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Public Rituals and Personal Journeys to Citizenship

Bridget Byrne



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Making Citizens

Public Rituals and Personal Journeys to Citizenship

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*To my parents, Angela and Eugene Byrne, and to Sami
who missed out last time*

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Acknowledgements

The first germ of the idea for this book came from an invitation by Laura Doan to see her receive British citizenship in Manchester in 2008. At the ceremony, I was particularly interested in the representation given in the ‘welcome speech’ of Manchester as a city built by migrants. What, I wondered, would they have said about migrants and diversity in a ceremony in Cumbria – Laura’s other home and one of the whitest areas of Britain?

It is one of the delights of academic life that what starts as a merely curious question can grow into an absorbing and major project. My first step was to email all the registrar offices in the country with a request to see the welcome speeches that were made at their ceremonies. The response rate for this email approach was impressive and, as I was to discover at other stages of the research, registrars are almost unfailingly helpful in response to requests for access and help. So I give my first thanks to Laura for bringing me to the ceremony and my next to the many registrars who answered emails, invited me to ceremonies, offered help in contacting interviewees and themselves gave up their time to talk to me. Whilst the book questions the nature of claims made in ceremonies about the welcome that British society in general gives to migrants, my experience has been that, in the vast majority of cases, registrars themselves are committed to making the ceremonies welcoming and celebratory events, and they indeed are hospitable to new citizens and researchers alike.

A fellowship from the Leverhulme Foundation enabled me to travel around Britain observing ceremonies in different towns and cities and also to interview both registrars who conduct the ceremonies and new citizens who had just participated in them. As I describe in Chapter 5, many new citizens were, perhaps understandably, reluctant to take part in the research. So I also want to thank those who gave me their time and trust by taking part. I hope I have repaid that trust in my use of their interviews. As someone who has ‘stayed put’, the experiences of those who’ve moved are always fascinating. A British Academy Small Grant enabled me to provide an international perspective and also brought Carla De Tona, Bethan Harries, Dieuwertje Dyi Huijg, Katherine Jones and Nadia Kidwai into the project – all of whom provided excellent observations and interviews which form much of the base material

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Permissions

'Borders' Haiku by Antoine Casar, mondepar rond.net.

1

Introduction

Le monde n'est pas ronde.

In the artistic webzine Mondepasrond.net on migration, borders and human rights, Antoine Cassar explains why, for him, the world is not round:

According to which passport one holds, the world takes on a different size and shape – governments have conveniently imposed upon individuals a world in the form of a complex polyhedron of nation-states.¹

The starting point of this book is both an appreciation of the importance of passports and an interest in those few who manage to cross borders, to navigate rules, regulations and testing, to acquire new citizenship and, consequently, new passports. The central concern of the book is the reception that these new national citizens get in their new countries, and particularly where the state chooses to mark the making of new citizens with official ceremonies. I will analyse this ceremonial performance of citizenship in six countries across the (Western) world – the United States, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, the UK and Ireland – examining the ways in which citizenship and the nation are represented in the ceremonies. In particular, I'll ask: How does the state choose to represent itself and migrants in these ceremonies? Who is upheld as the citizen to be welcomed or embraced by the state, and what forms of citizenship are silenced or rejected in these representations? What kind of potential identities – national, local and more global – are suggested by the ceremonies? And what identities are suppressed or ignored?

2 *Making Citizens*

The book will also explore the experience of new citizens who have taken part in the ceremonies across ten different locations in the UK, asking why they chose to become British citizens, what their experience of migrating to the UK has been, and what they think of the citizenship ceremonies. These accounts tell us the different ways in which the world is, indeed, not round, and the impact of border crossing on individuals' lives. Their descriptions also, in juxtaposition with the ceremonies themselves, raise questions about the nation's representation both of itself (particularly in terms of the narration of nation as welcoming spaces) and of its citizens and non-citizens. The research in this book needs to be understood in the context of a rising discourse which contests, or even proposes the end of, multiculturalism(s). These policies, which recognised, accommodated and sometimes celebrated cultural difference, were – particularly in Western Europe – the product of post-colonial migration (Modood 2007; Meer 2010; Lentin and Tittley 2011; Meer and Modood 2014).

Citizenship ceremonies were introduced in the UK ten years ago (2004) as part of a government policy of renewed attention to citizenship arising out of concerns about immigration, integration and the proposed 'failures' of multiculturalism. The ceremonies in the UK were not developed in isolation: they took inspiration from those which former settler colonies – the United States, Canada and Australia – had been holding for many years, and which, particularly in the case of US, are frequently represented in popular culture.² The introduction of citizenship ceremonies in the UK also influenced the establishment of similar rituals in other countries in the European Union, including the Netherlands and Ireland. This book will provide a comparison of the ceremonies in these six countries, covering both those that are longer established in countries of colonial settlement and the more recent introductions in Europe.

