities, and as these fade, larger, civilizational, and world religion identities are supplying a functional substitute.

While sharing the ultimate assumptions on the nature of civilizations with the clash of civilizations model, the model of the encounter of civilizations is more inclined to conceive normatively the possibility of dialogue among different cultures, and also the possibility of political cooperation. Within this perspective, there are four key principles. First, *diversity* maintains that cultural frameworks are irreducible to one another, and thus rejects universalism in the name of a reaffirmed pluralism (Dallmayr, 1996). Second, *respect* entails equal treatment among different civilizations and refuses the normative hierarchies used by the nineteenth-century discourse on civilizations vs. barbarians (Manoochchri, 2003).⁸ Third, *goodwill* is seen as the crucial component for starting up a dialogue that leads to reciprocal understanding (based on the hermeneutic method) and a nearing of different civilizations (Dallmayr, 2001b). Finally, *non-violence* prescribes peaceful ways of interacting (Tehrani and Chappell, 2002).

According to the civilizational model in both its conflict and dialogical variants, politics focuses on the high institutional level of exchange among élites. In contrast to the homogenizing tendency of current global transformations, this position fosters a multipolar world, in which mutual coexistence allows for the competition, or alternatively for the flourishing, of different cultural and political traditions. A major ideological foe of the model of civilizations is so-called neo-liberal globalization, with its equalizing tendency that neglects cultural differences. Politically speaking, this means that multilateral projects aiming at developing regional cooperation within and among different civilizational areas have to be supported (Camilleri *et al.*, 2000; Camilleri, 2004; Cassano and Zolo, 2007). A possible reform of the UN Security Council with civilizational representation would offer a valid institutional framework for this model (Mundy, 2006).

While presenting a number of valuable insights into contemporary global politics, the model of civilizations must ultimately be criticized for its incapacity to envisage a common political system in which diversity can be equally represented. While strongly motivated by recognition of the value of world pluralism, civilizational scholars fail to figure out an overarching institutional system where different cultural perspectives can develop a fair

dialogue. Their radical recognition of cultural irreducibility leads them to interpret political justice as meaningful only within a common civilization. This has, however, a major twofold consequence that impinges severely on the issue of transnational exclusion: neither a common principle of justice nor a common, global institutional framework can be identified. Without such principle and structure, only the alternative of unbalanced relationships in the vacuum of unruled international affairs remains. This vacuum would (and is currently) proving the perfect terrain for hegemonic actors to strengthen their power positions and generate exclusion. Beyond this overall objection, the civilizational approach has to be further criticized for its insufficient sensitivity toward individual freedom of choice and participation. With its affirmation of the centrality of the civilizational mode, this model overlooks the necessity of recognizing and protecting individual and other sub-civilizational forms of political participation. On account of these two limits and its ultimate normative reference (interaction-dependent justice), the civilizational approach preserves relevant forms of political exclusion and should thus be criticized.

Conclusions

This chapter presented the first strand of the anti-global democracy theories. Realism, nationalism, and the civilization discourse have been analyzed as major proponents of the contextualist interpretation of interaction-dependent justice. What all of these share is a restricted scope to apply the principle of political justice. Whether in the form of state, nation, or civilization, these theories deny that a full-blown conception of global justice could be legitimate. According to them, priority has to be granted to political fellows, in that the socio-political system is such that it has necessarily to rely on a reciprocal relationship within a shared cultural universe. Consequently, they also contest the legitimacy of all institutional and social correlates of the unwarranted principle of global justice.

These different variants of the principle of political community provide the most robust support for the phenomenon of transnational exclusion. In different yet consistent ways, they foster a regime in which vast parts of the world population remain outside the relevant decision-making mechanisms that decide the transnational fate of the world. This is the main reason they need to be contested. While possibly relying on a broadly democratic paradigm, they are ultimately self-contradictory in that they apply the same principle of democratic self-governance in different ways at different institutional levels. According to all of them, the autonomy of the community has to be guaranteed, and yet they do not envisage any overarching institutional framework, which can be the only guarantee of a fair preservation of such autonomy. Lacking such a framework, an inevitable struggle for inter-community power would result and the autonomy of the weaker groups would inevitably be damaged.

A different, more comprehensive system has to be sought for, allowing equality among the different members of international society. This will be outlined in Chapter seven. Before that, however, it is now necessary to examine the other strand of interaction-dependent theories, the universalist one, in order to complete an account of the set of normative arguments which support exclusion at the international level. Only when this second strand is also rebutted, will the way for a justifiable project of global democracy be open.

Notes

- 1 See scholars such as Aquinas (1248–73; reprinted 1988), Vitoria (1539; reprinted 1917), Gentili (1588; reprinted 1933), Grotius (1625; reprinted 1925), Pufendorf (1672; reprinted 1934), and Vattel (1758; reprinted 1982). For an overall survey see Midgley, 1975; Finnis, 1980; Ferrajoli, 1997.
- 2 For a survey see Beres, 1974; Archibugi, 1992.
- 3 For a survey see Heater, 1996.
- 4 The literature on realism is endless. For an initial critical consideration see Keohane, 1986b; M. J. Smith, 1986; Kipnis and Meyers, 1987; Baldwin, 1993; Guzzini, 1998; Portinaro, 1999; Donnelly, 2000.
- 5 For a critical consideration see Long and Wilson, 1995; Long, 1996; Wilson, 2003.
- 6 This is even more true at the international level. The fact that in the international arena agents are unequal in power constitutes, unlike in the domestic case, the single principal reason why a contract as the basis for public justice cannot occur. Unlike in the domestic case, at the international level, it is not true that everybody can kill everybody, for stronger agents can avoid submitting themselves to the sovereign (Hart, 1961, chapter X.5) and still survive. This domestic dis-analogy is central for understanding the responsibility that is in the hands of the governor.
- 7 For a reference to the political phenomenon see Kohn, 1944; B. Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; A. Smith, 1991. For surveys see Couture *et al.*, 1996; McKim and McMahan, 1997; Kymlicka and Straehle, 1999; C. M. Frost, 2001.
- 8 While the civilizations approach overlaps with social cosmopolitanism in its concern for a number of principles, such as diversity and respect, the role played by élites marks a strong difference between the two perspectives.

6 Liberal internationalism

[Divine Providence] has not willed for everything that is needed for life to be found in the same spot. It has dispersed its gifts so that men would trade together and so that the mutual need which they have to help one another would establish ties of friendship among them. This continuous exchange of all the comforts of life constitutes commerce and commerce makes for all the gentleness of life.

(Jacques Savary, *Le Parfait négociant*, 1675, cited in Hirschman, 1977, 42)

Liberal internationalism, the liberal strand of normative interpretations of international affairs, includes theories of democratic peace and theories of cosmopolitan governance. These subsets lie on a common normative ground, which consists of a universalistic reading of the interaction-dependent theory of justice. They thus enlarge the scope of applicability of political justice in comparison with the theories of political communities, but remain limited by being anchored to a conception of justice that is tied to the idea of interaction and reciprocity. This prevents them from conceiving a truly global implementation of the democratic ideal, and instead limits them to a fundamentally intergovernmental system.

International liberalism was at the core of international thinking for many centuries. The works of Montesquieu, Kant, and Tocqueville have a fervently liberal cast, interpreting international affairs as a potentially harmonious sphere of social, cultural, and especially commercial interaction. What was a mainly ethical interpretation became at the beginning of the twentieth century an institutionalist theory, traditionally referred to as idealism. Idealism had a brief success with its chief political exponent, Woodrow Wilson; however, the crises of the 1930s, the decline of the League of Nations, and the catastrophe of the Second World War, brought liberal internationalism under critical fire. Realist critics could with little opposition accuse liberal idealism of being too naïve and of indirectly opening the way for the humanitarian disaster of the war. Yet when in the early 1970s the first effective challenge to realist hegemony was mounted, the theory of democratic peace (i.e. international liberalism revived) proved essential. The theory's principal

thesis, that democratic states do not fight each other, still remains a formidable obstacle to the supposedly universal claims concerning competition and war that emerge from realist studies. In fact, it is mostly on the ground of democratic peace theory, in conjunction with the phenomenon of nationalism, that realism was challenged for its alleged limits in terms of description, explanation, prediction, and prescription of international affairs. This is therefore the same ground that, beginning with the UN, has determined the largely liberal character of most of today's international institutional settings. State sovereignty, limitations on waging war, democracy, and national self-determination are all of liberal origin (C. Brown, 2002, 57–66). And, of course, international liberalism remains very much associated with capitalism and free trade (Hirschman, 1977; Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999). It is, in the ultimate analysis, the theory behind western globalization.

Interaction-dependent universalist theories

Endorsed by the Rawlsian school of thought, the notion of interaction-based justice can safely be considered mainstream in current political philosophy. In fact, the principle of reciprocity – as opposed to beneficent samaritanism – is now widely accepted by many contemporary scholars of global ethics as the fundamental principle of justice (Beitz, 1979; Gauthier, 1986; Beitz, 1999b; Rawls, 1999; Pogge, 2002b; D. Held, 2004a; Sangiovanni, 2007).¹ Furthermore, as already noted, in being consistent with the principle of non-interference, the interaction-based principle of justice can be considered a central component of liberalism, and thus of modern western – especially Anglo-Saxon – political thought (Ryan, 1993).² While this principle of justice offers a number of important normative resources for tackling relevant social problems, such as exploitation, it fails on others issues that are especially pertinent to the problem of transnational exclusion. Thus, in providing crucial “support” for liberal-democratic versions of international democracy such as the project of cosmopolitan governance, the paradigm of interaction-dependence also generates a club-based version of democracy, which renders such democracies deficient in terms of their capacity for inclusion and participation.

The principle of reciprocity underpins the interaction-dependent versions of justice. Being a rights-based theory of justice, interaction-based justice does not aim to promote the good, but rather to ensure that a number of principles, often expressed as individual rights, are honored. Moral agents are simply under a negative duty of non-harm and non-interference. Beyond such strict duty of non-harm, individuals are not recognized as having any further “natural” obligation except for those entailed by reciprocity, which applies in the case of “artificial” co-operative practices.³ Were an individual to enter into a social interaction because he regarded it as self-beneficial, this voluntary step would then compel him to comply with a fairness principle of justice. Thus, if an agreement is stipulated, one has a duty to keep with it, but

there is no duty to stipulate it from the beginning. No duty of justice exists to enter into a cooperative practice.

The principle of reciprocity is usually characterized as that which sets justice apart from beneficence, which in itself is a deontologically biased presentation clearly favoring reciprocity (i.e. I will give if you also do the same) over beneficence (i.e. I will give without expecting anything in change) (Singer, 1972; A. Buchanan, 1987). According to this view, the promotion of others' well-being is meritorious, but not, strictly speaking, required, and is thus non-enforceable. Acts of beneficence are then regarded as acts of charity (or supererogation) rather than ethical imperatives – as imperfect obligations concerning which the vulnerable can advance claims, but on charge of nobody in particular. Conversely, the principle of non-harm and reciprocity generates perfect duties of justice, which are enforceable, in that the principle produces obligations compliance with which can be demanded of somebody specifically, i.e. the harm-doer or the practice cooperator.

A very much studied case in relation to the distinction between beneficence and justice is the penetrating example originally formulated by Singer of a child seen drowning in a pond (Singer, 1972). According to the interaction-dependent justice principle presented so far, the duty to rescue the child depends on the relationship between the child and the witness. For the duty to exist, either both parties have to be members of the same community or social enterprise, or the witness has to be causally connected with the child (this implying a duty to repair and compensate for the rescuer's wrongdoing). Outside these two cases, only thin obligations of beneficence – good samaritan actions among fellow humans – remain.⁴ Moreover, usually relying on the “restricted causation claim,” a claim according to which only direct and intentional causal consequences count for attributing responsibility, this view of justice maintains the distinction between action and omission, according minor relevance to justice for the latter in comparison with the former.⁵

The collective correlate of the principle of reciprocity and non-harm consists in the interaction-dependent institutionalism that forms the common ground of many contemporary, mainly liberal-contractarian political theories.⁶ Before exposing their failure to capture the ethical and political relevance of the exclusion factor, it is, however, necessary to point out the specific feature of these theories that generates such a failure. This can best be observed through their discussion of political justice, which invariably begins from the historically false consideration of a “closed system isolated from other societies” (Rawls, 1971, 8). The most emblematic case of this community-based approach is certainly Rawls's notion of a mutually beneficial cooperative enterprise. Central to this is the dis-analogy of the principles of justice according to which those principles that apply intra-society do not apply at the inter-societies level, and consequently no substantial duty of redistributive justice exists at the international level (Rawls, 1999). In this sense, the Rawlsian position offers eminent evidence of the inadequacy of the contractarian theory of justice in dealing with problems that pertain to

multiple levels of political action. In being anchored to a state model of societal organization, these theories fail to detect the relevancy of other transborder spheres of social conduct (Scheffler, 2001, 33–4). Since the principle of fair play and reciprocal justice is conditional, “the most Rawls can say about a society that does not have such a scheme is that it suffers from collective irrationality in that it is passing up a chance to do itself some good” (B. Barry, 1991; reprinted 2005, 531).

