


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The New Politics of Conflict Resolution

Responding to Difference

Morgan Brigg



Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies

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Preface

Early in my experience of cross-cultural conflict resolution work, I was faced with a paradox: the practice in which I was involved was characterized by little—if any—exchange of underlying cultural values and frameworks. Instead, the broadly Western values of my society dominated, serving as a type of natural and unquestioned backdrop for guiding conflict resolution practice. This changed for me when, in a mediation session I was running, an elderly Australian Aboriginal woman repudiated my authority to act upon her by asserting her tradition. In effect, she invoked the fact of colonization to challenge the liberal settler-colonial administrative and legislative basis for my practice and—by extension—the wider transnational liberalism deployed in globalized conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts. Her rebuff motivated me to explore the lack of exchange about values underpinning intercultural conflict resolution. In this work, a broad pattern emerged. On one hand, conflict resolution promises responsiveness to people in conflict, including to their cultural, identity and other differences. But conflict resolution is compromised in delivering on this promise by the way it relies upon, and explicitly or implicitly promotes, conventional Western approaches to conflict and social and political life. This situation led me to oscillate between excitement and frustration about the conflict resolution field, and energized my efforts to better understand and address conflict resolution's relationship with difference. This book is the result.

Over time my research made it clear that I needed to critically examine the politics of knowledge in the conflict resolution field by exploring linkages between ways of knowing and conflict resolution practice. Questions about how conflict resolution relates to difference in practice cannot be separated from how we know difference, or from the dominance of Western ways of knowing in social science and political thinking. The powerful idea of sovereignty, for instance, influences our understanding about the nature of selfhood and the organization of political life. These and related understandings underpin much conflict resolution scholarship as well as processes such as mediation and problem-solving workshops and the encounters across difference that occur through them. The types of education, socialization, and training that conflict resolution scholars and practitioners receive, and who they are as individuals, also play a role. Often overlooked, though, are the ways in which efforts

to facilitate order regularly see conflict workers serve as the agents of longstanding and quite particular Western ways of conceiving of selves, of political community, and of resolving conflict. This frequently leads the conflict resolution field to bypass or override non-Western ways of dealing with conflict—to deny difference even as it attempts to implement a progressive and responsive politics.

Cultural, religious, and identity differences animate key conflicts of our time, and are likely to continue to do so in coming decades. We therefore cannot rely solely upon conventional Western ways of knowing and approaching conflict. To do so fails to recognize that these ways of knowing are themselves culturally constrained and are unlikely to adequately respond to other realities, worldviews, and ways of knowing. Indeed, to persist in operating from a Western worldview without asking questions of it is to risk contributing to conflict rather than working to address it. This is precisely the difficulty we face. While conflict resolution has taken on a transnational character and draws to some extent from a number of traditions, it predominantly operates through Western knowledge frameworks, values, and problem-solving practices. In short, it has a tendency to “return to itself” for familiar—but not universal, or necessarily useful—ways of understanding and resolving conflict.

Difference, then, presents a particularly tricky challenge for conflict resolution scholarship and practice. To begin to address this challenge, I draw upon critical theory and my own self and experiences as methodological resources to analyze and question existing conflict resolution assumptions, categories, and processes, sometimes by revealing their historical and cultural specificity and contingency. This analysis shows that conflict resolution often unwittingly reinscribes dominant ways of thinking about political community, order, and conflict on Western liberal terms. I also show, however, that a combination of critical analysis at the limits of contemporary social science, and the practical commitment to responsiveness and personal engagement on the part of many conflict resolution scholars and practitioners, offers prospects for rethinking the field’s relationship with difference.

The book undertakes this analysis in two parts. Part I explores the ways in which conflict resolution orders and governs difference. The Introduction provides an overview of the conflict resolution field and expands on the above themes, outlining the challenge that difference presents for conflict resolution and how I attempt to bring difference to bear in the book without subordinating it to mainstream Western ways of knowing. Chapter 1 rethinks the way we frame difference in the social sciences, providing a new take on the challenge that cultural difference

presents to conflict resolution. Current conflict resolution approaches to culture exhibit shortcomings, but Chapter 1 also shows how the recent move to view culture as a relational effect promises some solutions and innovative ways of thinking about connections across difference. Chapter 2 utilizes a transnational Foucauldian analysis to show how conflict resolution processes such as mediation and problem-solving workshops govern difference according to liberal Western understandings of selfhood, order, and conflict, even as they promote and encourage liberal freedom. Chapter 3 explains how the influential idea of sovereignty contributes to the subordination of difference by facilitating the return of Western knowledge to itself (thereby bypassing and denying other traditions) and the integration of individual lives into sovereign states and transnational liberalism through conflict resolution processes. At the same time, sovereignty is necessarily fractured because it is in-and-of the world. Chapter 3 concludes by examining how this fracturing represents possibilities for moving beyond the ordering and governing of difference.

Part II explores how conflict resolution might move past the challenges discussed in Part I to fulfill its promise of responsiveness to people in conflict. It treats the practical and engaged nature of conflict resolution as a valuable way of moving the field forward while exploring theoretical resources which might support rigorous ways of responding across difference that have hitherto remained obscured and unutilized. Chapter 4 reviews the notion of a cosmopolitan conflict resolution before engaging ideas of recognition, often mobilized in struggles for cultural rights and justice, and relatedness, which promises relationship across difference based on intersubjective vulnerability deriving from the being-in-common of human existence. Both are necessary, but where recognition risks falling back upon sovereignty, relatedness mitigates these risks and offers more thoroughgoing possibilities for connecting across difference. Chapter 5 explores innovations for responding anew at the limits of contemporary conflict resolution scholarship and practice. It critically examines how the selves of individual conflict workers and the burgeoning field of complexity studies can serve as resources for connecting with others and analyzing conflict. The last section of the chapter explores the value of the network metaphor for conceptualizing the pursuit of relatedness to address the challenges of difference in conflict resolution.

The Conclusion summarizes the key themes and arguments of the book and looks to future difficulties and possibilities for conflict resolution's engagement with difference. While cultural, identity, and other differences clearly present challenges in the twenty-first century, I argue that conventional social science assumptions about difference, selves,

order, and conflict often exacerbate these challenges. To move beyond these assumptions to new and more peaceful ways of relating across difference requires foregoing the reassurance on offer through familiar ways of knowing and operating in conflict resolution. Questioning ingrained approaches is challenging, but to respond to others is also a key conflict resolution goal. To do so is to necessarily become vulnerable to other people's ways of knowing the world, entertaining the possibilities for social order and conflict resolution suggested by their political systems, and opening to their understandings of themselves and their existence. This book hopes to move us closer toward this possibility. The process is only partially achieved here, but facing this task is both necessary and an opportunity for dealing with difference in the twenty-first century.

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Many people have contributed to the development of this work. Key arguments in Chapter 1 are drawn from an article developed jointly with Kate Muller, and Kate has generously agreed for me to use this material. Rebecca Duffy has offered continual support along with comments and advice on the text. Catherine Mills has provided continuous intellectual companionship and encouragement. Roland Bleiker has been a constant source of support and guidance. I particularly want to thank him for contributing his time and energy. Numerous other people, including colleagues at the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland, have provided various forms of assistance. While I am unable to recall or name all who have contributed, I note the support and input provided by Charlie Watson, Mark Davidheiser, Mneesha Gellman, Lyndon Murphy, and Oliver Richmond. I take full responsibility for the text.

Introduction

Conflict resolution appears to offer a refreshing new politics. In a world fraught with conflict, competition, and violence, the field orients itself toward cooperation and consensus. Contrary to influential approaches in politics, international studies, and the social sciences more broadly, conflict resolution denies the claim that human social relations are characterized by conflict or competition. Rather, it asserts that people can and do cooperate to address difficulties among themselves. Certainly, cooperation does not characterize all human interaction, but collaboration is more pervasive in human history and cultures than is commonly thought.¹ While conflict resolution does not claim that we can inhabit a world without competition and conflict, it nevertheless works toward a future in which conflicts are managed productively rather than destructively, and through cooperation where possible.

The popular appeal of conflict resolution is further enhanced by its practical and normative orientation. The literature of the field is replete with “How to” guides and handbooks. Workshops and skills training programs are commonplace. Even within academic settings, many conflict resolution scholars are at some level driven by a motivation to ameliorate the suffering and anguish of conflict by intervening, or facilitating intervention, in the world. Most scholars and practitioners are also committed to responding directly to the needs and concerns of people in conflict. While this impulse does not manifest itself evenly, a majority in the field support the idea that the people involved in conflict should be empowered to deliberate upon and implement sustainable solutions to the disputes and conflicts they face.

The terms of the field’s engagement with people in conflict, though, are yet to be properly worked through. Conflict resolution may be hopeful and practical, but the details of the new politics that it promises

require debate and elaboration. Nowhere is this more apparent than in relation to an important leitmotif of our time: difference. From indigenous claims for self-determination and multiculturalism, to regional ethnic conflicts and a supposed global clash between Western secularism and Islamic fundamentalism, claims about difference fuel contemporary conflict. Such claims take a variety of forms as difference is mobilized under the banner of identity, sexuality, culture, political independence, sovereignty, and religion. Regardless of the form of these claims, though, difference is a factor of primary importance in many contemporary conflicts.

Within conflict resolution the question of difference manifests as a response to cultural diversity. But the field has drawn little from broader debates about the politics of difference that have animated political and cultural studies in recent decades, and the question of difference has not received explicit attention in the field. This relative lack of attention to difference, particularly in relation to conflict dynamics, is surprising. Differences in perceptions, interests, values, and culture trigger conflict, energize the life of disputes, and, in turn, exercise those seeking to ameliorate conflict. Difference is also internal to conflict dynamics. A minor difference, for instance, can generate positive feedback loops to reinforce a pattern of conflict escalation. Of course, there is no straightforward correlation between difference and conflict.² Yet, as Michelle LeBaron notes, "Conflict, put simply, is a difference that matters."³

This book addresses the challenge of difference for conflict resolution. It does so critically, but also in way that shares the goals of responsive engagement and a new politics. I show, on one hand, that enthusiasm for conflict resolution's practical possibilities unwittingly re-inscribes dominant ways of thinking about political community, order, and politics, and that this disavows and governs difference. This is a fundamental challenge for the field. Conflict resolution cannot credibly address pressing conflicts across difference if it denies some of the key differences to which it aims to respond. At the same time, this book also demonstrates that the practical nature of conflict resolution, including a commitment to responsiveness and critical personal engagement on the part of conflict resolution scholars and practitioners, is an important resource for working across difference. This type of critical engagement not only helps conflict resolution attend to, and mitigate, the challenge of cultural difference, it also shows how conflict resolution governs difference according to transnational liberalism, and reveals the influence of the powerful notion of sovereignty. To address these difficulties I explore the idea of recognizing difference, and less well-known

ideas of relatedness, in the context of the broadly cosmopolitan conflict resolution impulse to respond across difference to people in conflict. This opens up possibilities for responding anew beyond dominant ways of thinking about and undertaking conflict resolution which have tended to deny difference.

To further introduce this book I show that conflict resolution is a specialist and coherent field, albeit characterized by diversity and some level of contestation. Readers familiar with conflict resolution may wish to bypass this section. I then introduce the difference challenge. This section shows that difference is often subsumed in mainstream Western knowledge and that much of what is at stake in the difference challenge relates to dissimilar worldviews or versions of reality. Addressing this challenge requires an expansive approach to conflict resolution that does not separate scholarship from practice. The third section outlines the approach used to engage difference in this book. I explain my version of critical analysis, an innovative approach which partly draws upon my self as a methodological resource, and how I make use of my position amidst the Australian settler-colonial conflict. Finally, a detailed overview of the chapters further explains the approach I adopt and summarizes the key arguments made throughout Parts I and II of the book.

The conflict resolution field

Conflict resolution has come of age in recent decades. While all societies have resolved conflict, it is in the second half of the twentieth century that an influential global conflict resolution movement has developed. The most influential text in the field, *Getting to Yes*,⁴ is now published in more than 20 languages and has sold millions of copies worldwide. Its accessible “interest-based” approach to negotiation, and accompanying concepts including inventing options to satisfy all parties and separating people from the problem, circulate from the lecture hall to the boardroom to the Internet. Thousands of diplomats, managers, community workers, and professionals working in a wide range of organizations around the globe are now familiar with interest-based negotiation and its application in conflict resolution processes such as mediation and facilitation. A sophisticated literature is also burgeoning, with scholars beginning to address difficult questions about culture, identity, terrorism, theoretical frameworks, and the normative dimensions of conflict resolution intervention and practice. These and related topics are debated worldwide in postgraduate university programs.

Perhaps more significant is the fact that conflict resolution has had substantial impacts upon how we deal with disputes in a range of settings from the interpersonal to the international. Where avoidance, or the threat of force or court action, would likely have been the first—and possibly only—choice for managing disputes three or four decades ago, mediation and other well-known conflict resolution processes are now valued and accepted as real options for addressing a wide variety of conflicts.

Yet despite growth and consolidation, the task of specifying exactly what conflict resolution is remains difficult as the field continues to develop and change. Those wanting to know more than this short introduction is able to provide can refer to a by-now significant number of texts which survey and synthesize the field.⁵ In lieu of an extensive review of this and other literature, three sets of affinities characterize conflict resolution and help to distinguish it from other endeavors.

First, and as already outlined, conflict resolution is engaged and responsive. Most scholars and practitioners aim to assist in alleviating the anguish and distress that comes with conflict by intervening directly or by facilitating intervention into conflict situations. This goes some way toward distinguishing conflict resolution from its more traditional social science cousins. Second, conflict resolution practices tend to be more informal than formal. This distinguishes conflict resolution from legal proceedings and formal diplomacy channels. Finally, conflict resolution pursues consensus, and integrative or non-zero-sum solutions to conflict wherever possible. Conversely, the field eschews coercion, violence, or “elimination” of a party or parties as a way of dealing with conflict.

The details of these sets of affinities may be questioned and even contested by some. However, such moments of contention typically speak to the diversity and breadth of the field⁶ rather than to fundamental disagreements about the orientation of conflict resolution. At the same time, it is necessary to briefly address contestation about terminology and origins within the field.

In most specialist fields, particularly in the early decades of formation, the question of terminology is a matter of considerable fluidity and debate. This holds true for conflict resolution. For instance, the terms conflict *management* and conflict *transformation* both have some currency alongside the more widely recognized conflict *resolution*. Advocates of conflict management argue that theirs is a more comprehensive term because it is often more realistic to “manage” rather than “resolve” conflict. Conflict transformers argue the term “resolution” promotes settlement while neglecting the frequent need for fundamental changes

in the social and political structures which produce violence and conflict. We could expand the debate by discussing conflict regulation, conflict settlement, conflict work, alternative dispute resolution, and peacemaking.

The range of terminology at play in the field speaks to a further illustration of diversity: the question of origins and influences. For many, the beginnings of the contemporary field are in the international relations discipline of the 1950s and 1960s.⁷ But it is also the case that developments in the international sphere drew upon insights and practices for resolving conflict in industrial relations, within families and communities, and among individuals.⁸ Other important influences include Buddhism and the life and work of Mohandas Gandhi, and local dispute resolution processes documented through legal anthropology.⁹ The academic disciplines contributing to conflict resolution include political science, international studies, psychology, communication, sociology, law, anthropology, management studies, industrial relations, and economics. Each of these fields contributes a different emphasis from the others, and the relative merits of these emphases are sometimes matters of debate.

Questions about terminology and sources of influence will remain important to specialized debates within the field. Nevertheless, “conflict resolution,” conceived in broad terms, remains an appropriate umbrella-term for the purposes of this book. Conflict resolution is the most widely recognized term in the field, and there is likely more to be lost than gained—in terms of accessibility and strain upon readers—by using an alternative. As Ramsbotham and colleagues argue, the key consideration should be whether conflict resolution is able to signal the substance of what is being advocated by alternative terminology.¹⁰ I believe, with them, that it can. In the case of conflict transformation, the process of transforming the social and other structures which give rise to conflict deserves to be seen as the deepest level of the conflict resolution tradition.¹¹ Conflict management can be similarly understood as a particular practice within the broader conflict resolution field. Conflict resolution also has currency in a wide range of academic disciplines beyond those who specialize in conflict resolution, and is the most familiar with the media and the general public.¹²

Conflict resolution also has the advantage of taking in longstanding efforts to address a wide range of conflicts. The reach of the field is partly attributable to the fact that conflict resolution scholars and practitioners have, from the beginning, been interested in insights for understanding and intervening in conflicts in a broad sense. It is for this reason that the

divisions between, for instance, the domestic and international, often promoted by more traditional scholarship, have generally been avoided by conflict resolvers.¹³ While it is true that there are fractures in the field, and a need for further conversations among various subfields including the domestic and the international, it is also the case that longstanding cross-fertilizations are sometimes under-recognized, including within the field itself. Many think of the work of Roger Fisher, for instance, as initially focused on domestic and legal disputes before finding wider international application. But the forerunner to Fisher's work in *Getting to Yes* was his earlier work on international conflict.¹⁴ This commitment to resolving conflict irrespective of borders and aside from disciplinary specializations takes on increased urgency and relevance in a post-Cold War climate characterized by transnational conflict.¹⁵

Conflict resolution, then, is the most widely recognized and appropriate term for referring to the influential global movement to address conflict that developed in the second half of the twentieth century. Such a broad movement is difficult to define, but it typically aims to deal with conflict informally, non-coercively, and by being responsive to people in conflict. In these circumstances internal diversity and contestation signal vibrancy rather than significant differences about matters of substance. I now want to turn to the key focus of this book: the question of how the field relates to difference.

The difference challenge

Difference animates key conflicts of our time. Claims about difference breathe life into cultural, ethnic, religious, and values conflict. Difference is also often internal to dispute dynamics, including patterns of conflict escalation. The range and depth of difference challenges, then, are significant. Yet perhaps the key challenge for conflict resolution derives from difficulties in relating to and engaging difference. While conflict resolution has taken on a transnational character and drawn from a number of traditions, it predominantly operates through Western knowledge frameworks, values, and problem-solving practices. By operating in this way, conflict resolution, in effect, bypasses difference. By returning to its values and practices—by returning to itself—conflict resolution's ability to deal effectively and credibly with difference is compromised. This is not because of willful oversight or nefarious cultural imperialism on the part of conflict resolution practitioners. To the contrary, many of those interested in and undertaking conflict resolution are increasingly attuned to the challenge of difference.

The story of conflict resolution's difficulty with difference is a complex and historical one, taking in eras of colonialism, development, and globalization. It speaks to the spread of the west's institutions and ways of knowing, and the penetration of accompanying liberal cultural values, institutions, practices, and knowledge into societies across the globe—from former colonial centers of Europe to sub-Saharan Africa and Micronesian atolls. These values and knowledge are embedded in the discourses and practices of professionals and institutions from social workers and local courts to development workers and the United Nations. It is a story of encounters between differing ways of knowing, modes of governance, and organizing social life, and approaches to the meaning of existence and the “good life.” Elements of this story of difficulty with difference are introduced here; others are elaborated in following chapters.

Efforts to define difference illustrate a dominant feature of how the Western tradition relates to it, and the heart of the difficulty we face. Definitions tend to refer to difference as a state of non-alikeness, non-sameness, dissimilarity or, in more philosophical terms, non-identity. These definitions put difference in the definition itself with the result that we do not have a way of thinking about difference in itself.¹⁶ More striking is that difference is subordinated to the individual or concept which thinks or represents sameness (or similarity, identity, and so on).¹⁷ Here the self-sufficient, “I think,” the sovereign self of reason, comes to the fore in place of difference. Difference is a derivative and secondary quality. In other words, Western knowledge attempts to know difference, but in doing so it tends to bypasses difference to return to itself.¹⁸ As Gilles Deleuze's study of difference concludes, difference “remains condemned and must atone or be redeemed under the auspices of reason which renders it livable and thinkable.”¹⁹ So even when we attempt to approach difference in a positive way, we are working with and through a tradition which frames difference as negative.

To say that conflict resolution is part of a tradition which thinks of difference in negative terms does not necessarily translate to a problematic approach in practice. Nor does it follow that non-Western traditions deal with difference any more appropriately or adequately. But we cannot ignore the implications of how difference is known and framed for political relationships, and how these relationships have fed into mainstream Western knowledge. Feminists and postcolonial scholars in particular have shown how the framing of women and people of color as different and other has been integral to the development and operation of mechanisms for their governance and control. Most famously,

Edward Said's *Orientalism* showed that knowledge of colonial others which framed them as inferior and negative was crucial to the sense of cultural strength that was necessary for sustaining European empires.²⁰ Knowledge of difference is implicated in, rather than separate from, these political relationships. We now live in the fallout of colonialism where peoples, traditions, and cultures rub against one another in a globalizing world inflected by these same political relationships. The resulting encounters across difference and political struggles play out through everyday life in complex and unexpected ways which speak to key contemporary political challenges.²¹

Conflict resolution operates in this world, working with difference on an everyday basis. The field has begun to grapple with the question of cultural difference as a result. Yet it has remained relatively silent on broader and deeper political debates and challenges presented by difference. It has remained quiet about the colonial entailments of social science, and the accompanying implications for conflict resolution of the tendency to pursue self-sufficiency in knowing, governing, and being. As a consequence, questions about how to know difference in conflict resolution and the tension between re-establishing order and responding to difference in conflict resolution processes are yet to be addressed.

To further introduce the relative neglect of these matters in the field, and the approach taken in this book to deal with them, I want to consider the current survey of the conflict resolution field by Ramsbotham and colleagues.²² Of particular value is their distilled narrative about the development of the field. This narrative takes us from the 1950s to the present and into the future through the efforts of four generations of scholars and practitioners: *founders*, *consolidators*, *reconstructors*, and *universalizers*.²³

The field founders, operating in the aftermath of the Second World War, set themselves apart from mainstream approaches to international relations by advocating an interdisciplinary and problem-solving approach to the non-violent transformation of conflicts.²⁴ The resulting universal approaches assumed that there was little or no need to take account of culture. As one founder, John Burton, wrote in summary of his human needs approach, 'needs are a part of human inheritance and common to all peoples, regardless of culture'.²⁵ The result, for Burton, is that 'analytical processes, which seek to reveal those needs that are held in common, are applicable to all peoples in all cultures'.²⁶ This is perhaps conflict resolution at its most avowedly modernist and hopeful. All people share basic human needs, with reason allowing us to analyze conflicts to identify these needs beyond cultural and other difference.

Because some of the most basic human needs, such as security and recognition, are not in limited supply in the same ways as material needs, their satisfaction for one party neatly increases the likelihood of them being fulfilled for the other party.²⁷ Reason thus allows the pursuit of integrative solutions beyond difference.

The consolidators encouraged the global spread and development of conflict resolution, in part by establishing conflict resolution centers and organizations. This was also the time of the emergence and rapid growth of the alternative dispute resolution movement.²⁸ Yet despite enhanced international credentials,²⁹ the work of the consolidators broadly reproduced the a-cultural and modernist approach of the founders. The familiar and comfortable subtext at play here is one of benign Western expansionism. Increased social science knowledge about the causes and dynamics of conflict, the application of the power of analytical reason through problem-solving workshops, and the spread of these developments around the globe promises to bring to the world new and improved ways of addressing the scourge of conflict. A partial challenge to this story of universal relevance and application of broadly Western conflict resolution approaches, and the accompanying work of the reconstructors, would have to wait until the 1980s.

From the late 1980s, conflict resolution became subject to greater scrutiny and criticism, with the most challenging criticism relating to the question of cultural diversity. Leading the critique were anthropologists Kevin Avruch and Peter Black. In debate with John Burton and Dennis J. D. Sandole, one of Avruch and Black's key arguments is that culture has a constitutive rather than incidental role.³⁰ That is, culture speaks to how people conceive of conflict, the meanings they take from it, how they process conflict, and so on.³¹ Others have also made critiques of Burton's universalism in conflict resolution,³² or highlighted the importance of culture in complementary ways.³³ Ramsbotham and colleagues broadly agree, along with many reconstructors, that cultural difference represents a significant challenge to the field and that part of the necessary remedial action requires drawing upon local understandings of conflict; *ethnoconflict* theory, in Avruch and Black's terms.³⁴ Ramsbotham and colleagues note that dealing with the culture challenge is crucial because there can be no international conflict resolution without a shared commitment to the 'central goal of transforming potential violence into non-violent change'.³⁵

The realization that cultural difference is significant for conflict resolution has occurred in the context of a broader shift away from traditional social science approaches in the study of conflict and politics to

the introduction of critical and normative traditions.³⁶ Feminism, post-modernism, postcolonialism, and critical theory have all been brought to bear. One of the most popular critical claims in this broader mix is the assertion that knowledge of the world is “culturally-constructed”.³⁷ Claims that conflict is culturally constructed resonate and have gained purchase within this wider critical climate, particularly given the proliferation of difference conflicts and claims in a post-Cold War environment and increasingly globalizing world.

But we cannot allow critical analysis to rest with the claim that conflict is culturally constructed. This assertion ascribes too much explanatory power to a somewhat vague term. We need only note that talk of the culturally constructed nature of conflict and knowledge requires, by extension, exploring how culture itself is culturally constructed. Focusing on difference is helpful in this situation because it allows us to ask questions such as how we know and relate to “culture”—to examine what culture describes and how it organizes our knowledge of, and relationship with, human difference.

Contemporary conflict resolution tends to bypass these and related questions and their implications for the field. Most scholars instead assume that our current ways of knowing human difference through culture are adequate for dealing with the challenges we currently face. Ramsbotham and colleagues, for instance, endorse the ethnoconflict theory proposed by Avruch and others,³⁸ contending that we should take account of local conflict wisdom while also searching for lessons and generalizations that might be applied across different contexts. This is the commonsensical platform for the universalizers, the next generation of conflict resolution scholars and practitioners.

Ramsbotham and colleagues speak for many others when they say that the culture question is the “decisive”³⁹ challenge for the universalizers. But by asserting that a key goal is “ensuring that conflict resolution is indeed truly international, as its founders intended,”⁴⁰ they also underestimate the depth of this challenge. Key founders and their followers assumed—explicitly or implicitly through the methods they adopted—that it was possible and desirable to propound a global conflict resolution enterprise from largely Western social science roots. By reproducing in survey form the orientation of the field, Ramsbotham and colleagues illustrate a broader pattern. Rather than thoroughly engaging the challenge of difference internal to culture, their suggestion embraces conflict resolution’s broader modernist enthusiasm for practical forward movement. This movement has much to recommend it, but it also has the weakness of reaching for what is nearest at hand. In doing

so it reproduces itself and the dominance of the Western tradition rather than seriously engaging difference.

Ramsbotham and colleagues do not, of course, endorse a Western-dominated agenda. They propose that the universalizers pursue a *cosmopolitan* conflict resolution for dealing constructively with conflict beyond particular states, societies, or established centers of power.⁴¹ This call is no doubt broadly agreeable for many concerned with the challenges of difference. Yet it remains the case that cosmopolitanism is expounded from Kantian European roots. To invoke cosmopolitanism without self-critical analysis is to be part of a consistent privileging of modern Europe as the moral and scientific capital of the world. Such privileging involves an implicit claim that European ethnophilosophy is global and universal.⁴² This claim is ultimately untenable, especially so for those who want to strike up a global conversation across difference.

To question the credentials of cosmopolitanism is not to suggest a relativist world in which cultures are incommensurable or hermetically sealed from each other. Historical and contemporary experience attests to interaction and exchange across difference rather than separation. Nor is it to argue that we should attempt to leap beyond our current politico-cultural circumstances, and indeed ourselves, to seek out a pure and uncomplicated mode of interaction. Interaction across difference is often perplexing and messy. The approach adopted here also does not abandon the practical orientation of Ramsbotham and colleagues. As they correctly point out, our goal should not be 'to abandon conflict resolution because it is Western, but to find ways to enrich Western and non-Western traditions through their mutual encounter'.⁴³ Rather, I want to pursue the modest goal of more adequately bringing the challenge of difference to bear in our analyses and efforts to work across difference.

Yet to engage difference for conflict resolution is more challenging than it first appears. This goal cannot be achieved by simply incorporating different approaches to conflict within a dominant conflict resolution or Western political theory register. To do so overlooks the fact that different peoples and cultures often speak to different worldviews for making existence meaningful, for knowing the world, and for forming community and dealing with difficulties among people. Much of what is at stake in the difference challenge relates, in other words, to different versions of truth and reality.⁴⁴

Bringing difference to bear, then, requires an expansive approach to conflict resolution. Because differences in worldview speak to fundamental issues about how the world is known, it is not possible to separate the

conflict resolution scholarship from practice. Instead, the approach adopted here demonstrates and works with the precept that questions about how we know in conflict resolution are crucial to our ability to deal with the difference challenge.

Bringing difference to bear

To bring to bear that which is non-alike without making it “atone or be redeemed under the auspices of reason”⁴⁵ is a difficult task, and one which requires us to be comfortable with incremental progress and incomplete results. This is so, first and foremost, because it appears to be impossible to have difference speak purely on its own terms. The process of communicating another perspective inevitably involves transposition and translation. At the same time, each of us engages in such translation from a position of (greater or lesser) embeddedness in particular social and material worlds. So while we can strive to engage difference in more adequate ways, it seems that the most productive and realistic path involves acknowledging that pure access to difference is likely to be impossible. Second, contemporary scholarship, despite the critical turn of recent decades, continues a longstanding Western requirement to mobilize a certain level of self-sufficient authority. This authority leads the text to return to itself and its operative paradigms,⁴⁶ even as it might try to bring difference to bear.

Consider, by way of example, the challenge of how to deal with world-view differences arising out of interaction between one of the world’s oldest living cultures and one of its newest in a conflict resolution setting. Australian Aboriginal people frequently invoke the category “country,” including in conflict situations and the conflict resolution work I have been involved in with them. Country is an important term for ordering existence. It refers to tracts of land and to how land participates in reciprocal relation with human beings, bringing them into existence and serving as a type of poetic ordering principle for guiding relations among people and the generation of knowledge.⁴⁷ While it is not possible to explore the full meaning of country here, suffice it to say that country cross-cuts and challenges the ways of being and knowing of many Western scholars and conflict resolution practitioners. How are we to treat the difference implied by country?

To adopt the categories and ways of knowing of mainstream political studies would have the effect of returning to the Western tradition, bypassing and subsuming rather than bringing to bear the difference represented by the Australian Aboriginal term “country.” This would

resonate with a related social science pattern: representing and constructing indigenous people in perspectives other than their own.⁴⁸ It is also the case that the meanings of country, often conveyed in ceremonies and rituals and by being *in-country*, cannot be readily transmitted in the formats and the language of conventional scholarship.⁴⁹

Compromise, then, is necessary. Fortunately, critical scholarship can disrupt mainstream political studies and help to bring alternative perspectives, and difference, to bear.⁵⁰ The version of critical scholarship pursued here, inspired by poststructuralist theory, is relatively straightforward: use critical reason to question existing conflict resolution categories, orientations and processes, often by noting their historical and cultural specificity and contingency. As will emerge throughout, this approach offers opportunities for critically analyzing and recalibrating conflict resolution.

Yet the critical stance adopted here attempts more than replacing mainstream political studies with an approach more open to difference. I also gradually introduce and experiment, as I explain further below, with engaging and drawing on the self as a methodological resource. To do so I examine the dominant figure of Western selfhood and draw upon my personal experience. This helps to bring difference “up-close and personal” in conflict resolution, thereby bringing difference to bear in ways that are not possible through more conventional scholarship. Indeed, as I will show, working with the category of the self, and with our selves, is crucial if we are to mitigate self-sufficiency in knowing, governing, and being to take serious account of difference in conflict resolution.

Using myself as a methodological resource to undertake analysis contravenes a longstanding social science norm: the tendency to write the scholar out of scholarship. This norm is simultaneously curious and understandable. On one hand, our selves are necessarily at the center of our efforts to know; they are the “hubs” through which the world is known. The self is necessarily central to scholarship. By understanding our social and political world in terms of actors modeled on our selves—on understandings of selfhood as broadly sovereign, autonomous, and independent—we project ourselves into the world, and return to the self as a type of original unit of social and political life. On the other hand, established methodological approaches routinely pursue knowledge in ways that bypass the role of the self in knowledge production, despite the fact that the self is also a focus of intense interest and contestation in west culture and social science.⁵¹ Bypassing the self in social science practice is understandable in the context of efforts to be seen to be objective and scientific. But it nonetheless presents a methodological anomaly.

To bring the self back in is to acknowledge that the self is embedded in the world and with others; to concede that one is a lived being vulnerable to others. Doing so in my case brings into play the intractable Australian settler-indigenous conflict. When I refer to my personal experience, I am usually, although not always or entirely, drawing on my experience as a white mediator with Australian Aboriginal people. I am not, however, using the Australian settler-indigenous conflict as a case study here. Rather, I want to extract insights which take advantage of the antagonistic intimacy⁵² of settler-colonialism. The advantage I aim to utilize derives from the close entwinement and conflict between Western knowledge, institutions, and practices—all disseminated around the globe through colonialism, development, and globalization—and their Australian Aboriginal equivalents. In this relationship, valuable learning and exchange occurs alongside the continued dispossession and disavowal of Aboriginal people.

To be located in the antagonistic intimacy of Australian settler-colonialism is at once uncomfortable and a privilege. The source of discomfort for a white settler is obvious. Privilege, though, derives from the remarkable patience of Aboriginal people to educate and share knowledge across difference. It also comes from an opportunity to come into contact with different ways of knowing and being in the world, and hence for phenomenological experience of these differences as they bear upon conflict resolution. This perspective, as all others, has limitations. Yet the spread of Western knowledge, institutions, and practices, something now being further facilitated through conflict resolution efforts, has led me, and I hope will lead readers, to find that the insights developed here resonate in other contexts.

Conceding the limitations of experience is crucial for bringing difference to bear. To deal seriously with the difference challenge requires that we do without the social science tendency to speak across difference for all. However, to forego speaking universally does not mean, as the conclusion to this book makes clear, that we should not seek possibilities for knowing across difference around the globe. Indeed, this is all the more pressing as the effects of today's conflicts are often felt far from their immediate sites.⁵³ It does mean, though, that we need to seek stranger and more adventurous ways of knowing and relating to others across difference. The contours of such thought are barely visible, but they require a *de-centered* universalism inaccessible through the traditional sovereign eye of the social scientist or conflict resolution analyst.

There are inevitable constraints on the extent to which difference is brought to bear in this book. I typically write in the format and language

of conventional scholarship. As noted above, many manifestations of difference are often not well-communicated in these ways. Even more obvious than these limitations are those of a single author and volume. No single monograph or author can bring difference to bear in a complete or thoroughgoing way. As I note in more detail below, I engage “culture” as the most salient contemporary manifestation of difference at the expense of other dimensions of difference such as gender and religion. It is also the case that innovative approaches such as those pursued here usually suffer proportionally more than their conventional counterparts in terms of perceived incompleteness because they willfully bypass at least some of the contemporary received wisdom of the field. Some risk-taking is nonetheless required. The difference challenge, to paraphrase Ramsbotham and colleagues,⁵⁴ is indeed decisive for conflict resolution, and addressing big challenges requires more than reproducing conventional approaches.

Finally, this is not a handbook for mediating across difference. Some may find it a practical book in some senses because in various places it draws on personal experience and approaches issues at the level of the individual scholar or practitioner. But it is a theoretically informed, critical, and constructive treatment of the challenge of difference for conflict resolution. While some readers may find aspects of the analysis challenging, arguments are presented in an accessible way, again, in places, by working through individual experience. Further details about the arguments and approach to be pursued requires turning to the individual chapters and overall structure of the book.

Detailed overview

The chapters of Part I bring difference to bear through critical analysis by drawing on a combination of theoretically informed analysis and personal experience. They show that conflict resolution continues to risk reproducing the culture challenge in our ways of knowing, governing difference in its processes, and sustaining these problematic aspects of conflict resolution by remaining at least partly hostage to the powerful influence of the idea of sovereignty. Equally, Part I of the book also suggests that conflict resolution’s practical orientation is a potentially valuable resource for relating across cultures, mitigating governance of difference, and fissuring the influence of sovereignty in the field. Part II continues critical analysis, but it also shifts focus to consider how conflict resolution may deal with the difference challenge.

Chapter 1 begins the task of bringing the implications of difference to bear for conflict resolution by taking up the culture challenge. As noted above, cultural difference has emerged as a major test for the field. This starting point, and the response of subsequent chapters, means that I do not pursue a detailed engagement with all dimensions of difference. To attempt to engage difference as gender, class, values, religion, and so on, as well as culture, is beyond the scope of a single volume. In these circumstances it seems appropriate to engage the currently most important manifestation of difference in the field. In due course it may be of value to explore and decide the extent to which the approaches considered here are relevant for considering other dimensions of difference.

Chapter 1 first reviews existing approaches to culture in conflict resolution by briefly tracing increased responsiveness to cultural difference and advances in addressing the culture challenges which have come with the introduction of anthropological perspectives. With increased responsiveness, though, comes the difficulty of how to treat claims to cultural separation or uniqueness mobilized within conflicts in the name of "culture." This, along with definitional and methodological problems internal to the powerful and complex notion of culture (including the contemporary requirement that culture account for an increasingly refined and greater numbers of difference claims), leads the chapter to examine *how* we know human difference through "culture."

While the notion of "different cultures" is apparently commonsensical, the second part of Chapter 1 reveals culture as a particular way of knowing human difference bound with Western knowledge disciplines and the European colonial experience. Examining how culture knows human difference reveals that differences are not so much "there" to be simply documented in neutral terms which result in "culture." Rather, scholars and others "produce" culture by gathering together and aggregating differences (including behaviors, custom, ways of making meaning) in ways that are inflected through particular historical and political circumstances and ways of knowing. Chapter 1 shows that culture's colonial entailments generate two broad risks for conflict resolution: first there is a risk of overstating human difference and unduly separating individuals and groups and, second, a risk of devaluing those of non-European heritage by, for instance, denying indigenous approaches to conflict which do not fit with Western ideology about peace and harmony.

A further and important manifestation of the risk of devaluing difference emerges in a slightly different form in the efforts of the leading culture in conflict resolution scholar Kevin Avruch to deal with the first risk of overvaluing culture. The third section of the chapter examines

how Avruch uses Western social science to act as arbiter for deciding whether culture is being used by people in conflict in an illegitimate “political” sense, or a legitimate “technical” sense. Avruch’s use of social science in this way brings on an ethico-political dilemma by asserting the self-sufficiency of Western social science ways of knowing. Prioritizing Western ways of knowing and responding to difference in this way risks compromising conflict resolution’s credibility for dealing with cultural conflict.

To deal with these challenges, the final section of the chapter introduces the possibility of bringing difference to bear by putting to one side the longstanding Western social science requirement for self-sufficiency in knowing. I show that “culture” is a type of impossible object for conflict resolution and social science because it speaks to ineffable dimensions of who people are. This does not imply that we should dispense with the term, or with social science analysis. Instead, it introduces the notion of responding to difference and culture while continuing to question claims to *have* or *know* culture. Such an approach turns our attention to the more concrete dynamics and processes by which people articulate cultural claims, and hence to possibilities for exchange and dialogue across difference. These dynamics suggest, in turn, a relational approach to culture and difference, and the possibility of emergent connections and networks across difference, an approach I revisit in Part II of the book.

Chapter 2 critically examines how conflict resolution governs difference. When conflict resolvers respond to people in conflict, one of their goals is to facilitate order. Conflict resolution thus installs order upon or through those who participate in its programs and processes. Herein lays an intrinsic yet typically unrecognized tension for the field: how can conflict resolution be responsive to people in conflict, including to their values, while also producing order through transnational liberalism? To the extent that order among participants to conflict emerges through Western approaches to social and political life and social-science-influenced conflict resolution, the responsiveness of conflict resolution is in question as an element of its promised new politics. This important dynamic often goes unnoticed because conflict resolution advocates emphasize the informal, consensual, and dialogical dimensions of conflict resolution processes in order to contrast them with formal (legal and sovereign) processes which are seen to impose upon, constrain, and sometimes destroy lives. Nonetheless, Chapter 2 shows that conflict resolution does not govern any less for being informal.

To elaborate how conflict resolution governs difference even as it encourages liberal freedom, the chapter first draws attention to the

mutually constitutive relationship between the informal realm of law and sovereignty, and the apparently “free” and informal realm of civil and personal life. Conflict resolution typically sets itself against formal institutions and processes linked to the law and the state, but governmentality analyses show that informal processes contribute to liberal Western governance by having individuals act upon their selves in concert with the goals of formal governance. Because conflict resolution has tended to borrow assumptions about political life from mainstream Western social and political science, it has been unable to analyze how it contributes to this form of governance. The field has not reflected critically upon its participation in relations of governance, and particularly upon how its processes contribute to the current transnational liberal order.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the dominant politico-cultural relations of conflict resolution by mapping the relationship between informal and formal spheres. It demonstrates that non-Western approaches to conflict resolution tend to be identified with the informal realm, and thereby are subordinated to formal Western approaches to political order and resolving conflict such as rule of law and state sovereignty. Indigenous approaches may be drawn upon to complement formal Western approaches, or even to ameliorate some of their perceived negative impacts. But within conflict resolution, just as within the dominant transnational liberal order, non-Western ways of being together, organizing political existence, and dealing with the difficulties among people tend not to be seen as a serious alternative to their Western counterparts. This relationship and the liberal assumptions internal to it provide the backdrop and important norms for the informal governance of difference through conflict resolution processes.

The second section of Chapter 2 shows how conflict resolution, alongside much mainstream Western social science, promotes a number of important assumptions about order, conflict, and selves. Order is an achievement which is threatened by conflict, and individuals are self-sufficient beings who best contribute to managing conflict and restoring order by reworking themselves as rational and non-disputing. These assumptions lay the foundation for conflict resolution processes to enact facilitative governance. By deploying mechanisms which encourage participants to reconfigure themselves as rational and non-disputing, conflict resolution acts upon people to facilitate Western transnational liberal understandings of selfhood, order, and conflict which govern difference. Finally, Chapter 2 discusses how the rapid growth and international dissemination of conflict resolution processes leads to increased

governance of difference through conflict resolution. But there is also no guarantee that this governance is successful, and interactions across difference contain possibilities for ameliorating such governance from within conflict resolution itself.

Chapter 3 deepens the foregoing understanding of the difference challenge for conflict resolution through a critical engagement with the influential idea of sovereignty. To do so, the chapter explores the self as a category and makes use of the author's experiences as a methodological resource. Framing analysis in terms of sovereign selves allows us to examine the politics of the relationship between conflict resolution scholars' and practitioners' conceptualizations of their own selves and how we know and practice conflict resolution. The first part of Chapter 3 explores the influence of the figure of sovereignty in mainstream Western ways of knowing. By returning to the sovereign self, traditional social science analyses tend to subordinate difference. The key dynamic is an oscillation between an internal and deep self on one hand, and transcendence through God or knowledge on the other. The movement between these poles limits room for engagement and exchange with others by authorizing conflict resolution scholarship and practice to order others and the world in their absence.

The chapter reflects upon the "sovereign selves" of conflict resolution scholars and practitioners by drawing upon my personal conflict resolution experience more regularly and explicitly than in earlier chapters. This approach allows an accessible and grounded analysis of how the idea of sovereignty is bound with the culture challenge and transnational liberal governance of difference. Engaging the personal is also important because, following the practical and engaged nature of conflict resolution, the challenge of difference bears directly upon practitioner and scholar selves: practitioners and scholars will have to grapple with difference and change if we are to address the challenges discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.

By drawing on my experience as a mediation trainee and practitioner, the second section of Chapter 3 shows how sovereignty contributes to the governance of difference by facilitating the integration of conflict resolution selves into the transnational liberal order. Individual conflict resolution practitioners become agents of transnational governance as they come to embody and promote the figure of the self-sufficient and rational individual, and as they facilitate the subordination of individuals to the rule of law and sovereignty. This leads to the disavowal and subjection of non-Western ways of being, ordering political life, and dealing with difficulties among people.

The last section of Chapter 3 explores the implications of the fact that sovereignty, despite the foregoing arguments, is in-and-of the world. The relationships facilitated by the influence of sovereignty are also relationships with the concrete and immanent, a dynamic which is reinforced by conflict resolution's practical orientation. Regardless of the influence of the idea of transcendence internal to sovereignty, then, the relations of governance and domination facilitated by it remain vulnerable to difference. Engaging with the concrete and everyday generates fissures in sovereignty's hold on the way difference is known and governed in conflict resolution. Herein exist possibilities for mitigating the influence of sovereignty and responding to difference. Some of these possibilities are taken up in Part II.