The ceremonies are of interest because they are a moment in which the state creates a narrative of what a citizen is, as well as of how immigration regimes intersect with citizenship and the nation. These public events can shed light on how the citizen is imagined, and who – or what forms of citizenship – are excluded from this imagining. The rituals provide a rich source of narratives of nation and citizenship. Stories are told through the buildings in which the ceremonies are held; in the symbols, flags and portraits that are displayed, and in the rituals which are created. They are also told in the oaths/pledges or affirmations which are recited. Finally, they are told in the way the participants – those passing from being citizens-to-be (who I will call 'citizands') to citizens are addressed – as part of the national community or separated from it.

This book is the first in-depth comparative account of different citizenship ceremonies across the world. It traces the ways in which these public occasions function as rites of passage and how they share a similar symbolic lexicon of initiation to the nation. The book is also unique in that it is based on research derived from observation of the ceremonies in six countries and interviews with those who organised them. Additionally, in the case of the UK, I interviewed those who had just participated in the events and become citizens.

Whilst there are many different forms of citizenship and ways of understanding it, nation-state citizenship is critical in determining where people can live, work and travel. I will argue that citizenship is never neutral. In the context of Western countries, notions of membership and rights have emerged out of a racialised, classed and gendered history of colonialism and post-colonialism which has shaped both nation and migration. The formation of the nation-state system and the technological developments that enabled the state's control of movement over state borders emerged within the colonial context. The rights attached to citizenship have not been made evenly available to women, to sexual minorities, to the working class and to colonised and racialised Others. In fact, citizenship – how it is understood, who is said to possess it – has often emerged out of a process of differentiating between citizens and those gendered, raced and classed others – the anti-citizens (Barbero 2012). The construction of the anti-citizen – for example in the figure of the illegal migrant, the terrorist, the uncivilised Other, the deviant – can tell us much about the contours of citizenship. It can also act as a warning to citizens about how they should behave.

Nation-state citizenship is a constantly shifting terrain with a seemingly endless proliferation of modifications of Western nations' rules and regulations regarding immigration and citizenship. The continual adjustment to immigration rules and regulations is not only the product of increased levels of securitisation³ and suspicion about the migrant (particularly against certain groups of migrants); it also indicates the 'unnatural' state of citizenship. Citizenship is in a permanent state of reconstruction and redefinition – by the state, as well as by non-state actors (Isin 2012a). Citizenship has to be adjusted in part because the messy, interconnected lives of people do not always stay within the narrow confines of state citizenship. People move across borders (or borders move across people's lives), and the numerous cases where the rules prove to be illogical or contradictory – due to their inability to govern the variety of people's movements and affiliations – exposes the ways in which citizenship as a state and social contract which is often

inadequate for the task of governing social relations. National citizenship is often constructed as inevitable and something that has 'always been there'. This is indeed suggested in the term 'naturalisation' – to establish something as if natural. But at the same time, the language of naturalisation highlights the idea that the person is not naturally of the state – and perhaps more particularly of the nation. If you have to be 'naturalised' how can you be native? Naturalisation suggests impossibility – that is, you may be naturalised, but of course no one can be *made* natural – as it suggests artifice and unnaturalness.⁴ This raises the question of whether the new citizen would ever really be seen as 'equal to' the (real) national. Will naturalised citizens ever properly belong, or will they always be somehow 'probationary' to use the emerging language in the UK, where the model is increasingly that of 'earning' citizenship? The possibility, under certain conditions, of the revocation of naturalisation also points to its potential non-permanence and to a less-than-full-citizenship.⁵ Naturalisation is potentially an 'unhappy performative',⁶ where the act of naturalisation fails to make the person a natural/native citizen.

The idea that membership of the nation-state is somehow 'natural' also opens a route for the membership to be about biology and race, or about a profound level of culture which cannot be imitated or learnt. This again raises questions about the status of those not born to citizenship of a particular nation. In addition, for citizenship to be considered 'natural' suggests that it is clear cut – that one either is or is not a citizen, where belonging and identity are set up as a series of binary characteristics. Yet belonging is always more complicated than this binary structure. As will be discussed in the next chapter, a series of other characteristics and exclusions (including those based on age, gender, sexuality, class, race, dis/ability) affects citizenship claims.

This book focuses on the legal moment of making citizens, asking how the ceremonial rituals which have been created around the act of endowing citizenship construct the citizen and the nation. However, it is important to acknowledge that this is only one route into the politics of citizenship, and it is a particularly narrow route in three specific ways. Firstly, in the focus on formal membership, there is always a risk of 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), in which the nation-state is taken as the primary unit of analysis. Many different forms of mobility are not shaped primarily by the social and political force of the nation-state. In addition, there are many forms of movement, attachment and belonging that cannot be readily conceptualised (or even made visible) if national identity and membership, or

crossing state-borders, are the focus of analysis. National identity and belonging may be much less significant in people's lives than other forms of attachment and identification. Secondly, there is the additional risk that we may be co-opted by the state's focus on citizenship, migration status and the notions of illegal and legal migration. It is important to remember that illegality is created through state legislation, rather than it somehow being inherent to (or an inevitable consequence of) human mobility (De Genova 2007).