Other scholars theorize along similar lines. For instance, despite representing two different traditions of thought, Gauthier and Pogge both fundamentally rely on the assumption of a self-contained community, however expanded (Gauthier, 1986, chapter 9; Pogge, 1992, 51; 1998). Pogge, in particular, holds that the duty of justice toward every other person, which can be discharged merely by not cooperating in the imposition of an unjust institutional scheme upon them, is conditioned on the contingent presence of social interaction and consequently does not exist with respect to the plurality of self-contained communities. Pogge admits that prior to any trading there would still be fairly weak duties of morality in terms of beneficence, but he is firm in maintaining that there would be no duties of justice (Pogge, 2000, 166–7). One of the challenges raised by Pogge’s argument lies in the capacity to distinguish between a positive and a negative responsibility. For him, any ethical theory unable to accommodate the fundamental common-sense difference between acting and omitting to act would prove implausible. While a consequentialist theory can accommodate this requirement by differentiating between action and omission⁷ in terms of instrumental value,⁸ it is important to stress that attaching intrinsic value to such a distinction inevitably leads toward the kind of interaction-dependent justice, with its correlate of exclusion, so far exposed.

Before proceeding to a consideration of the particular significance of the interaction-based paradigm for the international realm of politics, a note of clarification on the issue of global interdependence is due. While the ever increasing worldwide interdependence occasioned by recent global transformations has certainly been a key factor in awakening global moral consciousness, it cannot play an independent normative role in any argument concerning international political theory and global justice. In particular, important as interdependence may be in the moral assessment of current international duties (Van den Anker, 2000; Caney, 2005), it is not the decisive factor for what concerns positive duties (Hurrell, 2001, 34). From a consequentialist perspective, the fact that we currently influence each other to such a high degree serves only to clarify that we are in a position to influence outcomes that affect others; it does not constitute a deontic principle in itself. If it did, the result would be a *contingent* ethics recognizing only a duty to those upon whom we depend, and “indeed, a wealthy nation that wished to exempt its populace from having any obligation to redistribute part of its wealth to impoverished nations might simply withdraw from economic exchanges with those nations” (Hardin, 1999, 410).⁹

The main theories of liberal internationalism are the theories of democratic peace and cosmopolitan governance. The next sections examine them in turn.

Democratic peace

The traditional embodiment of liberal internationalism consists of the theory of democratic peace, which re-elaborates many features of the formulations of idealism. While idealism dominated the field in the first years of IR before realism imposed itself as the canon, it was the theory of democratic peace that headed the resurgence against realism beginning in the 1970s. Both have modern theoretical ancestors. Fathers of the democratic peace theory are conventionally considered to be Locke (1690; reprinted 1963), Hume (1748; reprinted 1870), Montesquieu (1748; reprinted 1952), Bentham (1776; reprinted 1977), and especially Kant (1795; reprinted 1991). The ultimate ethical ground of international liberalism rests on individual freedom and autonomy. From this derives the legitimacy of republican/democratic states as political independent bodies, in whose affairs any other state should refrain from intervening. The theory of liberal internationalism holds that within states and in their international relationships there are no real conflicts of interest, in that people want only peace and commercial interaction. According to this perspective, states are thus seen as management tools (more specifically, as problem-solvers) rather than collective holistic personalities. Were all regimes genuine expressions of national self-determination and liberal-democracy there would be no war, and humanity would live in peace and ever-growing prosperity.

And yet conflicts are frequent and wars do occur. Proponents of idealism and the theory of democratic peace consider these to be negative manifestations of humanity as eminently irrational, but they do not see such manifestations as inevitable. Humanity can be corrected and peace established. Consequently, they are predominantly interested in understanding the causes of war and devising mechanisms to prevent them. According to their interpretation, if war occurs, it is because peoples are misled by undemocratic leaders, i.e. militarists or autocrats, and their aspirations to national self-determination are tamed by imperialistic powers. If conflicts arise, this is because of the imposition of special interests or ignorance. The reform of international institutions is key to transforming the anarchical system based on the balance of power into a lawful and peaceful regime. In an ideal system, collective security would be implemented through a mechanism created by the free consensus of all nations committing themselves to preserve international peace. Law would replace war. Military alliances and power balance would no longer be needed. A collective cooperative system of interstate security would be in place instead. For economic interaction, conversely, no need for coordinating international institutions is perceived, for economic interests reconcile themselves if left to themselves.

Table 6.1 Main assumptions of democratic peace

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- Human nature is essentially good or altruistic and people are therefore capable of mutual aid and collaboration.
 - The fundamental human concern for the welfare of other makes progress possible (i.e. the Enlightenment's faith in the possibility of improving civilization).
 - Bad human behavior is the product not of evil but of evil institutions and structural arrangements that motivate people to act selfishly and to harm others—including making war.
 - War is not inevitable and its frequency can be reduced by eradicating the anarchical conditions that encourage it.
 - War and injustice are international problems that require collective or multilateral rather than national efforts to eliminate them.
 - Democratic regimes do not wage war among themselves.
 - International society must reorganize itself institutionally to eliminate the anarchy that makes problems such as war likely.
 - The goal is realistic because history suggests that global change and cooperation are not only possible but empirically pervasive.
-

Based on Kegley, 1995, 4

Kant remains the most influential philosophical reference for liberal internationalism (Doyle, 1983, 1986, 1997). According to the Prussian philosopher, war among states is avoidable in that it does not derive from a fundamental evil of the human soul, but mostly from the wrong arrangement of national and international institutions. To redress such a situation, in his famous pamphlet on perpetual peace, Kant suggests three articles that could be the foundation for a peaceful system. First, “the civil constitution of every state shall be republican.” Each individual should thus be free and equal within a singly legislated state. Second, “the law of nations shall be based on a federation of free states.” An intergovernmental system based on a confederal model should be established with the objective of eliminating the possibility of waging war. Third, “cosmopolitan law shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.” An overarching legal system should be established in order to guarantee free mobility and commerce among nations (Archibugi, 1995b; Taraborrelli, 2004; Caranti, 2006).¹⁰ These three requirements of liberal republicanism would eventually lead to a perpetual peace based on tolerance, mutual accommodation, and international trade. And *prima facie* this has occurred. The democratic peace theory in fact affirms that peace is actually preserved among republics of the sort described by Kant (Doyle, 1983; Russett, 1993; M. Brown *et al.*, 1996; Doyle, 2000).

Following Kant, Moravcsik interprets the theory of liberal internationalism as based on three cardinal assumptions about the nature of social actors, the state, and the international system:

Assumption 1: Primacy of Societal Actors. The fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed

by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal influence. . . .

Assumption 2: Representation and State Preferences. States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics. . . .

Assumption 3: Interdependence and the International System. The configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior.

(Moravcsik, 1997, 516, 518 and 520)

While this interpretation tries to re-elaborate liberal internationalism beyond its own tradition, it is nonetheless interesting here because it summarizes so succinctly a number of key aspects of international liberalism. First of all, it sees international affairs from a bottom-up perspective, in which individuals with their autonomous preferences remain the ultimate point of reference. No simple harmony of interests in society exists, though it can be profitably and successfully pursued through the correct institutional arrangement. Liberal institutions are thus needed in order to overcome the inconveniences of pre-political life. In particular, liberal states should guarantee juridical equality, constitutional protections of individual rights, representative republican governments, and market economies based on private property rights (Burley, 1992). Second, the state is interpreted à la Hume as an institution created to satisfy the preferences of societal actors, as a transmission belt that facilitates fair competition and limited cooperation among individuals and private groups. Third, both war and peace are determined by the international institutional framework. While state independence is important for allowing constitutional government and rule of law to be applied, a strict notion of sovereign independence is outdated. International law, international institutions, and increased economic interdependence all render sovereignty less significant. In this sense, liberalism champions a rationalist critical political theory that challenges the oppressive traditions and dated political institutions which are considered to be the ultimate causes of conflicts and deprivation. Liberalism has always presented itself as a theory committed to challenging vested interests and arbitrary authority (Keohane, 1990; Hoffmann, 1995; Kegley, 1995; Zacher and Matthew, 1995; Tesòn, 1998).

Liberal internationalism has been interpreted not as fostering the status quo, but rather as “a process whereby the condition of war-like anarchy among autonomous states can, through cooperation, be transformed into peaceful coexistence according to the principle of domestic orderliness in a pluralist world of sovereign states” (Christov, 2005, 562). Underpinning this dynamic reading lie two basic assumptions. On the one hand, the interest of each self-governing entity safeguards the maintenance of peace among nations. On the other, through cooperation and interaction autonomous

societies pursue and evolve toward the spread of “civilization” and prosperity. The notion of material progress is indeed central to the liberal tradition. Commercial liberalism, in particular, highlights the benefits deriving from transborder economic transactions in terms of peace and prosperity. A *laissez-faire* policy towards the economic dimension characterizes international liberalism, together with a moderate ambition in relation to international political institutions. Eschewing what it takes to be a false dichotomy between an anarchical state of war and a peaceful world ordered by a world government, liberal internationalism has always supported intergovernmental solutions (Franceschet, 1999).

Conventional criticisms of international liberalism point to its limited degree of feasibility. In sum, international liberalism is accused of neglecting the material conditions that form a requirement for peace. More robust international political and economical organizations are needed to counter power politics. Formal intergovernmental arrangements remain too feeble when faced with the harshness of international affairs dominated by the search for power. This was the ground on which realists disputed the liberal idealism that established the League of Nations and eventually led to the Second World War. International relations are not only populated by liberal democratic states, but also by atrocious regimes such as the nazi-fascist authoritarianism. Men may be good individually, but may turn out to be immoral in society (Niebuhr, 1932). Politics needs to take this into account. A much less starry-eyed system is thus needed, one that is able to settle effective conditions for peace.

Beyond these plausible realist objections, another set of criticisms, which is more relevant for the present study, relates to the issue of transnational exclusion and the democratic deficit of the liberal international system. These kinds of criticisms are even more fatal for international liberalism in that they show up a clear internal inconsistency. While international liberalism proclaims faith in liberal democratic values and constitutional democracy at the domestic level, it has nothing to say when the focus is moved to the international and transnational level and when democratic demands are no longer satisfied. In essence, within the model of international liberalism, individuals’ political entitlements to participate in the decision-making processes are preserved only at the local and national level; at the transnational level individuals remain severely excluded. For the reasons anticipated in Chapter one, liberal intergovernmentalism remains flawed in democratic terms for it breaks the channel of reflexivity that constitutes the basis of democratic congruence. Minorities in democratic states, majorities in authoritarian states, and all individuals claiming transnational interests are structurally excluded from relevant transnational decisions that affect their lives. This line of criticism is key in locating the limits to both the theory of democratic peace and the theory of cosmopolitan governance; the latter, in many respects constitutes a further evolution of the traditional theory of international liberalism.