Chapter 4 explores how to mitigate the influence of sovereignty in conflict resolution by drawing upon the currently most advanced theoretical formulations available to the field. The chapter begins by briefly discussing and evaluating the idea of cosmopolitan conflict resolution as a way of responding to difference. A cosmopolitan approach, advocated most recently by Ramsbotham and colleagues,⁵⁵ resonates with conflict resolution's impulse to respond to people in conflict situation. Yet Ramsbotham and colleagues bypass the tricky question of the European roots of the brand of cosmopolitanism they promote. They also neglect difficult questions about how to advance a cosmopolitan agenda. While the cosmopolitan impulse is broadly laudable, fundamental questions about *how* to approach others must be addressed, even before discussions about what form ideals such as "reason," "justice," and "dialogue" might take. To not address such questions risks reproducing the influence of sovereignty and the disavowal of difference under the banner of progressive conflict resolution.

To take up questions about options for relating across difference in conflict resolution, the second section of Chapter 4 engages the popular and commonsensical idea of recognition. Recognition has in recent decades come to be presumed as a prerequisite for a just politics, and a valuable way of dealing with cultural difference. Yet I show that recognition is also accompanied by significant risks because it is at least partly bound with the relations of domination it seeks to surpass. It is true that recognition is characterized by an important and powerful movement toward equality, but it also tends to fall back upon sovereign ways of knowing, which appropriate rather than adequately acknowledge difference. I argue that we should not discard recognition, but it should also not be embraced as the primary means of addressing the difference challenge in conflict resolution.

The second part of Chapter 4 explores the possibilities for addressing the shortfalls of recognition by pursuing “relatedness”; the fundamental being together of humans. Where recognition risks return to the sovereign self, relatedness invokes a pre-cognitive given-over-ness which makes each of us vulnerable to others. By drawing upon a range of theoretical and philosophical perspectives, I argue that relatedness underpins much conflict resolution practice, and that drawing further upon its qualities facilitates movement across traditional boundaries and categories. Intensifying the dynamics of relatedness within conflict resolution practice contains prospects for disrupting the transnational liberal governance of difference, as I show by analyzing my mediation work with Aboriginal people. Where recognition risks returning to the sovereign self on its own terms, relatedness disrupts the influence of sovereignty to open improved possibilities for advancing relationships across difference. So while relatedness should not displace the popular notion of recognition, it offers possibilities for responding to difference which have hitherto been suppressed by the influence of sovereignty in conflict resolution and mainstream social science.

Chapter 5 argues that re-engaging conflict resolution’s impulse for responding to people in conflict from the vantage of relatedness is a valuable way of bringing difference to bear and avoiding problems associated with sovereign self-sufficiency in knowing, governing, and being. The chapter first explores how conflict resolution scholars and practitioners might draw upon their selves as a resource for increasing responsiveness to difference. Conceiving and practicing the self as an unfolding ensemble that connects with, and is susceptible to, external and unfamiliar forces and relations of the world and others allows us to be exposed and vulnerable to external perspectives, and hence to connect and respond across difference. This approach disturbs rather than confirms the feedback loops that produce more conventional sovereign selves and accompanying institutional arrangements and practices which disavow difference. I show how to minimize the risks of self-indulgence associated with such a strategy by contrasting it with commonplace understandings of reflexivity and underscoring the need to rigorously apply the principles of relatedness elaborated in Chapter 4.

The second part of the chapter explores how conflict resolution scholarship can pursue responsiveness beyond our selves by drawing upon the burgeoning field of complexity studies. Where traditional social science modeling has tended to assume homogeneity, limited interaction, and static equilibriums, agent-based modeling, based on the principles of complexity, allows for heterogeneity, dynamism, and interaction among

agents. These methodological principles are likely to prove valuable for understanding the dynamic and interactive dimensions of conflict, but they also facilitate a different relationship between the conflict resolution analyst or intervener and the world. Complexity undercuts the overarching sovereign position of the traditional analyst to facilitate greater attention to the philosophical possibilities of connection and relatedness across difference, and focuses attention on interaction and responsiveness among agents. The final section of the chapter introduces the notion of networked relationality to bring together insights about our selves-in-relationship with others and the key methodological principles of the complexity field to provide a framework for responding anew in conflict resolution.

The book concludes by summarizing the key themes developed in earlier chapters and looking to future difficulties and possibilities for conflict resolution's engagement with difference. It underscores the possibilities of relatedness for responding across difference while arguing that the difference challenge may not be as great as conventional Western ways of thinking about order and political community tend to suggest.

Part I Ordering Difference

1

The Culture Challenge

The most renowned cross-cultural encounter in the conflict resolution literature is Meron Benvenisti's account of his objection to a workshop in which he participated for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At a formal dinner attached to the workshop, Benvenisti stood up after "one glass too many" and "said to the organizer . . . , 'I wonder if you know who we are at all. For all you care, we can be Zimbabweans, Basques, Arabs, Jews, Catholics, Protestants, Greeks, Turks. To you we are just guinea pigs to be tested, or at best to be engineered.'"¹ The culture challenge suggested by Benvenisti's complaint is clear: cultural difference brings into question the often-universalist knowledge and methods assumed by conflict resolution scholars and practitioners. But this also raises a more fundamental challenge: How can conflict resolution succeed if it cannot work across difference? Difference, after all, animates much if not most conflict. The culture challenge evinced by Benvenisti is particularly urgent in the context of "new wars," increased politico-cultural identity claims, so-called clashes of civilizations, and the alleged global clash between Western secularism and Islamic fundamentalism. Conflict resolution must be able to deal with culture and with difference. The culture challenge also has implications for conflict resolution itself: if cultural issues cannot be satisfactorily addressed, the Western dominance of conflict resolution threatens to undermine its credentials and become a source of tension when attempting to work across cultural difference.

Benvenisti's complaint has been used by Kevin Avruch and Tarja Väyrynen² to introduce strong arguments for the importance of culture in conflict resolution, and to argue against universal conflict resolution approaches. The arguments of Avruch, Väyrynen, and others gained ground from the late 1980s,³ affirming the broad position that culture

seriously matters.⁴ Most scholars in the field now agree that culture frames people's experiences of conflict, their responses to other people in conflict, and the types of strategies they might draw upon to manage or otherwise address disputes. Rarely is it suggested that this implies incommensurability or the impossibility of exchange, but it does imply an issue of primary importance.⁵ Calls to address cultural issues have proliferated in recent years, with prominent commentators asserting that the "culture question" is fundamentally significant, and currently the most important challenge facing conflict resolution.⁶

There are various (inter-)disciplinary approaches to which the conflict resolution field can obviously turn to address the culture challenge. Political science, Psychology, International Studies, Sociology, Critical Legal Studies, Communication Studies, Anthropology, Cultural Studies, and conflict resolution itself can all usefully contribute. Some of these are already drawn upon in the aforementioned debates, and progress has been made through greater recognition of indigenous and local understandings about conflict and how to resolve it. But while there are advances, a question of fundamental importance is often overlooked: how should we know and relate to cultural difference? And, more broadly, how should we conceive and work across human difference for conflict resolution?

Benvenisti's complaint helps to draw out the question of how we know difference in a useful way. Other options, such as a review of the extensive literature on culture in conflict resolution, or an account of definitional issues, allow a description of approaches to difference. But Benvenisti's personal account offers a rich and meaningful evocation of the concrete meaning and implications of "culture" in a conflict resolution encounter.

When Benvenisti asks if the organizer knows "who we are at all" he is voicing a widely felt expectation about the basis for sound relationships. Clearly the organizer did know who the participants were, but the words "at all" make a demand about the manner in which people should be known. Benvenisti is not only asking that the organizer know that he and others differ; he is asking that the organizer understand something of his and others' uniqueness. This is not a technical question about the knowledge of diversity. Benvenisti's "at all" refers to a type of knowledge bound with matters of respect, trust, aesthetic appreciation, and other ineffable dimensions of knowing people.

One of the reasons conflict resolution struggles with questions of how to know cultural difference is because it draws heavily upon Western social science. These methods often clash with the ways in which people

want and expect to be known in everyday human terms. Benvenisti's comments about guinea pigs, testing, and engineering reflect the workshop organizer's mainstream social-scientific approach to knowing human beings. Such ways of knowing are found wanting because they struggle to address aesthetic and related dimensions of knowing others.

The challenge is a serious one because it relates to the very orientation of social science and conflict resolution knowledge. Social science traditionally claims to be "for itself." Yet recent critiques show that social science often pursues a type of reason which often returns to itself and to Western cultural values. This skews engagement with others, potentially bringing into question the credibility of the conflict resolution enterprise. It also means that no straightforward combination of traditional social science techniques or disciplines is likely to satisfactorily respond to Benvenisti's objection or address the wider challenge of working across difference. To begin to address these tasks we need to consider the question of how conflict resolution approaches and knows culture.

Conflict resolution is challenged by culture, but it also has the capacity—a capacity which complements and extends upon social science practice—for responding to this very same challenge. The key lies in a common conflict resolution commitment to responsiveness. Benvenisti explains that his objection to the workshop organizer was followed by a striking response. The organizer ". . . stood up and, with tears in his eyes, said, 'Thank you, I needed that!'"⁷ Most conflict resolution scholars and practitioners *want* to respond to individual human needs and difference in respectful ways. This orientation, forged through the practical and engaged nature of much conflict resolution, helps to set conflict resolution apart from more traditional social science approaches to security and conflict. To pursue the possibilities suggested by responsiveness requires a critical approach to the culture question.

To develop this approach, this chapter outlines the shortfalls of "culture-as-behavior" approaches and the move to a more sophisticated interpretive stance. It then expands the culture question to ask after the idea of "culture" and our current social science methods employed to know it. Asking *how* the notion of culture is used to know human difference reveals epistemological and ethico-political challenges in current ways of approaching cultural difference. These problems risk *overstating* the difference and separateness of cultural groups, and the operation of colonial-style hierarchy in our ways of knowing human difference which lead us to unwittingly *devalue* cultural difference. To address these difficulties the chapter argues that we should embrace the

constitutive incompleteness of practices of representation and the position of culture at the limits of social science disciplines. This acknowledges that culture is a fundamentally important phenomenon yet not one which should suggest boundaries between people. Rethinking culture in a way that is at once more thoroughgoing and circumspect promises a response to the culture challenge more informed by conflict resolution goals (including responsiveness to others) than by traditional social science disciplines.

From behavior to meaning

Conflict resolution's ways of knowing culture reflect the influence of social science disciplines and, over time, a move toward more sophisticated awareness and understanding. The most simplistic approaches, applied from international peacekeeping and post-conflict interventions to Track II diplomacy and local community dispute resolution, focus upon differences in visible or easily discernible traits including forms of greeting, social etiquette, rituals, and customs. Sometimes these differences in behavior are linked to attitudes to family, relationships, gender, and so on. Such differences are in turn associated with ethnic, national, and religious (among other) groupings. The goal of such approaches is to help mediators, negotiators, and other interveners avoid committing *faux pax* in cultural settings other than their own.

The identification of particular traits has some practical value, but focusing upon expected behaviors is also dangerous because it can mask exceptions, and shifts in mood or orientation, away from expected norms. Recognizing such exceptions and shifts is crucial for understanding and in intervening in conflicts.⁸ Identifying traits also risks missing important cultural dimensions such as symbolism and meaning which are significant for a variety of conflict resolution interventions.⁹

Alongside the identification of particular traits, approaches that identify differing patterns of communication and other behavior relevant to conflict and its resolution are slightly more sophisticated. These approaches also focus upon behavior, but analyze difference through binaries such as individualism/collectivism, high context/low context, egalitarian/hierarchical, and small/large power distance.¹⁰ Positivist-trained social scientists often appreciate this approach because it promises the possibility of a comprehensive framework and scientific precision for knowing culture and conflict behavior. The resulting understandings about behavior do provide useful guidance about the conflict behaviors that may be encountered in different cultures. But the focus on patterns of

behavior again masks exceptions to them and the importance of meaning and symbolism.

The practical shortcomings of these “culture-as-behavior” approaches are underpinned by their inability to come to terms with the diversity of human existence. Research outcomes are necessarily qualified—in contradistinction to the methodological approaches applied to generate data—by warnings to not take findings as wholly accurate measures of cultural behavior. Human difference continually escapes social science efforts to order through categories. The problem is most clear when culture-as-behavior conclusions are expressed in everyday language. Faure and Sjöstedt assert, for instance, that “West Africans and Arabs clearly respect authority and are apt to subordinate themselves to the dictum of the collectivity.”¹¹ Conversely, “Swedes and Israelis are much more individualistic and have less concern for formal authority.”¹² Efforts to categorize human beings in this way run into inevitable problems. Human difference is dynamic; it generates regular exceptions to rules, and people are rarely amenable to such simplistic ordering. This seriously undermines, for instance, psychological analyses of individualism-collectivism as a way of knowing cultural difference. Extending on a meta-study by Oyserman and others, Alan Fiske shows that heterogeneity *within* cultures and associated statistical anomalies in cultural research suggest that individualism and collectivism are “not meaningful constructs or that we do not know how to measure them.”¹³

A further and particularly telling shortfall of culture-as-behavior approaches is their tendency to rely upon Western cultural and conceptual frameworks to order human difference. Take, once again, the individualist-collectivist distinction. The research and literature on this topic assumes that this distinction is universally relevant. It does not, therefore, investigate implications of cultural difference for this framework itself. The individualism-collectivism distinction is simply assumed to be a useful and relevant one. However, anthropological literature explains that the traits of individualism and collectivism are *mixed* for some peoples.¹⁴ That is, some peoples cannot be placed on an individualist-collectivist continuum because their behavior and their supporting forms of social and political organization are *simultaneously* individualist and collectivist.¹⁵

The fact that the individualism-collectivism distinction is irrelevant in some cases means that this framework is unable to account for certain peoples. It cannot respond to them. Efforts to develop systematic and comprehensive analyses or typologies on the basis of Western theoretical frameworks¹⁶ narrow our understanding of difference and have the

effect of denying the social existence of certain peoples. The result is a form of epistemological violence which, by failing to recognize human difference, potentially contributes to, rather than addresses, conflict.

It is true, of course, that analyzing patterns of behavior can be of value for understanding human difference for conflict resolution. Culture-as-behavior analyses generate broad awareness of difference, and some studies provide useful knowledge about the patterns of behavior that one might expect in different contexts. We often rely on this type of provisional and commonsense understanding of others for assisting our interactions across difference. But to *orient* our approach to difference in this way seriously constrains our capacity for understanding and responding to human difference for conflict resolution. Culture-as-behavior approaches, and the mainstream social-scientific disciplines from which they spring, are oriented more toward ordering than responding to human difference. These efforts, at least at this time, are unable to adequately comprehend the complexity and subtlety of human diversity.

An important adjustment for the shortfalls of culture-as-behavior approaches is provided by the introduction of an anthropological perspective, predominantly by Kevin Avruch and Peter Black. Avruch and Black argue that we should move away from prescriptive understandings of cultural difference, adopt more complex definitions of culture, and promote interpretive understandings that attend to questions of cultural meaning in particular contexts.¹⁷ To do this, Avruch introduces an understanding of culture which is uncontroversial among anthropologists, but which is very different and much richer than approaches which look for traits or patterns of behavior. His preferred definition of culture refers to learned or created derivatives of experience that encode life and meaning,¹⁸ and emphasizes fluid and interpretive processes for making meaning.¹⁹ To adjust for the shortfalls of approaches that look for traits or patterns, Avruch argues that culture is not homogeneous throughout populations. Rather, he shows that it is socially and psychologically distributed, that it is not a *thing* but is an effect of human actions, that it is not mutually exclusive since one person can be a member of multiple cultures, that it is not custom or surface-level etiquette, and that culture changes through time.²⁰ This adjustment requires much greater attention to particular contexts, and can also alert us to the "cultural underpinnings of such expert [Western] theories as rational choice or principled negotiation."²¹

The introduction of an interpretive approach to culture is a substantial advance on approaches that look for traits and patterns. Interpretive

understandings take in questions of meaning and symbolism, and promise much greater capacity for responding to the full range of human difference. They resonate with Ledarach's elicitive approach to conflict resolution training,²² and promote recognition of local and indigenous approaches to conflict resolution through what Avruch and Black have called ethnoconflict theory and praxis.²³ Interpretive approaches also connect with the explicitly hermeneutic approach of Tarya Väyrynen which highlights the production of shared meaning—a Gadamerian “fusion of horizons”—as central to conflict resolution processes.²⁴ Ramsbotham and colleagues endorse Avruch's interpretive approach in their survey of conflict resolution for its recognition of “indigenous conflict understandings and resolution practices.”²⁵ These developments promise, and have begun to deliver, progress for addressing the culture challenge. Benvenisti's complaint might not have emerged if the workshop organizer had worked with an interpretive understanding of the cultures of workshop participants.

But the adjustment from culture-as-behavior to culture-as-meaning is also not sufficient for fully addressing the culture question in conflict resolution. The responsiveness to cultural difference suggested by interpretive approaches raises ontological and political questions about whether “culture” refers to fixed or malleable differences. Avruch²⁶ is quite clear that “culture” does not suggest incommensurability among cultural groups. For him, culture is flexible and malleable. But as Ramsbotham and colleagues point out, this is rarely the view of one's own culture taken by protagonists in conflict situations.²⁷ This raises questions about how culture frames human difference and how conflict resolution responds to difference in the context of its aspirations to (minimally) work across difference and to (maximally) operate universally. Is culture the only or best way to understand human differences for the purpose of understanding and resolving conflict? To address these questions we need to examine culture more closely.

The culture question expanded

Conflict resolution, like broader social science, faces conceptual and methodological challenges in its efforts to know human difference. It is true, of course, that there is an assumption within much conflict resolution and social science literature that “culture,” and the social science methods employed to know it (whether they be behavioral-psychological or anthropological-interpretive), are sufficient. But this often obscures the difficulties of knowing culture. Avruch has done more than most others

in conflict resolution to reveal some of the history, complexity, and conceptual awkwardness of the culture concept.²⁸ Yet the assumption that culture has sound ontological standing, also prevalent throughout conflict resolution literature dealing with the culture challenge, persists in his work. This assumption obscures the concrete (historical) fact that the idea “culture” has not always been with us. It also obscures important details of its genesis and history.²⁹ Contemporary serious interest in culture within conflict resolution is not adequately served by simply assuming that “culture” exists, or that our current ways of conceptualizing culture are useful or appropriate.

The definitional question “*What is culture?*” is a common starting point for (re-)considering culture, but puts severe limitations on the extent of rethinking we can undertake. One measure of difficulty is found in a contemporary and admirable cross-disciplinary definitional effort by John Baldwin and his colleagues. Their study acknowledges that culture is a “moving target” and ends with 87 pages of definitions.³⁰ Baldwin and colleagues urge historical and contextual understandings of culture, but this does not necessarily reveal the conceptual problems that inhabit the term. And although fields of study and our understandings develop and deepen through definitional debates,³¹ it remains the case that most (re-)definitions often simply reinstate culture in a (slightly) different form. This reproduces current conceptualizations of culture by reasserting control over the content and meaning of the term.

The need to go beyond commonplace assumptions about culture has partly emerged due to the success of those who advocate for it. Assertions about the “cultural construction” of social roles, meaning, and identities have in recent decades extended into arguments about the “cultural-constructedness” of knowledge. This has occurred as part of a wider critique of Western ways of knowing. It has become possible to use “culture” to challenge the efficacy of reason as a basis for producing knowledge. The result is that we currently grapple not only with the culturally constructed nature of social conflict in conflict resolution, but also of rationality itself³² as the basis of mainstream social-scientific ways of knowing.

The rise of a cultural critique of mainstream knowledge constitutes an important challenge to the type of social science reflected in Benvenisti’s complaint about being treated like guinea pigs. But in the process, culture with a capital “C” has come to resemble reason with a capital “R” to the point where we now have to deal with charges of “moral and epistemological privilege” similar to those previously leveled at reason.³³ Talk of the “culturally constructed” nature of knowledge requires, by extension

and inclusion, considering the constructed nature of culture itself. Addressing the culture question in conflict resolution must include examining how we have come to know and order human difference through culture. This question has important implications for how conflict resolution forms connections, knowledge, and relationships across human difference, and for how it responds to and manages this difference in processing conflict.

Of particular concern are ethical and political problems connected with our current ways of knowing human difference through culture. The term culture is invariably a means of aggregation; it asks after more than one human being by seeking out a way of grouping and ordering. It orders—while simultaneously differentiating—the incredible diversity of human existence. The ordering impulse at play in “culture” is partially set against diversity: culture orders by aggregating human difference. At the same time, a wide range of political, social, and lifestyle movements have in recent decades used culture to call for recognition of many different group and individual identities and ways of being. This phenomenon has gathered pace through indigenous cultural movements and increased cross-cultural interaction and hybridization in processes of globalization.³⁴

With these developments, new pressures come to bear upon the traditional social science emphasis on aggregation. Culture is now linked with race, profession, education, sexuality, lifestyle, and much more. This requires progressive definitions to specify, as Avruch does for conflict resolution, that culture is not homogeneous throughout a population, that membership of one cultural group does not exclude membership of others, that culture is not fixed, and so on.³⁵ The logic of these correctives culminates in the notion that culture is “a derivative of individual experience.”³⁶

The proliferation and “individualization” of cultures asks questions of the original aggregative effort of asking after more than one person by seeking out traits, patterns, or the ways in which groups of people make meaning. These developments move away from aggregation and toward the concrete individual. We now expect, for instance, that one person will participate in multiple cultures. In other words, recent developments push against the aggregation and ordering traditionally pursued by the social sciences. They move to embrace the multiplicity and contingency of human difference as it plays out through individual human beings.

As individually expressed “cultures” and multiple interactions and cross-fertilizations proliferate, knowing culture by asking the question “What is culture?” becomes more difficult. Asking *what* must progressively

limit its claims until, pursued to its logical conclusion, it arrives at the individual subject. Here it cannot serve its social science task of aggregation nor adequately know individual humans because asking “*What are you?*” does not adequately respond to human difference. Knowing culture is trending—against traditional social science impulses—toward knowing *someone* in the sense sought by Benvenisti in his objection to the workshop organizer.

Addressing the foregoing challenges requires examining *how* the notion of culture knows human difference. Refocusing the culture question through a brief historical and conceptual analysis of how culture knows helps us to understand how culture orders human difference and brings out some of the pitfalls for knowing and connecting across difference for conflict resolution.

Culture at the limit

Culture is a powerful concept. This power contributes to the attention the culture question receives within conflict resolution. Culture is also notoriously imprecise. Its often expansive definitions take in many, and in some cases all, dimensions of human activity. Culture can seem inefable, with some commentators contending that it is a type of invisible and un-specifiable abstraction.³⁷ Others note that culture “reveals itself to be a thing the existence of which in space and time can never be demonstrated.”³⁸ More precisely, culture can only be interpreted and understood by observing what people say and do even though this observed behavior belongs to a realm other than culture itself.³⁹

But culture is also an everyday and “lived” phenomenon. It is commonly described in conflict resolution as a way of life or meaning-making linked with a range of attributes including race, religion, language, belief and, more recently, with profession, education, and gender. This seems more concrete. But the fact that culture can refer to just about anything related to a way of being or living threatens dispersion and returns us to the problem of definition.

The imprecision internal to our conceptualization of culture seems odd given social scientific attention to definition. Yet the persistence of ambiguity⁴⁰ also suggests that the power of culture to capture imagination and inspire interest, and indeed its very importance, may be closely related to the impossibility of close definition. Historical perspective helps us to begin to understand this paradoxical situation.

Michel de-Certeau⁴¹ argues that, from the sixteenth century, as the social sciences progressively displaced religious ways of knowing through

the application of reason, the remainder—that which stood beyond the specific concerns and reach of the disciplines—became what we call culture. Reason has organized dominant social science ways of knowing for several centuries of scholarship since this time, including the study of other cultures that was explicitly taken up through anthropology and ethnology. Reason has maintained an upper hand over culture while incorporating culture within the disciplines in the pursuit of knowledge.

Yet even as reason has sought to know and appropriate culture, this same difference serves as a type of reservoir of the unknown which animates and inspires efforts to know. Much of the perplexity and power of culture arises from this relation. Ambiguity arises, in other words, precisely because culture is located at the frontier of the disciplines and scholarship. Efforts to know non-Western peoples in anthropology, for instance, bring social science knowledge into contact with the non-identical, and hence to its own limit.⁴²

This does not imply that non-Western peoples cannot be known. The enormous anthropological literature and the fact of everyday interactions and exchange across difference confirm that knowing across difference is possible. The point, rather, is that the negotiation of this situation has important implications for *how* the social sciences and conflict resolution know human difference, and hence for how they facilitate differentiation, connection, and relationship among peoples. To explore how culture structures our knowledge of human difference for conflict resolution, it is useful to consider European contact with non-Western peoples through colonialism. The human difference encountered and articulated here is important for the idea of culture, but also because contact between “different peoples,” both across and within national borders, has generated the culture question in conflict resolution.

Colonial encounters

Much of the current meaning of culture emerges out of encounters with other peoples and the development of means for describing grouping, dividing, and ordering human difference through the activities of European travelers, explorers, and colonial administrators. The concept of culture “might never have been invented without a colonial theater [sic] that both necessitated the knowledge of culture (for the purposes of control and regulation) and provided a colonized constituency that was particularly amenable to ‘culture.’”⁴³ Culture has since been taken up in a wide range of disciplines and contexts, including by (previously) colonized peoples, to articulate human difference. Culture serves as a

conceptual device for making sense of difference by framing people's everyday ways of being and interacting.

Yet this ordering of human difference through culture is itself a type of "cultural" invention. To illustrate how this is so, it is useful to consider the process of "making sense of difference" as thoroughly symmetrical. Roy Wagner⁴⁴ shows that "cargo cults" of Melanesian peoples—movements which purport to redress European control of large amounts of material goods through rituals which will see "cargo" miraculously delivered to them at some time in the future—are a Melanesian way of making European arrivals, impacts, and difference believable and intelligible on Melanesian terms. Cargo "is practically a parody, a reduction of Western notions like profit, wage-labour, and production for its own sake to the terms of tribal society."⁴⁵

For the anthropologist (or other scholar) undertaking fieldwork, "culture" serves a similar purpose: the analogies created by the scholar in the field situation to make sense of foreign behaviors and systems of meaning are filtered through the notion of culture. These analogies are extensions of his or her own notions and culture, of his/her sense making.⁴⁶ The fact that this process is creative does not imply inscrutability, or the impossibility of knowing "the other." Yet the implication of a symmetrical approach to making sense of difference is that "there is no reason to treat cargo cult as anything but an interpretive counterpart of anthropology" or culture.⁴⁷ Where Europeans delivered "cargo" to Melanesians, Melanesians and other peoples delivered "culture" to Europeans and, subsequently, to our wider understandings of difference.

The partial emergence of the idea of culture within colonial history shows that "culture" is not intrinsic. Culture is a contingent conceptual formulation with its contemporary use inflected through European knowledge disciplines, the colonial experience, anthropology, and related endeavors. Such a way of knowing human difference is invariably selective, affirming that our processes of representation are creative rather than simply reflective of pre-existing reality.⁴⁸ Cultural differences, as Homi Bhabha points out, "are not simply *there* to be seen or appropriated." Rather, the production of cultural differentiation is the "*effect* of discriminatory practices."⁴⁹ "Culture" helps to construct, produce, and maintain cultural difference even as it seeks to explain and understand this difference.⁵⁰

The fact that culture produces the difference of which it speaks may not of itself be problematic, because other ways of knowing human difference are likely to suffer similar problems. But we need to be aware of its effects. Nicholas Thomas shows that the framing of human difference

through the term culture in the colonial era leads to the sense that the “fact of difference is (anterior to any contingent similarities between [European] and other people, as it is to . . . [their] mutual entanglement.”⁵¹ Accompanying this effect is a tendency, at least as a partial effect of the culture concept, to freeze difference in a manner similar to concepts such as race.⁵² One of the results is that variation among Europeans and westerners tends to be understated while variation and distinction from others tends to be magnified and thereby exaggerated.⁵³

Framing human difference through culture facilitates notions of “us” and “them”⁵⁴ that currently play out in notions such as Huntington’s “clash of civilizations.”⁵⁵ This effaces the mutual entanglement of peoples through colonial and postcolonial encounters. Thomas points out that this is a “radical denial of history.”⁵⁶ It is also a radical denial of daily exchange across human difference around the globe. One effect of the term culture, then, is a corraling and reification of human difference. This risks *overstating* human difference, the internal coherence of cultural groups, and the barriers among cultural groups.

A second “culture-effect” arising out of the colonial experience is the designation of non-Europeans in negative and lesser terms.⁵⁷ Cultural differentiation was central to European colonialism, and particularly to the sense of cultural strength necessary for governing far-off colonies.⁵⁸ Knowing “other” cultures in the context of colonialism provided both indexical and oppositional reference points to recognize, gauge, and practice European society and selves as progressive, knowledgeable, civilized, noble, moral, and rational. Conversely, subject colonial populations were framed as regressive, lacking knowledge, and uncivilized, and hence were in need of rule, governance, tutelage, and education.⁵⁹

Social science practices were integral to this colonial project rather than separate from it.⁶⁰ In the process of knowing colonial populations, European analysts were positioned as the active agents of knowledge while other peoples became the known, the object of knowledge. This relationship contributes to the ordering and governing of difference. It also continues to suffuse much contemporary knowledge production, with culture remaining a key way of designating others who then become the focus of Western knowledge production.⁶¹ As Lila Abu-Lughod notes, culture enforces separations that carry an inevitable sense of hierarchy.⁶²

The colonial entailments of Western social science have, of course, been strongly contested, particularly in recent decades. The term culture itself is often central to this effort. Cultural rights are invoked as indigenous and other peoples campaign for cultural recognition to defend their traditions and heritage in the face of globalizing forces. The cultural turn

in scholarship promotes greater awareness of difference. And cultural awareness and appropriateness are valued and required across a range of professional practices. So the term “culture” sits in a paradoxical relationship with difference: it produces and sustains differences yet is invoked to respect differences and ameliorate the difficulties that accompany them.⁶³ Cultural recognition is an important part of conflict resolution’s response to the culture challenge, but we must also be attuned to the effects of colonial residues which permeate this recognition.

Culture’s colonial entailments generate, in sum, two broad risks for conflict resolution. The first is *overstating* human difference. Relying on “culture” to understand and recognize human difference can focus on difference where it is not significant, or where it is mobilized for nefarious purposes.⁶⁴ It can also overstate internal coherence within “cultures,” and suggest that boundaries between cultures are fixed. These patterns can lead conflict resolution scholars and practitioners into difficult waters. Take, for example, the problem of the construction of cultural difference for questionable purposes. We can agree with the widely acknowledged need to respect and respond to cultural difference. But this principle comes unstuck when, for instance, identity entrepreneurs or warlords—from Bosnia to Rwanda, Kashmir to the Middle East, and Somalia to the Solomon Islands—use culture to produce differences and to mobilize people for (ethnic) conflict. People can and do use culture as an adversarial means of gaining advantage; people can “fight with culture.”⁶⁵

Second, culture can manifest as colonial-style hierarchy in our ways of knowing human difference by leading us to *devalue* those who are not of European heritage. There is a tendency in conflict resolution scholarship, for instance, to overlook the use of controlled violence as a conflict resolution mechanism among indigenous peoples⁶⁶ because the use of physical violence does not fit broader Western ideology about peace and harmony.⁶⁷ This tendency delegitimizes indigenous social processes and selves, thereby perpetrating structural violence against people who are marked as different. Such disavowal is a primary manifestation of violence. Indeed, violence is much more than injuring or annihilating people: it involves “interrupting their continuity . . . [and] making them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves.”⁶⁸ This second risk also has a more subtle and pervasive dimension: colonial residues within mainstream ways of knowing human difference can lead us to unwittingly devalue cultural difference even as we attempt to respect it. I deal with this problem in the next section.

The fact that culture is both a powerful and complex concept is good reason to not take it for granted in efforts to address the culture question in conflict resolution. Although the notion of different cultures is apparently commonsensical when taken at face value, the foregoing discussion shows that culture is a contingent way of knowing human difference inflected through European knowledge disciplines and the colonial experience. Culture produces the difference of which it speaks, and this risks both overstating and devaluing human difference. To understand one of the more subtle ways the latter risk arises, and to chart a path to a more adequate way of dealing with the culture question in conflict resolution, the next section critically discusses Kevin Avruch's distinction between scientific and political uses of culture.

The culture challenge with Kevin Avruch

Kevin Avruch has been instrumental in placing the culture question on the conflict resolution agenda. He is the most widely published of a number of academics who raise cultural issues; he has consistently advocated responsiveness to cultural difference and, as already noted, has introduced conflict resolution to more nuanced ways of defining culture. In addition to addressing the general lack of attention—at least until recently—to culture in the conflict resolution field, Avruch also grapples with the problem of overvaluing culture, particularly where this relates to the mobilization of culture for dubious purposes. To do this Avruch distinguishes between “scientific” and “political” uses of culture. The value of Avruch's overall contribution to the field is beyond question, but critically engaging his work can help us to better address the perplexing question of cultural difference. To do so, this section shows that the distinction between scientific and political uses of culture risks devaluing cultural difference even as we attempt to engage and respect it. We need to reconfigure how we think of “culture” and “cultures” for conflict resolution as a result.

Avruch's distinction between scientific and political uses of cultures first appears in *Culture and Conflict Resolution* wherein he states that “the ultimate usefulness of ‘culture’ as a social science term is now threatened by its having been taken over by the political actors it is meant to explain.”⁶⁹ Avruch is particularly concerned about the “strategic use” of culture in the “human rights debate.”⁷⁰ While there is no doubt that culture can be—and is—used strategically, the ethico-political valence of Avruch's statement can be read as having striking implications for the way it places different actors. Culture is useful when in the hands of

social scientists whose purview takes in parties to conflict, yet it is corrupted when mobilized by others who are meant to be subject to analysis rather than active in using culture to pursue their ends.

Charging particular actors with strategic use of culture prioritizes the academic's perspective while masking the colonial residues of social science ways of knowing human difference. The distinction between scientific and political usages risks delegitimizing the arguments and culture of the "players" while prioritizing the frameworks and (social science) approaches of the (Western) conflict resolution academic and analyst. It also generates a tension within Avruch's work. On the one hand, Avruch's advocacy of culture has helped to create space for the voices of local peoples within conflict resolution through notions such as ethno-conflict theory and praxis. On the other hand, his distinction between political and scientific uses of culture has disturbing normative and hierarchical entailments. These can be figured as follows: usefulness is good; social science is useful, good, and ascendant; the good is threatened by the bad; the bad is political and particularly the strategic uses of culture; the good (social science) is neither political nor strategic. I am not, I should stress, attributing this intention to Avruch. Rather, I am identifying an aspect of what we might term the cultural politics of knowledge production embedded in relations between dominant (predominantly Western) social science and local peoples.

The difficulty for Avruch's attempt to deal with the problem of overvaluing culture derives from his distinction and, more particularly, his process for deciding which uses of culture are "appropriate" and which are not. To do so Avruch invokes "experience-near" (*e/n*) and "experience-distant" (*e/d*) conceptions of culture.⁷¹ These terms mirror the anthropological *emic* (from inside) and *etic* (from outside) ways of doing cultural research. He states that culture can "function in both experience-near and experience-distant ways," but analysts and practitioners will want to use culture "in its technical sense, as an experience-distant concept especially useful for identifying communicational impedances."⁷² At the same time, practitioners need to be aware that culture may be appropriated as an "ideological or rhetorical resource for parties or contestants in pursuit of their goals."⁷³ Problems arise because the practitioner and analyst frames of reference are imagined to be clearer and less political than those of the players. Yet social science ways of conceptualizing human difference through culture are themselves historically and culturally specific. So just when the analyst or practitioner believes she/he is recognizing the importance of culture by taking up Avruch's *e/n* or *e/d* distinction, she/he may actually become

involved reauthorizing the superiority of Western social science over other ways of knowing.

To be fair, Avruch's rendering of the *e/n* or *e/d* distinction is not as straightforward as I have presented. He states, for instance, that the "real work conspires against simple binary thinking" and that because "*e/n* conceptions of culture connect (in persons) with social identity and conceptions of the self . . . *e/n* culture may penetrate *e/d* culture in significant ways."⁷⁴ Moreover, it is also clear that Avruch intends the *e/n* or *e/d* distinction as a basis for analysis, and that analysis of culture as an *e/d* idea "*includes plumbing the experience-near aspects of it*"⁷⁵ rather than summary judgment and dismissal of peoples. Nonetheless, Avruch remains strongly committed to the *e/n* or *e/d* distinction and to the capacity of the social scientist to be in the position to make, through analysis, this judgment. He states: "You must decide which sense of *culture* is mainly relevant . . . the technical *e/d* sense or the political *e/n* sense."⁷⁶ So, notwithstanding Avruch's commitment to advocating for culture in a broad sense, his effort to draw a distinction between scientific and political uses of culture risks reasserting dominant conceptual frameworks and ways of knowing. This refers us back to Benvenisti's complaint, and to the culture challenge which Avruch himself, as well as others, has worked hard to address.

This problematic relationship with difference emerges as a paradox in Avruch's work because he has done more than most to highlight the importance of people's own understandings of culture and to encourage critical self-reflexivity in conflict resolution. One of his goals in teaching, for instance, is to help people examine the "cultural underpinnings of such expert [Western] theories as rational choice or principled negotiation."⁷⁷ So while Avruch promotes critical self-reflexivity, his use of modernist social science brings on an ethico-political dilemma within knowledge production by asserting the active scholar or analyst over the local subject. Avruch's way of dealing with the problem of overstating cultural difference risks devaluing cultural difference even as he attempts to engage and respect it. Such disavowal is part of an exercise of power—with roots in Western colonialism—which legitimizes and installs Western ways of responding to conflict and asserts the superiority of the Western conflict resolution and peacebuilding community over their recipients.⁷⁸ This risks compromising conflict resolution's credibility for dealing with cultural conflict. We need a better way of dealing with the complexity of culture to address the culture challenge in conflict resolution.

To move to a sound footing for meeting the culture challenge we must first face, and put to rest, the specter of cultural relativism. Avruch's

e/n or *e/d* distinction is aimed at identifying, differentiating, and managing situations wherein identity entrepreneurs and others mobilize *e/n* culture for personal ends—where people “fight with culture.” His distinction is in many respects a subtle and nuanced guide to help practitioners avoid the problems of either under- or over-valuing culture. What, then, is the alternative? Some will anticipate that to call into question Avruch’s distinction brings us to the precipice of a type of cultural free-for-all wherein conflict resolution analysts and warlord identity entrepreneurs can be seen as morally equivalent. Yet to call into question the process by which Avruch makes his distinction does not necessarily take us down this path. We have already seen that the term “culture” has the unwarranted effect of reifying differences and separating peoples from each other. And incommensurability and relativism are untenable for they participate in the problematic effects of our culturally and historically specific ways of knowing human difference through culture.

The immediate problem we face is that Avruch’s invoking of modernist social science to manage one ethico-political dilemma—the challenge of people fighting with culture—brings on second dilemma through a politics of knowledge with roots in European colonialism. A satisfactory response must deal with both of these dilemmas rather than only one. Indeed, if we invoke the privilege of the Western social science tradition to analyze the legitimacy of a culture, we compromise Avruch’s own critical impulse which includes critically examining the cultural underpinnings of Western conflict resolution theories and approaches.⁷⁹ The challenge of advancing our conceptualizations of culture for conflict resolution requires addressing multiple ethico-political challenges. How can we both value culture and manage the reification and overvaluation of culture *without* invoking historically and culturally specific underpinnings of Western social science?

The answer lies partly in moving beyond the colonial residues that continue to organize our conceptions of human difference in ways that risk either devaluing or overvaluing human difference. We cannot dispense with the term “culture” because it is a powerful and deeply meaningful concept and force in people’s lives and conflicts. Rather, the solution lies in recognizing and retaining the importance of culture while reconsidering and reworking its boundary-making effects—the effects which separate people from each other and enable culture to be mobilized for adversarial purposes in conflict. To do so, it is first necessary to clarify the importance of culture at the limits of Western social science disciplines. This provides the basis for simultaneously

valuing culture and reducing its capacity to prescribe differences and boundaries.

Culture without *Cultures*⁸⁰

The fact that culture is a notoriously vague and imprecise term raises challenging questions about social science practices of representation. Traditional social science approaches tend to assume that language allows direct and adequate representation of the world. If gaps appear between the devices and objects of representation (in the relation between language or concepts and some aspect of the social world), mainstream social science attempts to close them through improved definition, methods, and scholarly rigor. But these efforts overlook fundamental difficulties accompanying the fact that practices of representation always involve *re-presentation* whereby that which is presented can never be the original.⁸¹ For this reason our practices for knowing and representing are characterized by constitutive incompleteness.

The difficulties of representation are managed in a variety of ways in social science, but the notion of culture is particularly resistant. It is a type of impossible object, something which *needs* representation but cannot be easily signified in our systems of signification. To avoid the representationalist trap of traditional social science it is important that we do not see this as a lack or failing. Ernesto Laclau explains that this situation denotes not an error or a problem to be solved, but a *real* and “*positive impossibility*.”⁸² It is an impossibility which remains “an integral part of a system of signification.”⁸³ The problems of representing culture need not, then, be seen as a shortfall. We can say, instead, that culture is a sign so significant that it can never be fully specified and represented. Indeed, conceiving culture in this way is appropriate because it is often experienced as touching on questions of being, on fundamental yet ineffable questions of who people are.

The constitutive incompleteness of culture leads to the conclusion that culture should be valued, *and* that it cannot and should not be delineated or controlled by the efforts of actors including nationalists and identity entrepreneurs, or by particular ways of knowing. We should resist efforts to channel any ascendancy—moral, political, expert, divine, or other—through culture. The normative orientation of this position arises as a corollary of the impossibility of representation: culture escapes representation because it is too important to be controlled. So thinking of culture in this way values culture without reifying any particular claims to *have* or *know* culture. It thereby sidesteps *particular* cultural designations and,

instead, values ineffable and infinite human difference which is constitutive of culture. Culture, then, can be valued aside from efforts to order and prescribe.

One way to formulate this distinction is to conceive of “culture without *cultures*”.⁸⁴ Patrick Sullivan explains that the West tends to think of cultures by drawing upon mechanistic or biological metaphors which evoke *entities*—images of the natural world which are typically flat, bounded, and whose elements tend to be linear and linearly related.⁸⁵ But to think in terms of entities—in terms of *cultures*—is inadequate for knowing human difference because cultures emerge from the “limitless effects of human interaction.”⁸⁶ Anthropologists have noted that “some groups have porous boundaries, some potential groups lack a current sense of groupness, and some groups do not exist at all as groups except in our descriptive models.”⁸⁷ *Cultures*, in short, cannot be thought to have the types of boundaries and solid existence that are a legacy of colonialism and that tend to suit our contemporary habits of thought.

Taking culture as a marker for a quality or component of human (co-)existence which cannot be readily known, and should not be appropriated or corralled by particular claims to know or have a culture(s), helps us to rework commonplace responses to culture. Take, for instance, the currently popular injunction that cultural practitioners be “culturally sensitive” and the wider contention among a range of theorists that “cultural recognition” is the contemporary basis for the pursuit of just political relations.⁸⁸ Adopting a culturally sensitive approach or applying cultural recognition need not require accepting particular claims to culture. To do so runs the risk, given the conceptual history of the term, of overstating human difference by participating in whatever people choose to call culture. This can overstate difference (or concur with assertions that difference exists) where it may not be significant, or where identity entrepreneurs and others mobilize culture to seek personal or political gain. Instead, a particular culture should be seen as an effect; an articulation of human difference expressed or mobilized through sets of historical and contemporary relations. This effect deserves consideration and respect because it touches on questions of being and the expression of human existence rather than the erroneous claim that the differences involved are immutable or fundamental.

Cultural difference similarly deserves to be valued independently of attempts to know this difference. Claims to know culture invariably seek to order human difference on particular terms. In this regard, conflict resolution remains somewhat trapped by its reliance on Western social science approaches, including culture-as-behavior understandings of

difference and Avruch's political-scientific distinction. To accept that culture is positioned at the limits of the disciplines, to value cultural difference as an impossible object of representation, does not mean that we cannot or should not attempt to know human difference. But it does suggest that our knowledge will always be constitutively incomplete in ways that remind us of the importance of being and human difference aside from our necessarily selective and limited ways of knowing this difference, and aside from efforts to draw boundaries as part of our attempts to know.

Valuing culture without reifying particular claims to have or know culture—thinking of culture without cultures—necessarily turns us to the processes through which culture-claims are made and to the accompanying values, behaviors, understandings, and traditions with which people identify. Analysis and dialogue at this level makes it possible to treat the delicate and sometimes difficult question of how culture is mobilized or known while simultaneously valuing culture. The resulting dialogue across difference—a practice which is steadily gaining wider currency in the conflict resolution field and beyond—attends to the values, behaviors, and understandings which constitute actors' cultures. It simultaneously opens up claims to have or know culture to respectful scrutiny. This offers a practical way of dealing with the challenge that comes with overvaluing culture. Openly debating and scrutinizing cultural values and behaviors among people—explicitly bringing out the normative dimensions of claims to have and know culture—enhances democratic practice. It expands Avruch's⁸⁹ call for analysis beyond the methods, approaches, and scientific authority of conflict resolution analysts and practitioners, and taps movements for empowerment and participation.

Disaggregating culture and examining the processes, values, and behaviors at play in culture-claims promises to increase exchange and understanding across difference. Conflict resolution analysts and practitioners have begun to facilitate this process by openly examining and discussing their own cultural values within their practice. Advancing this process can generate possibilities for more dynamic conflict resolution processes by extending the practice, also already underway, of opening to—and learning from—local and indigenous capacities, including different ways of knowing, approaching, and managing conflict.

Sullivan's⁹⁰ notion of "culture without *cultures*" succinctly expresses the foregoing proposal for reconceptualizing culture in conflict resolution. Culture is a complex and difficult idea positioned at the limits of social science disciplines. Yet this difficulty and complexity can be turned into

a possibility. The difficulties in representing and knowing culture point to the fact that it is an important and powerful notion in human affairs. It is true that culture can overstate difference and be mobilized for nefarious purposes, partly because colonial residues and our images of culture suggest boundedness and separateness. These same colonial residues can lead us to devalue difference even as we try to respect it and deal with the difficulties it presents to us. But we can manage these challenges by valuing culture while remaining circumspect about *particular* claims to *have* or *know* culture—including the claims of social scientists. Responding to the culture challenge in this way respects human difference without reifying or overstating differences among groups of people. It is also a response to the culture challenge which lends itself particularly well to the new politics on offer through conflict resolution.

Possibilities of relatedness?

The influence of anthropological insights introduced by Kevin Avruch and others within conflict resolution has led to increasing recognition that different traditions and peoples have their own conflict resolution approaches and practices. Practitioners now sometimes respond to local traditions with elicitive practices, dialogue across different approaches, and efforts to facilitate local constituencies for peace which have their basis in local cultures. But as discussed in foregoing sections of this chapter, culture also continues to challenge conflict resolution. Culture is currently mobilized to promote responsiveness toward others and human difference, but the term also produces differences which can separate people from each other and be mobilized for nefarious purposes in conflict situations. This works against the efforts of conflict resolution to be a widely relevant and positive force for peace. Invoking social science to deal with these problems risks an ethico-political dilemma by reinstating a cultural hierarchy which privileges Western ways of knowing. We must, then, face the question of how conflict resolution can respond adequately and ethically to human difference while remaining widely relevant.

So far this chapter has refocused the culture question to show that key difficulties of the culture challenge arise from mainstream social science ways of knowing difference and colonial residues that continue to inhabit our understandings of culture. These problems can be addressed by acknowledging the colonial entailments of culture and its position at the limits of the Western disciplines. This suggests valuing culture as an effect of the play of human difference—an effect which is unable to be

adequately represented—while remaining circumspect about claims to have or know culture. We can think, in other words, in terms of culture without *cultures*. To sketch the broader implications of this approach, I want to clarify the nature of the revised tasks it suggests. Responding anew in this way involves, *inter alia*, gaining some distance from traditional Western scholarship and drawing upon conflict resolution's impulse for responsiveness.

As cultural claims proliferate, our responses are directed toward increasingly fragmented groups and to culture as an individually expressed phenomenon. *Cultures* proliferate. Thinking in terms of culture rather than *cultures* does not deny these group or individual cultural claims. Instead, taking culture as a marker for an important quality of human (co-)existence refers us to the ways in which people make meaning with others: it refers to the emergence of cultures as *relational* effects regardless of their expression in individual, atomistic, or isolated terms. Respectful engagement with particular expressions of human difference does not require that we circumscribe differences within bounded entities. Thinking of cultures as relational effects moves us away from reliance upon metaphors of entity, linearity, and mechanism for ordering difference. It pushes, instead, toward more flexible metaphors of network, flow, and connection—metaphors which are increasingly salient in contemporary understandings of human relations.⁹¹ This requires innovative thinking that moves beyond mainstream social science emphasis on bounded entities. As Sullivan states, "In the culture effect the shortest distance between two points is not necessarily a straight line, distant phenomena are stuck to each other in ways difficult to imagine, [and] . . . entities occupy the same space."⁹²

One way to underscore the need to gain some distance from the emphasis upon entities in traditional scholarship is to reflect critically upon the fondness in Western thought for the categories of self and other. A long and extensive tradition of scholarship reflecting upon questions relating to these categories⁹³ suggests separateness, rather than connection, as a fundamental feature of human existence. It is, of course, too simplistic to say that Western scholarship about self and other suggests only fixed or easily defined boundaries for the self,⁹⁴ and it is true that this scholarship contains much careful and useful thought about ethical questions regarding relationships across difference. But the categories of self and other as *entities* exert a powerful influence which is probably unwarranted. As Sylviane Agacinski explains, each of us is, before anything else, "in-the-world and with-others."⁹⁵ Indeed, the "problem" of "the other" may only emerge in Western scholarship

because the self of Western scholarship has detached itself from the world and others.⁹⁶

To think of culture in a relational sense, to move away from the separateness suggested by the influence of categories of self and other, does pose some challenges to mainstream quantitative social science practice. But it also connects, as I will discuss further in Part II, with exciting developments in the research of complex and emergent systems which after several decades of exploration in a range of fields from Biology to Neuroscience and mathematical modeling are now making impacts in the social sciences.⁹⁷ One of the most exciting possibilities accompanying these developments is suggested by the phenomenon of self-organization: a process whereby the actions of local-level autonomous agents generate an overall complex system without guidance or management from without.⁹⁸

Some may object that the suggestion to deal with the culture challenge by deferring to relationship and exchange across human difference—by valuing culture rather than particular claims to have or know culture—simply displaces the normative question about how to evaluate whether particular invocations of culture might be appropriate or inappropriate. It is true that no moral compass for such evaluations is proposed here. But it is also true that (an additional) one is not necessary. There are already plenty of moral compasses in circulation, and these continue to be drawn upon on an everyday basis to negotiate relationships and shared understandings across human difference. Indeed, the call for such guidance neglects the fact that the proliferation of cultures, and the wider claims of diversity, already put into question efforts to specify *a priori* moral guidance systems. We can, instead, pursue an emergent and negotiated moral order by working with and across difference. Conflict resolution's impulse for responsiveness, demonstrated by the workshop convener's response to Benvenisti's challenge, is a valuable resource in this task. It can also ensure the widespread relevance of the conflict resolution enterprise to the world's peoples. But to be able to pursue this possibility, we must first critically examine and engage the ways in which conflict resolution currently orders and governs human difference. This is the topic of the next chapter.

Conclusion

This chapter began with Meron Benvenisti's objection to the convener of a workshop for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Throughout I have argued that conflict resolution has been unable to respond

adequately to Benvenisti's complaint, and the wider culture challenge, because it has tended to rely upon social science understandings of human difference. Culture-as-behavior approaches suffer scholarly and ethical shortfalls, while more sophisticated culture-as-meaning approaches raise difficult questions about relations among cultures. To consider these problems further, the chapter examined how we know difference through the term "culture." Culture is an ambiguous and powerful concept positioned at the limits of Western knowledge. It is also steeped in colonial encounters. Two risks arise as a result: overstating the difference and separateness of cultures and the operation of colonial-style hierarchy in our ways of knowing which lead us to devalue difference.

The chapter addressed these risks by embracing the constitutive incompleteness of culture as a way of knowing human difference. This acknowledges that culture is fundamentally important, but not as a phenomenon which suggests strong boundaries among people. Thinking in terms of culture *without cultures* is one way of pursuing this orientation in conflict resolution. It allows us to value culture without reifying any particular claims to *have* or *know* culture, and hence for inquiry and exchange about the values and beliefs that are important to people in concrete settings and across difference. Conflict resolution is particularly well-placed to pursue this orientation because it foregrounds responsiveness and practical engagement. Other advantages are also on offer. Responding by thinking of cultures as relational effects rather than as entities provides innovative ways of thinking about connections across difference that are attuned to a globally networked world. I take up these possibilities in the second part of this book. First though, it is necessary to critically examine the ways in which conflict resolution orders and governs human difference. The next chapter examines the frameworks, assumptions, and mechanisms which govern difference in conflict resolution.

2

Governing Difference

Conflict resolution governs. From international dialogues and problem-solving workshops to training programs, community mediations, and local restorative justice initiatives, conflict resolution (re-)installs order. It does so by encouraging parties in conflict to reconfigure their orientation to their selves and their institutions, to others, and to the conflict in which they are involved. This governing dynamic is often overlooked because conflict resolution advocates tend to emphasize the informal, consensual, and dialogical dimensions of conflict resolution processes in contradistinction to formal processes of the sovereign realm which are seen to impose upon, constrain, and sometimes destroy lives. Against this oversight, a key goal of this chapter is to analyze governing as a necessary element of conflict resolution. My purpose is not to claim that conflict resolution is bad because it governs, but to show that understanding conflict resolution governance, and engaging with it, is necessary to deal with the challenge of difference and to sustain conflict resolution's promise to respond to people's needs. Of particular concern is that contemporary governing through conflict resolution occurs predominantly through a transnational neoliberal order. This governance disavows otherness and regulates difference even as it promotes and encourages liberal freedom.

The paradoxical governing of difference through the neoliberal order emerges in the shadow of the institutions of formal governance. For several centuries, governing in the West has been typically thought of as connected with the activities of sovereigns, whether monarchs or states, and concerned with a particular territory. Yet this traditional view is overly simplistic and somewhat limited. Against this approach, Michel Foucault has shown that governing has always been thoroughly concerned with managing the everyday conduct of selves, families, and

populations, even from the time of Machiavelli's *The Prince*.¹ His nuanced approach, which has proven very influential in recent decades, introduces and elucidates a form of power which he terms "biopower." This mode of power differs greatly from the traditional activities of the sovereign in relation to a particular territory. Where sovereign power is identified with the right to "take life or let live," biopower seeks to optimize, foster, and develop the forces of life, and to attend to the welfare of human subjects.² Foucault shows that biopower expanded rapidly in the modern era, becoming vastly influential due to its capacity to facilitate governance by constituting selves through micro-level everyday practices.

Among the most striking implications of Foucault's productive understanding of power, and of his work in general, is that the very constitution of selves, and hence who we are, is coterminous with the operation of power. Foucault did not extensively explore the linkages between this form of power and sovereign power. Yet he coined the neologism "governmentality" to describe the way biopower increasingly involves the behavior of individuals with the exercise of sovereign power.³ This has inspired significant governmentality scholarship.⁴ Initially deployed in domestic settings, Foucauldian and governmentality insights and analyses have more recently been applied to international politics and processes of development and globalization.⁵ The resulting literature shows that the modes of power and governing identified by Foucault operate across national borders such that we should properly refer to "transnational" governance. Such an encompassing framework is relevant for conflict resolution analysts, practitioners, and organizations because institutions, understandings, and processes developed in the "modern West" are exported and transposed, often with limited adjustment, to conflict and post-conflict situations. Conversely, practices tried in international service are "brought home" to domestic settings.⁶ A transnational perspective is also necessary because conflict resolution professionals find themselves operating in fluid situations where the players include local warlords, traditional and indigenous societies, refugee populations, private security contractors, transnational corporations, donors, and aid agencies.

I am not proposing a straightforward argument that states are less important because of globalization. States clearly remain crucial actors. Rather, thinking in transnational terms invokes Foucault's critical insight that approaching the state as a "black box" does not help us to conceptualize and analyze the concrete operation of power and governance. Against the reification of the state as an abstract entity attached to a

particular territory and the doctrine of sovereignty, Foucault shows that a diverse series of local, “multiple and indefinite power relations” give rise to the state and secure its existence.⁷ These relations form chains within and across boundaries to bring into existence and secure the state domestically and internationally. For these reasons, it is useful to speak of governance as transnational rather than in more traditional ways which separate the domestic from the international and *vice versa*.

This chapter draws upon a transnational Foucauldian approach to explore how conflict resolution governs difference. It first outlines the mutually constitutive relationship between informal and formal spheres and the accompanying politico-cultural relations of conflict resolution. These relations identify non-Western approaches with the informal and subordinate these approaches to the formal, especially to notions of law, state, and sovereignty. To understand how conflict resolution governs difference through the informal sphere and within this broad framework, the second section identifies dominant conflict resolution assumptions about selves, order, and conflict. These assumptions, with the figure of the rational non-disputing self at their centre, serve as norms that participants in facilitative conflict resolution processes are encouraged to move toward. The second part of the chapter shows how participants in conflict resolution processes are encouraged toward the norm of the non-disputing subject through mechanisms, drawn from Foucault’s analysis of power relations, normalization, and confession. Third parties manage their interactions with participants to promote behaviors and approaches to conflict that reproduce Western assumptions about conflict and its resolution. While the effectiveness of this governing of difference is not assured, the expansion and institutional consolidation of conflict resolution in recent decades suggests widespread governing of difference on Western terms.

Mapping cultural governance

The cultural makeup of conflict resolution makes it possible to assert, as Kevin Avruch⁸ does in the early 1990s, that the field is a predominantly “white” phenomenon; an expert practice dominated by the discourses and rationalities of the West. We can add that this practice helps to constitute liberal peace and facilitate its spread in the current transnational order.⁹ Avruch’s argument about the cultural makeup of conflict resolution is compelling, but not because cultural difference has been wholly absent from the field. Non-Western cultural perspectives including Buddhist and Gandhian ideas have been influential in helping inspire

and develop the conflict resolution field; legal anthropology has provided ideas for the development of mediation as well as awareness about the diversity of conflict resolution practices; and the daily practice of conflict resolution involves encounters across cultural difference.¹⁰ Non-Western cultural influences and perspectives are present but tend to be subsumed or overlooked in mainstream conflict resolution.

Understanding the dominance of Western approaches is in some ways straightforward. We can refer to the general “power” of the West by noting economic wealth, military power to impose peace, state power to impose order, concentration of academic institutions, publishing capacity, and so on. But the relative obscurity of non-Western approaches in conflict resolution is also the *effect*, or end product, of relations of power. To note this effect does not provide a satisfactory way of understanding *how* Western approaches come to dominate, nor the power relations that play out through conflict resolution practice. It involves, as Foucault points out,¹¹ the ossification of power relations rather than an understanding or analysis of their workings. By reflecting rather than engaging the dominance of Western conflict resolution approaches and the operations of power that occur through them, this formulation does not provide a productive way forward. We may go so far as to say that, by not providing a way of analyzing and engaging with conflict resolution relations of power and governance, such a formulation tacitly endorses domination. For the same reason, the culture question in conflict resolution cannot be adequately addressed by simply advocating greater cultural awareness and understanding and invoking cosmopolitan conflict resolution,¹² or by increasing dialogue among various cultural approaches. A fundamental and thoroughgoing requirement, alongside whatever other strategies are pursued, is to attend to *how* power and governance operate in conflict resolution.

Conflict resolution struggles to come to terms with its part in the operation of power and governance because it shares many problematic assumptions about power, governance, and conflict with traditional Western political and social theory. At the centre of these assumptions is the belief that the “informal” or civil realm, the sphere of social life and interaction where people are not subject to direct state sanctions, is a “zone of freedom” populated by pre-constituted and natural human subjects. This informal realm is set against a “formal” sphere of sovereignty, law, and power.

These traditional assumptions about freedom and governance deserve to be scrutinized and brought into question. One way to pursue a critique is to note that the notion of an informal zone of freedom is unable

to account for a tension between the ideological self-positioning of conflict resolution approaches and their sources of funding. Conflict resolution approaches have routinely imagined themselves as separate from, and other than, state and other formal approaches for managing conflict. Key conflict resolution processes such as mediation and problem-solving workshops emphasize, in their ideal forms, the intervention of independent (rather than interested) third-party facilitators to create an environment conducive to the development of options for the mutual satisfaction of the parties' needs. By placing emphasis on the parties' needs, conflict resolution processes distinguish themselves from juridical approaches, power politics, coercion, and Track I diplomacy; they imagine themselves as alternatives to these formal approaches.¹³

Yet transnational conflict resolution activities and institutions, from community mediation to the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, are both encouraged and heavily supported by states and their immediate agents. Funding and other support is channeled to semi-autonomous organizations and local and international non-government organizations including community organizations, educational institutes and centers, regional organizations (ROs), non-government organizations (NGOs), and international NGOs (INGOs) through government departments and aid and development programs. Governments are involved in researching, advocating, and often directly providing conflict resolution processes such as mediation to their populations.¹⁴ In these ways the formal sphere is more or less indirectly involved in the informal. This entwinement of the informal with the formal appears paradoxical in terms of the separation of informal and formal realms necessary for assumptions about freedom in traditional political theory and in much of conflict resolution's rhetorical self-positioning against formal legal processes and power politics.

Foucauldian governmentality scholarship resolves the informal-formal paradox by providing a way of conceptualizing their complex and entwined relationship and the accompanying operation of transnational liberal governance. Against the separation of formal and informal spheres, Foucault and others¹⁵ show that the informal is suffused with power relations crucial to the operation of liberal governance. Where conventional political and social theory mirror liberal ontology by setting the free individual against the power of the state, Foucault's work shows that individual subjects do not exist apart from power relations, but come into existence, or are manufactured,¹⁶ through a range of diverse and apparently apolitical practices. By inducing subjects to pursue their welfare and liberal understandings of selfhood, order, and

peace, both within nation-states and the broader transnational neoliberal order, these practices generate ways of being and behaviors aligning with those sanctioned by states. This power is not repressive in the sense of the traditional *modus operandi* of the sovereign monarch. It does not, for instance, negate or take away the forces of individuals.¹⁷ It is, rather, productive in the sense of mobilizing the forces of human subjects¹⁸ to produce human beings as agents who are “mediums of power in the very exercise of power upon themselves.”¹⁹ Individuals are not set apart, then, from the operations of liberal governance.

The operation of informal governance facilitates the workings of sovereign power and *vice versa*. By providing for the informal regulation of the vast majority of subjects’ behaviors through apparently apolitical means, the limited non-interference of law, sovereignty, and states, and their very standing, is possible. To the extent that individuals enact their subjection in the informal sphere through the work of semi-formal organizations, NGOs, and INGOs and the pursuit of “freedom,” state sanction is less necessary for the achievement of liberal governance.²⁰ Hence the extension of the control and governing of human subjects is consistent with the key liberal principle that state intervention should be limited.²¹ This carves out a sphere of “freedom” apart from the intervention of states allowing that they and their associated formal institutions and doctrines (including sovereignty and rule of law) maintain their standing as the absolute basis for order. As the recipients of peacebuilding and conflict resolution interventions implicitly accept the formal sanctions of Western rule of law and the oversight of social life by sovereign states, the formal and informal demarcate and bring each other into existence. The maintenance of this state of affairs in the contemporary transnational order is the condition of the operation of sovereignty on one hand and “freedom” on the other.²² Informal and formal spheres are not strictly separate from the vantage of Foucauldian understandings of liberal governance.²³

The entwinement of informal and formal realms in conflict resolution helps to generate behaviors and ways of being consistent with transnational liberal goals, including sustaining the necessary peace for the operation of sovereignty and the order of nation-states and the international order. Informal management of conflict through the largely voluntary processes of conflict resolution makes a valuable contribution to this governance by bringing subjects to act upon themselves and others in the name of peace. Emphasis upon empowerment and participatory decision-making helps to constitute a zone of informal “freedom” apart from the formal rule of law and sovereign states. In this way conflict resolution

contributes to the co-constitutive mutual reliance of the informal and the formal in the transnational liberal order.

The contingent subordination of the informal sphere to the formal and sovereign in the transnational order of states suffuses the politico-cultural relations of conflict resolution. The freedom on offer through informal conflict resolution processes requires the implicit acceptance of the sanctions of law, state, and sovereignty, either because legislation applies to parties and their dealings or because their efforts to address conflict must ultimately be subject to formal systems of law, diplomacy, and sovereignty. The informal is subordinated, in other words, to the formal at certain critical instances. If conflict resolution efforts fail, legal processes, the rule of law, or state sovereignty in the international order serve as the default, final, and superordinate arbiter. This applies from the fourth-world situation of indigenous peoples within Western states to the “chaperoned states” of international interventions from Iraq and Afghanistan to East Timor and the Solomon Islands. The informal and its operation are, in a sense, made possible by the formal. So although conflict resolution is often positioned in contradistinction to the formal, it also facilitates recognition of the formal as the realm of ultimate authority and the rule of law and sovereign states.

To the extent that conflict resolution is unable to reflect critically upon the problematic assumptions about power and governance which it shares with traditional Western political and social theory, it participates in, and contributes to, the reproduction of the existing transnational neoliberal order. This facilitates cultural governance because the transnational order, and the relationship between formal and informal spheres, is based in, and reproduces, Western liberal values. The consistent identification of non-Western ways of being together and dealing with conflict with the informal is one of the ways in which governance emerges within this schema. The early use of non-Western conflict resolution processes as part-inspiration for the development of mediation in the United States illustrates this pattern.

In an often-quoted legal reform article, Richard Danzig²⁴ contrasts the supportive, conciliatory, non-coercive, consensual, and local nature of indigenous processes against formal Western processes. Danzig’s is a staid and somewhat technical treatment of an aspect of cultural difference. Nevertheless, it is part of a wider Western pattern of identifying “other” peoples with traditional and communal values that ameliorate apparently negative dimensions of modernity. This primitivist lens of “appreciation” is a selective one. It (re-)inscribes politico-cultural relations rooted in a long history of European colonialism in which the

Western, and particularly the rational and masculine, remain ascendant.²⁵ The result is an identification of non-Western processes as interesting and valuable in some ways, but not on their own terms, and only in ways that require careful oversight by a civilized and rational West. These processes are informal, and hence cannot be equivalent or parallel to formal Western ways of organizing being together, such as the rule of law and state sovereignty.

A similar pattern emerges in *in-situ* treatments of local culture as part of efforts to deal with violent conflict and progress post-conflict peacebuilding. Noted Indonesian traditional conflict resolution processes, Pela-Gandong of Ambon and Motambu-Tana of Poso, have proved successful over time for managing violent conflict, including in recent communal conflict. But government and INGO actors tend to essentialize and celebrate Pela-Gandong and Motambu-Tana while simultaneously leading processes of modernization and introduction of Western conflict resolution practices which undermine the longstanding concrete local processes of narrative, performance, and inscription from which these practices derive their efficacy.²⁶ Although international interventions refer to the importance of engaging local peoples and cultures, this tends to be rhetorical rather than substantive. Interventions continue to be led by Western (and Western-educated) elites who draw upon their own values and philosophy in efforts to build peace. In this situation local cultures tend to be viewed alternately as the source of a magic “silver bullet” to address the conflict, or as the source of problematic behaviors which drive conflict.²⁷

So even as the non-Western is partially appreciated, the mode of appreciation leads either to disrespect or politico-cultural circumscription of these cultures that denies equivalent standing to them. The accompanying assumption that the rule of law and state sovereignty linked to a mode of rationality developed in the West are the only serious ways for organizing being together in the modern world remains widely held by social science and conflict resolution scholars. This is so despite consistent evidence that non-Western societies are “quite orderly and capable of holding together over time”²⁸ without political forms and mechanisms other than those of the transnational liberal order.

It is true that normative international relations theory has begun to mount a widening critique of traditional notions of state and sovereignty, and that this has extended to conflict resolution.²⁹ This valuable critique is often conducted under the broad label of cosmopolitanism. But it is yet to generate significantly revised conflict resolution practice and, as I will consider in later chapters, the critique remains closely tied to European

theorizing rather than an exchange across difference. Conflict resolution emerged, and continues to operate, predominantly with reference to Western conceptual and value frameworks. Because the accompanying assumptions are rarely identified explicitly, Western approaches come to stand for an apparently natural and universal approach to conflict resolution. This facilitates and reproduces dominant politico-cultural power relations and occludes serious exchange among different ways of being-together and dealing with difficulties among people.

The politico-cultural governance relations of conflict resolution emerge within the framework of this transnational liberal order where non-Western processes are identified with the informal, and where conflict resolution has demonstrated limited capacity to reflect critically upon this order.³⁰ The result is an operation of cultural governance in which non-Western ways of being together and dealing with conflict are subordinated in conflict resolution and broader transnational Western liberal governance. Indigenous processes may be drawn upon to ameliorate the more negative aspects of the operation of formal law, they may be deferred to in some aspects of international interventions, and they may be partially identified and accommodated within progressive conflict resolution practice, but they are not currently considered a serious alternative to law, sovereignty, or the resolution of conflict through Western mechanisms and on Western terms. Rather, they are ultimately subordinate to ways of being together and dealing with difficulties among people that find their grounding in the rule of law, sovereignty, and the state.

To further examine how difference is governed within conflict resolution, it is useful to identify dominant conflict resolution assumptions about selves, order, and conflict. These assumptions constitute a typically unquestioned backdrop for conflict resolution practice. They provide a series of norms and standards which broadly support Western assumptions about formal governance, and toward which people are expected to move as part of the informal governance which operates through conflict resolution endeavors.

Norms for governance

Conflict resolution shares a number of important basic suppositions about selves, order, and conflict with mainstream Western social science. These suppositions informs conflict resolution theorizing and practice, and serves as a norm and standard against which entities, from individuals to nation-states, are implicitly or explicitly measured, evaluated, and encouraged to move toward. They reinforce mainstream

Western understandings about how the world is and how it should be ordered, guiding how conflict resolution analyses, and interventions act upon, problematic (conflicting) individuals and populations in a variety of transnational settings.

At the centre of these assumptions about selves, order, and conflict is the conception of the person as an autonomous and discrete entity, an autonomous and independent center of cognitive and emotional agency. This self, consistent with dominant mainstream ways of conceiving of selfhood, is “organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against other such wholes and against a social and natural background.”³¹ The pursuit of self-interest attached to a subjective interiority is an important corollary which features prominently in conflict analysis and resolution. The subjective interiority of individuals is assumed to be a very significant, if not the most important, motivating force for behavior and action in conflict situations and conflict resolution processes. Individuals are taken as the central figures in interpersonal and small-scale conflict events, and are invested with “emotions, deeply held values, and different backgrounds and viewpoints.”³² Conflict resolution is thus sometimes reduced to trading, compromising, integrating, or otherwise reconciling these interests. Recent transformative approaches to mediation aim to engage participants beyond straightforward interests, but they share the assumption that selfhood is deep and interior. One advocate suggests, for instance, that in “facing our conflicts . . . we pass through to . . . transformational opportunities that ask us to develop, grow, and learn more about our inner selves.”³³

In large scale and complex conflict, corporate bodies modeled on the figure of the individual are taken as key units of analysis and action. Individual units are central to game theoretic and other modeling approaches. From individual diplomats to leaders, regional organizations, insurgency movements, and states, conflict resolution tends to conceive of actors, parties, or players in ways which recall the form of the self-subsistent subject in line with mainstream social science. Nation-states are anthropomorphized in language that attributes characteristics (rogue, failed, weak, and recalcitrant) to them in the singular. Conflict resolution interventions often encourage participants to look beyond their personal views and circumstances to analyze the broader conflict, but a similar understanding of selfhood is also at play in these analytic processes. It is assumed that participants should come to understand and analyze their conflict in similar, if not the same, ways as the discrete and autonomous rational knowers of Western social science disciplines. Solutions to the conflict are then possible because parties are invested

with a commonsense agency deriving from this understanding of selfhood. This manifests, for instance, in the undifferentiated assertion that “if the parties make the problem, then they can unmake it.”³⁴

While contemporary critical theory suggests the value of thinking of complex social relations and organization in terms of networks,³⁵ or imbroglios³⁶ rather than self-subsistent entities, conflict resolution continues to trade heavily in commonsense mainstream Western understandings of selves. No doubt this provides for a certain type of ontological security by reassuring scholars and practitioners that the world takes after the form of ourselves and is therefore understandable to us. But it does not make for good analysis or conflict resolution. It is true, of course, that conflict resolution assumptions about personhood, corporate entities, and their relation to conflict are sufficiently commonsensical in many contexts to go unremarked, and for potential practitioners and participants in conflict resolution to have no particular difficulty with them. However, this belies a cultural specificity which makes them appear strange and unsatisfactory from other perspectives.

Clifford Geertz notes that the notion of the self as a discrete entity, an independent centre of cognitive and emotional agency, is a “peculiar idea within the context of the world’s cultures.”³⁷ It can be the case, for instance, that difficulties among people derive not from the interior interests of a skin-bound individual but instead as an effect of forces—social, political, material, and spiritual—that flow through or around the person and the wider political community. Conflicts and their outcomes may be considered as the outcome of “long-term strategies” rather than “the emotionally laden revelations of, or judgments of, some inner self.”³⁸ Selves may be bound through kin-relations such that the reasons for—and consequences of—their actions can be placed with others.³⁹ And for some peoples, selfhood may be located in the body (as is partly the case in the Western tradition) but also within “the bodies of other people and other species, and within the world” more broadly.⁴⁰

The second and third assumptions, relating to questions of order and conflict, are similarly pervasive and problematic. Across a broad range of Western thinking about social and political life, the active pursuit of order (the good) occurs against disorder (the bad). The latter threatens the former and acts as its natural counterpart. In Christian terms, chaos and evil can intervene at any time. God threatens, and the world of human relationships He creates is profoundly fraught.⁴¹ Western political theory retains rather than surpasses this dynamic; it seeks rather than confirms or assures order. Order is an achievement, and struggle,

rather than a fact, or part, of social life. The classic formulation, of course, is Hobbes'⁴² distinction between the "state of nature" and the commonwealth, and the emergence of the latter from the former. This playing out of order and disorder generates an intense investment in order, pursued through the figure of the autonomous and rational self, which permeates thinking about conflict in the West.

Western social sciences reflect this preoccupation with order by taking the maintenance of order and peace as a central problem.⁴³ Theories of social science (and law) are attached to what Laura Nader terms "harmony models" which reflect "the belief that conflict is bad and in need of explanation, while its opposite is valued behavior that needs no explanation."⁴⁴ Conflict, then, is a problem. Formulated directly, society "is by definition ordered; a dispute is a moment of disorder; it is therefore unthinkable as a permanent condition."⁴⁵ The notion that conflict resolution is interested in the "management" of conflict, rather than its "resolution," also tends to reproduce this assumption. In almost all cases this idea is subordinated to an overall view that conflict dynamics and events are to be changed, overcome, or surpassed. Conflicts are aberrations in an ordered social landscape, or a set of dynamics impeding the emergence of a more peaceful world. These understandings interpolate conflict resolution advocates and practitioners to work against conflict.

One of the most pervasive manifestations of mainstream Western thinking about order is its pursuit through notions of unity and commonality. Despite variations, the Hobbesian model, the Enlightenment social contract (recently reformulated by John Rawls⁴⁶) and communitarian political theory are "all committed to an ideal of community founded on unity, consensus and commonality."⁴⁷ In Hobbes, a community of replicant individuals is unified in the sovereign, in liberalism "consensus is expressed in a mythical or hypothetical social contract," and the communitarian view foregrounds communal values and bonds.⁴⁸ Even the anarchical state-system of realist analysis (and hence the possibility of order through balance of power) relies upon a domestic realm unified by the sovereign as its foundation.

Against this dominant pattern, the possibility of embracing ideas about the formation of community through difference and dissensus—as occurs among some indigenous peoples—is very difficult. This possibility has only recently begun to be explored by philosophers such as Alphonso Lingis⁴⁹ and Jean-Luc Nancy⁵⁰ who are working at the limits of current debates. The emphasis on order also generates a tendency to see other cultures and traditions—bearers of difference from Rwanda to

the Balkans to the Middle East and indigenous peoples within liberal states—as sources of disorder and conflict⁵¹ rather than as presenting possibilities for ordering social and political life in alternative ways. As Edward Said⁵² shows, there is a longstanding tendency to pitch the rational and autonomous subject against the collective and disordered Other.

Conflict resolution shares these mainstream social science suppositions about how the world is and how it should be ordered. Autonomous and discrete selves or entities modeled on them are the key agents; ordered society is an achievement linked to rationality, and conflict represents a breakdown of this order which must be ameliorated or overcome. Within this triumvirate, selves are not merely assumed to take the form of a rational and autonomous cognitive centre; they should also direct themselves toward order and peace. The best self is rational (and rationally consistent) rather than emotional, non-violent rather than violent, non-aggressive rather than aggressive, conciliatory rather than combative, harmonious (but appropriately self-interested), and compliant and non-disputing. Violence itself is somehow irrational, and certainly a marker of irrationality which should be expelled from both self and society in the name of order and peace.

These suppositions about the nature of selves, order, and conflict support mainstream liberal understandings of the role and place of formal governance. The idea that disorder continually accompanies and threatens order reinforces the need to maintain the rule of law and sovereignty. State sovereignty serves as the transcendental and overarching force and mechanism—and the only legitimate wielder of violence—to secure order and peace. The focus upon order supports the efficacy of state management of conflict both within and beyond its borders. This efficacy and capacity, in turn, is necessary for the ongoing legitimization of sovereignty and the rule of law.

The ways in which these assumptions about selves, order, and conflict serve as a series of norms toward which people are expected to move is of particular interest for understanding how conflict resolution governs. Of course, most conflict resolution efforts are informal; they rarely invoke the rule of law or sovereignty and often set themselves against these and other formal institutions and processes. This does not mean, though, that they do not govern. It is precisely by operating through the informal sphere that conflict resolution can regulate difference even as it promotes and encourages empowerment, participation, and freedom.

Facilitative governance

Conflict resolution processes and interventions range from training, facilitation, and mediation to “interactive” conflict resolution, problem-solving workshops, and conciliation. The following analysis cannot speak for all conflict resolution processes as some elements of the following discussion may not be present in some practices. Yet the most prominent and popular conflict resolution processes also share a number of characteristics which allow analysis of the broad contours of conflict resolution governance.⁵³ Much is made of efforts to promote empathy and understanding among participants as a strategy for addressing conflict. More significant, however, is the goal of conflict resolution processes, whether explicit or implicit, to reconfigure participants’ orientation to the dispute in which they are involved, and hence to their selves and to others, to ameliorate conflict. At the centre of this task, and of many conflict resolution practices, is the figure of the third-party facilitator. The typical role of the third party is to guide semi-structured interactions among participants.⁵⁴ This extends, naturally enough, to managing interactions between third parties and participants.

How the third party guides participants in conflict resolution processes, and the ethics and efficacy of different ways of guiding, is much discussed and debated. Directive, coercive, or “muscular” strategies are often deployed by those who can bring status, resources, or some other exercise of power to play in the conflict resolution process. This style sits at one end of a spectrum and contrasts with “*facilitative*,” “*pure*,” and less-directive strategies. The latter, usually used by those who can mobilize control over the process but not matters of substance, are the main focus here for they are typically taken as more representative of a conflict resolution (rather than a formal or coercive) approach.⁵⁵

The role of facilitative third parties can be clarified by noting the two senses in which emphasis is usually put upon the notion of “*process*.” First, processes typically move through steps or phases (including preparations, introductions, discussing issues, and developing options) to bring about shifts in the orientation of participants. These phases are discussed below. Second, the facilitative role of the third party is usually emphasized over and above any intervention into the substantive matters at stake. This distinction, sometimes termed the “*process-content*” distinction, stipulates that facilitators control the structure of exchanges among participants and the overall process, while leaving judgments and decisions about the content of the conflict to the parties. The idea

is that a type of process advocacy, rather than advocating for particular parties or outcomes, generates the best, including the most sustainable results.⁵⁶

The process-content distinction sits alongside a number of other commonly held conflict resolution ideals for third-party facilitators. These include: voluntary participation by parties or representatives; neutrality or impartiality on the part of the third party; and modes of negotiation which are collaborative and integrative rather than zero sum or adversarial. These ideals may not be fully realized in practice, but they do structure conflict resolution practice and serve as goals which third-party practitioners strive toward. They also form part of the rhetorical repertoire justifying the standing of conflict resolution against other types of more formal and interventionist practice.

Ideals such as third-party neutrality and the process-content distinction help to legitimize conflict resolution because they exhibit a very liberal, *laissez faire*, orientation to participants. This orientation is widely popular. Yet a paradox arises here because third-party practitioners *cannot but* act upon the participants in the processes which they guide. The accompanying dynamics of participant-third-party interaction, and the extent to which various ideals are upheld or transgressed, are rarely closely examined.⁵⁷ The foregoing understandings of selves, order, and conflict, shared with mainstream social science and relied upon by third-party facilitators as an implicit reference point for acting upon participants, also tend to remain under-examined. These assumptions guide the actions of third parties on participants in conflict resolution processes. Conflict resolution's liberal orientation helps to mask and facilitate this operation of power and governance by having participants reconfigure their relationships to their selves and others within the framework of mainstream understandings of selves, conflict, and order.

Normalization

The overall mechanism of power for shifting conflict resolution participants toward ways of being and behaving consistent with Western understandings of selves, order, and conflict is a form of what Michel Foucault terms normalization.⁵⁸ Normalization evaluates the behavior of individual entities by referring this behavior to a norm which marks both the threshold of normality and a standard to which the entity should aspire and move.⁵⁹ While Foucault's analysis focuses on the normalisation of individual subjects within overall apparatuses of power,

this same type of analysis can be applied to other units, including nation-states. Analysis at the level of the nation-state can be conducted through Foucauldian analysis because the operation of power and governance at this level relies upon normalization at a range of other levels and sites, including that of individual subjects.

Normalization does not evaluate behaviour in order to punish it, and neither does behaviour be explicitly named. Rather, the process of normalization simultaneously surveys, scrutinises, and encourages shifts in the actions of entities by referring their behaviour to a field of possible behaviours that contains an ideal.⁶⁰ Within conflict resolution processes, an overarching or “macro” norm organizes a series of sub-norms relating to different stages of third-party conflict resolution process. The macro norm is the figure and behaviour of the non-violent, thoughtful, rational, harmonious, and non-disputing subject, or its correlate in the form of an organization such as the state. These qualities, usually embodied by the third-party facilitator and articulated in the goals of conflict resolution processes such as mediation and problem-solving workshops, constitute the ideal against which the behaviour of participants is evaluated throughout conflict resolution processes.

The field of behaviors subject to the operation of normalization through conflict resolution is marked out, in the broadest sense, by identifying zones of violence, conflicts, and disputes. This may seem a natural and commonsensical step for those interested in addressing conflict, but it is necessary to understand the processes and forces at play in such a designation. With this identification, a range of human behaviors attached to a group of people in a particular time and place are amalgamated under the sign of conflict, and against other behaviors designated (by default) as peaceful. This constructs a problem which requires remedy. It is true that critical voices occasionally point out that conflict or violence may be a response to particular circumstances and injustices, or that conflict can be a necessary and creative force for social change, or that conflict is a complex phenomenon pervaded by difficult questions of justice and equity. But the overwhelming sense conveyed by juxtaposing conflict with peace is that we are dealing with a breakdown of social order which needs to be remedied. This provides the rationale for conflict resolution processes.

Beyond the identification of a conflict or dispute, third-party conflict resolution processes typically begin with a preparation phase which, among other tasks, gauges the suitability of a particular conflict for intervention. Interveners assess party behavior, conflict intensity, the current dynamics, and stage in a conflict cycle. The need for analysts or

facilitators to discern some willingness to discuss issues and negotiate—perhaps only be a glimmer or hint—is central here. Often these questions are closely linked with questions of timing.⁶¹ Some conflicts move through relatively predictable cycles of intensification and de-escalation which suggest particular times for intervention⁶²—usually when the conflict is less intense and de-escalating—as more productive than others. Other conflicts may be less predictable, but there may be a conciliatory gesture, or some other type of de-escalation in the conflict which provides an opening for pursuing conflict resolution processes. In some cases a simple lack of motivation by the parties to continue to sustain the high costs the conflict has wrought thus far may be sufficient to justify initial advances by the third party. The initial approach by the third party, then, searches for signs of willingness to discuss and negotiate among key players. The third party then attempts to nurture this willingness.

The process of assessing the suitability of the conflict for intervention—and of individuals for participation in conflict resolution processes—identifies the field of behaviors upon which the mechanism of normalization will operate. Although a wide range of stances and behaviors are acceptable within conflict resolution processes, some behavior is deemed unsuitable. This leads to the exclusion of particular cases or individuals—a process that marks the frontier of the abnormal.⁶³ Physical violence among potential participants, for instance, is not acceptable for it marks a threshold signifying the breakdown, rather than possibility, of community in Western liberal understanding of order, society, and conflict. The possibility of restoring order through violence is not recognized. Marking the boundary of the abnormal in this way simultaneously marks the bounds of what can and cannot be worked upon and redeemed.

At the center of what can be worked with is rational speech, a faculty easily identified in Western understandings as a sign of negotiability and the mechanism for restoring viable community. This type of rational negotiability, or a susceptibility to it on the part of potential participants, is a prerequisite for facilitators' efforts to work on participants in conflict resolution processes and to have them reconfigure their approaches to themselves, the conflict, and others on the terms of transnational liberalism. Those parties or situations which are unresponsive to negotiability are marked as beyond the bounds of the normal and are left to be subdued by the sovereign state (where there is a jurisdiction able to achieve this), to further conflict, subordination by dominant actors, or their own disorder.

The exclusion of a relatively small number of cases in the preparatory stages of conflict resolution processes leads to the inclusion—conversely—of a wide range of participants and conflict behaviors. The most significant operation of governance through conflict resolution processes occurs, then, by including participants. As informal procedures, conflict resolution processes tend not to exercise power through sanctions that exclude. This is part of their (liberal) appeal. Instead, they attempt to act upon parties and have them to act upon themselves by mobilizing their self-interest within a framework of negotiability that promotes the resolution, management, or analysis of their conflict in relation to norms about selves, order, and conflict which are set by the facilitator and the conflict resolution process.

In all cases other than the most simple of conflicts, significant time and effort is expended in the preparatory phases of processes such as mediation and problem-solving workshops to include participants and begin to assert the role of interveners. In addition to developing an understanding of the history of the conflict, current dynamics, and the attitudes, needs, and concerns of key players, and making an array of necessary administrative and logistical arrangements, third-party interveners provide information about the proposed process and promote it to the parties. Delicate discussions about who is to attend, what issues are to be discussed, and, in some cases, the design of the process are also necessary. The key principle guiding interveners' interactions with parties on these matters is that the third party must retain control of the process.⁶⁴ This underscores third-party expertise and begins to build their authority to guide the forthcoming process.

Third parties often reinforce their authority over process matters by invoking the process-content distinction. They assert control and responsibility for the process while parties are encouraged to focus their energies upon content issues. This places responsibility for developing options, and indeed for resolving the conflict, firmly with the parties. Conflict resolution advocates and practitioners tend to emphasize the empowering effects of this approach. But it is important to note that these effects include establishing a foundation for having parties act upon themselves to address the conflict *within* the framework set out by the third party and confirmed through their expertise and control of the process. Throughout, the third party represents the figure of the rational and non-disputing subject toward which participants should move. The point is not that conflict resolution processes are disempowering, but that empowerment and governance are not mutually exclusive. Informal liberal governance operates through conflict resolution

by encouraging subjects to take control of themselves with respect to particular norms.

The introductory phase of conflict resolution processes further establishes the figure of the rational and non-disputing subject as the norm to which parties should assent and begin to move toward. Interveners assume and confirm their role in guiding the process. This may occur in more or less explicit ways depending on the nature of the process and whether all participants meet in person or are remote from each other. In some cases interveners will ask parties if they agree to the facilitators guiding the process, in other cases they will restate their role in guiding the process and encourage the parties to make good use of this opportunity to address their concerns or the wider conflict in which they are involved. The distinction between process and content dimensions of the resolution process, and assurances about the impartiality of the third party continue to lay the foundation for the subtle exercise of power by the third party. The informal yet carefully managed tone of the introductory session reinforces the norm embodied by the facilitator and sets the scene for a relatively controlled, considered, and non-violent interaction administered by the third party.

Confessional problem-solving

Following an introductory phase, participants are typically invited to explain their concerns and understandings of the conflict in which they are involved. This phase involves each participant, in colloquial terms commonly used in many conflict resolution processes, “telling their (side/part/understanding of the) story.” Interveners manage this phase very carefully so that participants can speak without interruption. The experience of talking through one’s concerns or understandings, the “talking cure,” is widely regarded as psychologically valuable—indeed crucial—to the process. Strong emotions are very often expressed, and practitioners commonly find that participants are unable or unwilling to move to—or productively participate in—later stages of the process without this often-cathartic step. Fisher and Ury’s formulation that emotional outbursts to “let off steam” make “it easier to talk rationally later”⁶⁵ has done much to popularize conflict resolution understandings of the value of this phase of conflict resolution processes.