Cosmopolitan governance

Internationally speaking, the political correlate of the interaction-based paradigm of justice entails a club-based interpretation of democracy, as eminently embodied in the recent proposal associated with the project of “cosmopolitan democracy.”¹¹ Recent proposals for cosmopolitan global governance, ostensibly intended as a “democratic” correction of the distorted “executivism” of current forms of multilateralism, have received favorable acceptance both in public discussion and in practice (Rosenau, 1997; D. Held and McGrew, 2002; D. Held, 2003). Without underestimating their relevance and effect as persuasive arguments for globalizing democracy, the cosmopolitan proposals for global governance can be criticized precisely on the issue of the democratic deficit. While contributing to overcoming the purely intergovernmental system, cosmopolitan governance ultimately has to be rejected for its incapacity to guarantee inclusion to all world citizens in global decision-making and frame-setting processes. Cosmopolitan global governance fails to guarantee inclusion in that it remains based on an uncoordinated system of independent jurisdictions based on the principle of stakeholderism. Only a limited number of self-appointed actors may participate in those jurisdictional decision-making processes. The “others,” the victims, the vulnerables, have little chance of being included. The current governance system and subsequent protests worldwide amply prove that this is the most likely outcome of this kind of arrangement. Consequently, from the perspective outlined by this study, acceptance of the cosmopolitan global governance proposal could only be warranted as a transitional mid-term political project¹² which has to be supplanted in the long term by a federal reform of international organizations as coordinated by a central political institution. The rest of this section presents a more detailed critique of cosmopolitan global governance proposals.

Table 6.2 Main assumptions of cosmopolitan governance

-
- Individuals are considered equal with an equal claim to autonomy (Kant), regardless of their nationality.
 - Politics at the global level becomes governance: technical negotiation rather than agonistic politics.
 - Political justice is entrenched in multilayered democracy.
 - Global issues require global political responses.
 - Participation in global institution is based on the principle of stakeholder democracy (affect principle).
 - Both individuals and states have representation in global monofunctional bodies.
 - Intergovernmental organizations are based on the principle one country, one vote. Cosmopolitan institutions on the principle one head, one vote.
-

Based on D. Held, 1995

“Global governance cosmopolitans” tend to recommend a decentralized and opaque governance structure characterized by multiple decision-making

centers, in which states still retain a certain degree of national autonomy, and only those agents which are part of a given socio-political interaction are entitled to join in the decision-making process. In this vein, the agencies of global governance that these cosmopolitans propose would be characterized according to an intergovernmental model of diffuse authority. Their vision of an additional UN Chamber would be based on a similarly low democratic standard because of its limited consultative function. In consideration of these limits concerning democratic participation, this kind of internationalism remains incapable of facilitating genuinely democratic global countermeasures to the whole litany of global issues confronting us today: global poverty, nuclear containment, transnational organized crime, demography, migration and trafficking in people; environmental degradation and the fate of future generations, the spread of infectious diseases, war to spread democracy; the global economy, and cyber crime.

More specifically, three principal problems concerning exclusion can be identified in the project of cosmopolitan democracy. They are problems related to the issue-oriented characteristics of cosmopolitan governance, to the relevance of its intergovernmental level, and to the risk of privatistic distortion. The first flaw consists in the exclusion generated by the proposed issue-oriented political structure, according to which only those agents that directly interact on a given issue-area are entitled to a political voice. In holding to a notion of democratic congruence based on the strict relation between those who make the rules and those who directly suffer the consequence of the rules (rather than one granting political power within the decision-making and frame-setting processes of public rules to *all* citizens, regardless of whether there are being directly affected by a determined set of actions or not), cosmopolitan global governance can only avoid direct exploitation, but not democratic exclusion. The strict notion of congruence, in fact, can be more easily associated with the decision-making method of a democratic *club* rather than that of democratic political system, in that it does avoid exploitation of those recognized as members (and those recognized *by* members) but does not allow for the inclusion in the public decision-making process of individuals who are classified (typically by those inside the club) as only indirectly or “publicly” involved in the socio-political interaction.

Such a system also shares a number of elements in common with the corporatist model of political participation, as characterized in particular by the two following features: interest-groups can only take part in those political discussions specifically dealing with the interests they represent; and their representatives have an issue-constrained political mandate (Bobbio, 1999, 410–28). In suggesting a net of narrowly circumscribed institutions, the “cosmopolitan democracy” proposal refuses citizens outside such structures a guarantee of representation (or, equally, offers a guarantee of representation in absentia). In particular, this corporatist model excludes three crucial categories of stakeholder: those who represent a) non-formally organized interests, b) future interests, and c) general interests (Einaudi, 1919; reprinted

1973, section I: 30–3). In the attempt to identify a threshold according to which only those who are relevantly affected are taken into consideration, this paradigm sometimes deploys the harm principle, restrictively intended, and other times deploys the principle of non-imposition of unjust institutional settings. In both cases, however, those who are indirectly (perhaps critically) affected are twice excluded: in being left out both from the public decision-making process that assesses the degree of the causal relation, and later from the mechanism of compensation for the harm suffered.

A significant consequence of such a club-based theory of democracy is that entire states or regions can be left apart or excluded from the centers of power if they are not recognized by the most powerful actors. In this sense, the project of cosmopolitan global governance based on *ad hoc* and limited functional bodies remains problematic, in that it lacks democratic centrality and therefore risks exclusion. In suggesting a net of delimited institutions, such a proposal does not guarantee representation to citizens outside that structure, and does not offer a chance to compare the effects of the uncoordinated decisions taken by different monofunctional agencies, which are considered equal in political authority (D. F. Thompson, 1999). In multiplying specialized agencies (supposedly, one for each global issue), this cosmopolitan governance model fails to establish a central authority where a legitimate political discussion can take place to determine the allocation of competencies and responsibilities on any determined issue-area. But this is not the only flaw of the cosmopolitan interpretation of global governance.

The second flaw of this project regards the participatory deficit evident in its intergovernmental structure. Despite the recommendation for a consultative second chamber at the UN where civil society actors would be represented, the predominant political principle underpinning the global governance proposal remains based on the relation between governments (Kuper, 2004, 162). Beyond the problematic roles allotted to civil society and states in this club-based structure, a third hypothetical alternative giving a role to individuals would prove equally problematic as it would entail overly intense participation. According to this, most politically active individuals would spend a fair amount of their time in repeatedly voting to elect their representative to each specialized institution. In principle, in fact, since the constituencies are different, there should be a vote for each agency. This would pose an incredible burden on each individual in terms of political commitment. But this is not what cosmopolitan governance scholars argue for. Instead, they remain broadly in favor of territorial representation of interests mainly through governmental channels. In this sense, however, the global governance model insufficiently addresses the very issue of representative democratic congruence. Governance policies are in fact taken at a high intergovernmental level, without offering individuals, who are the ultimate moral reference, the chance to have a direct influence on the decisions that affect them. Moreover such an approach, which ultimately rests on an interstate bargaining of national interests, fails to offer an adequate response to global

issues such as international migration, terrorism, and overpopulation, which require responses equally global in kind. Following from this – and also typical of the confederal model – another principal flaw of the global governance model is that the impediment it creates for open communication between decision-bearers and decision-makers leads, at best, to the duplication of the channels of accountability, and at worst, to their breakdown. In sum, the project of cosmopolitan governance remains flawed in terms of political inclusion for two reasons. On the one hand, it does not allow for proper coordination from above. On the other, it also precludes full participation from below.

Finally, a third flaw of the global governance model lies in its weak acknowledgement of the risk of distortion inherent to global governance; the same distortion currently so in evidence in international affairs. In the last decade, global governance has affected national governance through a relocation of authority related both to political dimensionality and agency. While a clear-cut process of redirecting power to supra- and sub-national spheres has marked the decline of the nation-state, no strong political alternative to tackle this unbound and de-localized power has arisen. Consequently, the locus of legitimacy has been shifted away from the public to the quasi-public and private sector, both at the domestic and at the international level.¹³ The private agents, primarily multinational corporations, have been the greatest beneficiaries of this tendency and have consequently acquired the status of stakeholder in governance, to the detriment of citizens' participation (D. Held and McGrew, 2002, 10; Coate, 2003). Moreover, the alleged "technicality" of the issues at stake has eroded the "political" dimension of the debate. With respect then to the global governance proposal's neglect to ensure comprehensive participation, this last phenomenon offers further doubts as to the viability of its project of global governance, even in its moralized cosmopolitan version.

In contrast to the argument of global governance, a strong political response is needed: one able to offer effective supranational public power while at the same time preserving a space for the national sphere of political action. In this regard, a consistent project for global democracy should consider public representative institutions as the most appropriate (and urgent) mechanisms to be reformed in order to close the gap between choice-makers and choice-bearers at the global level. If the democratic deficit of the current international system is to be eliminated, if the link between responsibility and vulnerability is to be re-established and an ultimate political authority affirmed, rather than a fuzzy net of global governance, a more centralized and inclusive framework of increased political participation needs to be envisaged. This is the challenge addressed in Chapter seven.

Conclusions

This chapter examined the two principal strands of liberal internationalism, the theories of democratic peace and cosmopolitan governance. While they

provide powerful normative and descriptive theoretical tools to interpret international relations, they remain insufficiently attentive to the need for political inclusion at the global level. Ultimately this is due to their common normative ground, which consists in a universalistic reading of the interaction-dependent theory of justice. While having a more universalistic understanding of the principle of political justice, both of these theories remain tied to the notion of interaction and reciprocity. In the ultimate analysis this critically undermines them, in that they remain anchored to a fundamentally intergovernmental system, and thereby multiply the phenomenon of transnational exclusion. They remain the key ideological support for the current exclusionary system as embedded in the wider global transformations that have characterized the last thirty years. Only by disputing such theories can the current disenfranchising context be criticized and a true globalist implementation of the democratic ideal be developed.

Part III overall – i.e. Chapters five and six – has shown the inadequacy of the two dominant paradigms of international relations that are intended to address and tackle the democratic challenges of current global transformations. In sum, what the analysis of the paradigm of interaction-dependent justice developed in the last two chapters has shown, is that the possibility of legitimately not entering into, or legitimately withdrawing from, a relationship, can be identified as a major generator of political ostracization. When universalist and contextualist interaction-dependent theories of justice are considered together in light of their specific prescriptions toward transnational exclusion, as has just been done here, an image of the mighty normative armature providing everyday politics with the ideological support for such political outranking is clearly revealed. Ultimately, this attitude shows indifference to the injustices not immediately occasioned by the moral agent in question. To use again the famous case of a bystander passive at the sight of a child seen drowning in the pond: it is this passive stance, the *justly* walking away attitude, that these chapters have aimed to discredit. In contrast to this, the present study offers an alternative reading of political justice with the intention of providing a viable normative foundation for a political system not driven by the inhumanity of transnational exclusion. The subsequent institutional proposal will therefore be presented as a consistent case of global democratic inclusion that claims to offer a better, more just, and more humane, alternative to the exclusionary theories which currently prevail in international political theory.