The cathartic appeal of telling one’s story in conflict resolution forums, and its value for moving toward the resolution of conflict, appears to be widespread given the accounts of practitioners and parties as well as the broader uptake of conflict resolution processes. Equally, the relevance of

telling one's (emotional) concerns is largely based upon anecdotal evidence rather than comprehensive research. This relevance begins to look less universal when we understand that not all cultures prioritize or compartmentalize cognition against other faculties.⁶⁶ For some peoples, the separation between "letting off steam" and "talking rationally later" is unlikely to be entirely appropriate. Attributing ownership of emotions to an interior self, such that after a heated outburst a party is freed "from the burden of unexpressed emotions,"⁶⁷ is likely to be similarly inappropriate.⁶⁸ Commonsense conflict resolution understandings of the value of telling of party concerns, then, bring parties into the purview of culturally specific assumptions and expectations about the nature of selfhood.

Inviting participants to tell their concerns within the ambit of Western assumptions and expectations about selfhood is significant for normalization because it initiates a key disciplining mechanism which Foucault terms the confession.⁶⁹ The practice of an individual confessing her or his emotions, thoughts, and desires to an external body or authority has been central to constituting Western selves as interior and self-subsistent beings, from the confessions of Augustine⁷⁰ through Christian practice to the proliferation of the modern and secular confession in operations of modern power and governance. Foucault shows that while this technique of the self is now typically deployed in secular contexts, it retains the same basic structure.⁷¹

The process of confessing "opens" the person and initiates a process of self-work which includes re-evaluating thoughts, behaviors, actions, and overall way of being. The confession "produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it: it exonerates, redeems, and purifies him; it unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him, and promises him salvation."⁷² Much contemporary confessing is directed toward ensuring a form of secular salvation that links with the goals and governing processes of the liberal state by pursuing peace, health, a higher standard of living, and so on.⁷³ The redeeming effects of this telling of one's self goes some way to accounting for why the process of confessing is so beguiling. The telling of one's concerns can be highly valued by conflict resolution participants as an opportunity to "have their say" and thereby achieve some measure of justice. It is unsurprising, then, that storytelling can be referred to as "unique and even magical" by some in conflict resolution circles.⁷⁴

The redemptive dimension of confessing is also closely linked with the powerful commonsense logic of problem-solving within conflict resolution. At the core of problem-solving conflict resolution is the idea that a disruption to social order can be identified, isolated, pragmatically

broken down, and successfully addressed through a reasoned process by empowered rational agents. In the process, the event of conflict, a discomforting failure, and disruption in social order, can be brought to an end. Social behaviors, practices, social meaning, and (if necessary) institutions can be re-arranged. Individuals and the social order are redeemed in this process. The power of the autonomous, rational, and non-disputing subject is restored as is "his" vision and version of the world. Third party and participants are redeemed through an external figure, not an omniscient god, but omnipresent and disembodied "rational man."

In Foucault's analysis, power relations are intrinsic to the "opening" and redemptive dynamics of the confessional. Confessing occurs in the presence of a person or set of institutional expectations and requirements. In conflict resolution this external figure is the third party and the norm of the rational and non-disputing subject. The person confessed to, variously requires and encourages the confession, specifies its parameters, appreciates it, judges it, and intervenes in it to support and reconcile the confessor.⁷⁵ Conflict resolution participants confess to the third party who also specifies the parameters for confessing either through explicit guidelines or through the establishment of the general environment in preparatory and introductory phases. The third party appreciates by listening respectfully to parties' rendering of their conflicts.

At other times third parties may intervene in participants' stories, bringing normalizing judgments to bear by redirecting parties to comply with guidelines such as focusing upon the main issues, speaking from their point of view, and avoiding direct attacks upon others. Facilitators also provide subtle signals to parties about the appropriateness of their behavior through approving or disapproving eye contact and body language. Parties are thus encouraged to express, to lesser or greater degree depending upon the relative emphases of different processes, their thoughts and feelings in a normalizing framework that suggests partially transcending these experiences to connect with the expectations of the conflict resolution process. This acts upon parties to encourage them to perform their selves in ways that are intelligible to the interveners and consistent within the goals of the conflict resolution session and accompanying mainstream Western assumptions about selves, order, and conflict.⁷⁶

After participants have recounted their concerns and thoughts about the conflict in which they are involved, conflict resolution processes usually take the form of a series of extended facilitated interactions in which Western approaches to selfhood, order, and conflict

are encouraged, promoted, and reinforced. The meaning of the macro norm of the non-violent, thoughtful, rational, and non-disputing subject varies across later stages of the process—discussing issues, developing options—such that facilitators gauge and evaluate behavior against a series of sub-norms that operate as “floating averages.”⁷⁷ The meaning of the macro norm also varies according to the particular conflict resolution process. In interpersonal and community mediation, parties are encouraged to think of the conflict in terms of their personal interests. In problem-solving workshops parties are encouraged to analyze the wider conflict in which they are involved through the lens of the rational knower of the Western social sciences. In most processes, though, the goal of encouraging rational behavior is central.

Facilitating rational selves

Third parties use a variety of communication skills to control conflict resolution processes and to encourage participants toward the norm of the rational and non-disputing subject. Facilitators may, for instance, intervene to indicate the appropriateness or otherwise of a particular behavior or approach taken by a participant. To do so, they may encourage participants through speech, eye contact, and body language. They sometimes directly praise parties for their forthrightness in discussing issues or positive attitude toward solving the conflict. To indicate inappropriate behavior, third parties may ignore what participants say or do, or use negative body language. In some processes participants may face coaching about appropriate communication styles, mini-lectures on approaches to conflict including topics such as the impacts of misperceptions in generating conflict, direct rebukes for how they are behaving, and the invocation of guidelines set at the beginning of the process.

The process of encouraging participants toward the norm of the rational and non-disputing subject occurs, importantly, with regard for participants' welfare. It typically proceeds without recourse to rebuke or reprimand. Participants are not forced into particular ways of being. How, then, does normalization proceed? Third parties act upon participants, operating as agents of transnational liberal governance, by mobilizing two qualitatively different, but not intrinsically opposed, capacities. On one hand they display susceptibility to others—a capacity which third parties are trained in, or otherwise develop in their practice for empathizing with and supporting participants, defusing strong emotions, and maintaining rapport throughout the process. On the other hand, technical, intellectual, and cognitive capacities enable third parties

to engage in careful listening, analysis, questioning, paraphrasing, and summarizing. This is necessary for reframing the tenor of discussion and redirecting parties' orientation to each other and the issues at stake.⁷⁸

The interplay of capacities for susceptibility and technicality allows third parties to affect the perceptions and behaviors of parties, and ways in which they constitute themselves. By summarizing a party's concerns, a mediator draws upon both technical skills and empathetic qualities before, for instance, directing her or him toward addressing their underlying interests to move toward resolving the conflict. Susceptibility is hereby mobilized in a process of technical ordering directed by the mediator. The effect of the mediator's intervention, if successful, is to formulate the party as an autonomous subject with interior wants and needs. This has the effect of encouraging the participant both toward resolution and liberal Western versions and understandings of selfhood and order.

Using rapport established at an earlier phase of the process, a facilitator demonstrates the power of a rational approach by directing parties away from emotional responses and toward possible solutions, and by breaking the conflict into apparently manageable portions and mapping relations of cause and effect between key actors. These operations may be empowering, yet the effects thus-generated steer participants toward particular ways of being. The helper acts upon participants to have them examine and rework their "needs and desires," and strengthen their "self-assurance and self-satisfaction"⁷⁹ within the framework of Western understandings of selves, order, and conflict. Working upon selves in this way encourages participants toward the norm of the rational non-disputing subject.

The operation of liberal governance in the informal realm operates precisely by avoiding threat, sanction, or similar devices that characterize the operation of sovereign power. Normalization engages parties in the process of reconfiguring themselves and their relations with others, and the conflict in which they are involved, by encouraging them to simultaneously move toward agreement (or other form of resolution) and the norm of the rational and non-disputing subject embodied by the facilitator. Conflict resolution processes are well-placed to achieve this, for they require the willing—and ideally voluntary—participation of the parties. In this way, the exercise of power proceeds by way of insinuation with(in) the being of parties rather than through attempts to exercise power over them.

Rational faculties and approaches are prioritized throughout a variety of conflict resolution processes including mediation, facilitation, and problem-solving workshops, although each of these processes may

give differing emphases to the history of the conflict, analysis of its causes, and options for resolution. The expression of emotion is typically taken as a precursor to rationally dealing with an issue. This does not mean that emotions are ignored or disavowed. Many processes encourage the expression of emotion in order to manage or mitigate its strength before redirecting the party or parties toward a rational means of dealing with the conflict. This technique resonates with advice, popularized by Fisher and Ury, to separate the people from the problem.⁸⁰ Problems, issues, and conflicts are treated rationally, aside from emotional complications. To assist with this goal, the conflict is often broken into separate issues that are discussed in turn to establish chains of cause and effect reasoning. This provides a basis for developing options for addressing participants' shared problems. Reason, then, is a key means for moving toward resolution and to shift from combative to conciliatory and peaceful selves.

Deploying reason helps to (re-)configure participants by subordinating other faculties to the autonomous and self-subsistent subject—the “I think.” Systematically breaking down issues and examining past problems for causes, for example, prioritizes the version of the self encouraged in mainstream social science and endorsed in much Western political thought by making it the entity for understanding and managing the dynamics of conflict. Facilitators seek out and value participants' rationally coherent performances, either to address their particular issues or to analyze the wider conflict in which they are involved. Conflict resolution thus encourages self-subsistent rational individuals modeled on mainstream Western selfhood. In this process Western understandings of order and conflict are reinforced: conflict becomes the shared enemy and an aberration in what should be an otherwise rationally ordered social landscape.

Personal redemption is on offer to those parties who subject themselves to conflict management based on Western understandings of selfhood, order, and conflict. Individual's experiences of conflict are often characterized by intrapersonal upheaval, turmoil, and discomfort. Conflict resolution processes use Western rationality to meet, manage, and redirect this personal state of affairs in supportive and reassuring ways that encourage dominant Western approaches to selfhood and conflict. As parties confess to the conflict resolution expert, they receive understanding and acknowledgement, and support and guidance. They also develop their own capacities. Controlled and rational discussion clears away miscommunications and misunderstandings. Difficulties are unlocked, opening the path to collaborative negotiation among autonomous and rational selves.

The overall trajectory of transnational liberal governance in conflict resolution processes resonates with an important micro-technique termed reframing. This term refers, in common conflict resolution usage, to a summarizing and rephrasing of participants' speech or concerns that aims to shift their attitude and orientation.⁸¹ Reframing can be used to shift participants' focus from presenting positions to interests and needs, from negative to positive attitudes, from the general to the specific, from differences to common interests and so on. It can detoxify language and move parties toward slightly different understandings of their world. This practice evokes the goal of many other facilitator techniques and the overall aim of reconfiguring participants' orientation to the conflict in which they are involved, to their selves, and to other participants.

If successful, the reconfiguring of selves as rational rather than emotional, and conciliatory rather than combative, brings participants into line with dominant Western assumptions about the nature of order and conflict, and disavows human difference. This operation of power and governance goes largely unacknowledged because parties are often voluntarily enrolled in their own subjection, and because the understandings of conflict and selfhood promoted through conflict resolution coincide with dominant understandings that circulate in the transnational liberal order. Governance is also likely to go unnoticed where conflict resolution is successful, particularly in contexts where the values and worldviews of participants accord with those enacted by third parties in conflict resolution process.

It seems logical and natural that resolving or managing conflict requires governing, and that in conflict resolution processes this requires managing interactions between third parties and participants. But questions must be asked about the values that are invoked in this governing, and how this places individuals and peoples. The liberal view of freedom is typically framed as *laissez faire* individualism which limits the intervention of the state into subjects' lives. But the informal realm accompanying this ideology is itself regulated as people are acted on and act upon themselves to generate ways of being and behaving which coincide with the values of Western liberalism. Furthermore, the liberal view of liberty is based on a developmental view of populations and individuals which means that some people/s are judged as not yet ready for freedom, or requiring coaching so that they can take up its benefits.⁸² This excludes a range of ways of being and forming political community which are not recognized or valued by Western liberalism. When human difference is included within conflict resolution processes, transnational

liberal governance encourages people toward the triumvirate norm of mainstream Western understandings of selves, order, and conflict.

Governance achieved?

In the past two decades, conflict resolution ideas and practices have become institutionally consolidated in Western countries, and have increasingly flowed Southward.⁸³ A number of factors drive the latter development and provide the necessary human and financial resources for global expansion of conflict resolution. Aid and development programs increasingly emphasize conflict sensitive development, particularly in post-conflict situations. Conflict resolution approaches and practices align well with notions of participation and empowerment favored in these programs, particularly as part of the development agenda surrounding legal reform, governance, democracy, and civil society. Active and professionalized domestic dispute resolution communities in Western countries (particularly in the United States) also play a role, as does the broader conflict resolution field. Just as international relations traveled South to become a derivative discourse in the South after World War Two,⁸⁴ the involvement of conflict resolution scholars and practitioners in the export game suggests a similar trajectory.⁸⁵ Southern nationals also contribute, returning home to spread the conflict resolution message in training programs while drawing upon knowledge and increased status gained through international postgraduate study.

So does conflict resolution operate as a normalizing apparatus which governs difference with a global disciplinary reach? Participants in conflict resolution processes often adopt and comply with the requirements specified by third-party facilitators and the particular process they are implementing. This is to be expected because participation is typically voluntary. Participants apparently enact the operation of liberal governance by adjusting their selves to perform in ways that are consistent with Western understandings of selfhood, order, and conflict that circulate in the transnational order. There appears to be no easy way of quantifying the success of liberal governance in broad terms, but George Pavlich concludes his analysis of community mediation in British Columbia by arguing that the success of liberal governance in expunging difference largely negates the hopes and claims of the advocates of informality in conflict resolution.⁸⁶

The broader effectiveness of conflict resolution as a mechanism of liberal governance should not be underestimated. The use of mediation

and related processes has increased rapidly in many parts of the world in recent decades, to deal with a variety of small-to-medium-sized conflicts from local neighborhood matters to interethnic and other conflicts as part of peacebuilding efforts. The problem-solving workshop, although it has had a smaller impact to date, is a very influential point of reference for conflict resolution efforts to deal with complex and intractable conflicts. In sum, conflict resolution processes are likely to subsume and disavow difference, including other ways of being together and dealing with conflict, behind a mask of liberal mantras of empowerment and participation.

We should, though, remain circumspect about the transnational governing effects of conflict resolution for a number of reasons. The reach of conflict resolution practice is not sufficiently comprehensive for an undifferentiated assertion that conflict resolution successfully governs difference from a liberal values base. Conflict resolution is very well established in some domestic settings, and while this practice has been extended to indigenous peoples within these countries, it does not yet have widespread transnational reach. Conflict resolution does not yet have the type of institutional density of development practice, for instance, although links with development suggest the conflict resolution may be rapidly becoming an adjunct to a liberal transnational security regime.⁸⁷

Where conflict resolution practices are in place we need to note that the operation of power through informal mechanisms requires, for its efficacy, that selves act upon their (own) selves. By reconfiguring their approach to their selves, to others, and to the conflict in which they are involved, they enact their "freedom" in concert with the goals of conflict resolution and liberal governance. Yet a small number of people do object to the procedures of conflict resolution, or resist the interventions of facilitators. Even when the effects desired by facilitators do manifest in conflict resolution processes, there is no guarantee that they are durable or will be sustained into the future. This evinces a weakness of informal liberal governance: the requirement to sustain norms through time through the (re-)iteration of behaviors necessarily contains, as its obverse, possibilities for their subversion.⁸⁸ Mimicry of the behaviors required by the dominant order can represent mockery rather than assent.⁸⁹ The operation of power that works upon and through individual subjects is complex and contingent. Governance through "freedom" is intrinsically incomplete, and open to subversion.

The fundamental condition for effecting transnational liberal governance through informal conflict resolution processes is interaction and

exchange across, and encounter of, human difference. The ways of being and behavior to be reconfigured through liberal governance must circulate through the informal “freedom” of conflict resolution processes. This interaction and exchange can be considered an encounter between two sets of forces. One set—those promoting behaviors and ways of being consistent with the liberal non-disputing subject—can be termed “governing forces.” Another set—those associated with the behaviors and ways of being marked errant, deviant, and different—can be termed the “forces of difference.” These “other” forces may include those associated with different ways of being, organizing being together, and dealing with conflict. Exchange between these sets of forces is brought to life through the selves of facilitators and participants because interpersonal interaction is central to the operation of conflict resolution processes. In this encounter, facilitators manifest the forces of the transnational liberal order. They embody and act, in other words as vehicles for “governing forces.” Conflict resolution practitioners routinely structure their interactions with participants through liberal political ontology to move them to treat their conflict in ways that are consistent with the liberal norm of a rational and peaceful subject. The liberal transnational order licenses the practitioner as a legitimate and valued expert undertaking this action.

Yet facilitators, acting as the agents of governance, are also necessarily *exposed to* “forces of difference.” They may, as a result, modify their behavior, actions, and the processes they administer to reflect cultural or other dynamics. A wide array of forces are operating at any one time, swirling, competing, and interacting as they circulate through the selves of facilitators and participants. The complexity and richness of this human interaction means that the governing effects of conflict resolution processes cannot be easily foretold. The conflict resolution doctrine of responsiveness to party needs is significant for it legitimizes the possibility of analysts and practitioners listening sufficiently closely to parties’ needs to detect other approaches to conflict. This contains possibilities for ameliorating the governing of difference through conflict resolution.

Conclusion

In summary, this chapter began by noting that conflict resolution tends to overlook the way its processes reconfigure selves and relationships in the name of ameliorating conflict. These governing dimensions often go unacknowledged because conflict resolution sets itself against formal institutions and forms of governance linked to the rule of law and the

state. But the governmentality analysis pursued here shows that informal conflict resolution governance operates in the shadow of formal institutions, and that formal and informal realms are deeply entwined and mutually reliant. Because it shares assumptions about power and governance with mainstream political theory and social science, conflict resolution has been unable to reflect critically on the way it participates in the reproduction of the relations of the existing transnational liberal order. While the conflict resolution field has attempted to respond positively to cultural difference, indigenous and local conflict resolution processes tend to be identified with the informal and are thereby subordinated to the formal. This effectively excludes them as serious means for establishing political community and dealing with difficulties among people.

Difference is governed within conflict resolution processes by reliance upon basic, yet culturally specific, assumptions about the nature of selves and dispute held in common with mainstream social science. These ways of being and relating to conflict are not universally shared. Practices such as mediation, problem-solving workshops, and conciliation draw upon these assumptions as a guiding framework for acting upon participants and encouraging them toward the norm of the rational non-disputing subject. To the extent that these conflict resolution processes have people reconfigure their selves and orientation to conflict and others, they effect an operation of governance on Western liberal terms. Through this type of facilitative practice, conflict resolution can govern difference even as it promotes and encourages liberal freedom. The next chapter extends this analysis by exploring the influence of the idea of sovereignty in the transnational liberal governance of difference in conflict resolution.

3

Sovereign Selves

Conflict resolution scholarship and practice is suffused with the influential modern and Western idea of sovereignty. The notion of an exclusive, accomplished, and self-sufficient entity—a self, or a territory circumscribing a group of people—and the accompanying right to exercise authority over this entity has been absorbed from mainstream social science scholarship and political thinking. Unfortunately, the idea of sovereignty has been subject to limited critical reflection or analysis in conflict resolution. Although sovereignty has come under some criticism,¹ sovereign entities, either autonomous and discrete individuals or states, continue to be assumed as the primary agents for knowing the social and political world of conflict, and the key institutions for responding to conflict and (re-)ordering relations and geographical regions disrupted by conflict events.

The privilege enjoyed by sovereignty is bound with its standing as a notion for thinking about, and organizing, political existence in the West. The sovereign state, the counterpart to the sovereign self, serves as a powerful backdrop for legitimate political organization and order. Within the transnational political community, stable and distinct quasi-transcendental political entities attached to particular territories are the dominant basis for organizing political life, including for the purpose of imposing order and managing conflict.²

Sovereignty also helps to make many of us who we are; it offers a level of ontological security by providing a sense of an autonomous, complete, and coherent cognitive and emotional being. We are, of course, not determined by sovereignty, but the *figure* of sovereignty nonetheless operates as an influential official and commonsensical account of who we are as individual people. And while this version of our selves is often contradicted by elements of everyday lived experience which highlight

our relationality and reliance upon others, it plays a particularly significant role in social science knowledge—in organizing *how* social scientists go about thinking and in influencing the categories and entities presumed in the production of social science knowledge.

In these circumstances, questions about the role of sovereignty in our dominant ways of knowing and relating to difference in conflict resolution are rarely brought into focus. Instead, the field tends to operate with a presupposition, shared by mainstream social science, that each sovereign self is the agent of thinking, that this knower knows what thinking involves, and that his or her accompanying processes of thinking are naturally true and correct.³ Indeed, the pervasiveness of assumptions about sovereignty account for the lack of attention they receive: sovereignty often operates as a “natural” part of our very ways of knowing and our understanding of our selves in the social sciences and conflict resolution. Beginning with the archetypal philosophical question “What is Man?,” individual selves of mainstream social science take command of psychic and social life in ways that constitute the knower as an overarching, detached, self-sufficient manager and organizer of the world.⁴

Thinking about conflict resolution in terms of sovereignty brings to bear additional critical resources for more deeply understanding the culture challenge and the transnational liberal governance of difference in conflict resolution. Until recently, the question of how we should know and relate to cultural difference has typically been approached from the vantage of the sovereign knower of social science. This perspective distances scholars and practitioners from people and their differences in ways that risk, as discussed in Chapter 1, disavowing cultural difference in contemporary conflict resolution. Similarly, approaching conflict situations through an understanding of political and international relations which foregrounds sovereignty (in the figure of the self-sufficient subject or actors modeled on this figure) sustains the practices and institutions of transnational liberal governance. Understanding sovereignty as bound with these relations and effects provides critical purchase for thinking about how contemporary conflict resolution negotiates tensions between responsiveness and ordering. It also provides a basis for beginning to examine, in Part II of this book, how conflict resolution might negotiate these tensions differently in the future.

Exploring how sovereignty is entwined with knowing difference and relations of political organization and governance is inevitably a conceptual task, and one which can at times be complex and esoteric. Yet, as with all knowing, this is also a necessarily concrete and personal task. As individual knowers we are, before anything else, “in-the-world and

with-others."⁵ So it is possible to explore assumptions about sovereignty and difference through our selves. I take up this possibility in places throughout this chapter by using my self as a methodological resource to explore links among the influential notion of sovereignty, how we experience cultural difference and conflict resolution governance of difference. This innovative approach speaks directly to the engaged and practical nature of conflict resolution efforts. After all, the challenges of conflict resolution bear directly upon scholar and practitioner selves; it is our selves that are at the centre of the culture challenge and governing difference discussed in previous chapters. Moreover, dealing with the challenges of conflict resolution will require attending to, and changing our selves. Of course, social science disciplines, particularly international studies, have only recently begun to examine the ways wider social relations of the international and other spheres have come to inhabit the domestic and personal.⁶ The approach pursued here, then, extends traditional social science inquiry, stretching its boundaries to move conflict resolution into different terrain.

This chapter first explores the influence of sovereignty in mainstream social science and conflict resolution knowledge production. It shows that our knowledge is invariably political, and that the influence of sovereignty tends to subordinate difference. The key dynamic is an oscillation between the immanent and the quasi-transcendent which sees the sovereign self return to itself. This pattern limits conflict resolution's capacity to satisfactorily engage, and respond to, cultural others. The second section of the chapter examines how sovereignty positions scholars and practitioners amidst the cultural politics of conflict resolution. It demonstrates that sovereignty operates as a fulcrum for integrating the lives of individuals with the sovereign state in modern governance, a process which subordinates non-Western ways of being, of ordering political life and dealing with difficulties among people.

The final section of this chapter discusses some paradoxes which hold promise for fissuring sovereignty. Sovereignty mobilizes ideas of (quasi-)transcendentalism, yet it must also engage with the concrete and immanent to achieve its effects. The result is that, regardless of its claims, sovereignty remains vulnerable to that which it attempts to transcend. Sovereignty also emphasizes autonomy, particularly with regard to individual selves. Nonetheless it is also clear that our existence relies upon others. So the autonomy claimed through ideas of sovereignty necessarily emerges through exchange with, and reliance upon others. The result is that sovereignty is always circumscribed, or mediated, by relationality. Finally, conflict resolution scholars and practitioners enact

sovereignty and are influenced by it, yet they may also deploy this same sovereignty to engage and mitigate its operation and effects. Such paradoxes and fissures offer prospects for rethinking conflict resolution's relationship with difference and negotiating tensions between responsiveness and ordering. These possibilities are taken up in Part II of this book, beginning with the Chapter 4.

Sovereign knowledge and the subordination of difference

Conflict resolution draws much of its knowledge of the social and political world from mainstream Western scholarship. At the centre of this knowledge and at the base of procedures and rules guiding social science knowledge acquisition is the seemingly commonsensical and universally applicable effort, stemming from the Greeks, to provide a reason why.⁷ The scientific method further requires that definition and related procedures and rules be applied in ways that separate, as much as possible, the individual knower from the object under scrutiny.

Yet engaging with the world to provide a reason invariably relies upon the individual researcher. For this reason scholarship invariably becomes entwined with something shared—language, history, experience, faith, gender, or culture. As a result, it is strictly impossible to separate explicit procedures and rules for knowing from the fact of being human and the emotional, aesthetic, affective, and other dimensions this entails. The practice of definition, of asking *what*, is central to much social science, but a lived *who* is always necessary for knowing to occur. Politics and knowledge encounter each other here because the questions we ask and the answers we receive are bound with who we are. As William Connolly states, “every interpretation presupposes or invokes some . . . problematical stance with respect to the fundamental character of being.”⁸ How we know is political and bound with who we are.

Questions about the position of the individual conflict resolution scholar and practitioner in relation to cultural difference first came to the fore in my work and research on intercultural conflict resolution with Australian Aboriginal people. Aboriginal participants occasionally questioned my authority as a white mediator by referring to the fact that we were on Aboriginal land.⁹ By doing so they would invoke the fact of colonization and the accompanying unresolved conflict between settler and indigenous peoples. By extension, they would also object to the (dominant) broader transnational liberal order. These challenges contained references to Australian Aboriginal worldviews—to the idea of country which I noted in the *Introduction* and the accompanying

ways of being and being together which cross-cut and contradict the assumptions about selves, order, and conflict widely shared by mainstream scholars and mediators. For this reason I had to consider my response very carefully.

To adopt mainstream social science ways of knowing would contravene key conflict resolution principles because it would deny Aboriginal ways of being and the accompanying approaches to conflict. In taking up dominant Western social-scientific ways of knowing, the sovereign subject disavows the representations that non-Western people give of themselves,¹⁰ including their ways of managing conflict. The problem here is that mainstream social science ways of knowing, rather than engaging ethically with human difference, often return to the Western sovereign subject¹¹ and its political, social, institutional, and other realities.

Some may suggest that we can safely examine the political issues accompanying such complex conflicts—issues such as rights and representation. But this presents problems because it assumes that commonplace social-scientific entities, including individuals and states, are relevant and useful categories for understanding politico-cultural questions in conflict. Cultural politics is not simply about resources, representation, or rights understood in relation to individuals or states. Rather, cultural politics is about the terms upon which reality is defined and understood.¹² Mainstream social science ways of knowing have not been able to deal with this issue because they have been largely developed in Western contexts which often bear limited relation to other cultural worlds. This contributes to the inability of Western political theory to come to terms with difference, a situation which is generating a crisis in the tradition of Western political thought.

To maintain a commitment to the conflict resolution principle of responding to the needs of others, I found that it was impossible to adopt the traditional terms of Western social science in my efforts to address the culture question with Aboriginal people. Attempting the detachment suggested by traditional political and social science scholarship would take me further away from the possibility of responding to Aboriginal people. It would potentially reinforce lines of cultural conflict through knowledge production. This would compromise the goals of conflict resolution by reproducing cultural conflict. Rather than responding to others to address conflict, enacting the assumptions of mainstream social science and conflict resolution would reproduce a picture of the world ordered on Western liberal terms and the culture problem evinced by Benvenisti.¹³

The figure of the sovereign knower and its ethico-political effects have, of course, been the target of sustained questioning in recent decades, and questions about the self have long been debated in Western scholarship.¹⁴ Structuralism, poststructuralism, postmodernism, and feminism, among other theoretical approaches, have critically engaged the notion of the subject as a sovereign, autonomous, and skin-bound entity.¹⁵ Many scholars have also implicated the capital "S" Subject in a variety of social, legal, cultural, and gender-related domination.¹⁶ Taking up this critical impulse helps to explore how the figure of the sovereign self is implicated in a problematic relationship with difference; a relationship that troubles efforts to address the culture question in conflict resolution and supports transnational liberal governance. Beginning with Saint Augustine, one of the Western tradition's seminal political thinkers, provides historical perspective for examining the influence of the figure of sovereignty in conflict resolution's ways of knowing and relating to others.

For Augustine, the self's way of being is fundamentally linked with political relations. The error of the pagan being, which Augustine links with the dominations and atrocities of Rome, is "to take itself, rather than God, as self-originating."¹⁷ Augustine's response, through the process of his famed conversion,¹⁸ involves constructing soulful depth and inwardness before God by fashioning a deeply reflective self.¹⁹ The continuing importance of Augustine lies in the linking of an intrinsic moral order with (the practice of) one's self, a relation which plays out in contemporary culture, although in less dramatic and more everyday forms than Augustine's conversion.²⁰

The Augustinian deep and interior self emerges largely through memory and the unifying and purifying method of confession. For Augustine, time "scatters the self in relentless, uncontrolled change."²¹ Memory is therefore crucial. In memory, "self can abide and hence become an object for its own continuous considered reflection."²² In this way the "confession begins to unify the self by *present-ing* the self in memory."²³ Crucially, one does not simply have a memory but one is constituted through memory. To confess is to "collect *the self* out of dispersion, to draw the self together" as a coherent and sovereign entity.²⁴

In the confessing Augustine we have an early instance of a practice which has been central to the development of modern Western selfhood and which, in turn, often features in conflict resolution scholarship and practice. The confession, although undergoing transformations from Augustinian origins and Christian practice, remains central to selfhood in our time and to commonsensical Western understandings of the self.²⁵ As discussed in Chapter 2, Foucault has famously articulated the

proliferation of a type secular confession, which also constitutes subjects as having a soulful depth and interior, in the operations of modern power and governance including those of conflict resolution.²⁶

I turn to links with liberal governance and conflict resolution practice shortly, but I first want to consider the implications of sovereign selfhood for knowing and relating to others. While the generation of soulful depth in relation to God is, for Augustine, the antidote to self-centered lust and domination, and the basis for honoring relations of reciprocity with others, it is, I will show, deeply problematic. Notwithstanding the profound ethical sensibility in Augustine and the broader range of ethical and political possibilities that lie with practices of the self, this relationship of the self *for and with itself* leads to significant problems for relations with others.

The counterpart of the deep and sovereign self, for Augustine and others, is transcendence. The accompanying dynamic established between depth and transcendence generates serious problems for relating with others. To illustrate, let us continue with the Christian theme by considering the injunction to love others as one would love oneself. This is an apparently commonsensical command, but attempts to fulfill it invariably risk its transgression.²⁷ One of many risks arises because the first dimension of the injunction requires “participation in the beings of others.”²⁸ Ideally realized, this extends across cultural and other human differences. Yet from the standpoint of a deep, collected, and inward self, such an extension of love faces the impossibility of participating in the being of others because they are other; “the other person . . . appears as that which is in itself infinitely withdrawn.”²⁹ The quandary is resolved, nonetheless, through reference to divine transcendence in Christian myth: the other person is inaccessible to self but it is at one with the other in general. That is, “the other that has its moment of identity in the divine Other [in God], which is also the moment of the identity of everything.”³⁰

The second component of the injunction to love others—to love them *as one would love one's self*—returns to the self and hence privileges a particular (Western) form of selfhood.³¹ God is “. . . not to be sought . . . in conversation with . . . native tradition.”³² Neither is knowledge. Soulful depth before divine transcendence bypasses serious dialogue with other cultural traditions. The interplay of depth and transcendence sets up the subordination of non-Western peoples in Western knowledge. This is not a satisfactory basis for dealing with the culture question in conflict resolution. Indeed, by disavowing others it risks cultural conflict within the politics of knowledge production.

So the relation of the sovereign self to the transcendent has profound ethico-political implications for approaching cultural difference. The divine other, God, belongs to the identical rather than the different. The Godhead subsumes both the intellectual construct—the *logos*—and other cultural traditions.³³ This interplay of centering, depth, and transcendence articulated in Augustine and manifesting in the contemporary sovereign knowing subject generates epistemological violence. Others are encountered, but the knower returns to the self and the Western tradition.

In more concrete terms, consider how the figure of the sovereign self can lead to problems for conflict resolution's relationship with difference through the commonplace practice of scholarly and professional writing, an activity undertaken on an everyday basis for conflict resolution scholarship and practice. Mainstream social science scholarship is usually oriented outward, toward what scholarship can tell us about the social world, including the world of conflict. But let us momentarily turn the gaze inward, toward the knower and the practices through which she or he seeks to understand the world. Here the practice of writing on a blank page, with the basic purpose of making meaning explicit and clear, is central to both social science and its politico-cultural effects.

To locate the practice of writing we should note at the outset that the phenomenon of the blank page or screen, and taking up the pen or keyboard, are peculiar in the predominantly oral scheme of human history.³⁴ They are also central to the Western tradition, with the practice of writing becoming enormously influential worldwide since the invention of the printing press and the mass production of texts. Writing, then, is part of a very significant historically and culturally specific entwining of technological and human elements. It generates a complex, an *imbroglio*,³⁵ which can be termed, following Michel de Certeau, the "scriptural economy."³⁶

At its core, the practice of writing consists of constructing "a text that has power over the exteriority from which it has first been isolated."³⁷ This has important implications for the constitution and standing of the knowing subject and the accompanying relationships established with the world and other humans. De Certeau shows that the blank space of the page "delimits a place of production for the subject."³⁸ The page represents the possibility of the conventional Western knowing subject, and a concrete practice that generates this subject: it is a space in which the self comes into being as knowing subject and social scientist. Facing the blank page places the subject in "the position of having

to manage a space that is his own and distinct from all others and in which he can exercise his own will."³⁹ A certain type of isolation is central to this practice, with writing involving "the withdrawal and the distance of a subject in relation to an area of activities."⁴⁰

Here it is necessary to draw a distinction with earlier and other ways of relating with the world and others. De Certeau states that writing introduces a separation by dividing "the traditional cosmos in which the subject remained possessed by voices of the world." Writing on the blank page cuts the knower off from others and shakes one free of them. It also separates knowers from the accompanying interactions that require taking concrete others into account. Writing invokes vision in place of orality, distance in place of immersion,⁴¹ and thereby both the construction and ordering of the world and others as object/s. "The island of the page is a transitional place in which an industrial inversion is made: what comes in is something 'received,' what comes out is a 'product!'"⁴² This mode of knowledge production centers the subject as sovereign. It also effects an operation of violence and domination by installing reason over activity, theory over practice, and intellectual over non-intellectual.⁴³ The "power" of writing is generative of the subject, giving both the knowing subject and scholarship the means to order others and the world in their absence by representing the world in particular ways.

Conflict resolution scholarship has absorbed the dominant features of mainstream social science so that it too installs its reason over the activity of others, and orders the world in their absence. One of the key ways in which this occurs is through assumptions which define conflict resolution in certain ways. Take, for instance, the assumption that violence is negative and to be avoided in conflict resolution efforts. Physical and other forms of violence are seen as dangerous, while talking and dialogue, in contrast, are regarded as desirable ways to deal with difficulties among people. This leads to the general position that the best forms of conflict resolution and peace, from community mediation to the United Nation's campaign for a "Culture of Peace," are non-violent. The definition of conflict resolution as non-violent, and the prescription that physical violence is inimical to resolution, gains its density and durability through practices of writing and publishing in the circuits of academic and professional discourse.

Violence is, of course, often associated with breakdown of order and it can lead to cycles of hatred and revenge that generate further conflict.⁴⁴ But it is also the case that some peoples value physical violence as ways of dealing with difficulties and restoring order among themselves. In doing so, they attach very different values to talking (on one hand) and

physical violence (on the other) to those typically ascribed in conflict resolution and everyday Western life. Gaynor Macdonald highlights an actual inversion of the Western valences of physical violence and speech when she elucidates how, for Aboriginal Australian Wiradjuri people, words wound and blows heal.⁴⁵ For Wiradjuri, a verbal insult, the casting of aspersions, or simply disregard by others can represent a challenge to an individual's very existence, including their integrity as a social being. In this situation, everyday Western responses such as simply ignoring or "laughing off" comments are untenable. Repudiation is necessary, and in this situation physical fighting, which is broadly distinct from assault, operates as "reclamation of sociality and harmony."⁴⁶

Serious political problems accompany the representation of conflict resolution as non-violent. When Wiradjuri "fight," for instance, are they not engaged in conflict resolution? To misunderstand Wiradjuri "fighting" as destructive is to delegitimize their social processes and ways of dealing with difficulties among people. The political impacts of this denial manifests in a number of ways. By adopting a definition of conflict resolution as non-violent, government agencies, courts, social workers, and others who have significant capacity to act upon and affect the lives of indigenous people assert the value of Western rather than Wiradjuri processes. The administration of funding available for conflict resolution programs in indigenous communities and the explicit barring of certain practices by the Western (colonial) legal system—practices all conducted through writing—contribute to this governance. Examples could be drawn from development and post-conflict peacebuilding practice demonstrating a similar pattern. In short, linkages between academic conflict resolution practice and the circuits of power promote and support Western political ontology over that of local peoples.

Arguably more serious is the disavowal of selves accompanying the relegation of some non-Western processes through conflict resolution assumptions and definitions. Continuing with the case of Wiradjuri people, what might it mean for Wiradjuri selves to be unable to repudiate or otherwise address a grievance through physical fighting? What ramifications does this have for who and how Wiradjuri are, both as individuals and with each other? Emmanuel Levinas argues that this type of disavowal is a fundamental manifestation of violence: "Violence does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves."⁴⁷ Such violence can in turn be linked with certain forms of physical violence because it consists in making persons "betray not only commitments but their own substance, making them carry out

actions that will destroy every possibility for action."⁴⁸ In the case of Australian Aboriginal people, for instance, social isolation relating from incarceration, linked in some cases to physical fighting, is a significant factor in suicide deaths in police custody.⁴⁹

Of course, it is not the practice of writing *per se* which generates the foregoing problems. Writing can be turned to many ends, including the pursuit of direct and affective connections with the world and human beings. The key difficulty relates to the cultural politics swirling around and through the figure of the sovereign knowing subject, and the fact that this figure tends to be presumed rather than put into question by mainstream scholarship. Sovereign knowledge reproduces itself in these circumstances because it already has recourse to the self it wishes to discover.⁵⁰ In the process of turning back upon itself in the production of text, the sovereign subject bypasses the distance through which she/he gains purchase over the outside world and others. Here the subject rediscovers itself and the categories and assumptions of its own tradition while ordering others and committing epistemological violence against them.

It can be hard, no doubt, to countenance the foregoing critique of the figure of the sovereign knowing subject of mainstream social science. No doubt many conflict resolution scholars and practitioners are more comfortable with the notion of a benign secular and rational figure that is not influenced by religious or transcendental forces. Yet transcendentalism manifests precisely in the commonplace pursuit of the secular and rational way of knowing which is highly valued in mainstream Western social science. Efforts to hold oneself apart from the object of inquiry are efforts to connect with, and make claims through, the quasi-transcendent. In this way, the (quasi)divine and transcendental are reproduced in notions of the "rational" and "human" modern man.⁵¹

To understand how sovereign knowers can be simultaneously secular-rational and transcendent it is useful to note the paradox whereby the *logos* is both reason *and* the word of God (in man). God can be distanced, yet remain present. Crucial here is the way humans replace God with the emergence of the modern Western knowledge disciplines. Foucault's study of the emergence of the figure of man in knowledge shows that man replaces God *in his image*.⁵² The figure of man emerges as God-like because the challenge of man's concrete origins, brought on by a scientific attitude, is resolved by the promise of continuous history enacted by man himself.⁵³ This establishes knowing man as a paradoxical figure. He is both secular individual and sovereign-transcendental. He is of the world and soulful, because the power in this relation is "that of his own being."⁵⁴

The distancing of God from the organization of nature and political relations in the development of the Western knowledge disciplines leads God to become “the crossed-out God of metaphysics”—an all-powerful God that can descend “into men’s heart of hearts without intervening in any way in their external affairs.”⁵⁵ The distancing is therefore not thoroughgoing. Rather, it is bracketed, allowing that God’s transcendence and immanence can be called upon so that he remains “effective and helpful within the spirit of humans alone.”⁵⁶ Westerners have hereby been able to fuse reason and religiosity, rational individuality and soulful depth. Western knowers can claim to be carefully detached observers with concern for what is immediately at hand *and* quasi-transcendental sovereign agents who use reason to produce enduring knowledge that transcends all other approaches, cultures, and ways of knowing.

Within conflict resolution this combination of immanence and transcendence manifests in ways of knowing which, for instance, disavow Wiradjuri ways of conceptualizing and processing difficulties among people. By combining interior depth with worldly transcendence in the commonsensical expectation that the world can be known through social science practices of representation, the sovereign knowing self relates difference to itself. Centering the sovereign self in Western knowledge and conflict resolution leads the knower to subject difference to the categories and processes of Western thought: difference is engaged, but in many cases this relates and subjects difference to the (Western) self.⁵⁷

Even as we attempt to engage and respect cultural otherness, there are risks, manifest in the foregoing discussion of the treatment of Wiradjuri approaches to conflict and the work of Kevin Avruch discussed in Chapter 1, that we disavow cultural difference. Dominant ways of knowing human difference return to the figure of the sovereign knowing subject, an internally complete being who is the agent of detached (quasi-)transcendent reason. The influence of sovereignty in conflict resolution brings on an epistemological violence within conflict resolution, just as it does in broader mainstream Western social science scholarship.

To further understand the influence of sovereignty in conflict resolution’s relations with cultural difference (before moving toward considering possibilities for fissuring sovereignty) it is useful to examine how sovereignty helps to position conflict resolution scholars and practitioners and facilitate liberal governance of difference. Professional conflict resolution selves are the concrete points of application of the influential figure of sovereignty. Critical awareness of the accompanying relations,

particularly of how sovereignty links individual conflict resolution professionals with transnational liberal governance, begins to address the challenge of conflict resolution's relationship with difference.

Facilitating liberal governance: Sovereign self, sovereign state

Conflict resolution academics and practitioners are drawn to analytical and social-scientific concerns about the nature and causes of conflict, and to how to ameliorate conflict and associated suffering. We are also sometimes drawn to more abstract questions about the role of institutions and systems of political order for managing or resolving conflict. How, though, are the agents of this practice made? How do conflict resolution selves come to be who they are? And what are the accompanying implications for the ways these selves relate to difference and the political order of which they are members, and for the ways they reproduce or modify the processes and institutions of this order in working for conflict resolution?

A "passion for peace" or desire to "make a difference" may feature, more or less explicitly, as an animating and motivating force for a career trajectory in the biographies of conflict resolution professionals. But here I am interested in much more prosaic, quotidian, and tangible influences and forces acting within the lives of conflict resolution scholars and practitioners. Regardless of motivations, tasks such as gaining qualifications, winning positions and consultancies, and building a profile move to the fore for neophyte professional conflict resolvers. The "official story" of an individual's journey on this developmental path is recorded in curriculum vitae.

But the official story of professional development overshadows yet another layer of everyday and often-contingent occurrences that form the tapestry of conflict resolution scholar and practitioner lives. Such everyday events and experiences are likely to be deemed trivial or irrelevant in the process of constructing a narrative of professional and personal development and gain—a definitive process for many selves in mainstream Western culture.⁵⁸ Yet these everyday and "unofficial" occurrences are also among the most powerful forces for constituting selves who come to act on the lives of others in the management of conflict.

The making of conflict resolution selves through both official and quotidian processes, and their connection with the broader transnational liberal order, generates the agents of conflict resolution ordering

and governance. Every path into conflict resolution is different, as is every life narrative. There is no possibility or need, then, for quasi-scientific circumscription of a body of data for our current purposes. Rather, my self and experience serve as a ready site for exploring the cultural politics circulating through the liberal Western conflict resolution scholar-practitioner.

At a public meeting in an Australian city in the early 1990s I listened to information about mediation and the immanent establishment of a local community justice service. Ideas of community and informal means for addressing conflict were prominent, manifesting in dissatisfaction with formal legal practices and the affirmation of “community-based justice.” I was predominantly along as an observer, but the ideas circulating in the room resonated with my priorities and allegiances. Notions of people reaching their own solutions to conflict, and ideas of empowerment, informality, civil society, and community all appealed to me. They apparently appealed to many others too: the meeting was popular and there was significant support for the proposed service.

Ideas of informality and empowerment circulate widely in conflict resolution. They form an influential discourse that appeals to community social workers, development professionals, and students of international politics alike. These ideas help to define conflict resolution against a range of other more formal processes from state policing and juridical administration to formal diplomacy and power-politics. After the meeting I found myself thinking about applying to become a mediator.

Although individuals often feel that their desires for acting in the world are formed uniquely,⁵⁹ my interpolation in the public meeting through notions of empowerment, participation, justice, and informality speaks to both the characteristics of conflict resolution and widespread Western liberal ideals that are influential for many conflict resolution scholars and practitioners. Ideas of social transformation and empowerment contribute to the imagining, positioning, and operation of conflict resolution against the juridical and formal—against the operation of sovereign power that gives much shape to the transnational liberal order of states. Yet as Chapter 2 and broader governmentality scholarship show, formal and informal realms are not so easily separated. Indeed the very notion of a separate realm of private freedom is central to contemporary mechanisms of government which see apparently apolitical practices such as conflict resolution act upon people to have them reconfigure their selves and behavior in concert with neoliberal values and goals.

The reformist impulse within conflict resolution lends support to ideas that certain life-possibilities are thwarted by the current social order, and

that the intrusions of formal governance are always too great.⁶⁰ This helps to reinforce the search for alternatives. In some cases, populist and nostalgic visions of community, and a simpler, easier or less formal and technocratic “golden-age” are at play.⁶¹ In other cases, notions of participatory or deliberative democracy, the possibilities of a Gadamerian dialogic fusion of horizons,⁶² or of Habermasian ethical communicative action⁶³ underpin the rhetoric of conflict resolution. These understandings help to further distinguish conflict resolution as a practice of freedom and justice (operating through the lives of self-directed individuals) in contrast with adjudicative and formal processes of the sovereign realm which are seen to impose upon and constrain lives.

Following the public meeting I began my involvement with the conflict resolution movement and its politico-cultural governance relations by applying to train as a mediator. The selection process to become a mediator tested for, and reinforced, my commitment to notions of empowerment and respect for individual rights. My mediator training further entwined me with the processes and practices that constitute Western conflict resolution. It also involved me more deeply with Western understandings of political life, including key conflict resolution assumptions about selfhood, order, and conflict. The training roleplays I undertook invariably placed self-sufficient and autonomous individuals against each other. Such individuals were assumed to be the key actors in the conflict events which trainees were attempting to mediate. Each individual’s behavior was also assumed to be the result of a subjective interiority. Trainees, as neophyte conflict resolution practitioners, were expected to deploy a similar form of selfhood by performing as an accomplished and self-sufficient manager of the mediation process.

Such assumptions about selves and conflict played out through my self during mediation training. As I dealt with the challenges of difficult roleplays in training sessions in an effort to succeed as a mediator, I reconfirmed my standing as a conduit for key dimensions of Western political ontology. Following a particularly difficult roleplay and a rebuke from the trainer for losing control of the mediation session, I spent an evening at home rewriting and practicing notes and guidelines for the entire process so that I would not lose control in the remainder of the training. The familiarity and competence with technique following from this self-discipline led to my induction into a broader community of mediators. The mix of pedagogical techniques and trainer-trainee interaction had successfully organized forces in an operation of power to constitute me as a mediator committed to addressing conflict through mainstream Western assumptions about selves, order, and conflict.

This circular and paradoxical freedom operated through me as I regulated myself in concert with the governance goals of the liberal order: I became (or at least affirmed my standing as) a rational and self-sufficient agent working for order and peace on the terms of Western liberal political ontology. The preponderance of this way of being establishes the figure of the rational and autonomous non-disputing subject as the norm toward which, as discussed in Chapter 2, people should move in conflict resolution processes. It thereby helps to discipline other ways of being in conflict resolution and contributes to the bypassing of other (non-Western) ways of dealing with difficulties among people.

Liberal governance of difference in conflict resolution requires a paradoxical relationship between the individual—both conflict resolution practitioner and individual parties to conflict resolution processes—and (state) sovereignty. Formal notions such as rule of law and sovereignty must circulate through individual selves even as these selves operate in the informal realm. Individuals must be subjected to a large and abstract ruling force, yet must also be involved with this force in a semi-autonomous way. Such an authoritative and overarching system which is also connected with individual subjects requires a type of paradoxical transcendence which simultaneously incorporates, binds, and frees human subjects. The West's Christian heritage is important here because the relation between individual selves and a larger abstract corporate body becomes possible, from the European Middle Ages, with "the thesis that the Christian was a member of the all-embracing, comprehensive corporation, the Church."⁶⁴

At this time, the inclusion of individual selves in an all-embracing corporate body was made workable by the concrete practice of baptism. The baptism ritual brings on a metamorphosis which has "effects in the public field since as a baptized Christian the individual was said to have become a new creature" which participates in the divine.⁶⁵ The distinction of soul from body induced through baptism brings the subject into the Church by making him or her subject to a larger, singular, corporate, and abstract entity. At the same time a reverse operation occurs: the divine, distinct from the natural and material body, lodges within the living being. This is the soulful depth of Saint Augustine, the forerunner to the contemporary figure of the sovereign and interior subject⁶⁶ influential among mainstream contemporary Western conflict resolution scholars and practitioners, and the figure most commonly expected as the key agent within conflict events.

The distinction between the natural and Christian subject, between body and soul, was mobilized by monarchs to claim rule over subjects

through divine will throughout the Middle Ages. The law is *given* to rather than *made by* subjects, and a subject's "faithfulness, consisted precisely in obeying the law of those who were instituted *over* him by divinity."⁶⁷ In Christianity the West thus finds the allegoric basis of significant and enduring doctrines of Western political philosophy.⁶⁸ In particular, sourcing an overarching organizational power in divinity allows that "all the individual bodies may and will die, but what cannot die is the idea of law, the idea of right order, which holds the public and corporate order together."⁶⁹ Christian cosmology serves as an influential source for crucial Western notions of possible order in Western political theory and life by linking individual selves with an ultimate mythical-transcendental register.⁷⁰

By bracketing out and limiting the relevance and intricacy of feudal and other relationships, this combination of soulful depth and transcendental order connects the sovereign individual and the sovereign state as homologous entities. This process sees individuals integrated in the informal liberal order through the dissemination of the figure of the self-sufficient and rational individual, and the subordination of individuals to the rule of law and sovereignty. Individuals and states become, as Michael Dillon⁷¹ notes, Siamese twins, a condition which allows them to readily mingle in modern governance.

Pursuing goals of professional accreditation and education puts self-sufficient and accomplished sovereign conflict resolution practitioners into relationship with the state and the doctrine of sovereignty at the centre of Western liberal governance. This process, a key logic of political liberalism, sidelines alternative unions through families and other groups (in earlier times, through guilds, communes, and tithes) which maintain "autonomous spaces" beyond the reach of the state.⁷² A parallel sidelining of alternative forms of political community is currently underway with regard to those peoples, particularly indigenous and tribal minorities, not already fully integrated into nation-states. Conflict resolution participates in this bracketing, and facilitates liberal governance to the extent that it does not recognize or support culturally different ways of organizing being together and dealing with difficulties. With support from transnational modern governance, the subject enrolled in acting upon him or herself in liberal governance pursues personal goals along lines sanctioned by the liberalism, and accepts its hegemonic authority on the basis that it also allows individuals to pursue their welfare.

From the time the quasi-transcendental sovereign register becomes the condition for order, government, and peaceable life in European history, it is very difficult in the Western tradition to hear other ways of ordering

political life and dealing with difficulties among people. Regardless of where other ways of organizing community and processing conflict come from, they are likely, as discussed in Chapter 2, to be identified with the informal and subordinated to the formal. The interplay between subjective interiority and transcendent order leads us to bypass serious dialogue with other cultural traditions and to subordinate them to the West. This threatens to reproduce the culture problem and cultural conflict within conflict resolution.

As with the earlier discussion of selfhood, knowledge, and transcendentalism, some might object that the foregoing discussion overplays the Christian legacy and the importance of transcendentalism in questions of political organization. Certainly, a more orthodox (and reassuring) treatment would uphold the progressive development of reason as providing the basis for the rule of law and modern conceptions of the possibility of order, secular government, and society that secure freedom for sovereign individuals. However, this depiction is unable to account for the exclusively universalizing, authoritative, eternal, and transcendental claims and standing of doctrines such as sovereignty and the rule of law. Such qualities exceed reason in ways that only the mythical and magical can accommodate. Authority is always in some way grounded in itself and is therefore “in some sense ‘magical,’ that is, unsubstantiated, without ultimate foundation in a final ground *qua* substantive reason.”⁷³ Just as the quasi-transcendental manifests in the sovereign knowing subject so that the figure of man can be both deep and transcendental, a parallel relation ensures that “sovereign” man can be simultaneously “free” and part of the political order. The sovereign man can claim to be both the concrete man of history and the agent who, through reason, generates enduring and quasi-transcendent society and political community that exists beyond, and outlasts, individual selves.

How, then, do these paradoxical relations play out through conflict resolution selves? Each self is unique, yet my story, particularly the story of my positioning in relation to informal and formal liberal governance through mediation training speaks to the broader cultural politics of conflict resolution and to the wider positioning of conflict resolution scholars and practitioners. Notions of individual empowerment and the values of the Western informal sphere enrolled me in conflict resolution practice while the rule of law and sovereignty operated as a type of unquestioned backdrop. These notions functioned almost unconsciously for me as a type of transcendent fact—as the ultimate arbiters somehow coterminous with the very existence of society. The transcendental theme played out

in unrecognized ways: the contradiction accompanying my enrollment in the informal against the formal, for instance, did not sound despite my knowing that the ultimate and binding register for the “empowerment” and resolutions we would pursue and promote in mediation was rule of law and the state. In responding to the rebuke from the trainer, I pursued my own empowerment, (re-)producing myself as a mediator-subject whose role is to enact conflict resolution techniques which struggle to acknowledge other ways of conceptualizing and processing conflict.

Knowledge and politics are also entwined in the broader relation between sovereignty and cultural others. The epistemological procedures that generate the modern figure of man also establish the relation that Western thought can have with all other cultures, and this relation bypasses the representations which these peoples may give of themselves.⁷⁴ The corollary in political ontology is the assertion and connection of the “freedom” of the individual with the sovereignty of the state which disavows other forms of selfhood and brackets out and subordinates non-Western ways of being, of ordering political life, and dealing with conflict.

The privileged place of sovereignty within Western social science and political thinking, then, leads to a deeply contradictory engagement with human difference within conflict resolution. Sovereignty refers itself back to identical or the “same” in ways that compromise its capacity to meaningfully engage difference in conflict resolution scholarship and facilitate the liberal governance of difference in conflict resolution practice explored in Chapter 2. It is also the case, though, that sovereignty does not automatically generate such effects. Individual knowers and practitioners are in-the-world and with-others. The hard edges of sovereignty are softened by the relationality of social life, by the fact that the scholar always participates in social life with others. Sovereignty is in-and-of the world, and that it must, therefore, engage with difference. The avowedly practical orientation of conflict resolution facilitates this engagement.⁷⁵ Herein lies possibilities for different, and more responsive, relationships across difference.

Fissured sovereignty

Much of the power of transnational liberalism derives from a capacity to move between the concrete and the quasi-transcendental without suffering the inconsistencies of this shift.⁷⁶ We freely and confidently talk of political participation and empowerment while knowing that this is thoroughly circumscribed by the sovereignty of the state. Such

inconsistencies play out through individual subjects, as they did through my self during my mediator training. Western liberal understandings of selves, order, and conflict are reproduced in oscillations between the concrete and the quasi-transcendental, a pattern which helps liberalism to operate as a simultaneously individualizing and totalizing form of power.⁷⁷

Yet any transcendental movement is also necessarily involved with the earthly and quotidian *en route* to their surpassing. The relationship between the individual and the state is inseparable from a range of interpersonal, institutional, and other relations. Although liberal governance brackets these relations and their ontological frameworks and ways of thinking to create direct links between individuals and the state, it necessarily operates through them. Such a situation invariably generates fissures in the hold of sovereignty on the way difference is known and governed in conflict resolution.

Consider the fact that dominant conceptions of sovereignty, order, and conflict are often at odds with everyday conflict dynamics. The state, sovereignty, and rule of law are depicted as the agents and source of order, yet the processing of many conflicts occurs beyond their machinery, ambit, and even influence. From domestic and community conflicts to insurgencies and cross-border warfare, states frequently remain unaware of conflict, unsure of how to intervene, or incapable of negotiating or imposing order. Even when sovereign interventions “end” conflicts—through means ranging from court orders to military operations—these conflicts often recur.

So sovereignty is limited while claiming to be absolute. Formal Western governance is simultaneously capacious and contingent, a relation extending from the Middle Ages when rulers negotiated the widespread influence of customary law in people’s everyday lives through the fiction that formal governance *could have* been opposed through the ruler’s legislative sovereign omnipotence.⁷⁸ Rulers could thereby confirm the validity of customary law (because it was not opposed in fact) while simultaneously retaining an overarching role for formal governance. The subsequent emergence and development of modern governance has involved the proliferation of a range of informal governance mechanisms which see the lives of individuals more closely entwined with the state. In this process, formal and informal governance are intimately entwined, with the contingency of formal Western governance continuing to require deep involvement with the informal realm.

The mutual reliance of formal and informal realms in liberal governance suggests possibilities for fissuring this very operation of governance.

As discussed in Chapter 2, third-party facilitators govern difference as agents of the Western liberal peace through a range of conflict resolution processes, but they are also necessarily exposed to the forces of human difference in this process. The condition for effecting transnational liberal governance in the informal realm is encounter and exchange across human difference. My operation as an agent of transnational liberal governance in conflict resolution processes requires that I be exposed to ways of being, behaviors, and ways of thinking about order and dispute other than those of dominant Western liberalism. The circulation of these differences through the “freedom” of the informal realm is the prerequisite for their reconfiguring through liberal governance. This condition for effecting power and governance through conflict resolution scholarship and processes involves, conversely, the possible vulnerability of the figure of sovereignty, of dominant ways of thinking about order and dispute, and perhaps of the governing of difference through conflict resolution.

In the realm of knowledge production, sovereignty is a deeply influential notion. Yet the sovereign knower cannot bypass the fact that knowing involves being in the world and with others. The figure of sovereign man, the agent of modern social science, occupies an “ambiguous position as an object of knowledge and a subject that knows.”⁷⁹ Although mainstream social science specializes in asking what, in procedures which separate the knower from the world in efforts to make meaning explicit and clear, it remains strictly impossible to entirely separate the process of giving an account of the social world from the fact of human “being together.” We may attempt to operate as autonomous and sovereign knowers, but we are always subject to being affected by others, and this fact suggests possibilities for exploring other ways of knowing which disrupt the figure of the sovereign knower.

Social science knowledge also has the capacity to fold back upon itself to engage in auto-critique and reformulation. My social science and mediation training (re-)produced dominant Western ways of knowing and politico-cultural conflict resolution assumptions through me, but these same assumptions also become subject to the forms of critique which are being mobilized in this writing. To date, conflict resolution has tended to fall into line with mainstream social science scholarship and political thinking, thereby reproducing the figure of sovereignty in an uncritical way. Yet we can equally deploy a critical orientation to sovereignty alongside conflict resolution’s impulse for responsiveness to address the culture challenge and the governing of cultural difference. Such an engaged and responsive conflict resolution would critique the

influential notion of sovereignty and exploit its paradoxes to push the limits of current scholarship and practice. To take up this challenge requires theoretical tools for engaging with others beyond the visage of sovereignty. This task is taken up in Part II of this book, beginning in the following chapter with consideration of the popular idea of cosmopolitan recognition.

Conclusion

Sovereignty is a powerful notion in conflict resolution. Absorbed from broader social science and political thinking, sovereignty influences the life paths and values of conflict resolution professionals. It plays an important role in how conflict resolution scholars and analysts know the social world and the entities and agents assumed to be important in conflict events. Despite this influence, sovereignty has often been assumed rather than critically engaged. To address this shortfall, this chapter engaged in a critical analysis of how sovereignty bears upon the culture challenge and the transnational liberal governance of difference in conflict resolution. The first part of the chapter showed that links between the knowing subject and modern Western knowledge generate a cultural politics of knowing which, following Christian influence, sees the sovereign self return to itself. This pattern tends to subordinate difference and compromise conflict resolution's capacity to satisfactorily engage, and respond to, cultural others. The key dynamic is an oscillation between the immanent and the quasi-transcendent, a pattern at once concrete and totalizing, which creates a version of the social world that provides limited scope for other peoples and their processes for facilitating social order and dealing with conflict to be known and recognized on their own terms.

The second section of this chapter explored links between the influence of sovereignty in positioning conflict resolution professionals and organizing and sustaining the institutions and dynamics of modern governance, including conflict resolution governance of difference. Pursuing conflict resolution training and skills mobilizes conflict resolution professionals as sovereign liberal individuals committed to the figure of the rational and non-violent subject as the key vehicle for processing difficulties among people. Sovereignty helps to effect the accompanying operation of governance through conflict resolution processes (discussed in Chapter 2) by providing a way of negotiating the paradoxical relationship between the all-embracing quasi-transcendental political sovereign and the individual autonomous subject. These governance relations parallel

the knowledge relations discussed in the first section of the chapter: sovereignty facilitates a return to Western forms while disavowing, bypassing, or subordinating difference. To the extent that conflict resolution deploys sovereignty successfully, it facilitates Western liberalism in ways that order difference on Western terms and undermine its capacity to pursue responsiveness toward others. Nonetheless and as discussed in the final section of this chapter, sovereignty is necessarily in-and-of this world. It is therefore paradoxical and fissured in ways which promise possibilities for challenging and mitigating its effects.

Part II Exploring Relatedness

4

Recognition and Relatedness

How can we pursue conflict resolution beyond the influence of sovereignty? In what ways can we respond without disavowing cultural others and governing difference? Part I of this book generated these questions through a critical engagement with conflict resolution, yet also suggested that the seeds for addressing them are already partly sown within conflict resolution itself. Conflict resolution is a practically engaged enterprise, committed to responding to people in conflict. This combination of practical engagement and responsiveness is a valuable resource for addressing challenges facing the field. Nonetheless, the possibilities should not be overstated, and realizing them requires sustained critical inquiry. The conceptual grounds for responding to others, including for undertaking dialogue and exchange, have largely remained implicit and continue to risk capture by the influence of sovereignty. There are, for instance, ongoing encounters across cultural difference in conflict resolution, but the field remains largely dominated by Western approaches. This situation reproduces the culture challenge and governs difference, thereby compromising the capacity of conflict resolution to address some of the contemporary world's most difficult conflicts. We need to explore avenues for dealing with pressing challenges facing the conflict resolution field while remaining cautious about commonsensical appeals to exchange and dialogue. To do so, it is necessary to ask questions about the relations between sovereignty and the field's advanced theoretical formulations.

Recent and promising theoretical developments frame conflict resolution as a cosmopolitan venture which respects individual difference within a single humanity. Cosmopolitanism ideals resonate with conflict resolution goals and practice. It is also the case, however, that questions about *how* to pursue cosmopolitan goals, particularly across difference, are yet to be adequately worked through. Consider the

fundamental question of how we approach and engage others. In recent decades, the notion of recognition has come to be assumed as a prerequisite for just political relations. But basic questions about who is recognizing, and what dynamics are at play are yet to be adequately resolved. The risks and possibilities of recognition, including its efficacy for moving beyond the influence of sovereignty, need to be scrutinized in efforts to advance cosmopolitan conflict resolution. We may not be able to dispense with the apparently commonsensical notion of recognition, but we do need to proceed carefully in order to address the culture challenge and the governing of difference in conflict resolution.

Recognition is a popular way of approaching difference, but other resources are also available to us. Numerous philosophers have put great emphasis on the value of what we can call relatedness—the fundamental being together of humans deriving from the fact that before anything else we are “in-the-world and with-others.”¹ Relatedness promises possibilities for relationships across difference hitherto suppressed in mainstream conflict resolution by the influence of sovereignty and mainstream social science. A key question for progressing conflict resolution’s relationship with difference is how recognition and relatedness interact with sovereignty, and what they can offer for addressing the culture challenge and the governing of difference in transnational liberal conflict resolution.

This chapter explores the place and efficacy of recognition and relatedness for mitigating the influence of sovereignty within the context of cosmopolitan conflict resolution. After outlining the call for cosmopolitan conflict resolution, the chapter probes the ethico-political efficacy of cosmopolitan recognition. It shows that while recognition is commonsensical and characterized by movement toward equality, it is also accompanied by significant risks because it is bound with the relations of domination it seeks to surpass. To further examine this quandary, I explore the workings of recognition in the context of conflict resolution work with Australian Aboriginal people. I show that recognition tends to fall back upon the sovereign self and mainstream social science ways of knowing which appropriate rather than adequately acknowledge difference. Cosmopolitan recognition is a necessary component of just political relations, but it cannot be the primary logic for moving conflict resolution beyond the influence of sovereignty.

The second half of the chapter explores relatedness as a means of addressing the shortfalls of recognition in conflict resolution. While recognition converts experience and interactions with others into categories and objects for knowing, relatedness refers to a pre-cognitive

given-over-ness which makes us vulnerable to others and makes our very being possible. Such relatedness underpins the sense of “being-with” people that is necessary for conflict resolution practice. It also promises to help us move beyond sovereignty in conflict resolution scholarship and practice. Against the aggregation and ordering pursued through the emphasis upon entities or categories in mainstream social science, pursuing relatedness explores the movement of human difference across traditional boundaries and categories. Intensifying the dynamics of relatedness can disrupt the transnational liberal governance of difference by amplifying tensions within conflict resolution practice. I conclude the chapter by arguing that exploiting these possibilities requires re-engaging conflict resolution’s impulse for responsiveness in innovative ways.

Cosmopolitan conflict resolution

Conflict resolution practices find their meaning against power politics, and in contrast with the rituals and processes of formal diplomacy, negotiation, and courts. As the conflict resolution field developed from the 1960s and through the 1990s, mediation, problem-solving workshops, and related processes have in many respects been “practices in search of a theory.” Social science has always been influential, but until the 1990s, conflict resolution theory tended to be drawn from traditional social sciences including sociology and psychology, and to focus on conflict dynamics and behaviors rather than the dynamics and normative bases of concrete processes for conflict resolution. As practitioner-theorists have turned to matters-theoretical, and as there has been a shift from positivist to post-positivist approaches in international studies,² interpretive (hermeneutic) and critical theory have come to prominence alongside more traditional approaches.³ Gadamerian explorations of how understanding arises between selves holding different points of view, and Habermasian theorizing about the reasoned exchange of claims have emerged as plausible frameworks for examining and advancing mediation and problem-solving workshops, and the overall conflict resolution field. Some valuable theorizing has been pursued along these lines,⁴ but much remains to be done.

The most current sweeping theoretical agenda-setting developments in conflict resolution emerge out of international studies, and are formulated in Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall’s survey of the field.⁵ Ramsbotham and colleagues grapple with the prospects and promises of the conflict resolution project in the context of terrorism and the claims

of difference in an increasingly globalizing world. Their response is “cosmopolitan conflict resolution,” a term which, following Kantian democratic peace ideals, suggests an approach that deals constructively with conflict beyond particular states, societies, or established centers of power. Such an approach responds to frustrated human needs from local to global levels.⁶ Ramsbotham and his colleagues sketch their cosmopolitanism by drawing on notions of dialogue, Gadamerian hermeneutics, and Habermasian communicative action theory.⁷ Their cosmopolitan approach is avowedly ethical and universalist, implying that all individual human beings bear “responsibility for the lives and life-hopes of others being damaged through conflict.”⁸

It makes sense to place conflict resolution under the broad banner of cosmopolitanism because mediation and similar practices aim to respond to people’s needs in conflict situations. Because conflict resolution processes are geared toward voluntary agreement-making, they necessarily “respect the condition of plurality.”⁹ As Deinol Jones explains, this “leads, eventually, to the development of cosmopolitan analysis.”¹⁰ Yet Jones uses this same cosmopolitan analysis to turn the tables on international mediation, arguing that the Oslo back-channel processes did not meet cosmopolitan standards of mutual recognition or communicative action because the facilitators bypassed the difficult question of Palestinian self-determination.¹¹ “The process and Accords make use of the cosmopolitan ideals of a ‘dialogic community’ without accepting the political and moral implications.”¹² The same could be said—and has been said in different language¹³—for a range of other mediation and conflict resolution processes from interpersonal to international settings. Critical perspectives, including those applied in Part I of this book and by Jones under the heading of cosmopolitanism, require that conflict resolution engage with “a normative tradition which transcends the narrow theory and practice” of conflict resolution processes.¹⁴

Jones is correct to note that engaging in critical analysis of conflict resolution processes and projects is a key task,¹⁵ but is cosmopolitanism a sufficient theoretical and normative resource for this purpose? Few conflict resolution advocates or practitioners would disagree with broad cosmopolitan calls for equality and responsibility, and it seems appropriate that we adopt cosmopolitanism as part of our terminology. Yet moving beyond such calls to questions of how cosmopolitan goals might be pursued (leaving alone the more difficult substantive question of *what* these goals might entail) runs into difficulties. How we pursue cosmopolitan goals invariably relies upon some form of specific—cultural, historical, or other—normative content. Jones acknowledges this when he notes that

cosmopolitan international studies is “designed to redeem the unfinished project of modernity,” a goal that is open to the charge of “presuming to speak with a sovereign voice beyond politics and contestation.”¹⁶

In response we might offer, with Anthony Appiah, that cosmopolitanism is the name of a challenge rather than a solution, and that this requires continuous interaction across difference.¹⁷ Conversation is Appiah’s preferred metaphor.¹⁸ But while cosmopolitan scholarship has begun to engage in a type of conversation by taking up important themes such as those around justice, community, and dialogue,¹⁹ the terms of engagement across difference are often presumed rather than critically examined. Before working through procedural or substantive issues—such as what forms “reason” or “justice” might take—and the implications of these debates for cosmopolitan mediation, there are yet more fundamental issues at stake. At the center of these are the terms and means through which we engage people in conflict situations. Here cosmopolitan conflict resolution intersects with another key political and theoretical concern of our time: the recognition of others.

Recognition has become a political keyword in recent decades, and one that conflict resolution must engage. Recognition underpins, and is often explicitly invoked in, movements for cultural rights, self-determination, and identity politics. It has also become a focus of significant scholarship.²⁰ The political implications of the turn to recognition have been partially debated and explored,²¹ but recognition has also come to be presumed as the precondition for the pursuit of just political relationships.²² Indeed this may be necessary; for it seems commonsensical and beyond doubt that some form of recognition of difference and diversity is important for dealing with contemporary political challenges. Recognition is doubly important for a cosmopolitan conflict resolution committed to responding to peoples needs, because it appears to be a commonsense requirement for responsiveness and for pursuing ethical and effective approaches to advance a cosmopolitan conflict resolution.

Yet there are also important reasons to be skeptical. We can readily intuit a critique of recognition because it is, at face value and in its use in contemporary politics, an action completed by a person or group toward an other/s. This raises questions about the relative standing and agency of people who interact through recognition, about the ethical and political implications of knowing another person or people through recognition, and about the nature of the relationships that it promotes. While the idea of recognizing others generally involves ethical intent and may be a necessary step for addressing the challenges of contemporary conflict resolution, it requires closer scrutiny. Engaging recognition

is necessary to critically explore the assumption by Ramsbotham and colleagues that cosmopolitanism can take us beyond established sites of power to respond to and engage people in conflict from the local to the global. Can cosmopolitan recognition move beyond the influence of sovereignty to address the culture challenge and the governing of difference? We may not be able to dispense with the notion of recognition, but an awareness of its potential difficulties allows us to proceed more cautiously and thoroughly.

The risks of recognition

The idea of recognizing others is in many ways commonsensical. Claims for recognition and their counterpart, the granting of recognition, are directly linked with efforts to work against oppression and domination. As Kelly Oliver notes, it “seems obvious that oppressed people may engage in struggles for recognition in response to their lack of recognition from the dominant culture.”²³ We can equally say that when we confront the domination of conflict resolution by Western approaches, or the domination of indigenous peoples by settlers, or limited acknowledgment of local approaches in conflict resolution and peacebuilding interventions, recognition is likely to feature as part of a progressive response.

Less obvious is the perplexing possibility that “recognition itself is part of the pathology of oppression and domination.”²⁴ As Kelly Oliver shows, it is “only after oppressed people are dehumanized” through domination that “they seek acknowledgment or recognition of their humanity.”²⁵ This situation is doubly perverse, as recognition is sought from “the very group that has denied them of it in the first place.”²⁶ Furthermore, because those “who are dominant have the power to create, confer, or withhold recognition,” recognition itself “operates as a cultural currency.”²⁷

We can discern the problems outlined by Oliver in recent moves to accord (limited) recognition to local and indigenous peoples and their approaches to conflict. Here recognition is accorded by progressive liberals. In the absence of asking fundamental questions about how such recognition occurs, recognizing others gains its political standing and force through liberal notions of equality and justice which have developed in Western centers of political power and privilege. This begs a prior political relation: recognition emanates from the site of ex-colonial powers that owe at least some of their current standing to previous colonial relationships, or it originates from settler-colonial nation-states entwined

with the political disenfranchisement of indigenous peoples through processes of violent and racially based nation-building.²⁸

If we follow Oliver and the foregoing critique of recognition, we can say that relying upon recognition to address conflict resolution's relationship with difference necessarily operates on the terrain, values, and institutions of the dominant (Western) partner.²⁹ Rather than addressing problematic relationships, trading in the currency of recognition involves all parties in the relations of domination which originally made recognition necessary.³⁰ This situation serves as testimony to what Oliver terms the "pathology of recognition."³¹

It is important, however, that we do not overly simplify or distort the range of relationships which characterize recognition. Regardless of relations of domination, those in oppressive relationships are able to withhold recognition in acts of dignity and resistance.³² And interactions which may initially exhibit aspects of Oliver's "pathology of recognition" can evolve, through complex encounters, to mutual exchange. To understand how such evolution is possible, consider that the process of according recognition (by someone in a position of power) itself requires the participation of, and counter-recognition by, the less powerful. Those conferring recognition are reliant (for the very process of giving recognition) upon recognition by those who would accept or reject such recognition. This situation can generate movement toward equality (rather than domination) because there is a certain symmetry, and hence a type of equality, necessarily at play in order for the exchange itself to take place, even in relationships of domination.³³ So while trading in the currency of recognition may involve parties in the relations of domination which originally made recognition necessary, we must allow that these relations do not remain stable.

Some might seize on this possibility to argue that in conflict resolution we need a more fundamental recognition of cultural others, and that only this can address disavowal and governing of difference. It could be argued, for instance, that non-Western peoples have their own forms of political organization, ways of being, and dealing with conflict, all of which are subsumed in the current transnational liberal order. Strong or "authentic" recognition would say that these ways deserve to be recognized alongside their Western equivalents. Such recognition would in some respects be a welcome move, and one likely to promote dialogue among different approaches to conflict and its management. It may also provide a basis for serious cross-cultural conversations.

However, emphasis upon strong recognition risks generating an inflexible and problematic understanding of human difference. Chapter 1

discussed how colonial and more recent understandings of difference contribute to this difficulty by obscuring both similarities among people and their historical and everyday entanglement. The very act of attempting to recognize “fundamental difference” can distance and alienate people from one another by producing essentialist notions of “us” and “them.” Its logical conclusion, if we are to speak of primary differences, is incommensurability. In contrast, it is clearly possible to have encounters across difference although they may be at times difficult, conflict-ridden, or tense.

Arguments for strong recognition also lead us into unhelpful debates between cultural relativism and universalism. The core difficulty of the relativist position is that it suggests the separateness of peoples. This cannot hold because any suggestion that there are no human universals undermines the possibility, and achievement, of anthropological and other understanding across cultures.³⁴ Equally, recent decades have seen the amassing of arguments and evidence that universalizing arguments often involve the more or less disguised assertion of a *particular* position across and over human difference. The compromise position of recognizing some difference and some universalism is, as might be expected, compromised. It provides no guidance for answering questions about *what* difference and *which* universals? It simply returns us to the problems of the struggle for recognition.

Thus far we see that recognition is bound up with domination *and* that it may contain the impetus for movements away from domination and toward equality. Arguments for a strong recognition do not solve the politico-ethical challenges raised by Oliver.³⁵ Instead they return us to recognition itself. There is a need, therefore, to further explore recognition. This time I explore our selves and our relations with others in conflict resolution to examine the role that recognition might play in addressing the contemporary challenges faced by conflict resolution.

Recognizing selves

Most theorizing about recognition can be traced to Hegel’s phenomenological explication of the dialectical master-slave encounter.³⁶ Here Hegel explores the curiously symmetrical relations of recognition through the scenario of two self-consciousnesses confronting each other and seeking to recognize their selves in the other. This leads initially to the famous life-and-death struggle for recognition and the domination of the master (the recognized) over the recognizing slave. Yet this situation is incomplete because the asymmetry of the relationship means that the

master cannot obtain the type of recognition—peer recognition—sought from the slave. According to Hegel, mutual recognition within the state is the only mature solution.

Hegel's theorizing is no-doubt subtle and sophisticated, but it is the underlying premise of his theorizing which Oliver and others want to question. Hegel begins with the assumption that we seek self-consciousness,³⁷ and that to do so we recognize ourselves in likeness or opposition to those who are different from us; that others serve as a type of mirror for our self-consciousness. Recognition, as Alphonso Lingis explains, is the key vehicle: when we "encounter others, it is recognition we demand, recognition of the freedom and self-consciousness of the ego, confirmation, attestation, certification of our identity."³⁸ In the master-slave struggle, the power to kill the other emerges as essential to one's own existence.³⁹ Oliver objects that such a space is one of alienation and aggression.⁴⁰ Lingis also objects that the demand for recognition is an eccentric way to conceive of our encounters with others.⁴¹ He notes that a descriptive phenomenology of everyday life shows that a quest for self-consciousness does not dominate our relations with others. Self-consciousness "is at best a means for acquiring certain skills."⁴² "One does not live to write one's autobiography."⁴³

Without either accepting or refusing the Hegelian schema, or the alternatives put forward by Oliver or Lingis, I want to explore the workings of recognition in the context of relations across difference in conflict resolution. Once again I draw upon my self to explore links between the position of conflict resolution selves and difference. This time I gain additional help from Gilles Deleuze's⁴⁴ analysis of recognition to consider how the make-up and bearing of scholar and practitioner selves in knowing and approaching difference are at the center of current challenges facing the conflict resolution field.

Some of my personally most significant work across cultural difference has occurred through involvement with Australian Aboriginal people. This followed limited personal awareness of Aboriginal people and issues, a somewhat common experience for white Australians of my generation.⁴⁵ My initial reflections upon cultural difference, in a professional rather than academic setting, were influenced by a revision of Australian colonial history to redress earlier silencing of Aboriginal presence and settler-indigenous relations. This was part of an (international) indigenous renaissance, including renewed political claims linked with calls for the recognition of Aboriginal peoples, histories, presence, and sometimes sovereignty. Notwithstanding the difficulties with recognition just explicated, I found calls for recognition compelling, and I responded to them.

My own sense of what was required to deal with difficulties between indigenous and settler Australians became in some sense predicated upon a type of cultural recognition.

Deleuze provides a way of understanding why recognition may feel compelling at the level of thought and knowledge, particularly when our familiar order is disrupted.⁴⁶ Deleuze examines recognition as part of his wider challenge to the assumption that we all know what it means to think and how to go about it.⁴⁷ He scrutinizes our processes of knowing to observe that a range of faculties, “perception, memory, imagination, understanding,” access the object we want to know, but recognition occurs when “all the faculties together relate their given and relate themselves to a form of identity in the object.”⁴⁸ Re-cognition occurs through this alignment. It occurs through a “certain distribution of the empirical and transcendental” which involves “the harmonious exercise of all the faculties upon a supposed same object.”⁴⁹ Recognition converts experience and interactions with others into categories and objects for the purposes of knowing.

The process of recognition assumes and relies, then, upon the collaboration of the faculties within the unity and coherence of a sovereign knowing subject.⁵⁰ To *recognize* is to bring the figure of the sovereign Western self into existence. Recognition and sovereignty are in a symbiotic relationship. But the sovereign self, the Cartesian *I think* is, as shown in Chapter 3, culturally and historically contingent rather than essential and natural. It should not be assumed or taken for granted. One implication is that the relationship between recognition and sovereignty requires scrutiny in our efforts to move beyond the influence of sovereignty in Western social science and conflict resolution.

The link between recognition and the sovereign self generates problems for knowing and relating to difference. Thought modeled on recognition helps to bring a particular type of self into being: the autonomous and sovereign knowing self that aligns the faculties through cognition. It continually refers to this self. When exposed to difference, to cultural others for instance, the recognizing subject subsumes them to the dominant version of the self. Self-consciousness “is not immanent adhesion to oneself, but re-cognizing oneself, cognizing one’s representation on an outside mind. Rather, looking at another, I look for recognition of myself, recognition of my own consciousness and freedom.”⁵¹ This approach to self and other involves doubling oneself and making “the other” supplement an absence.⁵²

One way to take this critique further is to say that recognition refers to conformities; it allows only the recognizable and the recognized.⁵³

Because recognition is drawn from commonsense, it falls back upon established ways of knowing human difference such as the notion of culture and the accompanying political, historical, and knowledge relationships examined in Chapter 1. This subjects difference to the requirements of knowing that prevail in mainstream social-scientific disciplines. Here “difference itself remains condemned and must atone or be redeemed under the auspices of reason which renders it livable and thinkable.”⁵⁴ The danger is that recognition disavows cultural others and limits possible relations across difference by returning thought to the sovereign knowing subject. Such thought tends to not produce anything new in our relations with others. Instead it disciplines and captures the world in an unchanging form.⁵⁵ It may be, then, that recognition brings about an impoverished imitation of the relation with a concrete lived other.⁵⁶

Recognition also supports the discrete and sovereign subject by playing other roles in mainstream Western social science and political life. Recognizing other cultures is the necessary counterpart of Western allegiance to a discrete, autonomous, and sovereign subject. Because the sovereign subject is separate, conceptual unities such as culture are required to explain and make human interaction meaningful in Western social-scientific thought.⁵⁷ Recognition of “other cultures” provides a powerful way for Western individuals and societies to recognize themselves as distinct from others. This returns, once again, to the familiar and the same, a process which risks epistemological violence and hence exacerbating, rather than addressing, the culture challenge and the governing of difference in conflict resolution.

Perhaps these objections to recognition explain why, more or less from the beginning of my relationships with Aboriginal people, I felt uncomfortable with the idea of cultural recognition, regardless of how it influenced my work practices. At times the notion of recognizing felt distinctly obscure and inappropriate, particularly in my personal relationships with people. Recognition did, of course, play out in my work on indigenous issues in conflict resolution where progressive social policy dovetailed with my professional practice. Here I drew upon the idea of recognition to acknowledge, and at times advocate for, recognition of indigenous approaches to conflict resolution. Even in this work, though, I found myself recoiling against injunctions associated with cultural recognition such as the call to be “culturally sensitive.” This idea seemed misplaced and thin. Although Aboriginal people affirmed that I *was* behaving in culturally sensitive ways, the idea of recognition was not the driving force in my working relationships

or friendships with Aboriginal people, or in the work I was committed to doing.

Instead, I had a sense which I can best describe as “knowing-through-being-with.” Such being together made possible our joint work. And this being together is not thinkable through recognition. Any move I make—even now—to *recognize* begins to bring me into existence as a sovereign subject distinct and apart from the people I worked with. Recognition does not describe the relation; it seems insubstantial and belies the extent to which *they* made it possible for *me* to be. Persisting with recognition does not seem useful or appropriate; this would bring about a configuration of my self that would actually parasitize both our experience and the being together that emerged between us.

Once again, though, recognition contains possibilities unacknowledged in the foregoing critique. My conflict resolution work with Aboriginal people, and the relationships formed in this sphere have a particular context and history. Struggles for personal, legal, and institutional recognition⁵⁸ all played a role in establishing the social and political setting in which I encountered Aboriginal people. The very possibility of a dedicated Aboriginal Mediation Project Officer position in which I was employed, for instance, relies upon these types of struggles. It might be said that the very *possibility* for me to be with Aboriginal people in the type of relations I refer to above has to be fought for, and this necessarily involves struggles for recognition.

The processes of recognition and the dynamics it promotes may also not wholly coincide with the sovereign Western self and its social, political, and cultural correlates that I have outlined. Recognition, in relation to both selves and others, is complex and messy. Indeed, recognition is at least partially characterized by internal mistakes and errors. As Jacques Lacan has famously argued, the constitution of the self involves the reiteration of *misrecognition*. This slippage contains possibilities for subversion and disruption of orthodoxies both in the formation of selves and with regard to the norms of the wider social order.⁵⁹ The continual reiteration of norms of mainstream Western culture and society for instance, necessary for their successful operation, also signals their inefficiency and therefore a weakness that can be exploited by continually rearticulating them.⁶⁰ In this way recognition may escape its attachment to dominant norms.

Finally, the anticipated end point of Hegel’s struggle for recognition is not (solely) the establishment of sovereign self-consciousness, but also mutual recognition and the affirmation of universal consciousness and ethical community. The struggle internal to this process, and particularly

the interweaving of individual consciences along the way, is emphasized by Axel Honneth.⁶¹ For Honneth, Hegel turned away from the “idea of an original intersubjectivity of human-kind” as he developed his philosophy of consciousness,⁶² and this has led to too much emphasis on the latter at the expense of the former. So through the work of Honneth and others, recognition may contain greater intersubjective potential than Oliver and others allow.

Nonetheless, these qualifications cannot totally allay concerns about recognition as a way of engaging others to address contemporary challenges in conflict resolution. Struggles for recognition may be crucial to just political relationships, but this does not mean that recognition can guarantee the possibilities of political struggle, misrecognition, or intersubjectivity. Notwithstanding its possibilities, recognition risks return to the sovereign knowing subject and the mainstream Western social-scientific tradition which attempts to know and construct the world after its own form. Recognition can open up exchanges and struggles across difference, but it can also deploy the faculties in an unacknowledged commonsensical arrangement that (re-)produces the dominant Western version of the sovereign knowing subject.

The risk of return to the sovereign subject means that cosmopolitan recognition should not be the dominant logic for moving conflict resolution beyond the influence of sovereignty to address the culture challenge and the governing of difference. We should not dispense with the notion of recognition, but Oliver’s critique of the pathology of recognition, and analysis of the dynamics of recognition, and my experience with Australian Aboriginal people in conflict resolution practice show that recognition presents problems as well as opportunities. Recognition may be geared toward mutual intersubjective recognition, but it also remains closely tied with singular subjectivity.

In the next section I draw upon relatedness to explore ways of complementing the influence of cosmopolitan recognition in conflict resolution while mitigating the risk of returning to the sovereign subject of the mainstream Western social-scientific tradition. Relatedness provides a much better account of the sense of “being-with” that I had with Aboriginal people, a sense that greatly assisted my conflict resolution work. I first draw upon my practical experience alongside a brief theoretical explication of relatedness. This leads me to explore how the intensification of ethical challenges through relatedness offers, for both scholars and practitioners, a way of encouraging exchange and discussion to mitigate the influence of sovereignty and the dominant politico-cultural relations of conflict resolution.

Relatedness: Complementing recognition

While something like “recognition of Aboriginal culture” was at play in my conflict resolution practice with Aboriginal people, this was not the major force in my working or personal relationships. In fact, the notion of according recognition to these people felt, and continues to feel, patronizing. My sense of the relationships I formed with Aboriginal and other people in conflict resolution processes is best described, as I noted above, as a type of being together or fundamental relatedness. I felt that these people made it possible for me to be. The relational sense is crucial, and it refers to a type of co-being which is not thinkable through recognition.