Notes

- 1 For a critical consideration of the notion of justice as reciprocity see Scanlon, 1982; B. Barry, 1989, section III; 1991; 1995a, chapters 2–3.
- 2 While discussing the non-harm and non-interference principles here with respect to their reliance on the assumption of social interaction, I recognize that they need not rely on this assumption. The principle of non-interference and non-harm can also clearly be embedded in a consequentialist framework; a single major reference

- for these principles is J. S. Mill. I do not include him in this discussion, however, on account of the distinctive (non-Kantian) axiological foundations of his theory which generates a different interpretation of the harm principle (Mill, 1859; reprinted 1962; 1861; reprinted 1962).
- 3 Pace Beitz, who in the afterword of the 1999 edition of his book *Political Theory and International Relations* seems to suggest a different perspective.
 - 4 For a discussion on *samaritanism* see Kleinig, 1976; Glover, 1977; Mack, 1980; McMahan, 1993; Malm, 1995; O'Neill, 2000, chapter 10.
 - 5 The formulation of the justice requirements in the case of the drowning child changes if a further refinement of the conception of harm is developed that adopts a more consequentialist reading. Two options can be considered to give meaning to the concept of harm, a restrictive and a complex view: harm can entail deliberately injurious actions, or indirect lack of assistance, such as a failure to comply with an obligation of beneficence. An example of a car accident might clarify the point on the difference between a complex and a restrictive view of responsibility. Assume a bystander does not offer assistance to the injured in a car accident. If the complex view is adopted, he could be incriminated for failing to give assistance, whereas he could *justly* walk away if the restrictive view is accepted. Bad samaritanism is not considered a punishable offence in the latter instance. Another consideration related to the case of the drowning child highlights the same opposition between a complex and restrictive view. If a complex view of responsibility is adopted, the non-rescue, the failure to act, could be interpreted as the causal factor prolonging (rather than originally causing) suffering, as it produces emotional pain damaging the self-esteem of the child. In this case the witness would be under a duty of assistance for his special relation *as witness*, in causal terms, to the child. This counter-restrictionist, complex view does not constitute, however, the conventional understanding of the causal relation claim associated with the principle of non-harm and reciprocity. That understanding discounts it as an illegitimately overburdening moral agent (Feinberg, 1984, 12; Linklater, 2006). Moreover, it has to be noted, as a critique, that both the restricted and the counter-restrictive view functionally need, contrary to what they affirm, an inclusive political paradigm, insofar as a comprehensive public system needs to be envisaged in order to create a forum where harm recriminations and the allocation of responsibility can take place. Without this, in fact, the causal link between choice-bearers and choice-makers can never be established with certainty. In conclusion, it is important to remember that attitudes such as indifference, negligence, and complicity are not only a matter of importance when distinguishing simple responsibility (i.e. the obligation to comply with established legal conventions) from complex responsibility (i.e. the added requirement to establish new legal conventions as necessary). More importantly, these stances are crucial aspects of the fact of the exclusion from moral consideration of suffering people with whom one does not interact, as the Holocaust literature has made amply clear (Geras, 1999; Neiman, 2002).
 - 6 But the republican theory also suffers a similar limitation (Pocock, 1975; Skinner, 1978; Viroli, 1995; Pettit, 1997). At the normative level it is possible to detect in this school of thought the same kind of weakness based on the interaction-paradigm. For a republican state to be just, it suffices to be both non-dominated and non-interfered, or alternatively non-dominating and non-interfering. Such a criterion of legitimacy does not however, prevent a certain degree of indifference toward peoples and countries with which no intercourse of domination or interference exists. For republicanism, as for all other interaction-based theories, sufficient sensitivity to prevent the vulnerable from suffering independently from the relationship with them is not present. This remains the case despite recent attempts to link republicanism and cosmopolitanism (Bohman, 2001; Chung, 2003).

- 7 Related to this is the concept of omission, namely an agent repudiating an act that he is capable of performing.
- 8 According to consequentialism, for instance, action could be valued more highly insofar as it is reasonable to assume that if someone commits an act, he can also equally avoid it, whereas in the opposite case, if he omits to act, it is harder to evaluate. A number of agent-centered considerations could also be taken into account in order to grant a prima facie priority to acting over omitting in instrumental terms, according to a consequentialist perspective. However, no intrinsic value can be associated with action rather than omission à la Pogge, in that ultimately both count in proportion to their contribution to the final outcome in terms of the universal and impartial promotion of well-being. As a consequence, the subsequent strict distinction between duties of justice and duties of beneficence also has to be revised from a consequentialist point of view. Instead, a scale of duties differentiated according to their contribution toward well-being must be envisaged, in which various degrees of demandingness can be accommodated, but qualitative distinctions such as that between duties of justice and obligations of beneficence cannot be accepted.
- 9 For a similar point see Murphy, 1998, 271–5, esp. 272; Linklater, 1999, 476–7; Singer, 2002, 197.
- 10 Article III, in particular, was intended as a critique to hegemonial border-crossing in an anti-colonial fashion. At the same time, following a traditional liberal belief, trade was conceived as an egalitarian interaction tool.
- 11 See Pogge, 1992; D. Held, 1995, 237; Archibugi, 1998, 219; Linklater, 1998b; Habermas, 1998; reprinted 2001, § 5; Galtung, 2000; Norris, 2000; O’Neill, 2000, § 10; D. Held, 2002; Archibugi, 2004; D. Held, 2004b, § 10; Habermas, 2004; reprinted 2006; Caney, 2006; Archibugi, 2008. Held took a different position in his earlier work, where he refers to the federal model. He shifted toward a more decentralized type of cosmopolitan global governance in the 1990s, in part as a consequence of the encounter with Archibugi (D. Held, 1993, 51, n. 77).
- 12 Which is not, however, what global cosmopolitans such as Archibugi, Held, and Linklater argue for, in that they consider cosmo-governance as the ultimate stage of democratic development, beyond which it is not prudent to venture.
- 13 A typical example of this “libertarian” trend is the increasing use of international arbitration in which social rules are reinterpreted through self-regulation.

Part IV

Global democracy restated

Part IV concludes the examination of the global democracy problem by presenting a model of global democracy that is consistent with the arguments of this study. In Part I, the current transnational deficit was outlined in terms of transnational exclusion. In Part II, the paradigm of cosmopolitanism was critically surveyed and developed in a multidimensional form comprised of its ethical, institutional, and social components. In Part III, the main competing narratives have been rebutted on grounds of failing democratic principles of inclusion. Consistently with these three previous parts, Part IV formulates a reading of global democracy that is intended primarily to redress the current democratic deficit at the transnational level. It does so on the basis of a version of cosmopolitanism that is all-inclusive, multilayered, and rooted. This model is arguably a viable normative tool to counter the current exclusionary paradigms of political communities and international liberalism. On the weight of the previous arguments, Chapter seven reconstructs a model of global democracy based on the tradition of cosmo-federalism, while Chapter eight develops a number of conclusive comments on the project of global democracy in current theoretical and political circumstances.

7 Cosmo-federalism

Our political and social conceptions are Ptolemaic. The world in which we live is Copernican.

(Reves, 1947, 37)

A contradictory double movement characterizes the relationship of contemporary international affairs to democracy. While the conventional democratic assumption, according to which individuals have the right to self-determination through political participation, is increasingly recognized as the cardinal principle of politics both in international covenants and national constitutions, international affairs themselves conversely create a situation in which such an entitlement is limited and decreasingly guaranteed. Unstable financial markets, environmental crises, and unregulated migratory flows are just a few examples of phenomena that simultaneously and all too clearly remind us of the intense interdependence of the contemporary international system as well as of its political deprivation. These intense processes of global transformation functionally require increased cooperation, and yet they pose a continuous challenge to the effectiveness and legitimacy of traditional political life. The lack, at every level of activity, of effective and legitimate political structures within which individuals can influence outcomes by expressing their free consent and exercising their capacity for autonomy, highlights the need for an adequate expansion of the democratic political system at the global level. A fundamental principle of justice thus demands that strengthening transnational institutions of democracy be strengthened, with the intention to create more inclusive mechanisms of democratic self-legislation in order to avoid perpetuating the current high degree of transnational exclusion.

As discussed, a number of competing theories, from realism to cosmopolitan governance, have suggested differing responses to the demands generated by global issues, but none has offered viable solutions to the challenge of transnational exclusion in democratic terms. Mindful of the limits of these theoretical positions, this chapter presents a proposal for the (re)construction of a supranational institutional framework determined by a new reading of political agency. The core of this proposal resides in a notion of cosmopolitan

citizenship according to which the capacity of individuals to exercise personal choice within the social system becomes the primary objective of the political system. This endorsement of the principle of control over one's life leads, then, to the recognition of the relationship between choice-bearers and choice-makers as a pivot of democratic reflexivity, and the subsequent recognition of the need for its institutionalization at each level of political life, including the global. In contrast to existing international law and national policies, citizens are consequently to be recognized as cosmopolitan citizens, entitled to rights which extend over a number of different spheres of political action. Insofar as the right to democratic participation in every sphere of political action is considered to be the political tool for maximizing the possibility of individual choice, the argument for global citizenship presented here rests on the key necessity for political agents being able to influence those public decisions whose consequences extend across borders. This validates the claims for the necessity of a multilayered and all-inclusive cosmopolitan politics to be implemented through new institutional global arrangements, primarily a federal reform of the United Nations.

In the current debate on cosmopolitanism the case for world federalism is undervalued. The few studies that consider it do not venture beyond a brief mention, with further thought foreclosed by the simplistic assumption that world federal institutions are not viable. The vast majority of contemporary cosmopolitan scholars favor instead projects for the democratic reform of current institutional arrangements of global governance. By the lights of this study, such democratic reform is itself not viable unless the institutional setting is reconfigured. While accepting other cosmopolitan proposals as promising mid-term suggestions, this chapter disputes their legitimacy as blueprints for a long-term political project on the ground of their limited capacity for democratic inclusion and participation. Defending instead a cosmo-federal case for world institutions as a more consistent project of ideal international political theory, the chapter then outlines an institutional alternative constructed on a notion of complex and multilevel political agency (laid out in Chapters two, three, and four). On account of its prominent position in international affairs, the UN unquestionably provides the most immediate substantial candidate for such federal and cosmopolitan reform. This chapter outlines a possible reform of both the UN's institutional framework and its socio-political processes in a way that is simultaneously consistent with the need for a non-exclusionary (thus centralized) and participatory (thus decentralized) system. The resulting image is one of complex political arrangements that, while preserving pluralism, constrain power positions, giving back to individuals the power to decide on their fate.

Reforming international organizations

The proposal presented in this chapter is intended as a sketch of how international organizations could be reformed to become vehicles for global

democracy that would elude the trap of transnational exclusion which is at the center of this study. An exhaustive project of global democracy would entail revising all international organizations in order to allow for the popular participation of citizens through direct elections, and so re-establish the democratic congruence required by a legitimate reading of the ideal of democracy. This reformist task is enormous, and it is not achievable in the short term. The value of the present proposal, however, is not diminished by this immediate inapplicability, for given the present political situation and in the current theoretical debate, it is key to defending the case for a consistent interpretation of the democratic principle. All current political discussions are based implicitly or explicitly on the value of democracy and yet the international and transnational application of democracy is far from being true to its own principle. A critique is thus urgently needed, as is a compelling indication of how practically to proceed with reform.

Reforming existing international organizations requires first and foremost the reform of the United Nations – a complex and contradictory organization. Among the many international institutions, the UN represents without a doubt the highest aspiration of humanity to settle on common rules for peaceful coexistence. The founding of the UN, however, was far from democratic. Negotiations for the UN charter were held in secret, far from public ears. There was a general belief among the great powers in the unpreparedness of people to hold political responsibility. Since people were thought to be not ready for political accountability (barring of those in a few democratic states), no duties were assigned to them, but only limited rights. Even the word democracy was rarely mentioned in the first official documents of the organization. Regardless of its original attitude, today the situation of the UN is very different. The terms “democracy” and “good governance” are daily present in UN documents. Democratic states are far greater in number, and democratization processes are under way in many countries. The global political scene of the third millennium is very different from that of the mid-twentieth century. A different political response in institutional terms is therefore demanded, and because it is being the central international institution, the reform of the UN in particular needs to be prioritized. A major requirement of any democratic system is the right balance between centralization and decentralization. While the first is necessary to avoid exclusion, the second is necessary to guarantee social participation from below. A reformed global institution could effectively provide a centralized organ that could work on an all-inclusive basis. But it could also leave room for local participation through the deployment of the subsidiarity principle in federal terms. The federal reform of the UN presented in this chapter is designed to facilitate the required balance of these two democratic components.

The discussion on the reform of the UN is almost as old as the UN itself. Beyond outright calls for its abolition (Pines, 1984), arguments for reform principally put five areas of UN action under scrutiny. The Security Council has been questioned and proposals for its enlargement have been formulated

alongside calls for the abolition of the veto powers of the “big five.” An Assembly of the Peoples, to be juxtaposed with the General Assembly, has been repeatedly advocated in order to balance the governments’ power in favor of more direct representation. Expansion of the jurisdiction of the extant International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been recommended, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) created. The limited endowment of the UN institutions with financial resources and political capabilities sufficient to control deviant behavior and coordinate cooperative undertakings has been criticized. Finally, a reform of the UN peace mandate, currently oscillating between peace-keeping and peace-enforcing, has also been hotly debated in the last decade (Baratta, 1987; Falk, 1993, 16; Archibugi, 1995a; Imber, 1997; Archibugi *et al.*, 2000; Patomäki and Teivainen, 2004, chapters 1 and 8; Marchetti, 2005c).