A wide variety of theoretical resources are available for exploring relatedness, yet all derive from the fact that human *being*—our very existence—is constituted relationally; to the fact that being necessarily emerges with others. Jean-Luc Nancy, for instance, shows that being is “in-common.”⁶³ He explains that being is only possible in its sharing and partitioning, which is experienced singularly yet is *in*-common.⁶⁴ Hence Nancy’s formulation that being is “singular plural.”⁶⁵ Such paradoxical relations speak to the richness of human existence. Neither being nor singularity pre-exists; all that exists “coexists because it exists.”⁶⁶ Adriana Cavarero concretizes the paradoxical relationality of being expressed by Nancy with the idea of narration.⁶⁷ She shows that others are necessary for the telling of our stories. The “relating” of one’s narrative by others is the condition of existence, with each life-story gaining its uniqueness precisely because it is “constitutively interwoven with many others.”⁶⁸

Where recognition converts experience and interactions with others into categories and objects for the purposes of knowing by the sovereign self, relatedness attempts to access the experience of being-with others so that this experience can stand uninterrupted. This task is difficult partly because the sovereign self, a way of being which assimilates experience by returning to itself and its systems, is a very influential way of knowing in the Western tradition. The question of how to relate to others while avoiding returning to the self-subsistent sovereign self has been vigorously pursued by Emmanuel Levinas, leading him to conceive of an “attitude” that is “beyond essence.”⁶⁹ Yet the question of what this attitude is, and how to progress it turns out to be very difficult to grasp, in large part because it must avoid “grasping” in the traditional mode of Western social science and philosophy.

To begin, Levinas suggests that our pursuit of relatedness should avoid converting experience into categories and pass up the impulse to

immediately realize or foresee its outcomes.⁷⁰ Levinas wants us to forego this so that we can encounter others. One way he illustrates the nature of his task is by referring to the effects of light as a sensory medium aligned with traditional Western ways of knowing. Light is a powerful and commonly used metaphor for knowing (we “throw light” on a particular subject, for example), but Levinas objects to the way it shines *upon*; the way it illuminates yet distances us from the world. He notes that light “renders us master of the exterior world but is incapable of discovering a peer for us there.”⁷¹ Here Levinas challenges traditional Western scholarship which proceeds precisely by converting experiences into categories through the knowing subject—through processes of recognition and representation that gain their efficacy by claiming to (immediately) know or to predict.

In place of traditional metaphors such as light, Levinas pursues relatedness through affective notions including “approach, proximity, caress and fecundity.”⁷² Being proximate to another and moving to communicate is “not a modality of cognition.”⁷³ Instead it mobilizes pre-cognitive, sensual, and affective dimensions of human existence and encounter. This challenges traditional Western understandings of self-consciousness, and sets the scene for bringing selfhood into an ethical relationship with other selves. Levinas shows that to “approach” another endows him or her with a quality and capacity to “know” us—a quality (which we also share) which is prior to self-consciousness. Consciousness is hereby turned *inside out*.⁷⁴ Approaching others means that our selves are not “other than the outside, but precisely the inside of the outside.”⁷⁵

Endowing others with the capacity to “know” us in this way breaks up inwardness and makes being vulnerable to others.⁷⁶ Where processes of recognition fold the world and others into self-consciousness, relatedness unfolds to others and the world—an attitude that can be characterized as a type of “given-over-ness.” In place of the confidence and insularity of the sovereign self, the breaking up of inwardness and exposure to others and the world makes being vulnerable.⁷⁷ This is not, importantly, the entwining of pre-constituted and separate subjects because, as Levinas and others show, the very possibility for self-consciousness relies upon others. Being is in-common; is pre-reflective and pre-linguistic.⁷⁸ The dynamics and relations of this type of ineffable “structure or event”⁷⁹ are incalculable and cannot be reduced to cognitive reasoning.⁸⁰ Rather, sensibility and vulnerability are at the very heart of relatedness and of selfhood itself.⁸¹ Relatedness evokes an affective encounter which makes possible our very being, and this being is singular-plural.

Relatedness and recognition should not, though, be thought of as oppositional terms.⁸² Each complements and extends the other. Levinas shows that pre-cognitive processes of relatedness offer a rich encounter that cannot be apprehended by a cognitively focused sovereign self, and that relatedness lays the foundation for pursuing ethical and just relations. But because relatedness is an ineffable event or quality, it tends to find its expression through norms and rules of social interaction such as, for instance, calls for human and legal rights. Relatedness cannot be reduced to these expressions, and we need to attend to the mutually constitutive vulnerability of relatedness to avoid returning to the epistemological violence of the sovereign self. Yet recognition is often necessary in political life to give expression to relatedness, and relatedness can permeate struggles for recognition.

While emphasis on recognition risks bypassing and disavowing difference by returning to sovereignty and mainstream social science, recognition and relatedness are both important for advancing conflict resolution. Political struggles for recognition are an important context for pursuing relatedness, and pursuing relatedness is necessary to mitigate the ethico-political risks of recognition. Relatedness is also essential to deepen and extend our encounters across difference to help conflict resolution address the culture challenge and the governing of difference. How might this play out in real-life encounters, and what are the accompanying implications for conflict resolution scholarship and practice?

Relatedness: Beyond sovereignty?

I was once mediating among Aboriginal people when an elderly participant, an Old Woman,⁸³ rebuked me by saying, “*No . . . you’re on my country now.*” Conflict resolution practitioners are trained to deal deftly and assertively with such challenges. Yet in this case something about the manner and nature of the Old Woman’s challenge silenced me. I found myself confounded and stalled, and my authority and ability to intervene disappeared. By invoking the question of land title and the fact of colonization she disrupted the prevailing order. The consent (apparently) previously given by participants, my training, previous experience, and administrative and legislative backing that find their apogee in the state all fell away. She challenged my personal sovereignty, the sovereignty of the settler-colonial liberal state, and, by extension, broader transnational liberalism.

The Old Woman's challenge can partly be characterized as a call for recognition. A treaty or similar settlement has never been negotiated in Australia, and serious recognition by the settler order of prior Aboriginal political standing is yet to occur. The term "country" refers to land, so, "No . . . you're on my country now" can be interpreted as calling me to recognize her authority and ownership over a particular territory. We were indeed mediating in the homelands of her tribal group. But "country" also invokes understandings of land, ownership, being, and political life at odds with those shared by mainstream Western conflict resolution scholars and practitioners. Country *participates* in reciprocal relation with human beings, bringing them into existence and serving as a type of poetic ordering principle for guiding relations among people.⁸⁴ People are custodians rather than owners. So while she challenged me, she was not demanding that I simply reverse dominant settler-colonial relationship dynamics by recognizing her and her rights to land in the way that these are understood in, for instance, Western property law. Indeed, neither recognition nor the regime of Western property law is sufficient for understanding Aboriginal ways of being and approaches to social and political life.

Beyond her demand for recognition, the Old Woman was calling me into relationship. In the same way that Benvenisti's complaint discussed in Chapter 1 used the words "at all" to make a demand about the manner in which people *should* be known by conflict resolution practitioners, the Old Woman's use of "country" refers to the importance of relatedness for her and her tradition; to a worldview in which relationship is crucial to the workings of life. She later invited me into her home and shared family photographs with me. Her invitation was a call to be affected, and to be vulnerable to her, her people, and tradition. I was compelled, without thinking about it, to take up her invitation, to sit and drink tea with her while she told me stories. Relatedness forms a bond across difference while the cognition in re-cognition keeps us apart.

The call to relatedness internal to the Old Woman's challenge led me to realize that I could not adequately address the culture challenge in conflict resolution through the detached and sovereign knowing subject of mainstream social or political science. Simply adopting the dominant ways of knowing of my (Western) social science tradition—the most dominant ways of knowing within conflict resolution scholarship—would deny or subsume her and other Aboriginal ways of being. The recognizing sovereign social-science scholar tends to use a form of reason which encompasses rather than engages other traditions. Such an

approach would generate epistemological violence and contribute to liberal settler-colonial cultural governance. This would in turn (re-)produce cultural conflict within knowledge production and undermine cosmopolitan conflict resolution principles and goals geared toward ethical and responsible relationship with others.

The striking nature of my personal experience with the Old Woman alongside the engaged nature of conflict resolution practice led me to consider the possibility of scholarship beyond the conventional sovereign and detached social science knower. In particular, I began to consider the link between relatedness and personal experience for realizing (cosmopolitan) conflict resolution's responsibility to individual people in conflict. The capacity to be affected and to respond (one's responsibility) relies upon relatedness—upon the given-over-ness of existence. And responsibility can only be felt and be allowed to come into play through the personal, whether this emerges through direct involvement or a broader sense of how one's existence emerges as part of a broader being-in-common. The personal is, of course, typically considered a difficulty in social science. It is something to be controlled, contained, and, according to many scholars, erased in the final research output.⁸⁵ Yet as discussed in Chapter 3, social science scholarship is invariably bound with, and cannot be separated from questions of who we are.⁸⁶

Pursuing relatedness across difference in conflict resolution scholarship suggests a way of getting beyond the influence of sovereignty and the culture question. Chapter 1 concluded by arguing that we can address the culture challenge by moving away from (cultural) categories that suggest separateness of people, by downplaying claims to have or know culture. Instead of the separateness implied by *cultures*, culture can be thought of as a relational term referring to the ways in which people make meaning with others. *Relatedness*, the given-over-ness and co-being articulated by Levinas and others deepens our understanding of this quality of co-existence. It suggests that conflict resolution scholarship rethink its allegiances to traditional social science scholarship, and serves as a vehicle for this rethinking. Where the sovereign subject operating on the model of recognition assimilates difference to itself, relatedness promises engagement across difference and, in Gilles Deleuze's terms, "stranger and more compromising adventures."⁸⁷

One concrete way of pursuing relatedness beyond sovereignty in conflict resolution scholarship is to ask after *who* to complement and extend traditional social science tendencies to ask after *what*. Adriana Cavarero shows the pervasive practice of asking what in Western scholarship is

linked with the archetypal philosophical question *What is man?* The place of abstract and universal man in myriad definitional efforts to circumscribe and define in the social sciences makes the whole of the Western tradition and its scholarship the field for sovereign man's self-representation.⁸⁸ For Cavarero, asking *who* invokes the "unrepeatable identity of someone"—not the sovereign individual of modern political doctrines⁸⁹ but the unique existent *who* emerges in constitutive relation with others. Where asking *what* refers us to the autonomous and abstract subject, asking *who* evokes the telling of our stories by others; the teamwork or co-being of existence which bypasses notions of a sovereign, separate, and autonomous knower.

A shift from asking "what" to asking "who" emerged in my intercultural research about conflict resolution practice with Australian Aboriginal people. My early research efforts set up definitional questions such as, "What is Aboriginal culture?" But this placed me awkwardly in my relationships with Aboriginal people. Although clearly relevant for social science research, it did not translate well into the field and my encounters with Aboriginal people. My sense of being-with people never suggested that I ask a question such as, "What is your culture?" Some scholars may say that that my role was to answer the question, "What is Aboriginal culture? (particularly to examine what is significant about it for conflict resolution) without directly putting the question. But such a translation process can mask manifold injustices.⁹⁰ Instead I pursued a way of knowing which asks after unique individuals and my encounters with them in the research process.⁹¹

Attention to being-with people in personal encounter helps to navigate traditional understandings of culture, particularly the tendency to refer to a group of individuals by distinguishing them from other groups. I did, of course, learn about who people were, where they were from, and so on. But by not asking, "What is culture?," I experienced no tension around *which* Aboriginal culture people belonged to; about whether they were part of a specific Aboriginal culture in the context of other Aboriginal groups, or whether they were part of a broad Australian Aboriginal culture. Problems of definition, in other words, melted away. It seemed clear and perfectly workable that individuals belonged both to their specific mob (or group)⁹² and, in contingent and variously mediated ways, wider Aboriginal Australia. Other definitory questions also dissipated. The difficulties associated with the question of *What is Aboriginality* or *Aboriginal* did not feature. It seemed, again, perfectly feasible and clear, for instance, that the Aboriginal person with access to ancestors, spirit, the government employee, and the friend who lent me

a machine to do construction work around my house were all equally co-present in the one person.

The co-constitutive relations of unique individuals with each other are a means for negotiating difficulties arising out of the categories and entities established and reinforced by asking *what*. Avruch, for instance, partly deals with the challenge of defining culture by telling us *what* it is not: culture is not homogeneous (it is socially and psychologically distributed throughout populations); cultures are not mutually exclusive (they can overlap such that one person can be a member of multiple cultures); and culture is not a "thing" (it is a complicated social and psychological processes).⁹³ The difficulty here is that the logic of these correctives culminates in the notion that culture is "a derivative of individual experience,"⁹⁴ an outcome which presents problems for the original social science effort to define culture by referring to a group of people. Relatedness bypasses the problem of seeking to identify a group. Instead it refers us to ongoing possibility of multiple and shifting relations across difference aside from the formation or existence of groups.

So pursuing relatedness begins to address important difficulties and shortcomings in conventional social science and conflict resolution approaches to knowing human difference. In contrast to aggregation and ordering through separate entities or categories, asking *who* moves in the direction of acknowledging human difference as it plays out through unique individuals across traditional categories and boundaries. Rather than affirming categories and entities, relational knowledge adjusts the balance between the ontological import of entities and relationships such that the latter gain more standing. We can apply this principle to the production of knowledge itself by asking after the concrete knowing subject to place him or her in relationship with others. This bypasses the sovereign and abstract knowing subject, generating greater capacity to negotiate boundaries and an opportunity for more supple and convivial understandings of difference.

Conflict resolution knowledge cannot, of course, entirely escape asking *what*, and nor can it leap beyond the sovereign knower of the traditional social sciences. Asking after *who* invariably draws us into description⁹⁵ and this involves recognition. But it is also not necessary to entirely displace asking after *what* to pursue cosmopolitan conflict resolution goals. It is necessary, though, to challenge, complement, and extend mainstream ways of knowing and the traditional figure of the sovereign knower in conflict resolution scholarship. Pursuing relatedness simultaneously helps us to work across difference and to mitigate the influence of sovereignty. It suggests that the knower *unfold* to the

world and others rather than *fold* the world into the sovereign self. Doing so aligns with conflict resolution's longstanding commitment to engaged practice and responsiveness to people in conflict. Possible avenues for relational knowing in conflict resolution scholarship are discussed further in the next chapter.

What, though, of conflict resolution practice and the ethico-political challenges of governing difference? I have explained that the Old Woman's challenge interrupted my sovereignty and the wider settler-colonial liberal order with its dominant politico-cultural relations. This suggests possibilities, based in relatedness, for mitigating the governing of difference in conflict resolution.

Chapter 2 explained that transnational liberal governance through conflict resolution processes relies upon two qualitatively different capacities—technicality and susceptibility. Third parties must hone their cognitive and intellectual abilities to listen, question, analyze, and direct interactions among conflicting parties to encourage people toward liberal norms about order, dispute, and selfhood. Such technical capacities involve, in Levinasian terms, converting experience with parties into categories.⁹⁶

Third parties must also be able to maintain rapport and empathize with strong emotions of participants; they must be susceptible to participants in conflict resolution processes. To mobilize empathic qualities, to respect and appreciate participants, and to attend to their welfare and empowerment, third parties must be affected by participants. These empathic qualities require that third parties experience exposure and vulnerability to participants. Such relations can only emerge because selves are in fundamental relation with others. Relatedness, then, is the initial condition for responsiveness in conflict resolution.

It is true, of course, that generic "listening techniques" employed by mediators and professional helpers are contrived in some instances, and may be mechanized through years of practice in others. While empathy may be contrived, this is unlikely to result in genuine feeling for others or, therefore, in effective forms of practice. Aside from and prior to any mechanization, relatedness with others is the original condition for responsiveness. And as conflict resolution requires trust between participants and third parties, ongoing affective capability for establishing rapport, and hence capacity for susceptibility, is necessary for effective practice.

Within conflict resolution processes, interactions between third parties and participants generate sets of actions upon other actions. Relations of power and governance emerge through an intricate interplay of capacities

for technicality and susceptibility. The capacity for susceptibility, crucial for generating and sustaining rapport, opens third parties and participants to each other on a multitude of occasions and with varying levels of intensity throughout the conflict resolution process. On each occasion, a moment pregnant with possibilities arises. The third party is susceptible to the participant's world as the participant is to the third party's. In this moment vulnerabilities and moving interpersonal exchanges are possible. Equally, poised lines of force overshadow these moments of proximity between selves.

The third party carries a mix of professional and institutional legitimacy in the transnational liberal order. Within this context, technical operations gain purchase through the very susceptibility internal to exchange between third parties and participants. Third parties rely upon susceptibility to effect a technical operation organized according to dominant ways of thinking about order and dispute. The interplay of technicality and susceptibility in conflict resolution processes is often relatively harmonious: empathic rapport developed with participants enables the technical operations of conflict resolution processes in alignment with dominant liberal forms of selfhood and approaches to order and dispute. As argued in Chapter 2, technicality often wins out. While both capacities are necessary, susceptibility is typically subordinated to technical ordering in line with the goals of transnational liberal governance.

Equally, liberal governance can be disrupted and its success is not certain. The interplay of technicality and susceptibility is not always harmonious. Troubling events at the limit of conflict resolution practice, such as Benvenisti's complaint, place capacities for technicality and susceptibility in conflict. When conflict resolution processes falter or fail, practitioners often reflect upon causes. Is failure a result of participants, outside forces, or the processes and approaches adopted by the third party? Deciding such matters represents an ethical challenge for practitioners. It also offers an opportunity for discussion and exchange to mitigate the influence of sovereignty and address the governing of difference in conflict resolution.

The fact that Australian Aboriginal people emphasize relationship⁹⁷ intensified my experience of the interplay of technicality and susceptibility in conflict resolution practice in ways that suggest possibilities for addressing the dominant politico-cultural dynamics of conflict resolution practice. In the early stages of my work with Aboriginal people it became clear that forging and practicing a responsive relationship, and hence prioritizing susceptibility alongside technicality, was a condition for guiding intercultural conflict resolution processes. The importance

of susceptibility became more significant in my intercultural work than in other mainstream areas of my mediation practice. Prioritizing relationship and susceptibility cut across my usual expectations by, for instance, emphasizing relationships with people over my behavior in performing the technical dimension of conflict resolution work.

During a large mediation an Old Woman loudly and publicly berated me following my summary of discussion because of implications it had for how it may have made her appear before the group. I had begun to develop a relationship with her and was concerned that my ability to work with her and the wider group would be compromised. When I apologized to her during a break, she dismissed the issue, saying something like, “that was just business [formalities]” and “you’re alright [fine, a good person].” The relationship appeared to be more enduring than the impact of what she saw as a shortcoming in my performance for there was subsequently no acrimony between us or problems for the process.

The emergence of susceptibility as crucial for my conflict resolution practice with Aboriginal people mitigated, and in some cases reversed the usual domination of technical abilities through my self and wider mediation practice. I began to wonder what it might mean to know the world and conflict resolution in an Aboriginal way. This movement emerged out of my interaction with Aboriginal ways of performing themselves which contradict liberal expectations about selves, order, and conflict,⁹⁸ and out of the accompanying resistance to dominant politico-cultural relations of conflict resolution. It is unsurprising that Aboriginal people might resist, but the fact that resistance manifested *through me*, a white Australian, is more remarkable. I was, after all, delivering a conflict resolution process sanctioned by the settler-colonial state.

So while conflict resolution processes typically effect an operation of power and liberal governance by trading in the susceptibility of selves to have parties reconfigure themselves as directed by practitioners, other dynamics are also possible. Yet in many of my interactions with Aboriginal people, a type of reversal was occurring through the reconfiguring of the mediator through Aboriginal forces. Some might object that this is simply the recounting of (my) personal experiences which have little import for wider conflict resolution. Nonetheless, all conflict resolution processes rely upon interpersonal exchange: interaction among people is central to managing and resolving conflict. And while it is true that I was part of this Aboriginal resistance, it is more accurate, and significant, to say that resistance occurred through me via the actions of Aboriginal people acting upon me in effecting the prioritization of relationship and other elements of Aboriginal worldview.

Aboriginal emphasis upon relationship compounded the broader capacity for susceptibility required for conflict resolution practice. Aboriginal forces took hold of me in a way that is unanticipated by the predominantly technical operation of liberal power and governance. This experience is promising for reconfiguring dominant politico-cultural relations because of the centrality of reworking and transforming selves for the operation of power through conflict resolution processes. If the agent who exercises power and governance through susceptibility in conflict resolution practice can become vulnerable through the relatedness necessary for conflict resolution, there are broader possibilities for challenging and addressing, rather than reproducing, the governing of difference in conflict resolution practice.

Engagements and encounters across difference are at the center of conflict resolution practice and transnational liberal governance. Conflict resolution is an agent of transnational governance across difference, but the importance of relatedness to conflict resolution practice contains the possibility for mitigating this very operation of power. Relatedness can disrupt the return to the sovereign self and liberal mainstream understandings of difference, order, and dispute. Furthermore, the impulse to respond to the needs of people in conflict situations is an important base for nourishing and developing the theoretical and practical possibilities accompanying relatedness—for helping conflict resolution to respond anew. This is the topic of Chapter 5.

Conclusion

This chapter began with the need to examine relations between the influential notion of sovereignty and advanced theoretical formulations in the conflict resolution field to better address the culture challenge and the problem of governing difference on transnational liberal terms. The call for cosmopolitan conflict resolution aligns well with conflict resolution goals, and promises to help to move the field to a footing which operates beyond any particular center of power. Caution is nonetheless needed because questions of how cosmopolitan conflict resolution might be progressed, and the normative foundation for its practice are yet to be adequately worked through. The chapter explored the question of how we engage people in conflict situations by examining the popular and commonsensical notion of recognition. While recognition is characterized by movement toward equality, it is also accompanied by significant risks because it is bound with the relations of domination it seeks to surpass. Recognition tends to fall back upon the sovereign

knowing self and mainstream social science ways of knowing which appropriate rather than adequately acknowledge difference. We should not dispense with recognition because it is a necessary component of just political relations. Yet it should not be the primary logic for addressing the difference challenge in conflict resolution.

The second part of the chapter explained how relatedness complements recognition and helps us to mitigate the risks of returning to sovereignty that troubles recognition and contemporary conflict resolution. While recognition converts experience and interactions with others into categories and objects for knowing, relatedness refers to a pre-cognitive given-over-ness which makes us vulnerable to others and makes our very being possible. Such relatedness underpins the sense of “being-with” people necessary for effective conflict resolution practice. By drawing on conflict resolution practice with Australian Aboriginal people, I showed that pursuing relatedness moves beyond the aggregation and ordering that accompanies the use of entities or categories in mainstream social science. It thereby allows more seamless movement across boundaries and categories. Moreover, intensifying the dynamics of relatedness can disrupt the transnational liberal governance of difference by amplifying tensions within conflict resolution practice. This suggests broader possibilities, which I explore in the next chapter, for renewing conflict resolution’s impulse for responding to people in conflict situations.

5

Responding Anew

Responsiveness is a compelling orientation for conflict resolution. Responding to the concerns and life circumstances of people in conflict suffuses founding approaches and guides many conflict resolution processes. It also features in the recent call by Ramsbotham and colleagues for a cosmopolitan conflict resolution in which each of us bears “responsibility for the lives and life-hopes of others being damaged through conflict.”¹ Such calls to responsiveness form a powerful and commonsensical rationale for conflict resolution practice. Problems arise, though, when this influential call is connected with similarly powerful—and dominant—ideas and institutions which suggest self-sufficiency in knowing, governing, and being. Consider, briefly, John Burton’s pioneering human needs approach.² It seems clear that humans have needs—for security, shelter and respect, for instance. But it is also the case that variation in the concrete ways in which needs are articulated and addressed or otherwise met in conflict resolution processes are probably more significant than abstract notions of need. This brings into focus culture and difference rather than the universal. From the perspective of human difference, the suggestion that conflict emerges because human needs are not met belies a more radical denial that comes with designating a person as having *universal* needs. Such a designation does not allow recognition of a person as *some-one*—as a unique person with particular needs.

This problem cannot be easily bypassed by referring to the unique expressions of a general human need because this introduces a contradiction which undermines the viability of the universal needs framework itself. So-called universal human needs are undifferentiated by their very nature: the human needs framework must deny multiple articulations of human difference to sustain itself. If we start to speak of

multiple expressions of human need—by, for instance, expanding the range of voices authorized to speak in the name of conflict resolution scholarship—then we must choose between allowing these expressions to take on their own importance *or* re-asserting a fundamental and underlying set of shared needs through an exercise of self-sufficient scholarship. The first choice puts an end to the universality claimed by the human needs approach, the second choice bypasses conflict resolution’s commitment to responsiveness.

This does not mean that the situation is impossible, or that we slide into relativism. Conflict resolution can respond to the needs of difference, but to do so it must mobilize responsiveness without folding back upon self-sufficiency—without returning to the sovereign knower of the social sciences or the autonomous and accomplished conflict resolution practitioner. Such an effort is necessary to address the culture challenge, to mitigate transnational liberal governance through conflict resolution and the influence of sovereignty, and to fulfill conflict resolution’s cosmopolitan impulse to respond across difference to people in conflict. Chapter 4 argued that success in this effort requires pursuing relatedness alongside the more traditional “recognition” of difference. We must, in other words, respond anew.

This chapter investigates what it might mean to respond anew; to respond in ways that help us grapple with and to mitigate self-sufficiency in knowing, governing, and being that continues to imbue much conflict resolution. The first part of the chapter examines how we might draw upon our selves as resources for increasing responsiveness. I argue for conceiving and practicing the self as an unfolding ensemble that connects with and is susceptible to external and unfamiliar forces and relations of the world and others. This approach disturbs rather than confirms the feedback loops that produce more conventional selves, making us exposed and vulnerable to external perspectives. Using our selves in this way can risk self-indulgence, but I show that we can guard against this risk by applying the principles of relatedness explicated in Chapter 4. I do so by discussing the distinctness of the approach advocated here in contrast to commonplace understandings of reflexivity.

The second part of this chapter takes up the need to move beyond our selves to explicitly engage mainstream forms of social and political inquiry in order to adequately address the range of questions and issues of interest to conflict resolution. To do so, I show how agent-based modeling in the burgeoning field of complexity studies allows for heterogeneity, interaction among agents, and dynamism. This contrasts with traditional social science modeling which has tended to assume

homogeneity, limited interaction, and static equilibriums. These methodological principles are valuable for understanding conflict situations, but they also facilitate a different relationship between the conflict resolution analyst or intervener and the world. In particular, complexity undercuts the overarching sovereign position of the traditional analyst to encourage a more humble relationship with the world. It promotes greater attention to the philosophical possibilities of connection and relatedness, and focuses attention on interaction and responsiveness among agents. The final section of the chapter introduces the network metaphor, and in particular the notion of networked relationality. The accessible idea of the network brings together insights about our selves-in-relationship with others and the key methodological principles of the complexity field to provide a framework responding anew in conflict resolution.

Selves as resources

During conflict resolution practice with Australian Aboriginal people, the strategy of foregrounding my self as “non-sovereign” gradually evolved as a compelling response to the methodological, cultural, and political difficulties presented by settler-indigenous conflict. I discovered that attempting the detachment suggested by traditional political and social science scholarship would only take me further away from the possibility of responding to the people I was involved with. Adopting mainstream social science methods would either subsume or deny Aboriginal ways of being, knowing, and organizing social and political life. This would reproduce and reinforce, rather than address, cultural conflict. The personal, in contrast, suggests capacity to be affected and hence ability to respond.

In recent years the conflict resolution field has begun to explore the self as a resource for conflict work, and the role of relationship for connecting across difference. The value of drawing upon our selves is a key methodological premise for John Paul Lederach’s recent reflections about peacebuilding;³ Bowling and Hoffman have brought attention to the important role played by personal qualities of mediators;⁴ and Michelle LeBaron⁵ and Benjamin Broome⁶ promote the role of the personal and interpersonal relationship for connecting across difference. Yet there is a tendency in this otherwise valuable literature to leave the meaning of self and relationship, alongside notions of dialogue and self-awareness, curiously under-theorized and unspecified. Using our selves as a resource for connecting across difference and responding anew in conflict resolution requires closer examination of the self.

Theoretical resources for examining the self have expanded as questions of being, selfhood, and subjectivity have been increasingly explored in twentieth-century-Western scholarship. Critical questioning of the self as a sovereign, autonomous, and skin-bound entity has gathered pace in recent decades through the critiques offered by structuralism, poststructuralism, postmodernism, and a range of other perspectives.⁷ Anthropology has also contributed to debunking the naturalness of the dominant Western version of selfhood by identifying its cultural specificity.⁸ A central theme in these recent critiques, particularly those of poststructuralism and postmodernism, is the multiplicity, heterogeneity, dispersion, and fragmentation of the self. The contention is that the self is more appropriately considered an assemblage produced by discourse, or coordinated by more or less contingent narratives, rather than an intrinsic being.

Postmodern theorizing about the demise of the sovereign self is a provocative and useful corrective to dominant Western understandings of selfhood. However, the postmodern version of selfhood is also not wholly borne out in our everyday lives and practices. Indeed it is common for so-called postmodern authors to write about fragmented subjects while themselves continuing to operate as an authorial centre.⁹ This does not suggest, though, that we should return to the sovereign self. The most compelling argument for how our selves emerge and are lived appears to lie somewhere between the arguments for modernist sovereignty and postmodern fragmentation. As Stephen Muecke shows, we negotiate our “centeredness” *through* multiplicity.¹⁰ Our selves do not arise from a pre-given and essential interior but instead emerge—depending on circumstances—as more or less stable and durable entities through sets of external relations. The self is unlikely to be, in other words, radically fractured, or dispersed. Rather, and following Cavarero, we are unique existents constituted through concrete others and the world.¹¹ The centered self emerges in constitutive relations with others as *neither* a fragmented multiplicity nor sovereign and autonomous agent.

Gilles Deleuze’s¹² explication of Foucault’s notion of the “folding” of the self provides further precision for such an understanding of selfhood. The idea of folding and its converse, unfolding, allows a critique of sovereign interiority or depth while also accounting for the sense of the self as internal and centered. Folding evinces a dynamic reciprocal relation between the outside and the inside. In this conceptualization, the “outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and foldings that together make up an inside: they are not something other than the outside, but precisely the inside

of the outside."¹³ The inside, a category typically mystified and unaccounted for in conventional understandings of a deep and interior sovereign self, can only arise through multiplicitous relations with the outside. The idea of folding thus allows the centered self, yet eschews sovereign self-sufficiency to facilitate ongoing connection with external relations.

Involvement with external relations necessarily implies unfolding because the motions of folding that constitute the self by opening onto the world and others to form the inside can only arise through relations with the outside. This sense of "opening onto" is crucial for connecting with others and addressing the epistemological violence and cultural conflict that come with the tendency of the sovereign subject of mainstream social science to close upon itself. The idea of "opening onto" can be further sharpened through José Gil's notion of exfoliation.¹⁴ Gil's term operates at the level of the body, referring to how human sensory interaction with the world induces plural effects within bodies. Again, this does not deny a single or centered self. There is no suggestion that, in opening onto others and the world, the body and resulting being are other than a unique self.¹⁵ The key point, rather, as Nancy tells us, is that being is only possible in its sharing and partitioning which is experienced singularly although it is in-common.¹⁶

Reconfiguring selfhood as ongoing involvement with the external world rather than a sovereign accomplishment moves us from the category of Being to processes of becoming. Such a shift—from being to becoming, from entities to relationship, and from the static to the dynamic—is increasingly being explored as a way of addressing entrenched patterns of domination.¹⁷ It is also increasingly taken up as a way of exploring the complex behavior of human social life.¹⁸ How, then, might we draw on the idea of becoming to pursue a revived responsiveness through the selves of conflict resolution scholars and practitioners?

The notion of becoming takes us away from the self-sufficient and accomplished sameness of sovereignty. Herein lies much of its value for thinking through and pursuing responsiveness. Notwithstanding our tendency to operate as centered beings, to be in a process of becoming is to be always changing, moving away from the same, and engaging with difference. As Deleuze states, "becoming is difference from self."¹⁹ This is perhaps a strange notion for many—it certainly appears strange in the conventional register of Western selfhood. To explore this idea further it is useful to focus on the possibility of connecting with difference through the more specific concept and phenomenon of *becoming-other*.

While our processes of becoming usually return to our socially sanctioned and familiar selves, we can, and do, sometimes escape these selves in our interactions with difference.

Becoming-other

Deleuze and Guattari help us to understand the sometimes strange phenomenon of becoming-other by referring to a range of historical and contemporary examples in which humans are capable of taking on, for instance, the characteristics of animals.²⁰ These events involve an encounter with difference wherein selves unfold to the world and difference in ways that lead them away from their socially sanctioned and familiar selves. The encounter with difference involves a communing with the forces of difference which escapes the usual patterns of coding.²¹ Becoming-other involves coming into proximity at a micro-level with other forces which interact, through a type of contagion, with those of one's own body and self.²² Such events cannot be contrived and do not involve, strictly speaking, features of the sovereign self such as imitation, imagination, or cognition.²³ In short, becoming-other involves the upheaval of the conventional self, often through interactions with difference that have striking or unusual effects for the self.

Becoming-other events are important because they speak to concrete instances of the constitutive relation of selves with others and the world, and to the capacity of selves to respond to forces and perspectives beyond their usual perspective and way of being. Becomings-other are possible because of the centrality of relatedness to social life and the vulnerability and exposure of the self to the world and others. These experiences are also often strange, demonstrating the possibility of interacting with forces beyond "usual" or "normal" boundaries of the sovereign self. They necessarily involve a type of connection and responsiveness across difference. The connections made may be modest, and because becomings are dynamic they cannot guarantee particular outcomes.²⁴ Nevertheless, becoming-other provides a way of thinking through the responsiveness of selves in conflict resolution which moves beyond platitudes and generalizations about openness and respect.

Becoming may be experienced in quite personal or idiosyncratic ways. In conflict resolution work with Aboriginal people, I can best describe my experiences of becoming-other manifesting as a "complex of forces" (inexplicable in conventional social science terms) catching in me and carrying me. While working over an extended period of time in a difficult mediation process, the call of birds linked with a particular location

took hold of me. I froze, the organization of my body changed as Aboriginal ancestors called down the decades, not offering support, but company, while I was undertaking the work in which I was involved. As Paul Patton explains, becoming-other involves a transformation of bodily capacity, an enhancement of one's powers, and is a question of the production of affects.²⁵ A cold chill tingled down my spine. These ancestors did not appear as an apparition; I experienced them bodily rather than through vision. Their presence manifested though my body in means not amenable to rationality or recognition.

The veracity of such experiences cannot, of course, be readily established. Indeed this type of experience is typically dismissed or pathologized by mainstream Western social science in ways that help to police and govern the boundaries of behavior and selves.²⁶ We must, however, resist the governing impulse of mainstream social science. We cannot risk relegating such experiences in the context of efforts to address the governing and regulation of difference. To judge becoming-other experiences takes us away from understanding the implications of such experiences and once again disavows or subsumes difference rather than responding to it. We can, though, accommodate incredulity about such experiences while examining their concrete effects and taking up the question of how they might facilitate responding anew in conflict resolution.

To become-other suggests moments of connection across difference. It is not possible to make definitive claims about the veracity of these moments, or about their political effects. But the fact that the otherwise-centered and accomplished self is disrupted and brought into exchange with something strange and beyond its usual purview is enough to demonstrate that becoming-other can bring about change from the conventional figure of the sovereign self and its operative paradigms. We can also evaluate such experiences in relation to the contexts in which they emerge. Experiences of the type I refer to, especially when connected with particular places, are commonplace in Aboriginal Australia.²⁷ Indeed, such experiences are an expected method for individual knowing for many Aboriginal people. So in this case, the becoming-other experience involves connection with, and responsiveness to, a different cultural register. Because the experience operates at the level of bodily effects rather than reason, it cannot be readily brought within the control of the accomplished cognitive sovereign self. Becoming-other *undoes* the traditional figure of the complete sovereign self: it speaks to relatedness rather than recognition.

How can this somewhat technical term and strange phenomenon be brought closer to the idiom of contemporary life and conflict resolution

practice? Part of the value of becoming-other is that it challenges and disrupts who we are. But as a result, it does not sit easily with the conventional ways in which we relate to ourselves. Take the notion of reflexivity as a contemporary exemplar of the terminology through which we think of our relation to ourselves. Certainly, becoming-other does involve self-awareness (another commonplace way of relating to ourselves and a prerequisite for reflexivity), and reflective exploration of our selves (a common understanding of reflexivity). Yet becoming-other does not exactly mean reflexivity, and the commonplace use of terms such as self-awareness and reflexivity risks a certain subjectivism by returning to the sovereign subject rather than encountering difference. As some critics have noted of recent efforts to draw on the self as a resource in social research, focusing on the self can risk rehearsing Western forms of sovereign individualism and reinforcing the particular cultural and institutional setting which gives rise to the claim of “reflexive” selfhood.²⁸ There is a need, then, to clarify how becoming-other is related to, yet also goes beyond, the notion of reflexivity.

Beyond reflexivity

Reflexivity has become a popular and appealing notion in recent decades. In professional and scholarly practice reflexivity connotes critical and ethical self-awareness. One does not claim to be un-reflexive! Yet the fact that reflexivity occurs, at least to some extent, naturally—that it is impossible to not be reflexive in some way—suggests that this term requires closer scrutiny to properly evaluate it as a way of working with ourselves to respond anew across difference.

Michael Lynch reviews a wide range of “reflexivities” within social inquiry to find that the term refers to a variety of means of turning-back-upon one’s self or one’s practice.²⁹ Yet Lynch’s discussion shows that such turning-back-upon is too loose to indicate any specific virtues. While there is a tendency to assume that reflexivity is critical, emancipatory, and transformative in relation to dominating or conservative social orders, this depends upon the type of reflexivity used and how it is deployed.³⁰ In line with Lynch’s insights, reflexivity only partly and imprecisely defines the type of self-involvement suggested in the above discussion outlining becoming-other as a renewed way of responding to difference in conflict resolution.

The proposition that we respond anew in conflict resolution by becoming-other does engage the self reflexively, yet it does so by unfolding to external relations with others and the world. The reflexive action

of turning back upon the self is thus secondary to turning outward, and contrasts with common understandings of reflexivity. Where the dynamics of reflexivity with regard to the inside and outside typically remain under-specified, becoming-other foregrounds the outside and difference to stress the need to affect and disrupt the conventional self through an encounter with the forces of the world and others. Where self-reflexive action can bring into existence selves who are more or less autonomous and sovereign, becoming-other disrupts this self. The former are more likely to arise out of cognitive, familiar, and orchestrated processes, the latter out of affective, strange, and chance events. One cannot, for example, choose becoming-other. The sovereign accomplishment of recognition is not available through becoming-other, only the being-chosen of events and encounters.³¹

Becoming-other requires more than the awareness of one's subject position in relation to others in the contemporary political, social, or cultural order. Increased awareness of this type does assist, of course, in working across difference. Such turning back upon is a prerequisite for working usefully with oneself for responding anew. Yet reflexive recognition of one's position also risks a (re-)constitution of the subject as a participant in identity politics—a self with relatively fixed boundaries and limited possibilities for connection across cultural difference. As Gayatri Spivak notes, reflecting upon or questioning the place of the subject remains a largely “meaningless” exercise.³² Instead, reflexivity for responding anew must create movement by making the self susceptible and vulnerable to difference.

To become-other also cannot be achieved by attempting to conceptually grasp and respect someone's identity or difference. Rather, we can pursue the *possibility* of becoming-other, and indeed of communicating effectively, by allowing that our integrity, independence, and autonomy be broken up in encounters across difference.³³ In this way we can be torn from ourselves,³⁴ as occurred in my experience of birds calling to me down the decades. Such moments of vulnerability cannot be planned or chosen because to do so would re-introduce the cognitive pre-existing self and return to autonomous and sovereign being. Becoming-other involves often-unexpected vulnerability in which one is chosen “without assuming the choice.”³⁵ Accessing such concrete expressions of the relational nature of selfhood requires tapping into affective rather than cognitive registers; it requires a “felt” rather than intellectual experience.

Becoming-other does involve the reflexive practice of turning-back-upon ourselves, yet it also pays particular attention to unfolding to others and to the world, to affective rather than cognitive processes, and to chance

events and encounters rather than to planning. Although becoming-other may appear a strange and compromising venture to many, we have resources at our disposal to engage our selves in this way. Becoming-other taps into relatedness, into pre-cognitive given-over-ness which makes us vulnerable to others. Some general guidance is also possible: becoming-other downplays recognition, bypassing the conversion of experience and interactions with others into categories and objects for knowing and doing. Moving from the category of being to processes of becoming involves conceiving and practicing our selves as unfolding entities, as ensembles that can become different while continuing to be what they are. Such an effort can be thought of as an art of the self,³⁶ engaging the self as an “object of complex and difficult elaboration”³⁷ to “get free of oneself”³⁸ and invent revised and improbable ways of being.³⁹ In this way we may disrupt our conventional selves to become susceptible and responsive to difference beyond recognition and the influence of sovereignty.

What, then, is on offer for those looking for a more accessible way of guiding engagement with others to respond anew? There is no formula for working with oneself to become-other and connect across difference. The ethical nature of this question—the fact that it speaks to one’s relation with one’s self—means that it should be engaged as a practice rather than a problem to be solved. Moreover, any search for a formula would compromise the phenomenon and dynamics of becoming-other. Nevertheless, Chapters 2 and 4 discussed how the engaged nature of much conflict resolution practice requires susceptibility for effective practice. So those already engaged in conflict resolution are likely to have had, or to have in the future, experiences across difference which facilitate becoming-other. These experiences may be somewhat like my experience of birds calling to me, or may be quite different depending upon the individuals and circumstances involved. In addition, Adriana Cavarero’s notion of asking who rather than what,⁴⁰ introduced in Chapter 4, is an accessible way of orienting ourselves to responding anew through co-constitutive relations with others.

For Cavarero, “asking after who” refers to the life of someone narrated in relation with others. Where “asking after what” refers to the abstract subject, “asking after who” refers us to someone’s unique story.⁴¹ Where asking “what” may refer us to patterns of escalation or numbers of deaths or weapons, asking “who” connects us with people’s stories and their trials and vulnerabilities.⁴² Their stories in turn connect with our stories as they and we continue to emerge in-the-world through constitutive narratives with external relations.⁴³ Introducing the idea of the

narratable self into one's practice makes one vulnerable as an acting, narratable, and exposed being. In this practice there is less space for an aloof identity or self-contemplation, and more for relating and responding to others.⁴⁴ Just as becoming-other folds outward to external relations in unpredictable ways, the being that results from someone's story is also a dynamic process. People's stories are, just like life, "unforeseeable and uncontrollable," even though they leave a pattern.⁴⁵

Thus far, this chapter has argued that conflict resolution selves are useful resources for responding anew to address some of the field's key challenges. By drawing on critical theoretical approaches, I suggest conceiving and practicing the self as an unfolding ensemble that connects with and is susceptible to external and unfamiliar forces of the world and others. This is neither the traditional Western figure of the self-sufficient and autonomous sovereign, nor the fractured subject of postmodern theory. Rather, this is a self that is centered through multiplicity; a self which can become-other as it folds onto the world and others to disturb rather than confirm the feedback loops that produce the conventional sovereign Western subject. In becoming-other, the self does not fold back upon itself as suggested by commonplace understandings of reflexivity. Rather it pursues relatedness alongside notions of recognizing difference and others. By conceiving and practicing selves as co-constituted narrated beings, conflict resolution scholars and practitioners can become exposed and vulnerable to external perspectives to better connect and respond across difference.

Conflict resolution selves are a valuable and central resource for responding anew because selves are at the centre of conflict resolution efforts. Addressing the challenge of difference and tensions between responsiveness and order will require attending to, and changing, our selves. In particular, it requires resisting the self-sufficient and sovereign version of selfhood often practiced in Western social and political studies and conflict resolution. Even so, some readers may find the foregoing focus on the self awkward, perhaps even overly indulgent. Some might question the capacity of this approach to respond to macro-level societal and political issues, or to generate legitimate insights for practice. Indeed, making the most of relatedness requires some caution, and necessitates analysis beyond individual conflict resolution selves.

Avoiding self-indulgence

The suggestion that we engage our selves to respond anew can risk self-indulgence. There is a commonplace assumption, relied upon and

promoted by the self-help industry, that self-reflection and self-awareness are unequivocally valuable practices. Yet as noted above, certain types of self-engagement risk rehearsing culturally and historically specific forms of individualism.⁴⁶ Self-engagement that predominantly folds back upon the self does not offer anything new, including any prospects for connecting and responding to difference. Self-referential self-engagement is indeed self-indulgent.

The type of self-engagement suggested here, though, involves turning outward to the forces of difference which constitute the self and bring it into existence. Framed and pursued in this way, the task of self-engagement is not a simple, straightforward, or reassuring one. It involves making oneself vulnerable and responsive to difference beyond the reassuring influence of sovereignty. While self-indulgence involves a relation between the self and itself where the other, if present at all, serves only as spectator, the self-engagement evoked by becoming-other involves a vulnerable, fragile, and unmasterable self.⁴⁷ Where the conventional figure of sovereign selfhood returns to itself, compromising engagement with the world and others,⁴⁸ becoming-other, and the foregoing discussion suggests an outward-orientated exercise of the self.

The question of *how* to conceive and practice selves is crucial to avoiding self-indulgence. Responding anew through our selves requires moving beyond the traditional fiction of the discrete, autonomous, and sovereign subject. We are, as I noted in Chapter 4 with Sylviane Agacinski, “in-the-world and with-others’.”⁴⁹ While the traditional figure of sovereign selfhood tends to return to itself and its operative cultural and historical paradigms, other options are available. Engaging ourselves as an intricate and complicated work,⁵⁰ or simply making one’s self vulnerable to the narrated identity of others, necessarily breaches this figure and brings us into contact with other and perhaps strange experiences and ways of being. The figure of the sovereign self is deeply influential, yet we can engage and transform this self. Doing so offers possibilities for responding and connecting across difference.

However, to assert the value of engaging ourselves does not mean that we can do so with total freedom or abandon. This would indeed be a type of solipsistic self-indulgence because it would disregard the principle of relationality. We need, rather, to engage ourselves in targeted ways that are related to the challenges and tasks of conflict resolution. In this book, I have engaged my self to work with the challenge of difference, culture, governance, and the influence of sovereignty in the conflict resolution field. Other engagements may be targeted toward particular aspects of responding anew, or to other dimensions of conflict resolution

practice. Such use of our selves promises to grapple with contemporary problems facing the field, and to simultaneously grow the field and its scholars and practitioners.

Yet working toward particular ends is also insufficient because it does not allow us to feel confident that the insights and practices generated are legitimate or valuable. There is a risk, for instance, that too much emphasis on the artistry of practice, currently popular among some in the field, returns to the self to become self-referential and self-indulgent. The insights we gain by drawing upon ourselves must be communicated with others. They must also be challenged, debated, and discussed to test for resonance within and beyond the field. Such insights should draw, at least to some extent, upon traditional scholarly argumentation, and be able to withstand the scrutiny of critical inquiry.

This is not to say that the insights for responding anew which we might draw from ourselves must always meet the methodological procedures and criteria of traditional social science. Because such requirements emphasize cognition rather than relatedness, they are likely to unduly limit the range of faculties and resources we can draw upon. But we must test our insights gained with others, and be able to justify and defend positions taken. Communities of practice and scholarship, including processes of peer review and assessment are important for this purpose.

Self-indulgence is the inevitable risk of drawing upon our selves, but applying the principle of relatedness helps to avoid this problem. Turning outward to external relations and the forces of difference militates against overly self-referential practice. It follows, then, that drawing upon selves to respond anew must be engaged with the tasks of our time, and with our peers. Conflict resolution scholars and practitioners can then judge the results of personal experience and insights for responding anew through communities of practice which draw upon, but are not restricted to, the tools of critical inquiry.

Some may wonder, though, about the relevance of relatedness for dealing with larger entities such as nation-states, or with the dynamics of civil wars? How is it possible to respond beyond personal encounter, experience, and interaction? The experience of individuals is directly engaged with the world of nation-states and vice-versa,⁵¹ so it is possible to gain many insights about macro-level questions by drawing upon our selves. Yet to adequately address the range of questions and issues of interest to conflict resolution, there is indeed a need to move beyond our selves and to more explicitly engage more mainstream forms of social and political inquiry. The solution does not rest, though, with formal modeling and rational actor assumptions of traditional social science.

Rather, at this time the best prospects for responding anew beyond personal encounter and experience lie within the burgeoning field of complexity.

Responsive complexity

Conflict analysis and resolution has typically attempted to know conflict dynamics by understanding the world in terms of entities modeled on our selves; on understandings of selfhood as largely sovereign, autonomous, rational and independent. The same is true of Western social science and its efforts to know the world beyond ourselves more broadly. As Lars-Erik Cederman notes of international relations, “the overwhelming complexity of world politics usually forces analysts to rely upon an anthropomorphic view of actors as both unitary and rational.”⁵² This same understanding of selfhood informs the assumptions, discussed in Chapter 2, which underpin the governing of difference in conflict resolution processes. Individual selves, or units modeled thereon such as nation-states, are the dominant actors in our social and political analyses, and in our policy and practice prescriptions. Even where critical approaches are available, they either share the same assumptions about selves or have tended to struggle in the face of the influence of the formal modeling approaches of their mainstream counterparts who rely upon the figure of the rational and self-subsistent agent.

A significant cost associated with the mainstream modeling of social and political life has been the assumption that the underlying agents are characterized by a high degree of homogeneity.⁵³ Whether social scientists assume highly restrictive behavioral rules and limited access to information to a small number of agents, or full-information and rational-action to large numbers of agents, the prevailing assumption is uniformity rather than heterogeneity among agents. This tends to simplify and flatten-out social life. It is true that modeling has been able to develop more or less adequate analyses of the behavior of small numbers of actors (typically one or two) and very large numbers⁵⁴—for example one monopoly in a market, two superpowers in the international system, or perfect competition among large numbers of firms. But because these analyses have focused on modeling causal links between small numbers of agents or averaging out the behavior of large numbers of agents, they have not been able to gain much purchase on the behavior of intermediate numbers of interacting agents.⁵⁵ Most existing social science models also tend to focus on equilibrium states rather than

dynamic processes, an approach which is somewhat like trying to understand running water by catching it in a bucket.⁵⁶

The task of understanding dynamic social relationships such as those occurring in the escalation and management of conflict is truly challenging, but the cost of the foregoing assumptions of mainstream social science are also simply too high to bear. Actors in conflict are far from homogenous, with the fact of difference often crucial to conflict itself. Interactions and the feedback loops among participants are central to conflict and its resolution. Moreover, conflict is an inherently dynamic process rather than an equilibrium state. Of course, there are no easy answers to these shortfalls. Nonetheless, this book has demonstrated that conflict resolution needs to move beyond assumptions that selfhood is broadly sovereign, autonomous, rational, and independent. It also must move beyond the implications of these assumptions in our current ways of knowing social and political life. As I have argued in the first part of this chapter by discussing the benefits of drawing upon our selves as resources, part of the necessary response for addressing contemporary challenges in conflict resolution requires working with difference and relatedness. The currently burgeoning field of complexity studies is one vehicle for weaving responsiveness and relatedness with analysis of conflict to augment the understandings that are possible through our personal encounters and interactions.

Ideas of complexity have been taken up in the natural and social sciences in recent decades, but are yet to make a significant impact in conflict resolution and closely related disciplines such as political and international studies. Notions of complexity, including related terms and fields of inquiry such as emergence, chaos theory, quantum physics, artificial intelligence, post-normal science, and self-organization, generate much enthusiasm and exciting research. Perhaps one reason for the slow uptake of these approaches in some areas, then, is the fact that they represent a fundamental shift from conventional ways of knowing. Mainstream social science has tended to assume linear systems wherein cause and effect relations are observable, where system inputs are proportional to outputs, and where the whole is the sum of its parts. Complexity, in contrast, shows us that in the dynamics of many relationships and systems, cause and effect relations are not apparent, small inputs can have disproportionate effects and vice versa, and that “more is different” (“interacting agent systems take on behavior that is qualitatively different from the behavior of any individual agent”).⁵⁷

Examples of everyday complexity abound, from the behavior of traffic, to bird flocks, brains, ant colonies, and the development of cities.

All these systems share a defining characteristic of complex systems: the interaction of local agents (drivers, individual birds or ants, neurons, builders, developers, and so on) to generate a dynamically ordered emergent whole which cannot be fully predicted or known before it arises. With this characteristic, *complex* systems differ from *complicated* systems: an ant colony is complex while a jetliner is merely complicated.

Because complex systems operate between chaos and order they require a new type of inquiry. Efforts to know such systems thus far have tended to use computers to aid *agent-based* or *generative* modeling. This type of modeling typically specifies a number of parameters for agents, as in mainstream social science. But rather than attempting to make these assumptions model an entire population, computer models have the agents interact so that experimenters can observe emergent behavior.

The pioneering generative modeling most relevant to conflict resolution is Robert Axelrod's work on the evolution of cooperation through his extension of the Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm.⁵⁸ Axelrod was, in this work, extending his research on the prevention of conflict, particularly nuclear war, between nations. By first specifying how agents interact and then allowing the most successful strategies to reproduce through John Holland's genetic algorithm, he showed that cooperation based on reciprocity emerges as the most successful strategy.⁵⁹ Although this type of modeling is highly abstract, there are ways in which agent-based modeling can help us more directly understand important conflict dynamics. Ravi Bhavnani, for instance, has shown how multiple runs of agent-based-modeling, beginning with different initial conditions and arising along different trajectories of participation, might help us to understand the micro-level emergence of ethnic norms in situations of ethnic conflict.⁶⁰

The type of modeling suggested by Bhavnani does not aim to predict or make definitive claims about conflict dynamics. Rather, agent-based modeling is a type of thought experiment which helps to guide our intuition and understanding.⁶¹ It uses simple assumptions to generate results between chaos and order; results that are emergent and complex rather than straightforward. In this way agent-based modeling combines features of deductive and inductive approaches to knowing.⁶² This leads to numerous advantages over traditional social science methodology. Where traditional approaches assume homogeneity among agents, computational models can easily introduce heterogeneity by inserting different agents, incorporating mutations and other random events, or endowing agents with capacity for learned behavior.⁶³ Such models can

be re-run many times to simulate different initial conditions or external impacts on a system. Agent-based modeling can also provide us with insights into the behavior of small to large numbers of interacting agents, and understandings of dynamic rather than equilibrium states. These benefits are of potentially great value for understanding and intervening in conflict situations, and they address the key costs of traditional social science processes outlined above.

While complexity and agent-based modeling offers advantages over mainstream social science models by introducing heterogeneity, interaction, and dynamism, some may object that surely this is not sufficient to claim that complexity is “responsive.” The process of assembling and coding simple assumptions about behavior and running them—sometimes over and over—through generative computer models seems to take us a long way from conflict resolution’s avowedly practical aim of responding to others in conflict. Sitting at a computer, after all, does not suggest responsiveness. Indeed, it is true that complexity does not offer the type of responsiveness discussed in the first part of the chapter—that arising out of personal encounter, for instance. Nonetheless, complexity does involve fundamental shifts away from mainstream social science which imbue it with potential to be more responsive than existing alternatives. To explain why, it is necessary to consider how complexity changes the orientation of the traditional analyst and places him or her in connection with others and the world.

The fact that complex systems exist on the boundary between chaos and order has implications for the standing and orientation of those who seek to know and intervene in conflict situations. Where social science has typically pursued assertive predictability in knowledge that mirrors the self-sufficient and accomplished posture of the sovereign subject, those investigating complex systems have to opt for a much less controlling way of relating to the world. Because emergent behavior can never be predicted beforehand, the study of complex systems must aim at attuning researchers and analysts to patterns and possibilities in a way that forces us to embrace contingency. In sophisticated analyses, for instance, the complex adaptive systems approach allows “the level of agent sophistication, and even the behavior itself, to adapt.”⁶⁴

The need to embrace contingency and the agency of actors *within social science analysis* shifts the locus of control away from analysts and potential interveners to the agents, circumstances, and dynamics of conflict situations. Complexity encourages a “more humble attitude”⁶⁵ by encouraging analysts to allow the impact of accidental events and to understand that patterns of emergent order arise in the world beyond

social science capacity for prediction. So where traditional social science has adopted a top-down approach to knowing which mirrors the sovereign “god-eye from nowhere,”⁶⁶ complexity requires a bottom-up approach which foregrounds actors and their circumstances.

Displacing the sovereign authority of the analyst and foregrounding actors suggests a closer relationship between analysts and agents. Of course, a closer relationship is not *required*, but is also hard to see how a complex adaptive systems analyst could justify analysis which remained distant and abstract from, for instance, the circumstances, life concerns, and dynamics among people involved in ethnic conflict. Developing appropriate parameters for agent-based modeling requires micro-level knowledge about individual agents as well as matters of context and history. People’s stories, cultures, histories, and social and political circumstances are all relevant information for this purpose. So seeking out the stories of those involved in the conflict is likely to be just as important as gathering more traditional data about numbers of deaths, weapons, and so on. People’s stories in turn connect with the stories and lives of analysts as their being continues to form through constitutive narratives of external relations.⁶⁷ In this practice there is less space for aloof and technical social science practice, and more for relating and responding to people in conflict.

Connections between analysts and the agents and circumstances of inquiry are further facilitated by the place of connection and relatedness at the philosophical core of complexity. Where traditional natural and social sciences assume that observers can stand apart from what they observe, the complexity paradigm shows that observers are invariably involved with the world they observe. At one level this involves, following insights from neuroscience, putting aside the idea that there is an autonomous faculty of reason apart from our “bodily capacities such as perception and movement.”⁶⁸ Our thought and reasoning are radically embodied⁶⁹ so there is no possibility of “uninvolved” knowledge. Even more startling insights, this time from quantum physics, show that the world is deeply interconnected at the sub-atomic quantum level.⁷⁰ An implication of this in the physical sciences is that it is impossible to devise observational apparatuses for experiments which themselves do not become part of the experiment.⁷¹ So there is no “god-like perspective from which we can know physical reality ‘absolutely in itself’”⁷²—no possibility of total separation between the observer and observed.⁷³

For social inquiry, this means that our minds, our thinking, and the world we attempt to know, are likely to be more intimately related than we have hitherto allowed.⁷⁴ Where Western understandings of our

thought typically make a distinction between the process of thinking and the content of thought, it is more accurate to say that the process and content of thought emerge together in a type of connected wholeness.⁷⁵ Sylviane Agacinski's philosophically informed formulation that we are "in-the-world and with-others"⁷⁶ takes on a more persuasive and thoroughgoing meaning when combined with the insights of neuroscience and quantum physics in the complexity paradigm. We are far from knowing the full implications for social inquiry of these relatively recent insights. Yet the broad upshot is that those who apply a complexity approach to better understand the nature of conflict situations and the prospects for intervention are also likely to find themselves more fundamentally entwined with others and the world.

The foregoing philosophical implications are bound with the key methodological advantages of the complexity paradigm: the ability to incorporate heterogeneity, interaction, and dynamism. Where traditional social science tends to rely upon homogeneity, limited interaction between agents, and equilibrium models, complexity offers distinct advantages for understanding conflict and possibilities for intervention. Indeed, difference among agents and their interaction to generate emergent patterns are central features of conflict. The ability to incorporate these elements will be a necessary part of improving our understandings of conflict situations in the future. Interaction sits at the centre of these methodological principles, serving as the driving force among agents and hence the generating force for emergent patterns. In the complexity paradigm, interaction among local agents is also the engine which drives behavior transcending individual actors. So within complexity it is interactions among local agents which lead to emergent patterns of conflict or peaceful coexistence. Such interaction speaks directly to responsiveness at the concrete level of actions of social agents. Analysts who make use of the complexity paradigm will have to become similarly attuned to questions of responsiveness among agents.

In sum, the burgeoning field of complexity promises to contribute to the task of responding anew in conflict resolution beyond what is currently possible in mainstream social science. Complexity shifts the locus of control away from sovereign knowers, encouraging a more humble attitude on the part of analysts. Foregrounding actors and the need to embrace contingency within our analyses facilitates a closer and potentially more responsive relationship between analysts and people in conflict situations. This orientation is further facilitated by philosophical insights, drawn from neuroscience and quantum physics, that uninvolvement is impossible and that we are more intimately connected with

the world and others that we have hitherto realized. Finally, the methodological advantages of complexity for the study of conflict situations turn attention directly to the question of interaction and responsiveness between agents. Together these effects of the complexity paradigm facilitate a more responsive social science than has been possible through mainstream approaches to date. Such effects cannot be guaranteed, but complexity does change the orientation of the traditional analyst and his or her placement in relation to others and the world to encourage greater rather than lesser responsiveness.

While complexity emphasizes the importance of agents in conflict and emergent relations among them to encourage greater responsiveness in social science, relatedness and complexity can be somewhat nebulous and difficult to conceptualize. Take, for instance, the question of selfhood discussed in the first section of this chapter. Although that section drew on social and political theory, it shares with the foregoing section the insight that our selves are emergent: we emerge as unfolding entities in relation with others. Yet our selves are also quite centered and concrete. How, then, can we think of our selves as both centered and emergent? The network metaphor serves this purpose, and the broader need to express the concepts of relatedness and complexity in more accessible terms. In particular, the idea of networked relationality provides a useful framework for responding anew in conflict resolution.

Networked relationality

While machine metaphors have served as dominant metaphors in modern industrial society, they suffer severe limitations. From the clock to the assembly line, such metaphors are restricted to linearity, cause and effect relationships, and proportionality of inputs and outputs. This makes them inadequate for understanding complex systems and much of social and political life. In their place, and for good reasons, the network metaphor is coming to the fore. Indeed, networks appear everywhere,⁷⁷ in biological, social, economic, and political life. Our brains network neurons, ecosystems network species, and the Internet networks computers and their users. More than just conceptual tools for analyzing the world, networks constitute the world.⁷⁸ To the extent that conflict resolution has often followed traditional social science reliance on machine metaphors, it has missed the opportunities for understanding and pursuing relationality and responsiveness through the idea of networks.⁷⁹

The key elements of networks are nodes and relationships, but it is the way they relate to each other and how we think of them which

distinguish networks from other modes of organization. Nodes in a network may be pre-existing entities, but, crucially, it is relations with other nodes (sometimes thought of as lines or flows) in the network which allow them to function and hence bring them into existence. The network emerges, in other words, from its systems of relations. The continuous movement and circulation of forces are crucial: networks are not made up of static entities, but entities that are continually forming and re-forming through relationship. Continual formation of relationships adds a further important network characteristic: networks are open rather than closed systems. Networks are able to connect and grow beyond themselves, and to incorporate new elements.

Clearly networks can be highly differentiated. Questions about where the permeable boundaries of networks form, lie, and shift; about the nature of connections among nodes (are they material or social); and about the density of connections (are they weak or strong) and their direction (are they linked to a hub or multidirectional) are all important for those who work closely with networks.⁸⁰ Yet if we think of networks as overly structured, as occurs in some versions of network theory,⁸¹ the ability to understand and work with the key qualities of dynamism and relatedness are lost. At the same time, this need for caution points to why the network metaphor is so powerful and compelling for dealing with complex and mobile social and informational formations of the twenty-first century. The network-idea sustains a tension within itself: networks simultaneously point to a totality of nodes and relationships while simultaneously denying the consistency of this "totality."⁸² "It enables one to think about the mutual relationships between a number of actors, technologies and practices as if they are in the same picture without arresting movement and turning this picture into a static model."⁸³

Relationality is crucial to the network metaphor. The idea of networks "fastens thought on relationships and their mutual interdependencies instead of individuals or institutions alone."⁸⁴ Perhaps what is most striking about the network metaphor is the way that it reflects, through relationality, back upon the nature of nodes or entities in relationship. The fact that the idea of network allows us to view entities as tending toward the mobile and fluid, where they were previously seen as static, returns us to processes of becoming discussed in the first part of this chapter. Becoming, as Deleuze says, "is difference from self."⁸⁵ It is becoming, and particularly becoming-other, which makes possible fluid and shifting connections and relationships within networks. Indeed, becoming is at the base of Deleuze and Guattari's biological network

metaphor of rhizome, one of the earliest and most notable incarnations of network thinking.⁸⁶ Networks and becoming-other are bound in the relational capacity of entities to respond and connect with forces, perspectives, and entities beyond their normal boundaries. The key work of the network as metaphor is the work of connecting and relating entities across difference.

The notion of networked relationality combines the insights of complexity and emergence, and the becoming-other of entities-in-relationship—including selves—through a widely accessible and concrete metaphor. Networks are particularly relevant and useful for conceptualizing a hyper-modern and rapidly globalizing world of rapid information flows and the compression of space and time through the use of transport and information communication technologies. Within conflict resolution, these changes see agencies, donors, and conflict workers active on a global scale, moving, sometimes very rapidly, across borders of political and cultural difference. But the network metaphor has also long made sense to many indigenous and local people around the globe. While for more than two centuries Western industrial society and much accompanying knowledge has made use of mechanical metaphors to know the world, many people made, and continue to make use of network metaphors in local kinship systems or wider cultural networks of alliance and exchange. In processes of conflict resolution, local peoples from Central America to the Melanesian Pacific have used notions of tangled nets, and their untangling, as metaphors for managing and resolving conflict.⁸⁷ Finally, we all participate in networks. With even a little reflection, we realize that we rely on these networks to sustain our very selves, to bring our selves into existence. The network metaphor promises, then, to focus attention on relationality for conflict resolution work, including for responding anew through conflict resolution selves.

Networked relationality provides a framework in which we can become-other across difference, connect with the stories and lives of people in conflict situations, pursue social inquiry through the insights of the complexity paradigm, and connect with other peoples including, perhaps, with the ways that local people conceive of social and political life. Engaging conflict resolution selves is not the only way to pursue networked relationality. But our selves are an important resource for two reasons. First, the challenges of conflict resolution bear directly upon scholar and practitioner selves and addressing these difficulties will require attending to, and changing, these selves. Second, our selves provide a ready place to begin. The work on networks, and relationship, and

complexity is limited in conflict resolution aside from some discussion of webs of relationship,⁸⁸ some exploration of the value of working through networks between chaos and order for organizing peacebuilding efforts,⁸⁹ and some literature introducing the field to the concepts of complexity and emergence.⁹⁰

In my own conflict resolution practice, the idea of a networked relatedness called me into existence in relation and responsiveness to Australian Aboriginal people. My experience of birds calling to me down the decades is an experience of becoming-other, wherein the sovereign and accomplished knower and practitioner of conflict resolution and social science was dislodged and disrupted from itself by forces of difference. At the same time, this disruption placed me in relationship with another extended community. I continue to draw on this network of relatedness with Aboriginal people and forces to explore and pursue appropriate courses of action, both short- and long-term to deal with a longstanding settler-indigenous conflict. Such experimenting with our selves will be necessary alongside our broader and more traditional social inquiry and analysis if we are to respond anew in conflict resolution analysis and intervention. While caution is required to avoid self-indulgence, external relatedness draws us away from ourselves because we are all involved, globally, with an “intense relationality of worldwide connections.”⁹¹

Conclusion

This chapter began by suggesting that the conflict resolution field can use its impulse for responsiveness as a resource to avoid falling back upon the problems associated with self-sufficiency in knowing, governing, and being. The first part of the chapter explored how we can use our selves as resources to respond anew across difference. By conceiving and practicing selves as beings who are simultaneously centered and unfolding to external relations, I showed that possibilities for becoming-other allow connection and responsiveness across difference. Utilizing our selves in this way can risk self-indulgence, but we can militate against this risk by focusing on external relations and carefully considering how this practice relates to commonplace notions of reflexivity.

To move beyond our selves to explicitly engage mainstream forms of social and political inquiry and address a fuller range of questions and issues of interest to conflict resolution, the second part of the chapter discussed the implications and possibilities of the burgeoning field of complexity studies. There I showed that agent-based modeling allows for

heterogeneity, interaction among agents, and dynamism where traditional social science modeling has tended to assume homogeneity, limited interaction, and static equilibriums. Complexity's methodological principles are valuable for understanding conflict situations. They also undercut the overarching sovereign position of the traditional analyst to facilitate a more humble relationship with the world, encourage greater attention to the philosophical possibilities of connection and relatedness, and focus attention on interaction and responsiveness among agents. The idea of networked relationality brings together insights about selves-in-relationship with others and key methodological principles of the complexity field to provide a framework for responding anew which is both widely accessible and relevant to conflict situations.

Conclusion

Conflict resolution has come of age as a dedicated and coherent field, but it struggles to deal with the challenge of difference. While scholars and practitioners are committed to engaging and responding to people, conflict resolution's ways of knowing and relating to difference frequently fall back upon a self-sufficiency in knowing, governing, and being that is influenced by the idea of sovereignty. These ways of knowing and relating resonate with mainstream social science and reproduce transnational liberalism. The accompanying disavowal and governing of difference, typically manifesting in a facilitative mode in line with conflict resolution's emphasis upon informality, undermines the capacity of conflict resolution to work across cultural, religious, identity, and value differences. Addressing these and related problems is crucial because difference claims, variously mobilized from within indigenous self-determination movements to regional ethnic conflicts and to a supposed clash between Western secularism and Islamic fundamentalism, animate key conflicts of our time and are likely to continue to do so in coming decades. The field must, then, attend to the challenge of difference if it is to be an effective and viable body of knowledge and practice for addressing conflict in the twenty-first century.

To respond to difference challenge, this book has adopted an expansive approach which avoids distinguishing between conflict resolution scholarship and practice. Instead, I have argued that questions about how we know difference are integral to how conflict resolution relates to difference in practice. Conversely, concrete and everyday encounters interact with the frameworks and assumptions that conflict resolution uses to engage difference. This approach shows that alongside the problems of disavowing and governing difference linked with sovereign self-sufficiency, the concrete and practical engagement of conflict resolution

with difference promises ways of fissuring sovereignty and opening up possibilities for relating and responding anew. These possibilities also show that boundaries and distinctions evoked in the name of difference are likely to be more negotiable than is often thought within the long-standing tendency in Western political thought to see cohesion and political community arising out of commonality, and to see difference as a threat to community and a source of conflict.

While the practical responsiveness and engagement of conflict resolution is a valuable resource for addressing the difference challenge, it is not sufficient. Practical engagement can be a platform for pursuing connection and relatedness across difference, but without critical analysis and awareness about the frameworks and assumptions informing the approaches and actions of practitioners and scholars, engagement can readily be a vehicle for disavowal of difference and the operation of transnational liberal governance. Beyond the checks and balances of critical analysis, there is a need to explore the nexus among difference, social order, and conflict resolution apart from the sovereign eye of mainstream social science and conflict resolution analyses. Political community, social order, and mechanisms for conflict resolution can and do arise and exist through difference and differentiation rather than sameness and commonality. Entertaining these possibilities requires stepping beyond the influence of sovereignty in our practices of knowing, governing, and being to embrace greater humility and incompleteness in the face of difference.

This conclusion summarizes the key themes developed in Parts I and II while looking to future difficulties and possibilities for conflict resolution's engagement with difference. It argues that although difference presents significant challenges, these difficulties are reinforced by conventional social science and conflict resolution assumptions about selves, order, and conflict. For this reason, the difference challenge may in some respects not be as great as conventional ways of thinking tend to suggest. A key challenge for the field is to expand its ways of dealing with difference by embracing possibilities at the limits of contemporary conflict resolution and social science practice.

Ordering difference

Part I of this volume explored conflict resolution's tendency to follow a broader social science pattern of bypassing difference and returning to the sovereign analyst and practitioner of Western knowledge. This pattern facilitates transnational liberal governance by disavowing difference

or managing and ordering it within the inclusive and facilitative mechanisms of conflict resolution processes such as mediation and problem-solving workshops. The influence of the powerful idea of sovereignty, as a way of thinking about the organization of politics and selfhood, suffuses and supports this way of relating to difference. Individual and group difference is subordinated to the figure of sovereignty within a hierarchical political order, and individual selves are framed as self-sufficient and sovereign entities who best contribute to peace when they perform their selves as rational and non-disputing beings consistent with Western understandings of order and conflict. When conflict resolution scholar and practitioner selves take up the role of social-scientific analyst in attempts to know difference, the self-sufficient “I think”, the sovereign self of reason tends to come to the fore and displace difference. Like other Western knowledge disciplines, difference in conflict resolution in many respects “remains condemned and must atone or be redeemed under the auspices of reason.”¹

The response to cultural diversity within conflict resolution is the most notable manifestation of the difference challenge, and is also a key theme that has been followed throughout this book. Cultural difference has come to be recognized as a major challenge for the field, and there is much to commend the work done by a range of culture-focused scholars including Kevin Avruch, Peter Black, John Paul Lederach, Tarja Väyrynen, and the open advocacy of the problem by Oliver Ramsbotham and colleagues. Nonetheless, the expansive approach to the culture challenge pursued in Chapter 1 by taking in questions of how we know cultural difference reveals important dimensions to the culture challenge that are overlooked by these scholars. These dimensions include complexities relating to the colonial entailments of the term “culture,” and its position at the limit of Western social sciences. Exploring these complexities shows that culture has historically served as a way of ordering difference in colonial and modernist social science projects by drawing boundaries among groups within an overall Western knowledge project that struggles to recognize other ways of knowing and being. Deploying this type of ordering continues to risk alternately overvaluing or devaluing difference—either fuelling conflict during conflict resolution interventions or disavowing difference in ways that jeopardize the credibility of conflict resolvers.

At a time when anthropologists and others are beginning to embrace ideas of “cultural flows” in place of assumptions that cultural groups are bounded and separate, we are witnessing the deployment of ideas of group bounded-ness in difference claims which fuel contemporary

conflicts. From Iraq and Afghanistan to Sri Lanka and the so-called war on terror, the exclusivity of cultural and religious grouping is invoked in the escalation and maintenance of conflicts. We are faced, in other words, with a disjuncture between academic and everyday understandings and notions of group identity. Curiously, it is the case in at least some regions that understandings of personal and group identities as discrete and bounded are not indigenous, but have been appropriated following contact with European conceptions of selfhood and forms of social and political organization.² To deal with this situation, Chapter 1 argued that we should be cautious about once again falling back upon Western knowledge as the means for ordering difference by, for instance, drawing upon social science to decide when people's invocations of culture are legitimate or illegitimate. Rather, the chapter suggested valuing culture as a term that refers to ineffable dimensions of human existence while reducing its capacity to prescribe differences and boundaries between individuals and groups. Thinking of cultures as relational effects offers a way of valuing difference while simultaneously embracing connections and relationships that form through difference.

Where Chapter 1 explored the ethico-political and practical challenges accompanying our current ways of knowing cultural difference for conflict resolution, and pointed to the possibilities of relatedness to addressing these challenges, Chapter 2 dealt with the ways in which conflict resolution governs difference. Conflict resolution claims to differentiate itself from formal processes of the sovereign realms of law and statecraft by emphasizing its consensual and dialogical dimensions. However, governmentality analysis demonstrates that conflict resolution processes govern informally even as they promote and encourage liberal freedom. Conflict resolution also struggles, alongside mainstream social science, to recognize non-Western ways of conceptualizing social order and managing difficulties among people as legitimate counterparts to the rule of law and sovereignty. So in addition to informal governance of difference through conflict resolution processes such as mediation and problem-solving workshops, conflict resolution tends to subordinate non-Western ways of organizing political life and processing conflict by identifying them as informal.

To show that conflict resolution governs is not to argue against governance *per se*. Governance is a necessary dimension of conflict resolution because all mechanisms for reproducing order act upon parties to conflict, or have them act upon their selves to reconfigure their selves and institutions. Nonetheless, Chapter 2 showed that conflict resolution governs difference in relation to liberal assumptions about selves,

order, and conflict. It denies, constrains, and disciplines difference by narrowing the range of ways of organizing political life and dealing with difficulties among people that are validated by dominant institutions and processes. Conflict resolution risks, then, disavowing the difference claims to which it attempts to respond in dealing with conflict. This issue will likely come into greater focus as conflict resolution programs and processes proliferate within Western states as well as within law and justice reforms in developing countries, interventions to manage or resolve conflicts across difference, and transitional justice arrangements in peacebuilding efforts.

Coming to terms with and mitigating conflict resolution governance of difference will require much more than simply drawing on local conflict resolution processes to complement interventions sponsored by liberal states and the international community. Working with local conflict resolution processes is valuable, but this will need to be accompanied by conversations and negotiations about the values and structure of political communities which inform and drive conflict resolution mechanisms and processes. Should this occur, it will necessarily bring into question and displace the assumption that transnational liberalism is the primary and universal framework for progressing order and peace.

Addressing questions of governance, order, and political community to deal with the difference challenge requires further critical engagement with the influential idea of sovereignty. Despite some critiques, sovereignty continues to serve as a powerful idea for structuring political life and individual selves in transnational liberalism. The idea that sovereignty is the most advanced form of political organization subordinates alternatives and their accompanying conflict resolution processes. The figure of the sovereign and rational self also remains central to assumptions about the behavior that is necessary and desirable for resolving disputes in conflict resolution processes. But it is also clear that sovereignty is necessarily incomplete and fissured because it is in-and-of the world. The transcendental claims of sovereignty are continually permeated and fissured by everyday and mundane encounters, from the non-violent refusal of individuals to participate in conflict resolution on the terms of the mediator to the violence of international terrorism. The relationality and interdependence of everyday social life also continually undermines commonplace assumptions that selfhood is characterized by the figure of a discrete and self-sufficient sovereign individual.

The critical analysis developed in Part I of this book showed that conflict resolution follows a broader social science pattern of pursuing self-sufficiency in knowing, governing, and being. Despite recognizing

culture as a major challenge for the field, conflict resolution risks reproducing the ethico-political and practical difficulties presented by cultural diversity by pursuing self-sufficiency in knowing difference, governing difference, and reproducing the powerful influence of sovereignty. Nonetheless, the relational approach to culture and difference suggested by recent anthropological approaches, the fact that informal governance is open to resistance and reconfiguration, and the fissuring of sovereignty were also discussed as avenues for addressing the difference challenge. The ideas of connection and relatedness at the center of these possibilities form the basis for discussion of suggestions for realizing new relationships across difference for conflict resolution.

Toward a new politics?

Part II of this book built upon the critical analysis undertaken in Part I to explore possibilities for addressing the culture challenge, mitigating transnational liberal governance of difference, and grappling with the influence of sovereignty in conflict resolution. While suggestions for a cosmopolitan conflict resolution are broadly appealing for dealing with the difference challenge, questions about cosmopolitanism's European origins give reason for pause. Fundamental questions about how we engage others were explored by considering recognition and relatedness as paradigms for relating across difference. The discussion showed that both are likely to be necessary for addressing the challenges of difference in conflict resolution. Where recognition risks falling back upon sovereignty, relatedness mitigates these risks and offers more thoroughgoing possibilities for connecting and responding across difference. Realizing the possibilities of responding anew through relatedness will require, as I discuss further below, exploring theoretical and methodological innovations at the limits of conflict resolution and contemporary social science.

Chapter 4 began by noting that recent suggestions for a cosmopolitan conflict resolution³ are imbued with ideals that are likely to resonate with many in the field. Calls to respect individual difference within a single humanity, and to find ways to be responsible for people in conflict beyond the influence of particular states or established centers of power,⁴ align with conflict resolution's impulse to respond to people's needs in conflict in non-coercive and participatory ways. But cosmopolitanism's Kantian and European origins also make it a tricky proposition. Even if we allow that cosmopolitanism does not carry within it the implicit goal of completing a European modernist project,⁵ we cannot readily adopt its basic categories. Emphases upon the individual and reason, for instance,

are broadly defensible in abstract terms, but anthropology has taught us that operational conceptions of selfhood vary spatially and temporally, and that people reason with different concepts.

Problems arise because terms such as “individual” and “reason” are readily filled with liberal Western content once we accept cosmopolitanism as our theoretical framework. The forms of rational individualism promoted in conflict resolution processes, for instance, disavow other ways of being. This forecloses on addressing the difference challenge. We must, then, alongside ongoing encounters across difference, deal with fundamental questions about how we relate to others rather than assuming the terms of a pre-existing theoretical framework. Achieving this will require drawing upon the recognition paradigm and, to mitigate its shortfalls, turning to less well-known, but increasingly popular, ideas of relatedness.

The commonsensical notion of recognition, increasingly embraced in recent decades as necessary for a just politics of difference, is characterized by an important and powerful movement toward equality. The curiously symmetrical relations of two self-consciousnesses seeking recognition require that the recognized party also gives recognition to the recognizer. Mutual recognition is necessary, not least because recognition itself is necessary for human existence. But Chapter 4 shows that recognition can also fall back upon the sovereign individual and analyst in ways that appropriate rather than acknowledge difference. Recognizing presumes the action of a self-sufficient person who confers recognition prior to an encounter with others. The dynamics of seeking and providing recognition can, then, reinforce problematic politico-cultural relations by proceeding on the terms of those who denied recognition in the first place.⁶

The notion of relatedness, in contrast, disrupts the influence of sovereignty and taps directly into the being togetherness and necessary interdependence of human existence. Where recognition converts encounters across difference into categories and objects for knowing and acting in conflict resolution, relatedness refers to a pre-cognitive given-over-ness which makes human beings mutually vulnerable to others. Relatedness does not automatically promote ethical relations; indeed it enables conflict resolution practitioners to act upon participants in operations of liberal governance in conflict resolution processes discussed in Chapter 2. Nonetheless, the given-over-ness and vulnerability suggested by relatedness offer ways of intensifying ethical relationships in conflict resolution processes to mitigate transnational liberal governance and connect across difference.

Chapter 4 does not, though, argue that relatedness should replace recognition. Because relatedness is an ineffable event or quality, it often finds expression through struggles for recognition and the development of norms and rules for social interaction. Recognition and relatedness complement and extend each other.⁷ Political struggles for recognition are an important context for pursuing relatedness, and relatedness is necessary to mitigate the ethico-political risks of returning to sovereign self-sufficiency through recognition. Nonetheless, Chapter 4 showed that relatedness should be utilized for dealing with the difference challenge because it offers particular prospects for mitigating the influence of sovereignty.

The first proposal for pursuing relatedness canvassed in Chapter 5 was the suggestion to draw more thoroughly upon conflict resolution scholar and practitioner selves as resources for conflict work. This approach is beginning to gain popularity in conflict resolution, but it is often presented without the necessary theoretical and critical analysis to demonstrate how it can help us address challenges of difference. Chapter 5 makes use of contemporary theorizing about the self and my conflict resolution experience with Australian Aboriginal people to argue for an approach which conceptualizes and practices the self as an unfolding ensemble whose centeredness emerges through continually shifting relations with others and the world. Conceiving of selves as relational ensembles who are vulnerable to external and unfamiliar forces offers connections across difference in place of returning to the conventional self and the cultural, social, and political institutions which give it support.

Using selves as a resource must not collapse to commonsensical self-reflection or to notions of “artistic” practice. To the extent that such non-critical practices unreflectively reproduce existing forms of selfhood they cannot bring difference to bear or promote responsiveness to others. Engaging the cultural, social, political, and institutional contexts which condition selves is crucial to respond to the difference challenge. Because our selves are invariably entwined with institutions and the broader social and political order, engaging ourselves critically is not strictly, or merely, a private or interpersonal venture. As discussion of conflict resolution processes in Chapter 2 demonstrated, the institutional mechanisms and processes of political orders act upon selves to encourage particular ways of being, and the actions of agents of political orders help to constitute, and to change over time, the character and operations of these same orders.

Beyond the immediate personal experience of conflict resolution scholar and practitioner selves, the second proposal advanced in

Chapter 5 draws upon the burgeoning field of complexity studies, an exciting and relatively new area of inquiry which bridges many disciplines. A key insight of complexity research relates to the way in which order can emerge in physical, biological, and social systems through the interaction of locally acting agents. Crucially, the dynamic order which arises from local interactions cannot be known or predicted before it arises. Everyday examples range from the interaction of neurons to generate minds, ants to generate colonies, birds to generate flocks, and builders and residents to generate cities. In all cases, local relationships contribute to unorchestrated yet recognizable patterns which emerge at the boundary of chaos and order.

Complexity has gained some attention in conflict resolution, but is not yet widely known. Chapter 5 showed that complexity promises better understandings of the heterogeneity and dynamism of conflict situations and hence greater responsiveness to difference. It also undercuts the overarching position of the conventional sovereign analyst of social science. The inability to predict the outcomes of complex systems, and the focus on the role of difference and contingency in the interactions of agents encourages a more humble attitude on the part of analysts, and greater attention to the philosophical possibilities of connection and relatedness.

The final section of Chapter 5 introduced the notion of networked relationality to conceptualize in a single framework the possibilities of pursuing relatedness by drawing upon the selves of conflict resolution scholars and practitioners and the insights of the complexity paradigm. The widely accessible network metaphor evokes entities-in-relationship wherein the nodes of the network are constituted through relationship. The open character of networks, including the fluidity of individual nodes which arises through their continual reproduction in relationship, facilitates the work of connecting and relating across difference. Networked relationality helps to conceptualize how individual selves come into being through relationship with others, and how order can arise without the influence of a sovereign agent who oversees all actors.

Proposals to draw upon our selves and the field of complexity studies to deal with the difference challenge take us to the limits of contemporary conflict resolution and social science. They also bring us face-to-face with the longstanding tendency in Western thought, widely shared in conflict resolution, to think of community and order as arising out of sameness and commonality. In this view, discussed in Chapter 2, difference is typically seen as a problem or source of threat. This approach to difference is currently being challenged at the frontiers of contemporary

scholarship, both in political philosophy⁸ and anthropological accounts of order and identity among non-Western peoples.⁹ But it remains the case that difference tends to be viewed in the negative when it comes to questions about the formation and maintenance of social order. Multicultural states, often touted as evidence of liberalism's tolerance of difference, do not present a challenge to this broad view because here difference is managed by, and is ultimately subject to, sovereign oversight. The possibility that political community and mechanisms for conflict resolution might arise out of difference and differentiation as much as sameness remains novel and perplexing for Western social thought.

The tendency in Western thought to see community arising out of commonality means that difference readily suggests boundaries and distinctions which are difficult to cross. This exacerbates the difference challenge faced by conflict resolution. It is true, of course, that encounters across difference can be challenging. But the volume of global empirical evidence surely weighs more heavily on the side of the possibilities of encounter and exchange, regardless of difficulty, rather than incommensurable or insurmountable difference. For this reason, I have held to the view throughout this book that interaction and exchange across difference are possible and desirable. This position suggests that the universal aspirations of conflict resolution and cosmopolitanism are possible. But I also argue that any universality must be responsive across difference. In other words, problems arise not with universalism *per se*, but with operations of universality that are not responsive to difference.¹⁰

Against the influence of sovereignty which returns to itself and foregoes responsiveness by operating from a single point, networked relationality opens the possibility of relating across difference through the interaction of local agents. It is true that the type of order on offer here is not the same as that offered by sovereignty, and that many will not be easily convinced. Yet innovation is called for if conflict resolution is to successfully pursue universal relevance and responsiveness to difference in the twenty-first century. The complexity paradigm shows that locally acting agents can generate a self-organizing overall order without guidance or management from without.¹¹ By militating against the traditional Western social science tendency to view from a single sovereign point, the network metaphor offers possibilities for what might be termed "de-centered universalism." The nature of such a universal cannot be, of course, be specified beforehand because it always remains an emergent work-in-progress. Yet the promise of this approach for addressing the difference challenge lies precisely in eschewing traditionally coordinated global approaches in favor of opening to and encouraging the

“unexpected and unstable aspects of global interaction.”¹² Exploiting the possibilities of emergence and self-organization requires work beyond the scope of this book to examine how to best tap into and foster the relationality of worldwide connections in conflict resolution.

Part II of this book suggests significant innovation to deal with the difference challenge. Pursuing networked relationality requires foregoing the reassurances of sovereignty in knowing, governing, and being. Yet it is also the case that these possibilities resonate with conflict resolution’s commitment to engaged practice and responsiveness to people in conflict. To respond to others is to necessarily become vulnerable to peoples’ lives, fears, and hopes. Such vulnerability involves becoming susceptible to peoples’ ways of knowing the world, entertaining the possibilities for social order and conflict resolution suggested by their political and social systems, and openness to their understandings of themselves and of their existence. The working forth of conflict resolution scholar and practitioner selves in this process goes beyond a personal practice as it interacts with the processes and institutions of transnational liberalism. It is impossible to pursue a conflict resolution which does not govern, but pursuing relatedness brings difference to bear in ways which can move us beyond the paradigms of conventional scholarship and practice.

No single work can lay claim to a comprehensive account of the challenge of difference for conflict resolution, but incompleteness has virtues from the perspective of networked relationality. To sidestep the self-sufficiency of conventional scholarship leaves more space for others and for difference. Through everyday encounters across difference, conflict resolution scholars and practitioners are, if they choose, able to open to the play of a variety of forces, and a variety of ways of organizing being together and dealing with difficulties among people. To pursue these where they may lead will be crucial for addressing the difference challenge and grappling with the influence of sovereignty in knowing, governing, and being in conflict resolution, and for working across difference to build broader possibilities for conceiving of social order and resolving conflict.