Behind these practical issues, three political problems of predominant relevance can be identified. First, the internationalization of recent decades together with – of immediate importance here – an ever more visible UN presence, with no allowance for direct electoral representation, highlights the fact that the distance between rulers and ruled has widened beyond the maximal distance tolerable. Second, the heterogeneity of the ruled has also increased significantly insofar as such diverse political agents as individuals, groups, and non-state actors all claim recognition at the global level. Finally, the third crucial problem of UN reform is dual subject status, with the current arrangement discriminating in favor of a territorial mode of representation (one state, one vote) over an individualist mode (one person, one vote) (Bienen *et al.*, 1998, 290). In general, the debate has concentrated on the dual status issue rather than on the other two problems, with subsequent proposals locating accountability with the Security Council or the proposed elected second assembly, thus recognizing the predominance of states or individuals respectively.

The perspective of the present book is based on the observation that any reform of the UN would invariably fail on the side of political inclusion were it not grounded on a direct and democratic model of participation. That the current institutional structure has to be changed is proved first and foremost by the straightforwardly undemocratic rules of the Security Council’s power of veto. But even if this norm were modified and the effective decision power were granted uniquely to the General Assembly, as it is currently organized the entire procedure would still be utterly undemocratic. On the one hand, a large number of states do not have democratic voting systems, and therefore vast sectors (perhaps the majority) of their population would be excluded from representation; and on the other hand, even the currently “democratic” states would structurally deprive their minorities, be they national or transnational, of representation. With regard to democratic states, furthermore, a serious problem of accountability remains insofar as the multiple steps of delegation loosen the effectiveness of concrete control from their constituency. Finally, even assuming a (hypothetical) complete democratization of all

countries, the situation would still be one of “equality” between, for instance, the representative of San Marino with a constituency of 20,000 voters and the representative of India with a constituency of 1 billion. There is an evident denial of the democratic rule of “one head, one vote” when the head of one citizen of San Marino counts as much as the heads of 50,000 Indians. Hence, even if these reforms concerning the Security Council and the General Assembly were implemented, democracy would remain in the far distant future.

Two extra-UN strategies have recently been proposed in the attempt to increase the level of democratic control of the UN, i.e. allowing both national MPs and civil society organizations to influence UN projects, often on an external, consultative basis. However, both represent insufficient responses on the question of political inclusion. Within proposals such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union, any national MP, elected by a national constituency and for a national party, would remain anchored to national priorities, insofar as his mandate would be principally national in kind. Were a conflict raised between national and international interest, his decision would be structurally constrained to favor the national side for its unique voting power over him. A more advanced proposal concerns the case for transnational civil society organizations playing a contestatory function within a secondary peoples’ assembly (Segall, 1990; Pettit, 2005). These organizations claim to represent transnational constituencies and to have a moral global mandate that allows them to endorse a non-territorially biased perspective. While more promising, these proposals are still deficient in democratic terms. Civil society organizations are in fact affected by a different, and yet equally serious, democratic deficiency on a number of political levels of analysis. The constant challenges made to the legitimacy of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), interest groups, and social movements principally concern their capacity to represent the relevant constituency, their internal democratic procedures, and their organizational accountability. Until a plausible response to these three main challenges is offered, their political status cannot be more than consultative. Beyond these two failing strategies for the democratic augmentation of the UN procedures, then, a third more plausible proposal remains, one that pursues a truly global democratic inclusion in international institutions: the federal alternative.

Principles of cosmo-federalism

The consequentialist cosmopolitan perspective advocates a federal reform of the UN¹ in response to its claim that the democratic goal of participation cannot² be properly achieved through either a liberal confederation of republican states or an enhancement of multilateral structures of global governance. It must be noted that the present proposal, unlike those within the mainstream federal tradition, seeks the establishment of a more democratic form of governance at the global level for purely consequentialist reasons

pertaining to the democratic reflexivity between choice-bearers and choice-makers. While the predominant concern for many federalists was peace (Russell, 1961; Clark and Sohn, 1966), the primary concern for the present version of cosmopolitanism is democratic participation as the most conducive strategy for pursuing the maximization of world well-being. As this is in fact attainable only through the enhancement of individual freedom of choice, it is necessary to secure political empowerment enabling every political agent to self-legislate on all aspects of his/her life. Consequently, at each level of political action, be it at the individual, state, regional, or world level, norms of democratic reflexivity should be implemented that guarantee the preservation of the individual's capacity to choose. The most effective and consistent way of responding to these requirements at the global level currently resides in the promotion of federal and cosmopolitan institutions, and thus primarily in the reform of the UN.

Table 7.1 Main assumptions of cosmo-federalism

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- Individuals are considered equal, with multiple identities, and with an equal entitlement to have their welfare (via freedom of choice) guaranteed, regardless of their nationality.
 - Politics is the regulated reign of antagonistic pluralism.
 - Political justice is entrenched in procedural and multilayered democracy.
 - Global problems require global political responses.
 - Participation in global institution is based on the principle of all-inclusive democracy. This guarantees that transnational exclusion is avoided.
 - In the global sphere, authority is granted to a global parliament directly elected by individuals.
 - Decisions are taken on the principle one head, one vote.
 - A global parliament and a global constitutional court draw the jurisdictional boundaries of lower levels. The principle of subsidiarity is applied.
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Federalism is traditionally described as a political theory affirming the division of powers between two or more institutional levels of government: the central power and the powers of federate communities.³ In organizing political power on several levels, federalism benefits from the advantages of both universalism and localism, in that it permits applying the principle of self-government (thus preserving the identity of the units) to be applied to a plurality of centers of independent power, consistently and democratically coordinated. Every citizen is subsequently subject to two powers (dual loyalty) without this implying the renunciation of the principle of “uniqueness of decision” thanks to the mechanism of subsidiarity (Vernon, 1988; Norman, 1993; Føllesdal, 1998). Rejecting the traditional model of double indirect representation through states' representatives, federalism proposes a democratic rather than diplomatic union of states, according to which all political representatives are directly elected to a law-making assembly by the people, and political decisions taken by the federal government apply directly to citizens rather than states. Finally, central to the federal ideal is the transformation of interstate relations from unruled and violent to having complete

juridical status. Since peace is not interpreted negatively as the lack of war, but rather positively as state and law, a central government is envisaged as a vehicle for the peaceful and lawful solution of political, economical or social international conflicts. Contrary to those confederations that have no check on the power of single states, the law of the federal system provides the political means to eliminate the appeal to arbitrary violence. In this way, federalism leads to the corrosion of a portion of statehood, such as military capability. For instance, since foreign policy would no longer exist, the army would be replaced by international or federal policing.

Following from these features, the superiority of federalism over confederalism with regard to the criteria of participation and accountability is evident. Federalism fundamentally fulfills these criteria insofar as it allows for direct representation of citizens (rather than states) at several levels of political decision-making. In this way, it offers a viable answer to the currently unchecked invasiveness of international policies; it promises to establish permanent peace because of the presence of a superordinate law that, importantly, does not permit withdrawal from the federation; and it envisages an attitude more convenient to solving global problems, in that it reduces biased decisions based on national interests. Additionally, the federal form of government offers the best political device to avoid despotism, in that “the federal level of deliberation and legislation provides a second chance to protect against abuse by local majorities” (Føllesdal, 2001, 11). Finally, such a political system promises to be able to secure both efficiency, in that it has an in-built responsiveness to local circumstances, and institutional innovation, in that it allows for more experimentation at different political levels (Hamilton *et al.*, 1787–8; reprinted 1961, esp. section 15).

Objections to cosmo-federalism

A number of objections have traditionally been raised against the idea of a global federation. Two sets of arguments, one against the feasibility (Objection 1) and the other against the desirability (Objection 2) of the federal proposal, are the most frequent with regards to the general thesis of world federalism.⁴ Beyond these general objections, a number of more specific arguments have been formulated against a consequentialist understanding of cosmo-federalism (Objection 3). While raising important issues, these objections can be dismissed from the present point of view.

Objection 1: on the political feasibility of a world federation. As regards feasibility, critics point out that federations have historically come into being in reaction to external enemies or for common interests, and that this is inconceivable at the global level.⁵

Response: This argument can be rebutted by pointing to, on the one hand, global threats such as global warming or lack of security (especially related to

nuclear weapons and transnational terrorism), and on the other, global public goods such as peace and international financial stability, which represent common interests capable of unifying differing strategic agendas. Such interests currently provide the motive pushing international cooperation beyond borders and toward an interdependent political system. Indeed, federal arguments have traditionally relied on functional and historical consideration of the extension of democracy. The conventional line of argument for a global federation holds that democratic government has been continuously adapted to historical circumstances – from the limited extent of the *polis* assembly, through intermediate enlargement in the modern representative state, and finally to democratic macro-regions – and that the time has come for the fourth extension toward a federal world government (Elazar, 1995). The contemporary circumstances of global interdependence would thus point toward a parallel enlargement of the democratic system at the global level.

In addition to the increase in interdependence, the emergence and consolidation of new democratic global players (both governmental and non-governmental) also provide strong drivers working toward the democratization of world affairs, which may in turn open up new opportunities for institutional change. On the one hand, new democratic regional powers such as Brazil, India, and South Africa are already destabilizing the current geo-political system, from trade relations to political representation in the UN. Equally, the European Union (EU) is another new regional actor that is pushing for increasing democratization of international relations through policies such as the democratic clause (i.e. the set of requirements to sign agreements with the EU) and its campaign for a moratorium on the death penalty at the UN. On the other hand, non-governmental actors at the transnational level are also contributing to increasing the chances for democratization of world affairs, both through discursive actions (e.g. advocacy campaigns on human rights, debt relief, or environment protection) and practical actions (e.g. fair trade or peace activism in transition countries). While none of these actors may produce an effective change on their own, the combination of their efforts within a favorable political opportunity structure may indeed promote democratic improvements in global politics.

Objection 1.2: on the technical unfeasibility of world management. In the current international scenario, characterized by the high quantity and high complexity of actors, it is argued that that it is not possible to find a common and stable legal-political framework.

Response: Four points provide an adequate response here. First, there have been enormous improvements in technology since Kant's time (Kant being one of the first to raise the complexity issue). Second, a sketch of a common legal-political framework is already in place with the UN regime and the vast system of international law. Third, the demands of justice may well require a certain number of trade-offs at the expense of administrative efficiency (e.g.

the EU translation service). Fourth, the high diversity of global political agents provides a reason for (not against) the search for a common, non-exclusionary framework of justice. The two latter points crucially underscore the desirability of global federalism, as illustrated below.

Objection 2: on the desirability of a world federation given the threats of homogeneity, despotism, and tyranny. The other major critique of global federalism concerns the issue of desirability and holds that the power accruing to a world government would inescapably lead to an enforced homogeneity, or worse, to a despotic, universal monarchy or a global tyranny.⁶ In the context of the federalist debate, this argument was first put forward by the anti-federalists, i.e. the opponents of the adoption of the US federal constitution. Republican in style, they defended a localist position according to which participation is considered an end in itself rather than a means to other objectives (Duncan, 1995). They held that the larger the state, the more efficient the executive must be in order to manage public affairs properly. According to them, however, beyond a certain point, the executive becomes no longer controllable by the legislative and the citizens' constituency, and may easily fall into despotism. In the current debate on globalization, this argument is often formulated by radical scholars who fear that transnational élites could institutionalize, through "sinister" technocracy, their power positions.

Response: The quick response to this consists in stressing that these risks are higher without a federal authority than with it. With regard to homogeneity, it should be remarked that only through a political system where choice-bearers can democratically express their consent or dissent based on an equal standing, can the imposition of mere power (both political and cultural) be countered and local differences be respected. In contrast to the traditional international liberal stance, according to which interests can be combined harmoniously, the present position is fully pluralistic and agonistic; it recognizes that different values and interests are at stake and that the only way to reconcile them resides in political institutions based on principles of justice. With regard to despotism, the value of democratic law has to be acknowledged in response to the fear of power positions. It is only through a democratic system of multilayered accountability that weak actors can counter, both locally and globally, the enormous influence of transnational élites. Within the current highly integrated and intrusive global system, any strategy that attempts to escape the challenge of transnational power positions just by turning to the local is inevitably destined to fail. If we consider the infinite means of influence across borders, an all-inclusive world organization based on equal democratic participation represents the only political project able to escape the imposition of a particularistic interest on the world community. Finally, with regards to tyranny, the distinction between a unitary state and a federal government should be highlighted, together with the recognition that a federal global institution would only rule on global issues,

while leaving national affairs to the jurisdiction of local authorities according to the subsidiarity principle. A world government would not accrue all power to itself. It would wield power sufficient to deal with global issues, while leaving the appropriate power to the institutional sub-levels. In this way, states would preserve their *raison d'être* while the risk of an authoritarian state would be diminished. Moreover, a world federalism would actually reduce the chances of authoritarianism, by virtue of the fact that it would lack foreign policy, with its temptations to authoritarian misuses of external threats to induce restrictions on internal liberty.

Objection 3: on the non-welfare-maximizing consequences of cosmo-federalism. A number of more specific objections to a consequentialist justification of cosmo-federalism have also been raised. In sum, such objections hold that a world federation would not be welfare-enhancing if compared to the status quo or to an international society based on a stronger protection of state sovereignty.

Response: A first overall rebuttal to this kind of objection points to the welfare added-value of institutional procedures that entail a guarantee of freedom of choice. As shown in the previous chapters (and especially in Chapters two and three), the democratic system based on freedom of choice through political participation is procedurally bound to generate positive results in terms of welfare-enhancement. While the reasonable expectation that freedom of choice generates welfare seems more than simply intuitive, this book has also tried to show how to connect freedom of choice to political entitlements.⁷

Objection 3.1: on the increase in conflicts that would characterize a world federation in comparison with a sovereign state system. While an interstate system could achieve a relatively peaceful status quo, based on a pragmatic *modus vivendi*, a world federation would inevitably exacerbate competition for political power within it, and would thus lead to a more intense phase of conflicts.

Response: At a minimum, there is no reason to think that there would be an increase in the number of conflicts within a cosmo-federal system in comparison with the current international system. More positively, it is possible to argue that common political institutions based on equal democratic participation have a long-term effect of reducing conflicts in society, or at least of offering a way to solve them peacefully. Federalist thought has long argued that the only way to escape conflict at the international level consists in the establishment of a federal system. Indeed, central to the federal ideal is the transformation of interstate relations from unruled and violent to having a complete juridical status. Since peace is not interpreted negatively as the lack of war, but rather positively as state and law, a central government is

envisaged as a tool for the peaceful and lawful resolution of the political, economic or social international conflicts.

Objection 3.2: on the higher value attached by ordinary citizens to national autonomy rather than to humanity as such. According to this point, attachment to national institutions is considered a permanent characteristic of political citizenship and one that excludes other allegiances.

Response: As mentioned earlier, an overarching and impartial system is needed in order to guarantee respect for *all* political and cultural difference, since legitimate partiality can only be attained through impartiality (see the previous discussion on football in Chapter four, section two). A cosmo-federation would be a global organization in which states would share part of their power for specific global purposes under a system of strengthened international and cosmopolitan law. Being able to participate in global decision-making and frame-setting, being a global ruler, would be regarded as a gain in freedom and order. Moreover, individuals would acquire full cosmopolitan citizenship while remaining national citizens within a consistent scheme of multiple allegiances, which would allow for frustrated and excluded citizens to channel their claims beyond their national governmental representation. In this way, the system would provide a chance for dispersed minorities to aggregate, and have robust political representation of their autonomy-based claims at the global level, thus envisaging an inter-layered mechanism of protection against abuses by local majorities. Beyond this argument based on democratic justice, the other response to this objection is to point to the increasing attention and care being paid to international issues by ordinary citizens, thus proving that our emotional boundaries are indeed flexible and able to encompass simultaneously and consistently several layers of political engagement.

Objection 3.3: on the reduced freedom of choice generated by a world federation due to lack of exit opportunities. Since an (unjustly) persecuted individual could not escape to any other country, the system would not offer a second chance, which is considered a condition for freedom.

Response: This is a classic objection to world government. In principle, with any single world political system (even one that is inherently multiple), the exit option would not be available any more. This is immediately evident. And yet a more sophisticated consideration can highlight further aspects that are relevant here. First, in a cosmo-federal system the reasons for exit would be diminished in that such a democratic system with all-inclusive participation rights would maximize accountability, consequently minimizing the chances of authoritarian drift. Beyond this, the possibility of system corruption would always be present, but as in any democratic system it would be reduced in comparison to non-democratic systems. Second, a certain degree

of secondary exit opportunity would be preserved among different political jurisdictions. Moreover, the possibility of changing the political and cultural environment would actually be increased in a world federal system in that, as here described, it entails freedom of movement (Marchetti, 2008b). Third, reduction of exit opportunities also means the reduction of exit opportunities from the law and thus reduces the chances for criminal actors to find safe havens. Overall political coordination would in fact allow for improved policing activities, thus filling the gap in the current security and accountability system at the international level.

Objection 3.4: on the reduced democratic value of a world federation due to its size. The argument here is that the costs of a global federal democracy would not be compensated by its benefits in terms of citizen participation, since the latter would be vanishingly small at the global scale. Also known as Dahl's *restricted-size* argument, this argument holds that an extended republic is an oxymoron, in that the bigger a state is, the smaller is the weight of each single vote in proportion to the total of the voting lot; consequently, the less democratic the state is (Dahl and Tuftle, 1973; Dahl, 1999, 2001). This argument in favor of a limited size is often coupled with the previous argument on the alleged despotism of big federal governments.

Response: Three counter-arguments can be used to refute Dahl's formulation. First, as was made clear by *The Federalist* authors (Hamilton *et al.*, 1787–8; reprinted 1961), the right size for a republic is not at all clear, since it seems that if we stick to the original ideal of a republican society, a state such as the US (or India, or Brazil, or indeed most contemporary states) would remain structurally inadequate for any form of democratic government. Second, in the current interdependent state of international affairs, it is likely that an individual will be affected in any case by decisions taken outside of her/his community. In light of this, it is unreasonable to argue against granting the opportunity to influence such decisions politically, even if the final result is minimal impact. And third, in a situation such as the current one, i.e. one deprived of any form of direct international representation, the relative weight of each individual's vote remains even more severely discounted, insofar as it passes through a double mechanism of representation: from the citizen to the national MP and from the MP to the state's delegate in international organizations.

Objection 3.5: on the lack of a global deliberation/demos. In particular, it is argued that the welfare-enhancing effects of democracy do not result from simple majority voting but from public deliberation, which is close to impossible at the global level.

Response: A threefold counter-argument can be deployed here. First, a global demos is emerging. Within the context of new non-state transnational actors,

an unprecedented global public domain is materializing in which alternative readings of global legitimacy are being advanced (Albrow, 1996; Meyer *et al.*, 1997; Anheier *et al.*, 2001; Ruggie, 2004). Second, a bottom-up political process has always to be coupled with top-down institutional reform in order to generate effective changes motivated by considerations of political justice. This is not dissimilar to what occurred at the domestic level during the process that established nation-states. There, too, these two processes (i.e. top-down and bottom-up) had to be simultaneously realized in order to produce a consolidation of state institutions. Third, once public institutions are in place and effectively empowered according to principles of justice, citizens will most likely care for them since they generate decisions that affect their lives. The European Parliament offers an example here. Today it still lacks social and political attachment, but this is arguably due to the fact that it is still significantly dis-empowered. A clear trend can be traced according to which the more power it accrues, and the more historical presence it accumulates, the more attachment it receives.

In conclusion, we need to recognize that the arguments put forward against the idea of a world federation are often underdeveloped and premature in dismissing the idea of a truly global polity. While inevitably not offering the final word on a debate that goes back many centuries, this section is intended to provide at least a set of viable counter-arguments to engage those who have not yet given serious consideration to the idea of a cosmo-federalist system.

Cosmo-federalism as an institutional framework

A reformed UN would be a global federal organization in which individuals and states would share power for specific global purposes under a system of strengthened international law (Eleftheriadis, 2003). Consequently, states would renounce a portion of their sovereignty and agree to a compulsory jurisdiction intended solely for a determined list of competences on global issues (typically, non-territorial or territorially intermingled issues),⁸ while retaining those powers and specific institutional forms directed at domestic concerns. Rather than a loss, this delegation of power to the global government would be regarded as a gain in freedom and order, since states would be compelled only to accept decisions taken according to majority rule – General Assembly resolutions would have a legally binding status – and implemented through a subsidiary scheme of actions at both global and state levels.⁹ Transnational decisions would be authoritative inasmuch as they would not be determined by national governments but by a truly world assembly and would only be accountable to it. Moreover, individuals would acquire full cosmopolitan citizenship while remaining national citizens within a consistent scheme of multiple democratic allegiances. They would be enfranchised as voting constituents for an elected legislative world assembly with an authoritative mandate representing general as well as special interests restricted to global issues.¹⁰ National minorities could at last acquire their

legitimate political weight in that their nationally marginal votes would be aggregated at the global level (see, for instance, the example of the anti-nuclear citizens in Chapter one). Finally, since global agents would be recognized as vulnerable and responsible, they would also be protected from and punished for global crimes, according to an appropriate multilayered and multi-agent scheme of sanctions.

A critical point concerning a federal reform of the UN lies in the allocation of the diverse functions and powers between the central world government and the federal states. As with current forms of federalism, even in the case of the reformed UN a stable equilibrium would not be possible without a constitution the authority of which is accorded primacy over all other powers. In the case of conflict between the different institutional layers, the supranational authority must trump the lower ones. A global constitution (and an ad hoc constituent assembly) is thus required to delineate the distribution of legislative and executive authority regarding a number of functions between the different levels of political action. A clear demarcation of the issue of competence is crucial not only to allocate *ab initio* authority (and its limits), but also to solve conflicts that may arise about the power to judge. The authority to decide on who has to decide resides neither with the central power (as in the unitary state) nor with single states (as in the confederation), but only with the constitutional court (Kelsen, 1944; Levi, 2002, 11). As a complement to the constitution, a global constitutional court should also be envisaged with the authority to settle any ultimate dispute concerning the so-called “competence catalogue.”

An example of how a global constitutional court could work innovatively on the issue of exclusion and jurisdictional boundaries can help to illustrate the point. Imagine an ethnic group which is dispersed throughout several countries (countries A, B, C, D, etc.). This group (whose parts constitute a minority in each state) feels that a decision taken by the local authority of country A is unjust, in that it does not take into adequate account the general interest of the ethnic group in its entirety (i.e. beyond borders as well). According to a state-based jurisdictional paradigm, the members of the ethnic minority in country A would have to accept the decision, because the only relevant constituency is the national one. This means that only the national constituency is entitled to decide on which voices are accepted in the discussion on what is politically right. As a consequence, the minorities in countries B, C, and D would most likely be excluded. According to a cosmofederal paradigm, however, the constituency cannot be established *ex ante*, but it can only be defined through an all-inclusive procedural mechanism. According to this latter paradigm, the minority in countries B, C, and D, as well as that in country A, can appeal to an upper institutional level (a regional and eventually global constitutional court), and ask for a reconsideration of the legitimate authority on the decision at stake. In such a way, the minorities in any country have an in-built institutional guarantee against transnational exclusion.

While a straight consequentialist approach to allocating functions and authority would be to compare the expected effects of alternative distributions between central power and sub-units (benefits and burdens, risks and opportunities), the method followed by consequentialist cosmopolitanism is different, in that it takes into consideration the epistemological constraints put on political action and thus relies on the principle of individual participation, procedurally intended, and on that of subsidiarity. According to this structure, the federal government and its delegate agencies would have direct competence only on a limited set of global issues, retaining only a subsidiary charge for universally protecting a set of minimal rights at the individual level, and for supervising the possibility of collective self-determination and respect for minority rights at the state level – a sort of “global guarantee clause” (Halperin and Lomasney, 1993). Global institutions should primarily pursue the safeguard of global public goods at the global level and the handling of all those political issues that have a pre-eminently global character. In sum, a separation of functions can be delineated between the following two universal fields of action: positive global politics to guarantee the vital interests of each human being, together with a number of other collective national and global interests; and a procedural politics to guarantee political participation to each citizen and thus democratic congruence globally.