Notes

Introduction

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3. Michelle LeBaron, *Bridging Cultural Conflicts: A New Approach for a Changing World*, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2003, p. 11.
4. Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce M. Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In*, London: Random House Business Books, 1999.
5. Possibilities include Daniel Druckman, Sandra Cheldelin, and Larissa Fast (eds), *Conflict: From Analysis to Intervention* London: Continuum, 2003; Daniel Druckman and Paul F. Diehl, *Conflict Resolution*, London: SAGE, 2006; Johan Galtung, *Transcend and Transform: An Introduction to Conflict Work*, London: Pluto, 2004; Louis Kriesberg, *Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003; Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2005; James A. Schellenberg, *Conflict Resolution: Theory, Research, and Practice*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996. For a list of an impressively large number of synthesis of various dimensions of the conflict resolution field, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts," *Journal of Dispute Resolution*, vol. 2003, no. 2, 2003, note 2.
6. Frank Blechman, "Ethics and Field Building," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 3, 2002, pp. 373–74.
7. Menkel-Meadow, "Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts," p. 336.
8. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, p. 3. The domestic United States alternative dispute resolution movement is crucial here, and it remains the case that "the techniques, technology, and apparatus of conflict resolution 'processes' are much more professionalized and developed in domestic dispute resolution" than in the international sphere. See Menkel-Meadow, "Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts," p. 336.
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10. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, p. 9.
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
 12. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
 13. One of field leader Johan Galtung's maxims is that all conflicts are created equal. See Galtung, *Transcend and Transform: An Introduction to Conflict Work*, p. viii. For thoughts of another field pioneer about the interdisciplinary nature of conflict resolution see John Burton, *Conflict Resolution and Provention*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990, p. 20.
 14. Roger Fisher, *International Conflict for Beginners*, New York: Harper & Row, 1969. See Menkel-Meadow, "Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts," note 2.
 15. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, p. 250.
 16. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, London: Athlone Press, 1994, p. xiv.
 17. *Ibid.*, p. xiii.
 18. Emmanuel Levinas, *Time and the Other and Additional Essays*, Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987, p. 65.
 19. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 262.
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 21. See Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, *Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005.
 22. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*.
 23. *Ibid.*, pp. 328–9.
 24. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
 25. John W. Burton, *Conflict Resolution: Its Language and Processes*, Lanham, Md., & London: Scarecrow, 1996, p. 23.
 26. *Ibid.*
 27. Kevin Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, pp. 88–9.
 28. See Peter Adler, Karen Lovaas, and Neal Milner, "The Ideologies of Mediation: The Movement's Own Story," *Law and Policy*, vol. 10, no. 4, 1988, Jerold S. Auerbach, *Justice without Law?*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.
 29. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, p. 328.
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 31. Kevin Avruch and Peter Black, "The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution," *Peace and Change*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1991, pp. 31–3.
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 38. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, p. 309.
 39. *Ibid.*, p. 329.
 40. *Ibid.*
 41. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
 42. Hwa Yol Jung, "Introduction," in *Comparative Political Culture in the Age of Globalization: An Introductory Anthology*, Hwa Yol Jung (ed.), Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002, p. 2.
 43. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, p. 8.
 44. Jayne Seminare Docherty, *Learning Lessons from Waco: When the Parties Bring Their Gods to the Negotiation Table*, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2001; R. E. Young, *Intercultural Communication: Pragmatics, Genealogy, Deconstruction*, Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters, 1996, p. 148.
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54. *Ibid.*, p. 329.
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1. Meron Benvenisti, *Conflicts and Contradictions*, New York: Villard Books/Random House, 1986, p. 119.
2. Kevin Avruch, "Introduction: Culture and Conflict Resolution," in *Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*, Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, and Joseph A. Scimecca (eds), Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1991; Tarja Väyrynen, *Culture and International Conflict Resolution*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2001.
3. See the brief overview by Jayne Seminare Docherty, "Culture and Negotiation: Symmetrical Anthropology for Negotiators," *Marquette Law Review*, vol. 87, no. 4, 2004, p. 711. Key contributions to the debate include Kevin Avruch and Peter W. Black, "A Generic Theory of Conflict Resolution: A Critique," *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1987; Kevin Avruch and Peter Black, "The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution," *Peace and Change*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1991; John W. Burton and Dennis J. D. Sandole, "Expanding the Debate on Generic Theory of Conflict Resolution: A Response to a Critique," *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1987. Aside from Avruch and Väyrynen's contributions, a key monograph is John Paul Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures*, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1995.
4. My phrasing here is drawn from Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts," *Journal of Dispute Resolution*, vol. 2003, no. 2, 2003, p. 325. Skeptics, of course, remain. For an example see William Zartman, "A Skeptic's View," in *Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes* Guy Olivier Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds), Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993.
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7. Benvenisti, *Conflicts and Contradictions*, p. 119.
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 14. See, for instance, Fred R. Myers, *Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self: Sentiment, Place, and Politics among Western Desert Aborigines*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991; Joanna Overing, "In Praise of the Everyday: Trust and the Art of Social Living in an Amazonian Community," *Ethnos*, vol. 68, no. 3, 2003; E. Richard Sorenson, "Preconquest Consciousness," in *Tribal Epistemologies: Essays in the Philosophy of Anthropology*, Helmut Wautischer (ed.), Aldershot ; Brookfield, IL: Ashgate, 1998.
 15. For instance, Joanna Overing explains that the high value placed on "being able 'to live one's life in one's own way' . . . is not to be confused with the egoism of a familiar brand of Western individualism" because "*personal autonomy is a social capacity*." Overing, "In Praise of the Everyday: Trust and the Art of Social Living in an Amazonian Community," pp. 305–6, emphasis in original.
 16. See Stella Ting-Toomey, "Toward a Theory of Conflict and Culture," in *Communication, Culture, and Organizational Processes*, Lea P. Stewart, William B. Gudykunst, and Stella Ting-Toomey (eds), Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985, p. 71; M. K. Kozan, "Culture and Conflict Management: A Theoretical Framework," *International Journal of Conflict Management*, vol. 8, no. 4, 1997; James A. Wall, Jr., John B. Stark, and Rhetta L. Standifer, "Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 45, no. 3, 2001.
 17. Among other pieces listed in notes thus far, see Kevin Avruch and Peter Black, "Ideas of Human Nature in Contemporary Conflict Resolution Theory," *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 6, no. 3, 1990; Avruch and Black, "The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution.,"; Peter W. Black, "Surprised by Common Sense: Local Understandings and the Management of Conflict on Tobi, Republic of Belau," in *Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*, Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, and Joseph A. Scimecca (eds), Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1991; Peter W. Black and Kevin Avruch, "Anthropologists in Conflictland: The Role of Cultural Anthropology in an Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution," *Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, vol. 16, no. 3, 1993; Kevin Avruch and Peter W. Black, "Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: Problems and Prospects," in *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application*, Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe (eds), Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993.
 18. See Kevin Avruch, "Culture and Negotiation Pedagogy," *Negotiation Journal*, vol. 16, no. 4, 2000, pp. 343–44.
 19. See especially Kevin Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, pp. 5–20.
 20. Ibid., pp. 14–16.
 21. Avruch, "Culture and Negotiation Pedagogy," p. 345.

22. Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures*.
23. Avruch and Black, "The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution."
24. See Väyrynen, *Culture and International Conflict Resolution*; Tarja Väyrynen, "International Conflict Resolution through Negotiations: Coming to an Understanding in Gadamerian Dialogue," Tampere University, Finland: Conference paper, 2001; Tarja Väyrynen, "Review Essay: A Shared Understanding – Gadamer and International Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 42, no. 3, 2005.
25. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, p. 309.
26. Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*.
27. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, p. 315.
28. Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, pp. 5–20.
29. Roy Wagner, for instance, shows that culture is an invention. See Roy Wagner, *The Invention of Culture*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975, p. 16.
30. John R. Baldwin, *Redefining Culture: Perspectives across the Disciplines*, Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006, pp. 3–24, 139–226.
31. Renato I. Rosaldo, "Foreword: Defining Culture," in *Redefining Culture: Perspectives across the Disciplines*, John R. Baldwin (ed.), Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006, p. xii.
32. Docherty, "Culture and Negotiation: Symmetrical Anthropology for Negotiators," pp. 716–17.
33. David Scott, "Culture in Political Theory," *Political Theory*, vol. 31, no. 1, 2003, p. 92.
34. See Bryan Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism, and Globalism*, London; New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 183; James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 95.
35. See Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, pp. 12–16.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
37. Morris Freilich, "Introduction: Is Culture Still Relevant?," in *The Relevance of Culture*, Morris Freilich (ed.), New York: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, 1989.
38. Christopher Herbert, *Culture and Anomie: Ethnographic Imagination in the Nineteenth Century*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 11.
39. Patrick Sullivan, "Introduction: Culture without Cultures – the Culture Effect," *The Australian Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 17, no. 3, 2006, p. 259.
40. Baldwin, *Redefining Culture: Perspectives across the Disciplines*, p. 4, *passim*.
41. Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 6.
42. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, New York: Vintage, 1970, p. 373.
43. Nicholas B. Dirks, "Introduction: Colonialism and Culture," in *Colonialism and Culture*, Nicholas B. Dirks (ed.), Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992, p. 3.
44. Wagner, *The Invention of Culture*.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 31. See also Kenelm Burridge, *Mambu, a Melanesian Millennium*, London: Methuen, 1960.

46. Wagner, *The Invention of Culture*, p. 12.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
48. See Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge & the Discourse on Language*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1972, p. 49; James Clifford, "Introduction," in *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds), Berkeley: London: University of California Press, 1986, p. 2.
49. Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London and New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 114, emphasis in original.
50. Lila Abu-Lughod, "Writing against Culture," in *Recapturing Anthropology: Working in the Present*, Richard G. Fox (ed.), Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research Press, 1991, p. 143.
51. Nicholas Thomas, *Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Pacific*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 3.
52. Abu-Lughod, "Writing against Culture," p. 144.
53. Thomas, *Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Pacific*, p. 3, *passim*.
54. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, London: Vintage, 1993, p. xxviii.
55. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
56. Thomas, *Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Pacific*, p. 3.
57. This is not to suggest, as I will discuss below, that culture cannot be used for the opposite purpose of valuing cultural difference and working against hierarchy. The most notable example is Franz Boas' early twentieth-century arguments against racist understandings of cultural difference. See Mark Risjord, "Scientific Change as Political Action Franz Boas and the Anthropology of Race," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, vol. 37, no. 1, 2007.; Kevin Avruch, "Type I and Type II Errors in Culturally Sensitive Conflict Resolution Practice," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 3, 2003, p. 356.
58. Edward Said, *Orientalism*, London: Penguin, 1995 [1978].
59. *Ibid.*; Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government*, Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1994.
60. See Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event*, London; New York: Cassell, 1999.
61. Abu-Lughod, "Writing against Culture," p. 143.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
63. Anthony Appiah neatly captures some of the accompanying complexity. He states that "people have been inclined to fret about the export of Western culture; but among the most successful Western cultural imports has been the concept of culture itself – a concept that has then been mobilized against 'cultural imperialism.'" Anthony Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 119.
64. See Jack David Eller, *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 48, *passim*.
66. Gaynor Macdonald, "Where Words Harm and Blows Heal," *Australian Dispute Resolution Journal*, vol. 1, no. 3, 1990; Gaynor Macdonald, "A Wiradjuri Fight

- Story," in *Being Black: Aboriginal Cultures in "Settled" Australia*, Ian Keen (ed.), Canberra, A.C.T.: Aboriginal Studies Press for the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1988; Marcia Langton, "Medicine Square: Swearing and Fighting as Dispute Processing Mechanisms in Aboriginal Society and Their Illegality under the Australian Legal System," in *Being Black: Aboriginal Cultures In "Settled" Australia*, Ian Keen (ed.), Canberra, A.C.T.: Aboriginal Studies Press for the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1988.
67. Laura Nader, "Harmony Models and the Construction of Law," in *Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*, Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, and Joseph A. Scimecca (eds), Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1991; Paul Salem, "A Critique of Western Conflict Resolution from a Non-Western Perspective," in *Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays*, Paul Salem (ed.), New York: American University of Beirut, 1997.
 68. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1991, p. 21.
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 72. Ibid.
 73. Ibid., p. 356.
 74. Ibid., p. 362.
 75. Ibid., p. 366, emphasis in original.
 76. Ibid., p. 362, emphasis in original.
 77. Avruch, "Culture and Negotiation Pedagogy," p. 345.
 78. Oliver Paul Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 219.
 79. Avruch, "Culture and Negotiation Pedagogy," p. 345.
 80. This expression and idea is taken from Sullivan, "Introduction: Culture without Cultures—the Culture Effect."
 81. Jack Goody, *Representations and Contradictions: Ambivalence Towards Images, Theatre, Fiction, Relics, and Sexuality*, Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1997, p. 5.
 82. Ernesto Laclau, "Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?," in *Deconstruction: A Reader*, Martin McQuillan (ed.), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001, p. 408, emphasis in original.
 83. Ibid., p. 405.
 84. This expression is drawn from Sullivan, "Introduction: Culture without Cultures—the Culture Effect."
 85. Ibid., p. 259.
 86. Ibid., p. 253.
 87. Eller, *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict*, p. 3.
 88. See, for instance, Seyla Benhabib, *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996.
 89. Avruch, "Type I and Type II Errors in Culturally Sensitive Conflict Resolution Practice," p. 366.
 90. Sullivan, "Introduction: Culture without Cultures—the Culture Effect."

91. *Ibid.*, p. 260. For discussion of the increasing importance of networks see Kai Eriksson, "On the Ontology of Networks," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, vol. 2, no. 4, 2005.
92. Sullivan, "Introduction: Culture without Cultures—the Culture Effect," p. 260.
93. For a partial overview see Jerrold Seigel, *The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
94. Fred R. Dallmayr, "Introduction," in *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber*, Michael Theunissen (ed.), Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 1984, p. x.
95. Sylviane Agacinski, "Another Experience of the Question, or Experiencing the Question Other-Wise," in *Who Comes after the Subject?*, Peter Connor, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Eduardo Cadava (eds), New York; London: Routledge, 1991, p. 12.
96. *Ibid.*
97. See, for instance, the special issue of *Theory, Culture, and Society*, John Urry, "The Complexity Turn," *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 22, no. 5, 2005.
98. Robert Axelrod's work on complexity and cooperation is the most prominent example in conflict resolution. See Robert Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997.

2 Governing Difference

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2. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, London: Penguin, 1981, p. 136, emphasis in original.
3. Michel Foucault, "Security, Territory, and Population," in *Michel Foucault: Ethics, the Essential Works I*, Paul Rabinow (ed.), London: Penguin, 1997, p. 68.
4. Many important contributions are available. For a sample, see Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose (eds), *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996; Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (eds), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991; Mitchell Dean, *The Constitution of Poverty: Toward a Genealogy of Liberal Governance*, London and New York: Routledge, 1991; Mitchell Dean, "'A Social Structure of Many Souls': Moral Regulation, Government, and Self-Formation," *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1994; Mitchell Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, London; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999; Barry Hindess and Mitchell Dean (eds), *Governing Australia: Studies in Contemporary Rationalities of Government* Cambridge; Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, "Governing Economic Life," *Economy and Society*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1990; Nikolas Rose, "'Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism,'" *Economy and Society*, vol. 22, no. 3, 1993; Nikolas Rose,

- "The Death of the Social? Re-Figuring the Territory of Government," *Economy and Society*, vol. 25, no. 3, 1996; Nikolas Rose, *Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self*, London and New York: Routledge, 1991.
5. For a sample see Michael Dillon, "Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the 'New World Order' to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, vol. 20, 1995; Francois Debrix, "Space Quest: Surveillance, Governance, and the Panoptic Eye of the United Nations," *Alternatives*, vol. 24, no. 3, 1999; Randy Lippert, "Governing Refugees: The Relevance of Governmentality to Understanding the International Refugee Regime," *Alternatives*, vol. 24, no. 3, 2000; Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, "Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency," *Alternatives*, vol. 25, no. 1, 2000; Dore Salskon-Iversen, Hans Krause Hansen, and Sven Bislev, "Governmentality, Globalization, and Local Practice: Transformations of a Hegemonic Discourse," *Alternatives*, vol. 25, no. 2, 2000; Wendy Larner, *Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces*, New York, NY London: Routledge, 2004.
 6. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, "Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts," *Journal of Dispute Resolution*, vol. 2003, no. 2, 2003, pp. 336–7.
 7. Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power," in *Power/Knowledge*, Colin Gordon (ed.), New York: Pantheon, 1980, p. 122.
 8. Kevin Avruch, "Introduction: Culture and Conflict Resolution," in *Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*, Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, and Joseph A. Scimecca (eds), Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1991, p. 5.
 9. See Oliver Paul Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; Mark R. Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*, London; New York: Zed Books, 2001.
 10. Buddhist and Ghandian influences are important in Johan Galtung's work. For a sample of legal anthropology see Paul Bohannan, *Justice and Judgment among the Tiv*, London: Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press, 1968; Paul Bohannan, "The Differing Realms of the Law," *American Ethnologist: Special Issue on the Ethnography of Law*, vol. 67, no. 6, 1965; James Gibbs, "The Kpelle Moot: A Therapeutic Model for the Informal Settlement of Disputes," *Africa*, vol. 33, no. 1, 1963; Max Gluckman, *The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965; Max Gluckman, *The Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1955; Max Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict in Africa*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970; Laura Nader, "The Anthropological Study of Law," *American Ethnologist: Special Issue on the Ethnography of Law*, vol. 67, no. 6, 1965. For debates about the introduction of (non-Western) processes into the United States, see Richard Danzig, "Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal Justice," *Stanford Law Review*, vol. 26, no. 1—November, 1973; Michael Lowy, "Modernizing the American Legal System: An Example of the Peaceful Use of Anthropology," *Human Organization*, vol. 32, no. 2, 1973; William Felstiner, "Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing," *Law and Society Review*, vol. 9, no. 1, 1974; Richard Danzig and Michael Lowy, "Everyday Disputes and Mediation in the United States: A Reply to Professor Felstiner," *Law and Society Review*, vol. 9, no. 4, 1975.

11. Michel Foucault, "Power and Strategies," in *Power/Knowledge*, Colin Gordon (ed.), New York: Pantheon, 1980, p. 139.
12. Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2005, see Part II.
13. This is captured directly in the term "Alternative Dispute Resolution." See also Peter Adler, Karen Lovaas, and Neal Milner, "The Ideologies of Mediation: The Movement's Own Story," *Law and Policy*, vol. 10, no. 4, 1988; Christine B. Harrington and Sally Engle Merry, "Ideological Production: The Making of Community Mediation," *Law and Society Review*, vol. 22, no. 4, 1988; John Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy," *Interdisciplinary Peace Research*, vol. 3, no. 1, 1991.
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15. A wide range of scholarship from analysis of local level governmental programs to global governmentality critiques is relevant here. For a sample see Dean, *The Constitution of Poverty: Toward a Genealogy of Liberal Governance*; Debrix, "Space Quest: Surveillance, Governance, and the Panoptic Eye of the United Nations."; Dillon, "Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the 'New World Order' to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order"; Marc DuBois, "The Governance of the Third World: A Foucauldian Perspective on Power Relations in Development," *Alternatives*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1991; Hindess and Dean (eds), *Governing Australia: Studies in Contemporary Rationalities of Government*; Miller and Rose, "Governing Economic Life."; Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace*; Rose, "The Death of the Social? Re-Figuring the Territory of Government."
16. Michel Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended," in *Michel Foucault: Ethics, the Essential Works I*, Paul Rabinow (ed.), London: Penguin, 1997, p. 59.
17. See Foucault, "Truth and Power," p. 121; Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in *Power/Knowledge*, Colin Gordon (ed.), New York: Pantheon, 1980, pp. 96–8; Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, p. 136.
18. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, p. 136.
19. Dillon, "Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the 'New World Order' to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order," p. 324.
20. Rose, *Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self*, p. 256, passim; Dean, "'A Social Structure of Many Souls': Moral Regulation, Government, and Self-Formation"; Mitchell Dean, "Foucault, Government and the Enfolding of Authority," in *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government*, Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose (eds), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
21. Michel Foucault, "The Birth of Biopolitics," in *Michel Foucault: Ethics, the Essential Works I*, Paul Rabinow (ed.), London: Penguin, 1997, p. 74.
22. A number of authors examine the interplay of these two spheres. See, for instance, Dillon, "Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the 'New World Order' to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order"; Peter Fitzpatrick, "The Impossibility of Popular Justice," *Social and Legal Studies*, vol. 1,

- no. 2, 1992; Peter Fitzpatrick, "Relational Power and the Limits of Law," in *Law and Power: Critical and Socio-Legal Essays*, Kaarlo Tuori, Zenon Bankowski, and Jyrki Uusitalo (eds), Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 1997.
23. As Fitzpatrick argues, "an encompassing set of mythological figures . . . inhabit and unite popular justice and formal regulation." Fitzpatrick, "The Impossibility of Popular Justice," p. 200.
 24. Danzig, "Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal Justice," pp. 42–3.
 25. See Nicholas Thomas, *Colonialism's Culture: Anthropology, Travel and Government*, Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1994, pp. 170–95; Marianna Torgovnick, *Gone Primitive: Savage Intellectuals, Modern Lives*, Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1990.
 26. Frans de Djalong, "Violent Communal Conflict as the Corollary of Disempowered Common Traditions," Paper presented at Mediating across Difference Workshop, Brisbane, 29–31 March, 2007.
 27. Richmond as paraphrased in Morgan Brigg and Roland Bleiker, "Report on Workshop: Mediating across Difference—Indigenous, Oceanic and Asian Approaches to Conflict Resolution," *Dialogues*, vol. 26, no. 2, 2007, p. 59.
 28. Simon Roberts, *Order and Dispute: An Introduction to Legal Anthropology*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England; New York: Penguin, 1979, p. 12.
 29. See Tarja Väyrynen, "International Conflict Resolution through Negotiations: Coming to an Understanding in Gadamerian Dialogue," Tampere University, Finland: Conference paper, 2001; Deinol Jones, *Cosmopolitan Mediation? Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999; Vivienne Jabri, *Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered*, Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 1996.
 30. A. B. Fetherston, "From Conflict Resolution to Transformative Peacebuilding: Reflections from Croatia," Bradford, UK: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 2000.
 31. Clifford Geertz, "From the Native's Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding," in *Interpretive Social Science: A Reader*, Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan (eds), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, p. 229.
 32. Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce M. Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In*, London: Random House Business Books, 1999, p. 19.
 33. Kenneth Cloke, *Mediating Dangerously: The Frontiers of Conflict Resolution*, San Francisco: Wiley/Jossey-Bass, 2001, p. xiii.
 34. Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach*, New York: Pinter, 1996, p. 3.
 35. See Kai Eriksson, "On the Ontology of Networks," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies*, vol. 2, no. 4, 2005; John Law, "Notes on the Theory of the Actor-Network: Ordering, Strategy, and Heterogeneity," *Systems Practice*, vol. 5, no. 4, 1992; John Law and John Hassard, *Actor Network Theory and After*, Boston, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1999.
 36. See Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993.
 37. Geertz, "From the Native's Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding," p. 229.

38. Peter W. Black, "Surprised by Common Sense: Local Understandings and the Management of Conflict on Tobi, Republic of Belau," in *Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*, Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, and Joseph A. Scimecca (eds), Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1991, pp. 149–50.
39. Nancy Williams, *Two Laws: Managing Disputes in a Contemporary Aboriginal Community*, Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1987, p. 105.
40. Deborah Bird Rose, "Indigenous Ecologies and an Ethic of Connection," in *Global Ethics and Environment*, Nicholas Low (ed.), London; New York: Routledge, 1999, p. 180.
41. Hugh Brody, *The Other Side of Eden: Hunter-Gatherers, Farmers and the Shaping of the World*, London: Faber and Faber, 2001, pp. 75–81.
42. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960[1651], pp. 82–3.
43. Simon Harrison, *The Mask of War: Violence, Ritual, and the Self in Melanesia*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993, p. 3.
44. Laura Nader, "Harmony Models and the Construction of Law," in *Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*, Kevin Avruch, Peter W. Black, and Joseph A. Scimecca (eds), Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1991, p. 41. See also Elizabeth Colson, "The Contentiousness of Disputes," in *Understanding Disputes: The Politics of Argument*, Pat Caplan (ed.), Oxford; Providence, R.I.: Berg, 1995. Exceptions, such as George Simmel's work on the functions of social conflict, have had minimal impact in the field. See Georg Simmel, *Conflict: The Web of Group-Affiliations*, Glencoe: Free Post, 1955; Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956, p. 8.
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46. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1971.
47. Linnell Secomb, "Fractured Community," *Hypatia*, vol. 15, no. 2, 2000, p. 136.
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51. See Fetherston, "From Conflict Resolution to Transformative Peacebuilding: Reflections from Croatia."
52. Edward Said, *Orientalism*, London: Penguin, 1995 [1978].
53. For detailed accounts of problem-solving workshops and mediation, two of the most influential conflict resolution processes, see Mitchell and Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach*; Christopher W. Moore, *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003. There is, of course, a range of other important literature. A selection includes Tarja Väyrynen, *New Conflicts and Their Peaceful Resolution*, Mariehamn, Finland: Alands Peace Institute, 1998; Herbert C. Kelman, "Applying a Human Needs Perspective to the Practice of

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54. For brief historical accounts of the emergence of this role see James Laue, "The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third Party Roles in Conflict," in *Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications*, Dennis J. D. Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (eds), New York: New York University Press, 1987; Ronald J. Fisher, "Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup Conflict Resolution: A Review of Studies," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 27, no. 2, 1983.
 55. For a useful outline and discussion of these contrasting approaches see Chapter One of Jones, *Cosmopolitan Mediation? Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords*.
 56. Laue, "The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third Party Roles in Conflict," p. 20.
 57. But for some critical analysis see Sara Cobb and Janet Rifkin, "Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in Mediation," *Law and Social Inquiry*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1991; Trina Grillo, "The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women," *The Yale Law Journal*, vol. 100, no. 6, 1991; George Pavlich, "The Power of Community Mediation: Government and Formation of Self-Identity," *Law and Society Review*, vol. 30, no. 4, 1996.
 58. See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, London: Penguin, 1979. For a more detailed analysis of normalization in community mediation see George Pavlich, *Justice Fragmented: Mediating Community Disputes under Postmodern Conditions*, London and New York: Routledge, 1996.
 59. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, pp. 182–3.
 60. Ibid.
 61. See William Zartman, "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments," in *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, John Darby and Roger MacGinty (eds), Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
 62. Ibid.; Asaf Siniver, "Power, Impartiality and Timing: Three Hypotheses on Third Party Mediation in the Middle East," *Political Studies*, vol. 54, 2006; Louis Kriesberg, "Introduction: Timing Conditions, Strategies, and Errors," in *Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts*, Stuart J. Thorson and Louis Kriesberg (eds), Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1991.
 63. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, p. 183.
 64. See Mitchell and Banks, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution: The Analytical Problem-Solving Approach*, p. 77.
 65. Fisher, Ury, and Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In*, p. 31.
 66. Niko Besnier, "Language and Affect," *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol. 19, 1990, p. 420.
 67. Fisher, Ury, and Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In*, p. 31.

68. See Besnier, "Language and Affect," p. 421; Avruch, "Introduction: Culture and Conflict Resolution," p. 5.
69. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, pp. 58–62, passim; Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (eds), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, pp. 213–15.
70. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 128–9.
71. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, pp. 58–62, passim; Foucault, "The Subject and Power," pp. 213–15.
72. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, p. 62.
73. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," p. 215.
74. Isabelle R. Gunning, "Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths," *Journal of Dispute Resolution*, vol. 1995, no. 1, 1995, p. 68.
75. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, pp. 61–2.
76. See Gunning, "Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths," pp. 65–8.
77. Pavlich, *Justice Fragmented: Mediating Community Disputes under Postmodern Conditions*, p. 120.
78. For more on these capacities see Morgan Brigg, "Governance and Susceptibility in Conflict Resolution: Possibilities Beyond Control," *Social and Legal Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1, 2007.
79. Alphonso Lingis, *Dangerous Emotions*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000, p. 181.
80. See Fisher, Ury, and Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement without Giving In*, pp. 17–40.
81. See Laurence Boule, *Mediation: Skills and Techniques*, Chatswood, N.S.W.: Butterworths, 2001, pp. 129–32.
82. Barry Hindess, "The Liberal Government of Unfreedom," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, vol. 26, 2001, p. 95.
83. See Douglas H. Yarn, "Transnational Conflict Resolution Practice: A Brief Introduction to the Context, Issues, and Search for Best Practice in Exporting Conflict Resolution," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 3, 2002; Christopher Honeyman and Sandra I. Cheldelin, "Have Gavel, Will Travel: Dispute Resolution's Innocents Abroad," *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 3, 2002; Menkel-Meadow, "Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts."
84. Phillip Darby, "Introduction," in *Postcolonizing the International: Working to Change the Way We Are*, Phillip Darby (ed.), Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006, p. 3.
85. Not all scholars and practitioners are sanguine about exporting conflict resolution methods. Recognition of the importance of cultural questions has led many scholars and practitioners to be critically reflexive about the practice of expanding conflict resolution internationally. See Menkel-Meadow, "Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts."
86. Pavlich, *Justice Fragmented: Mediating Community Disputes under Postmodern Conditions*, p. 157.

87. See Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*.
88. Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits Of "Sex,"* New York; London: Routledge, 1993, p. 237.
89. See Gillian Cowlishaw, *Rednecks, Eggheads and Blackfellas: A Study of Racial Power and Intimacy in Australia*, St Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1999, p. 277; Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London and New York: Routledge, 1994, pp. 86–92.

3 Sovereign Selves

1. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
2. Richard Devetak, "Postmodernism," in *Theories of International Relations*, Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds), Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 171–81.
3. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, London: Athlone Press, 1994, p. 131.
4. Adriana Cavarero, *Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 49.
5. Sylviane Agacinski, "Another Experience of the Question, or Experiencing the Question Other-Wise," in *Who Comes after the Subject?*, Peter Connor, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Eduardo Cadava (eds), New York; London: Routledge, 1991, p. 12.
6. See Phillip Darby, "Introduction," in *Postcolonizing the International: Working to Change the Way We Are*, Phillip Darby (ed.), Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006, p. 2.
7. Alphonso Lingis, *The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994, p. 3.
8. William E. Connolly, *The Augustinian Imperative: A Reflection on the Politics of Morality*, Newbury Park: Sage, 1993, p. 149.
9. For instance, one elderly woman challenged me by saying, "You're on my country now." Country refers to particular tract of land and invokes the "Law" or "Dreaming" based in it which brings human beings into existence and serves as a type of poetic ordering principle for guiding relations among people. See J. M. Arthur, *Aboriginal English: A Cultural Study*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 119–20; W. E. H. Stanner, *White Man Got No Dreaming: Essays, 1938–1973*, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1979, pp. 23–30.
10. Kenelm Burridge, *Someone, No One: An Essay on Individuality*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979, pp. 11–13; Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, New York: Vintage, 1970, p. 378.
11. Emmanuel Levinas, "The Trace of the Other," in *Deconstruction in Context*, Mark Taylor (ed.), Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986.
12. R. E. Young, *Intercultural Communication: Pragmatics, Genealogy, Deconstruction*, Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters, 1996, p. 148.
13. Meron Benvenisti, *Conflicts and Contradictions*, New York: Villard Books/Random House, 1986, p. 119.
14. See, for instance, Jerrold Seigel, *The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

15. For two overviews, see Michel Henry, "The Critique of the Subject," in *Who Comes after the Subject?*, Peter Connor, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Eduardo Cadava (eds), New York; London: Routledge, 1991; Fred R. Dallmayr, *Twilight of Subjectivity: Contributions to a Post-Individualist Theory of Politics*, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1981, pp. 21–37.
16. Foucault and those following him have been particularly prominent. Others of course, including Charles Taylor, are more sanguine about the ethico-political implications of the Western self.
17. Romand Coles, *Self/Power/Other: Political Theory and Dialogical Ethics*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 17.
18. See Augustine and James J. O'Donnell, *Confessions*, Oxford: Clarendon Press; Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1992 [398].
19. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 128–9; Coles, *Self/Power/Other: Political Theory and Dialogical Ethics*, pp. 27–39.
20. See Connolly, *The Augustinian Imperative: A Reflection on the Politics of Morality*, p. xviii, *passim*.
21. Coles, *Self/Power/Other: Political Theory and Dialogical Ethics*, p. 34.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*, p. 35, emphasis in original.
24. *Ibid.*
25. See Nicholas Abercrombie, Bryan S. Turner, and Stephen Hill, *Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism*, London; Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pp. 43–54.
26. The theme of the constitution of selfhood is scattered throughout Foucault's works. In one of his own reassessments, he says, "the goal of my work . . . has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects." Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Hubert L Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (eds), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 208. For a brief discussion of the relationship between Christianity and modern power see Foucault, "The Subject and Power," pp. 213–15. For the centrality of the confession to Western society, see Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, London: Penguin, 1981, pp. 58–62. See also Michel Foucault, "Technologies of the Self," in *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, L. H. Martin, H. Guttman, and P. H. Hutton (eds), Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 1988.
27. Slavoj Žižek, Eric L. Santner, and Kenneth Reinhard, *The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 5.
28. Burridge, *Someone, No One: An Essay on Individuality*, p. 10; Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000, pp. 79–80.
29. Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, p. 79.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. Burridge, *Someone, No One: An Essay on Individuality*, p. 12.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
34. Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*, London; New York: Methuen, 1982, p. 7.
35. Bruno Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993.

36. Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 131.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 134.
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*, p. 72; Walter J. Ong, *Interfaces of the Word: Studies in the Evolution of Consciousness and Culture*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977, pp. 20–1.
42. de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, p. 135, emphasis in original.
43. Mark Poster, *Foucault, Marxism and History: Mode of Production Versus Mode of Information*, Cambridge: Polity, 1984, p. 59.
44. I am not, of course, endorsing physical violence. It is also the case that some cultures actively avoid conflict and violence altogether. See Bruce D. Bonta, "Conflict Resolution among Peaceful Societies: The Culture of Peacefulness," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 33, no. 4, 1996.
45. Gaynor Macdonald, "Where Words Harm and Blows Heal," *Australian Dispute Resolution Journal*, vol. 1, no. 3, 1990.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 125, 27; Gaynor Macdonald, "A Wiradjuri Fight Story," in *Being Black: Aboriginal Cultures in "Settled" Australia*, Ian Keen (ed.), Canberra, A.C.T.: Aboriginal Studies Press for the Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies, 1988, especially pp. 182, 87, 91. This is also true for other peoples. See Simon Harrison, *The Mask of War: Violence, Ritual, and the Self in Melanesia*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993, p. 18.
47. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1991, p. 21.
48. *Ibid.*
49. Australian Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, "National Report," ed. Commissioner Elliot Johnston Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service (with Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation in *Justice and Equity*, CD-ROM format), 1991, Volume 2, Chapter, especially sections 11.10.13, 11.11.6–11.11.13, 11.11.17.
50. Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1991, pp. 23–4. See also Jacques Derrida, "The Ends of Man," in *Margins of Philosophy*, Jacques Derrida (ed.), Brighton, England: Harvester Press, 1982, especially pp. 124–5 for discussion of the relationship between the thinking of being, humanism, and subjectivity.
51. See Saul Newman, "Politics of the Ego: Stirner's Critique of Liberalism," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, vol. 5, no. 3, 2003, especially p. 14. See also Anthony J. Cascardi, *The Subject of Modernity*, Cambridge; Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 58, pp. 70–1.
52. Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*.
53. In efforts to know the scientific origins of man and his activities aside from God, boundaries are pushed further and further back, revealing a disturbing lack of a single point of origin. The impossibility of access to origin disperses being in time. Crucially though, it also promises the possibility of the return of the origin and resolution of the meaning of being through continuous and developmental history. *Ibid.*, pp. 331–4; Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge & the Discourse on Language*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1972, p. 12.

54. Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, p. 335. See also Cascardi, *The Subject of Modernity*, pp. 70–1.
55. Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, p. 33.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
57. See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 133, pp. 262–3.
58. See Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity*, pp. 105–6.
59. This is a common rite of passage for Western selves. See *Ibid.*, p. 39.
60. Michel Foucault, “The Birth of Biopolitics,” in *Michel Foucault: Ethics, the Essential Works I*, Paul Rabinow (ed.), London: Penguin, 1997, p. 74.
61. See Peter Adler, Karen Lovaas, and Neal Milner, “The Ideologies of Mediation: The Movement’s Own Story,” *Law and Policy*, vol. 10, no. 4, 1988, p. 334; Peter Fitzpatrick, “The Rise and Rise of Informalism,” in *Informal Justice?*, Roger Matthews (ed.), London: Sage, 1988, p. 179.
62. Tarja Väyrynen, “International Conflict Resolution through Negotiations: Coming to an Understanding in Gadamerian Dialogue,” Tampere University, Finland: Conference paper, 2001; Tarja Väyrynen, “Review Essay: A Shared Understanding—Gadamer and International Conflict Resolution,” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 42, no. 3, 2005.
63. Jay Rothman, *From Confrontation to Cooperation*, London: Sage, 1992, p. 72.
64. Walter Ullmann, *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages*, London: Methuen, 1967, p. 7, *passim*.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 7, see also p. 101.
66. See Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity*, pp. 128–9; Connolly, *The Augustinian Imperative: A Reflection on the Politics of Morality*, p. xviii, *passim*.
67. Ullmann, *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages*, p. 9; Walter Ullmann, *Law and Politics in the Middle Ages: An Introduction to the Sources of Medieval Political Ideas*, London: Sources of History Limited: Distributed by Hodder and Stoughton, 1975.
68. Ullmann, *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages*, p. 146, *passim*.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
70. Scholarship on political theology is important here. Carl Schmitt, for instance, argues that “[a]ll significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.” Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1985, p. 36. See also Carl Schmitt, *The Necessity of Politics: An Essay on the Representative Idea in the Church and Modern Europe*, London: Sheed & Ward, 1931; Carl Schmitt, *Roman Catholicism and Political Form*, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996.
71. Michael Dillon, “Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the ‘New World Order’ to the Ethical Problematic of the World Order,” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, vol. 20, 1995, p. 328.
72. Newman, “Politics of the Ego: Stirner’s Critique of Liberalism,” p. 7.
73. Eric L. Santner, *On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud and Rosenzweig*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001, p. 50.
74. Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, p. 378.
75. Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2005, p. 317.

76. For a related point see Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, p. 38. Latour explains that “moderns” have separated “relations of political power from the relations of scientific reasoning while continuing to shore up power with reason and reason with power.”
77. See Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” p. 213.
78. Ullmann, *The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages*, pp. 60–1.
79. Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, p. 312.

4 Recognition and Relatedness

1. Sylviane Agacinski, “Another Experience of the Question, or Experiencing the Question Other-Wise,” in *Who Comes after the Subject?*, Peter Connor, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Eduardo Cadava (eds), New York; London: Routledge, 1991, p. 12.
2. Stephen Ryan, *The Transformation of Violent Intercommunal Conflict*, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007, p. 14.
3. See Jay Rothman, *From Confrontation to Cooperation*, London: Sage, 1992.
4. See Vivienne Jabri, *Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered*, Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press, 1996; Deinol Jones, *Cosmopolitan Mediation? Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999; Tarja Väyrynen, “International Conflict Resolution through Negotiations: Coming to an Understanding in Gadamerian Dialogue,” Tampere University, Finland: Conference paper, 2001; Tarja Väyrynen, “Review Essay: A Shared Understanding—Gadamer and International Conflict Resolution,” *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 42, no. 3, 2005.
5. Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2005.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 291–300.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 251.
9. Jones, *Cosmopolitan Mediation? Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords*, p. 157.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, see Chapters 6 & 7.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
13. See, for example, Trina Grillo, “The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women,” *The Yale Law Journal*, vol. 100, no. 6, 1991; Morgan Brigg, “Mediation, Power, and Cultural Difference,” *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 3, 2003.
14. Jones, *Cosmopolitan Mediation? Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords*, p. 67.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
17. Anthony Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*, London: Allen Lane, 2006, pp. xv, xxi, *passim*.
18. *Ibid.*
19. See, for example, Richard Shapcott, *Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations*, Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

20. Some of the key contributions include Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Amy Gutman (ed.), Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995; Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, Cambridge, Mass.: Polity Press, 1995; Seyla Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002; Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange*, London: Verso, 2003; Robert R. Williams, *Hegel's Ethics of Recognition*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. For an overview see James Tully, "Recognition and Dialogue: The Emergence of a New Field," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, vol. 7, no. 3, 2004.
21. Fraser and Honneth, *Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange*.
22. See Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990.
23. Kelly Oliver, *Witnessing: Beyond Recognition*, Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 2001, p. 23.
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*
28. See Michael J. Shapiro, *Methods and Nations: Cultural Governance and the Indigenous Subject*, New York and London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 20–1.
29. In some cases government actors also pursue peace and conflict resolution while maintaining less-than-peaceful relations with indigenous populations at home or other peoples abroad. See Oliver Paul Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 58–9.
30. Oliver, *Witnessing: Beyond Recognition*, pp. 26–7.
31. *Ibid.*, see Chapter One.
32. See Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984; James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1990; James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.
33. See Jacques Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, pp. 16–17, *passim*.
34. Morris Freilich, "Introduction: Is Culture Still Relevant?," in *The Relevance of Culture*, Morris Freilich (ed.), New York: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, 1989, p. 13.
35. Oliver, *Witnessing: Beyond Recognition*.
36. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Arnold Vincent Miller, and J. N. Findlay, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.
37. Alphonso Lingis, "To Die with Others," *Diacritics*, vol. 30, no. 3, 2000, p. 109.
38. Alphonso Lingis, *Dangerous Emotions*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000, p. 87.
39. Lingis, "To Die with Others," p. 108.
40. Oliver, *Witnessing: Beyond Recognition*, p. 4, 189.
41. Lingis, *Dangerous Emotions*, p. 87.

42. Lingis, "To Die with Others," p. 109.
43. Ibid.
44. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, London: Athlone Press, 1994.
45. Aboriginal people constitute a relatively small proportion (approximately 2.5–3 percent) of the overall Australian population and large sections of Australian history are characterized by concerted settler "forgetting" and denial of Aboriginal people. See W. E. H. Stanner, *White Man Got No Dreaming: Essays, 1938–1973*, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1979, pp. 207–16; Ross Gibson, *Seven Versions of an Australian Badland*, St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 2002, pp. 134, 49; Henry Reynolds, *Why Weren't We Told?: A Personal Search for the Truth About Our History*, Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 2000.
46. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, pp. 131–4.
47. Deleuze states that the presupposition that "everybody knows" is "borrowed from the pure element of common sense" to convey that "thought has an affinity with the true; it formally possesses the true and materially wants the true." Yet this is no basis upon which to ground our thinking because it "cannot be regarded as a *fact* that thinking is the natural exercise of a faculty, and that this faculty is possessed of a good nature and a good will. 'Everybody' knows very well that in fact men think rarely, and more often under the impulse of a shock than in the excitement of a taste for thinking." See Ibid., pp. 131–32, emphasis in original.
48. Ibid., p. 133.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Lingis, "To Die with Others," p. 108.
52. Adriana Cavarero, *Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 84.
53. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 134.
54. Ibid., p. 262.
55. John McCumber, *Metaphysics and Oppression: Heidegger's Challenge to Western Philosophy*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999, p. 261.
56. Cavarero, *Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood*, p. 84.
57. Christine Helliwell and Barry Hindess, "'Culture,' 'Society' and the Figure of Man," *History of the Human Sciences*, vol. 12, no. 4, 1999, p. 7.
58. For the importance of these struggles for recognition see Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*.
59. Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits Of "Sex,"* New York; London: Routledge, 1993.
60. See Ibid., p. 237.
61. Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*.
62. Ibid., p. 30.
63. See Jean-Luc Nancy, "Of Being-in-Common," in *Community at Loose Ends*, Miami Theory Collective (eds), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991; Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.
64. Nancy, "Of Being-in-Common," pp. 4–5.
65. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.

66. Ibid., p. 29.
67. Cavarero, *Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood*.
68. Ibid., pp. 67, 71.
69. Emmanuel Levinas, "The Trace of the Other," in *Deconstruction in Context*, Mark Taylor (ed.), Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1986; Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1991; Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1991.
70. Levinas, "The Trace of the Other," p. 349.
71. Emmanuel Levinas, *Time and the Other and Additional Essays*, Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1987, p. 65.
72. Colin Davis, *Levinas: An Introduction*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996, p. 25.
73. Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, p. 48, 119.
74. Ibid., p. 48.
75. Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, London: Athlone, 1988, p. 97, emphasis in original.
76. Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, p. 48.
77. Levinas is famous for deriving the idea that ethical responsibility for the other from his theorizing of relatedness, but it is important to note that the vulnerability of being is both itself a type of violence and a situation that can engender the fear, paranoia, and antipathy that underpin ethnic divisions and genocidal violence. See Ibid., p. 53. See also Michael Jackson, *Existential Anthropology: Events, Exigencies, and Effects*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2005, p. 43.
78. Jackson, *Existential Anthropology: Events, Exigencies, and Effects*, p. 36.
79. Davis, *Levinas: An Introduction*, p. 75.
80. Jackson, *Existential Anthropology: Events, Exigencies, and Effects*, pp. 36, 43.
81. Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, p. 54. Levinas most famously articulates this relation as the face-to-face. For some primary explications see Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, pp. 187–240; Levinas, "The Trace of the Other," pp. 352–3. For secondary sources see Davis, *Levinas: An Introduction*, pp. 132–6; Alphonso Lingis, *Deathbound Subjectivity*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989, pp. 135–55.
82. Relatedness and recognition are the terms I draw from Levinas' dense discussion of the "Saying" and the "Said." See Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*.
83. "Old Woman," "Old Man," and "Old People" are terms of respect for the elderly in Australian Aboriginal English.
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5 Responding Anew

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Conclusion

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