Falk has offered a broad description of the would-be tasks of a world government. There should be

considerable centralized capabilities with respect to the following governmental functions for the world as a whole: legislative organs to establish binding standards; administrative capacities to interpret these standards; financial powers, including revenue resources, and taxing powers; rules and procedures determining membership and participation in international institutions and the status of international actors, as well as modes to render all actors accountable; verification of compliance with behavioral constraints and enforcement mechanisms; disaster-relief, and refugees services; regimes for protecting and managing the global commons; regulation of collective violence and supranational police; framework for world economic life, including trade, monetary and financial spheres, and protection against agreed-upon categories of disruption (debts, price shifts, boycotts, credit lines); and finally, a *global constitution*.

(Falk, 1993, 15)

Within the federal reform of the UN, a reconfigured general elected assembly would acquire the role of the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the UN, whose accountability and transparency would be consequently improved.¹¹ Members of such an assembly would be elected through a universal democratic voting system, according to which

national votes would be aggregated globally, thus providing a strong incentive toward the formation of transnational political parties.¹² Together with this principal assembly, a further state-based assembly could be envisaged in order to preserve state recognition, thereby safeguarding small political entities.

However, the necessity of fair voting procedures in the original countries poses a severe practical constraint on this proposal. While this mechanism could in fact have beneficial effects on the remaining non-democratic countries in terms of pressure to change, it would also be impracticable if democratic regimes were not dispersed throughout a minimally sufficient number of countries. This variable profoundly affects the political strategy for implementing this reform proposal. A clear precondition for legitimate reform of the UN remains the existence of domestic democratic systems, since any new membership of this democratically renewed supranational organization must be on a free and voluntary basis (Kant, 1795; reprinted 1991; Bobbio, 1989, 9; Archibugi, 1995b; Habermas, 1997). Only when states have accepted democratic voting procedures domestically, can democratic elections (with guarantees of fair procedures)¹³ be called for electing an assembly with the specific task of reforming the UN charter.¹⁴ While this does not deny the possibility that a relatively small number of existing democratic states could provide the initial basis for such an assembly¹⁵ – possibly, but at least at the beginning not necessarily, in conjunction with the UN (Falk and Strauss, 2001, 219) – the fact that currently only a minority of states are democratically organized requires the formulation of an appropriate political strategy.¹⁶ A previously decentralized process fostering democratic systems within states does, indeed, form a condition for any legitimate reform of the UN, and is therefore a priority for any cosmopolitan political project. The promotion of local democracy seems to be the most promising strategy for escaping the dilemma of attainable and irrelevant or radical but unattainable reforms, and overcoming the causes that currently block any reform. The need of envisaging the process for establishing of global democracy as a peaceful revolution from below leads us to a key consideration: global democracy can only be achieved and sustained through local democratization.

Cosmo-federalism as a social process

The project of cosmo-federalism so far outlined is only conceivable if coupled with an intense process of social democratization from below. In fact, without this popular component, the project runs two risks. On the one hand, it may never be implemented for the reasons concerning democratic procedures just outlined. On the other, it may be seized by global élites and transformed into a technocratic system at the service of transnational powers. In order to avoid these dangers, highlighted by the debate on social cosmopolitanism, a democratic process from below needs to be conceptualized and encouraged

so that open and active participation of citizens in political institutions remains genuine. No institutional short-cut is available for achieving global democracy. At the same time, this does not imply renouncing the proposed institutional strategy and relying only on civil society actors, for this would only foster social power positions. A complex, balanced system thus needs to be envisaged in which institutional reform is coupled with social emancipation, for the two processes would only work by a reciprocal challenge and strengthening. While institutions would guarantee space for weaker actors to be heard, social processes would generate genuine inputs from below.

As regards the problem of establishing a cosmo-federal system, many political strategies have been proposed for reforming of the UN as a supranational institution. Beyond the revolutionary strategy, the two more promising strategies remain based on either incremental reforms or a comprehensive convention. Some, following Kelsen, see the action of international tribunals such as the ICJ and the ICC as constituting the first forms of transnational statehood. Others favor the possibility of calling for an independent treaty body or a world convention that would create a global parliament. Yet others regard democratic regionalism (especially the EU) as the mechanism through which to achieve democratic reform of international organizations such as the UN. Any of these strategies is fine as an ideal vision, but they all lack political strength if not coupled with a social process from below. A reformist strategy to deal with the almost legally invulnerable system of the UN charter needs to rely on the persuasive power of legitimate public opinion, such as the voice that could potentially be expressed by a qualified world majority with strong local ties.

Within this perspective, transnational social movements, in particular global justice movements, are key actors in relation to the process of establishing global democracy. Just as UN reform cannot be achieved except through prior domestic democratization, so also transnational politics cannot but be locally rooted. In particular, social movements spur democratic practice on two major fronts. On the one hand, social movements formulate external claims that force the strengthening of democratic practices in international institutions. In this regard, a few successful campaigns of the 1990s can be mentioned as significant examples: the campaign for the establishment of the ICC (1995), which led to the approval of the Rome statute (1998); the Jubilee campaign on Third World debt (1996), which induced the creditor governments and the International Monetary Fund to take the first steps toward debt relief of the highly indebted poor countries; and the international campaign to ban landmines (1992), which managed to secure support in the intergovernmental conference in Ottawa where the Mine Ban Treaty (formally the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) was signed in 1997 (Pianta and Marchetti, 2007; Marchetti and Pianta, 2008). The other way in which social movements strengthen democratic practice relates to their internal practices of democracy. In this regard, the thousands of

micro-practices from indigenous collectives to urban neighborhood councils reveal a different understanding of democracy as implemented through participative and deliberative practices. This more intense understanding of participatory democracy undoubtedly provides a fruitful avenue for renewing current local and national institutional settings. If considered jointly, these two democratic struggles prove the essential political role of local and transnational social movements as unique forces for change toward new forms of global democracy.¹⁷

Taking into consideration the request for a fair balance between formal institutions and social processes, once a system of global democracy is finally established, a number of different considerations need to be developed. Given that the avoidance of transnational exclusion is the single principal aim of this model of global democracy, the issue of comprehensive participation remains central to its design. The risk of creating a system that is western and managed by powerful élites is certainly a real danger feared by many opponents of the broad cosmopolitan project. Particular care thus needs to be used in creating and keeping open channels through which local inputs can pass and grassroots experiments be developed. On the one hand, political and institutional space needs to be left at the local and national level in order to guarantee political autonomy to emancipatory processes with high popular participation. On the other hand, institutional mechanisms should be devised in order to allow for such local claims (as expressed by both majorities and minorities) to be heard at the upper levels of the political system. As previously argued, a cosmo-federal system claims to be the most adequate for this challenging task in that it combines centralization with decentralization. It is centralized at the upper levels for decision-making with transnational and global scope, and also importantly for drawing legitimate jurisdictional boundaries that avoid exclusion. But the system also works through decentralization, with pluralism and subsidiarity that allow for local participation and social flourishing. The ability to express consent and dissent through direct voting at each institutional level is the key tool through which inputs from below can be heard and accountability demanded.

In envisaging this federal plan of reform for international institutions, cosmo-federalism aims to re-establish congruence between choice-makers and choice-bearers. Central as it is to any democratic form of politics, achieving such congruence constitutes one of the most severe challenges of global politics. Only where the correspondence between ruler and ruled is universally upheld through a centralized and comprehensive mechanism of public decision-making, frame-setting, and accountability, such as the one presented, is the individual in fact in the position to self-legislate over the entire range of activities in which s/he is involved, and thus to preserve his or her democratic freedom. This kind of global integration remains the only legitimate opponent to the other kind of global integration, that is, the current one: one driven by market forces and political power positions, creating high social marginalization and transnational exclusion.

Conclusions

To the original contention that the international political system generates exclusion and is thus morally unaccountable, this chapter has suggested a cosmo-federalist answer. The current division of accountability between choice-makers and choice-bearers has been analyzed and criticized through the adoption of a radical democratic perspective, which offers back to all citizens the possibility of participation in the process of self-legislation. The specific circumstances of international justice have been taken into account by a particular interpretation of the idea of a universal right to self-determination, which forms the core of the present cosmopolitan argument and generates two key proposals for reform: a) the recognition of multiple membership at different levels of political action in terms of cosmopolitan citizenship, and b) the federal reform of the United Nations, entailing the creation of an elected world assembly endowed with legislative power for issues concerning the global sphere of action. Only through such a multilayered political system and consequent multilevel citizenship, encompassing differing degrees of responsibility and relative power at all levels of political decision-making, can the individual possibility of choice receive an impartial hearing, so that the maximization of world well-being can be pursued. Arguably, these are, for the time being, the appropriate political arrangements required by a democratic theory of global justice in the case of citizenship and global political institutions.

Notes

- 1 For an initial consideration on federalism see Althusius, 1614; reprinted 1995; Hamilton *et al.*, 1787–8; reprinted 1961; Riker, 1964; Friedrich, 1968; Bernier, 1973; King, 1985; Albertini, 1993; Malandrino, 1998; Watts, 1998; Levi, 2002; Føllesdal, 2006. For the discussion of world federalism and the idea of a world state see Ewing, 1947; Reves, 1947; Hutchins *et al.*, 1948; Johnsen, 1948; Clark and Sohn, 1966; Beres, 1974; Forsyth, 1981; A. Vincent, 1983; Baratta, 1987, 1–15; Nielsen, 1988; Coddling, 1990; Barnaby, 1991; Falk *et al.*, 1991; Glossop, 1993; Yunker, 1993; Heater, 1996, chapters 6–7; Horn, 1996; Elazar, 1998; Höffe, 1999; reprinted 2007; Galtung, 2000; Agnew, 2002; Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann, 2002; Baratta, 2004; Delbruck, 2004; Frankman, 2004; Levi, 2005; Marchetti, 2006a.
- 2 Despite the reeassurance of the prediction that a world government will in any case be established within a hundred years (Wendt, 2003, 491), this proposal sticks to the normative stance and more modestly suggests that such an institutional arrangement should be actively pursued rather than awaited.
- 3 The process of the historical extension of democracy always been at the centre of federalist thought. The traditional line holds that democratic government has been continuously adapted to historical circumstances – from the limited extent of the *polis* assembly to the intermediate enlargement in the modern representative state – and that the time has come for a third extension toward a federal world government. Equally, federalists have reckoned that economic development always imposes a functional imperative on the structure of the political system. Thus, from the first agricultural city-states to nation-states focused on industry and

- commerce, the historical trajectory of economic globalization leads toward a world federal system.
- 4 Traditional formulations of such criticisms can be found in Kant, 1795; reprinted 1991; Carr, 1939, chapter 5; Niebuhr, 1949; Schmitt, 1950; reprinted 2003, 324–35; Walzer, 1980, 224; Suganami, 1989, 187–91; Habermas, 2004; reprinted 2006, chapter 7, section II.6–7; Christiano, 2006; Maus, 2006b. For a classic statement of federalism that provides strong counter-arguments to many of these objections see Hamilton *et al.*, 1787–8; reprinted 1961, sections 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 39, 46, and 51.
 - 5 The more general argument against a world state is Hobbesian: on the one hand, at the international level there is no equality among actors (i.e. in contrast to the state of nature at the domestic level, it is not true that everyone can kill everybody) and some states do not need to resort to the state for protection (Hart, 1961, chapter X.5). On the other hand, the possibility of collective security provided by an organized community alleviates the security dilemma (Kratochwil, 2007, 268). The possibility of atomic weapons, however, invalidates both these conventional considerations.
 - 6 See Kant, 1795; reprinted 1991, 113; 1797; reprinted 1991, 171, and his critical commentators Hurrell, 1990, 190; Lutz-Bachmann, 1997; Axinn, 1998; Franceschet, 2002; Habermas, 2004; reprinted 2006, chapter 7, section I.4; G. W. Brown, 2005, 515; Maus, 2006a.
 - 7 I need to acknowledge that the kind of proof that can be offered in any consequentialist argument as applied to international affairs remains inevitably reliant on hypothetical considerations. A world federation has never existed in history. It is thus impossible to make a precise assessment of its potential in terms of welfare-enhancement based on past experience. Nonetheless, it is possible to make an analogical argument based on existing democratic institutional arrangements at different levels, from the local to the macro-regional. Through this analogy, it is possible to envisage an institutional design based on procedures that on the whole generate a positive result in terms of preservation of freedom of choice, and thus of welfare-enhancement.
 - 8 Examples would be (drawing on the earlier list of transnational concerns): global poverty, nuclear containment, transnational organized crime, demography, migration and trafficking in people, environmental degradation and the fate of future generations, spread of infectious diseases, wars to spread democracy, the global economy, and cyber crime.
 - 9 As a further guarantee of lower (i.e. local, national, or regional) prerogatives implemented through the principle of subsidiarity, the rule of the “subsidiarity check” could be envisaged. According to this, lower parliaments would be allowed to ask for reconsideration of any decision taken at an upper institutional level if they could reasonably claim the issue at stake could more effectively be ruled at the lower level.
 - 10 Proposals for the creation of a Global Parliamentary Assembly have been recently restated by Falk and Strauss (Strauss, 1999; Falk and Strauss, 2000, 2001), though their project does not endow the suggested assembly either with federal or fully legislative powers. For previous path-breaking attempts in a similar direction see Falk, 1977; Mendlovitz, 1977; Falk, 1992, and their discussion on new world order models.
 - 11 The judicial and executive powers of the UN have also been criticized and reforms subsequently proposed in order to enhance the International Court of Justice and abolish the veto in the Security Council. Due to space constraints, however this chapter concentrates on the legislative power because of its political supremacy.
 - 12 Proposals on voting systems have been numerous and diverse during the last fifty years. For a selection, including the so-called Binding Triad, see Clark and Sohn,

- 1966, 20–34; Hudson, 1976; Newcombe, 1983; Hudson, 1991; Newcombe, 1991; Szasz, 1991.
- 13 Without this proviso, any proposal for a UN assembly with representation contingent only on democratic election of the representatives from each country, irrespective of each country's form of government or its observance of human rights, would be self-contradictory. For an instance of such a misjudgment see Singer, 2002, 148.
 - 14 This would be legitimate, but not necessarily legal, according to the existing UN charter. In fact, art. 103 states that the UN charter has legal supremacy over any other international agreement or covenant, and art. 108 affirms that changes in the charter are allowed only if voted by two-thirds of the existing (state) members, including the big five. This arrangement, which was due to the historical circumstances following the Second World War, perfectly preserves the power of the five permanent members of the Security Council, in that it does not allow for any change without their consent. A legal possibility for reform relies on art. 22, which allows the General Assembly to create subsidiary organisms. This would circumvent the power of veto and could lead to the creation of a subsidiary assembly with initially marginal powers.
 - 15 Examples in this regard might be the Community of Democracies or the Council of Europe.
 - 16 According to the Freedom House Index only 89 states are free democracies. This amounts to 46 percent of UN member states and to 2.968 million citizens, i.e. 45 percent of world population (Freedom House, 2006). For a different reading based on state counting only see Diamond, 2003.
 - 17 Beyond social movements, another prominent case of transnationalism is offered by migrants and refugees. Migrants, or moving between multiple political and cultural contexts, bring waves of social hybridization, and when institutionally integrated, also political innovation, in that they retain multiple citizenships (B. Barry and Goodin, 1992; Marchetti, 2006c). Refugees provide an even stronger case for transnational citizenship. Since the approval of the Geneva Convention on Refugees and its Protocol (which came into force in 1954 and 1967 respectively), refugees in fact enjoy a transnational right to receive assistance (Hassner, 1998; Gibney, 2001). In a world still anchored to an exclusionary state system, migrants and refugees are the first claimants of cosmopolitan citizenship.

8 Conclusions

Utopia and reality are thus two facets of political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place.

(Carr, 1939, 10)

È concepçom monoteísta
pensar que existe umha só soluçom
é um conceito banal
o dividendo por baixo do divisor
é umha história perdida
a coerência de grande pensador
é un debate sem limite como fazer a perfeita revoluçom
é un debate sem limite como fazê-la perfeita.¹

(Marful, 2006)

Before formulating a number of final thoughts, it is perhaps useful to summarize the principal findings of the study. To this end, it is worth recalling the example of the private club that I presented in the introductory chapter. In that case, there was an issue between the club's members who polluted the river passing through their club's grounds and the neighboring citizens who suffered the consequences of the polluted river. I referred to that situation to introduce the concept of exclusion. The rest of the book was an elaboration from this starting point and a reconstruction of a democratic alternative.

The book began by introducing the problem of transnational exclusion in terms of political disenfranchisement, underlining the degree of subordination that it imposes on so many citizens around the world. This is nowhere more visible than in the institutional barriers that prevent individuals from influencing decisions which affect them transnationally. Having identified this key political deficiency, critical attention turned to its ideological foundation: the normative theories underpinning such exclusionary phenomenon. These theories share a common basis: they rest on an interaction-dependent paradigm of justice, according to which any substantial duty to those with whom one does not interact directly is denied. Such theories of "in-justice" have been implemented in an exclusionary institutional system at the

international level. From the statist model of Westphalia to the global governance system, it is possible to detect a common institutional denominator that preserves the situation of transnational exclusion.

In order to challenge these ideological and institutional bases of transnational exclusion, the book reconstructed an alternative international political theory anchored to different cosmopolitan grounds. Three different historical and theoretical strands of cosmopolitan thinking have been considered here together for the first time: the ethical-philosophical debate that began in the 1970s, the politico-institutional discussion that developed from the 1990s, and the sociological and activist reflection that emerged from the 2000s. Engaging with almost forty years of contemporary cosmopolitan debates, the study elaborated a more comprehensive and consistent theory of global democracy based on three cardinal principles: all-inclusiveness, multi-dimensionality, and rootedness.

The reflection within the ethico-philosophical debate on cosmopolitanism helped to develop a conception of consequentialist global justice. Based on a universal, yet plural, idea of political agency, cosmopolitanism provides an alternative conception of politics that is able to reframe the institutional space beyond the traditional border-centered conception of political justice. By surveying the recent reformulations of cosmopolitan theory and the debate they have provoked since the 1970s, my elaboration defended a consequentialist version of cosmopolitanism that sets itself apart from other cosmopolitan theories in its emphasis on two key features: freedom of choice and maximization of world welfare. These in turn generate a dual metric of political justice in guaranteeing vital interests and political participation. An initial acknowledgement of the insurmountable epistemological barrier to interpersonal comparability led then to the full appreciation of an all-inclusive moral system.

The consideration of the institutional debate was useful in elaborating a notion of a procedural hierarchical democracy beyond borders. Following from the earlier ethical debate, the central argument in support of global democracy was identified as the right to participate in decision-making processes at each level of political deliberation. Criticizing rival reasoning, a consequentialist theory of global democracy was then seen to be as centered on the parity of participation in social and political life, i.e. inclusion in the community of those who are entitled to make justice claims on one another. This has a twofold meaning: public participation in the decision-making and norm-setting processes, as well as public participation in public processes of contestation, which ought to be institutionally channeled and thereby offer back to citizens a sense of social and political empowerment. From this, a number of institutional aspects were further elaborated, concerning the issue of international and collective responsibility and the issue of how to draw jurisdictional boundaries legitimately (i.e. in a non-exclusionary way). With regard to the former, a complex notion of political agency was formulated according to which both individuals and collective bodies are charged with

responsibility depending on their capacity to influence the outcome. With regard to the latter, an all-inclusive upper body for drawing jurisdictional boundaries was proposed, together with a subsidiarity principle.

The rethinking of the social debate on cosmopolitanism, finally, concluded with the statement of a rooted and thick democracy in which local emancipatory struggles from subaltern actors remain essential. Beginning by analyzing two typical cases of false accusation of cosmopolitan disembodiedness (i.e. the cosmopolitan Jew and the football fan), the argument first proved not only that cosmopolitan can be consistently rooted, but also that it should be so if it is to preserve political effectiveness. In this regard, cosmopolitanism remains a political theory focused on the inclusion of subaltern actors who have been excluded from global politics. Reconstructing the historical emergence of this position, the study examined both the cognitive arguments on the hegemonic thinking about cosmopolitanism and the new forms of politics of resistance and emancipation that have been experimented with in a number of social movement and civil society contexts. From the analyses of this reflection, a complex bidirectional political system was suggested, in which institutional reforms from above and social struggle from below are simultaneously envisaged.

Next, attention was devoted to the disagreements of the main competing theories that argue against the idea of global democracy. A critical examination of the paradigm of political community as embodied in realism, nationalism, and the civilizational approach was thus developed. Similarly, the paradigm of liberal internationalism as expressed by the theory of democratic peace and cosmopolitan governance was also scrutinized. These theories present the most robust defense of the current institutional system and at the same time the most challenging critique of the ideal of global democracy. Using the focus on transnational exclusion as a critical tool to test international political theories, the study found all of these different conceptions of international politics highly deficient in terms of the democratic paradigm. Their incapacity to include non-members generated a democratic assessment that cannot but be one of severe failure.

The final focus was dedicated to bringing the ideas formulated in the previous parts to completion in a fully fledged political model. The ethical, institutional, and social features of cosmopolitanism have been brought within a scheme of cosmo-federalism that promises to be the most consistent political design to attain transnational inclusion. It is in fact through a double movement of centralization and decentralization that this system promises to avoid global disenfranchisement, while at the same time allowing for local participation. A new image of cosmopolitan citizenship thus emerged according to which individuals are called to engage in politics at all levels of political action: from the local level, within direct social emancipatory experiments, to the global level, through voting directly for their representative to a world parliament with full powers. In this regard, a cosmo-federal reform of the UN was suggested as the most consistent project for the extension of the all-inclusive democratic ideal to the global level.

In sum, this study has elaborated and defended an all-inclusive political model, serving two main aims. On the one hand, it was intended to offer a consistent stance from which to criticize the current degree of exclusion generated by the decision-making process presently in force. On the other hand, the consequentialist cosmopolitan model also presents a clear alternative to the phenomenon of international political exclusion through a system that is universalist and yet multilayered and sensitive to cultural differences. The argument presented here is original in that by seeking to bridge the paradigms of consequentialism and cosmopolitanism, it provides a particularly strong argument in favor of a political system which is based on universal inclusion and participation. This is argued to be the most convincing critical response available to the current exclusionary conceptual framework of international affairs. Alternative political theories are less fit to deal with the issue of global democratic inclusion because of their fundamental reliance on the interaction paradigm, which generates jurisdictional compartmentalization and subsequently fragmentation-cum-exclusion in international affairs.

The vision presented here stems for the most part from a normative exercise in international ideal-theory. In this vein, it is critically different from current political reality, in that it is “unrealistic.” And yet, it claims to grasp onto the evident – albeit still minoritarian – tendency toward progressive democratization of political life currently under way through differing social struggles. Beginning in this way is not new in politics. Many transnational social movements’ campaigns had, for instance, their origins in similar uncertainty, in that they:

began with an idea that was almost unimaginable, even by its early proponents. That they could abolish slavery, gain the vote for women, or end foot binding hardly seemed possible. One of the main tasks that social movements undertake, however, is to make possible the previously unimaginable, by framing problems in such a way that their solution comes to appear inevitable. The case of female circumcision reminds us that such changes are neither obvious nor linear. They are the contingent result of contestations over meaning and resources waged by specific actors in a specific historical context.

(Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 40–1)

The fact that a global democracy has been proposed several times during modern history and yet has never been implemented cannot be a valid reason for simply ignoring it. In contrast to the past, nowadays there are normative reasons that call even more loudly for formulating such a project. The socio-economic transformations that are leading towards a more integrated world urgently demand a reform of the political system in order to make such global changes consistent with our ideal of democratic control and participation. Once the project of global democracy is normatively secured, the assessment of its feasibility remains a political exercise that cannot claim to be axiologically

neutral. All those assessments which hold that a specific innovatory politics is unrealistic are either simply hypocritical, or else are based on different normative grounds, and thus open to criticism. In sum, this study maintains that global democracy is no more unrealistic today than national democracy was 200 years ago, or women's enfranchisement fifty years ago, or blacks voting in the US south just a few decades ago, or the end of the apartheid system in South Africa even more recently, if we assume the correct normative perspective.

Note

1 Translation:

It is a monotheistic conception
thinking that just one solution exists
it is a banal concept
the dividend under the divisor
it is a lost story
the consistency of great thinkers
it is an endless debate how to make the perfect revolution
it is a borderless debate how to do it in a perfect way.

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