Finally, the focus on citizenship as membership, which is the central concern of this book, is not the only way that it can be – or should be – thought of (Stephens and Squire 2012). For Engin Isin, it is possible to think of 'citizens without frontiers', particularly if we focus on citizenship as the acting (rather than moving) subject (Isin 2012a). These 'citizenship acts' are able to cross the borders of citizenship by subjects *acting as* citizens, even where the state may not recognise them as such (Isin and Nielsen 2008). This is a form of citizenship which rejects – or in Isin's terms 'transverses' – state borders and state definitions. Acts of citizenship frequently involve the voicing of rights and claims which go beyond the national frame (such as the anti-apartheid movement or the activities of Greenpeace or WikiLeaks). They also involve contesting both borders and normative frames. For Isin, 'a fundamental feature of a citizenship act is that it exercises either a right that does not exist or a right that does exist but which is enacted by a political subject who does not exist in the eyes of the law' (Isin 2012a: 13). This approach to citizenship acts is exciting because of the ways it can challenge definitions of what citizenship is and who can be citizens. It provides a critical frame which recognises agency in those who are often seen as lacking it (such as undocumented migrants) as well as a structure for understanding actions which challenge the nation-state formation. This approach also draws attention to the different levels on which citizenship may be enacted – those above the level of the nation, such as claims to regional (for example, European) citizenship, as well as at the sub-national level, such as of the region, city or more local community.

However, it is also worth remembering that not all citizen acts may be as progressive as those generally discussed in this literature. How can we understand international far-right organising and activities within this framework? Are actions that seek to close off citizenship to others also citizen acts? For instance, Cynthia Weber (Weber 2012), in her examination of activism around the US-Mexican border, explores the practices of the Minutemen, who are challenging the state to secure the border, and taking the right upon themselves where they feel the state has failed (see

also discussion in Isin 2012a: 47). At the same time, other activists, in organisations such as 'No More Deaths' and 'Humane Borders', are highlighting and trying to prevent the many deaths which occur among those trying to cross the border (Weber 2012). It would be worth exploring further how these different approaches fit into the frame of citizen acts. In addition, the idea of citizen acts itself still relies on normative notions of citizenship. Isin defines citizen acts by the absence of state recognition that the actor is a citizen or that the right is a legal claim. So here again we return to the question of citizenship as state membership or belonging. Whilst the potentially transgressive quality of citizen acts also helps illuminate the closures and exclusions of normative citizenship, this book argues that the normative frame remains an important concern, not least for the real effect that it has on everyday lives. As will be discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6, interviews with new citizens in the UK show that they engage in citizen acts which make claims to citizenship predating state recognition or grants of formal rights. They also draw on other forms of belonging: to cities or to other affiliations, such as those forged through colonialism. These claims can be understood to counter or transverse the borders of state membership.

This book is particularly concerned with the question of 'new' citizenship: the state citizenship produced by the transnational movements and settlements of people. It involves the granting of citizenship to people who do not have it by virtue of where they were born or the status of their parents. Importantly, this citizenship status appears to have an 'in/out' quality to it. One cannot be 'slightly' or 'almost' a citizen – although with the introduction of ideas of 'probationary' citizenship, and the gradual increase of rights for those who are granted forms of permanent residency, the 'almost' citizens begin to emerge (Soysal 1995). National state citizenship is inherently dependent on the ability to identify those who are not of-the-nation – the strangers or aliens. The citizen is known at least partly in her/his differentiation from the non-citizen. In the modern era, states have been developing technologies to differentiate between them. Whilst initially, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, the main focus was on controlling the mobility of citizens, increasingly states have focused on their power to detect, exclude and expel non-citizens as well as to enable surveillance of citizens who are considered a threat to the state. The boundaries of citizenship are often framed in national terms: 'citizenship is meant to be universalistic and above cultural difference, yet it exists only in the context of a nation-state, which is based on cultural specificity – on the belief in being different from other nations' (Castles and Davidson 2000: 12).

As 'new' citizens are often citizens of two (or more) states, the granting of citizenship also raises questions of dual citizenship and its relationship to nationality and national identity. Internationally, there appear to be two conflicting trends in response to migration, particularly by Western states. On the one hand, there is increasing acceptance of dual citizenship, with many countries now accepting (either legally or in practice) that their citizens may also be citizens of other countries.⁷ At the same time, in an era of securitisation and in the political context of the 'War on Terror', certain categories of individuals with dual or multiple citizenships are subject to particular levels of scrutiny and suspicion. They can also be left vulnerable because of gaps in the protection that states will offer them, or some states' willingness to deport them (Stasiulis and Ross 2006; Walters 2002). The context for these conflicting responses to dual citizenship is a general retreat from discourses of multiculturalism and a return to those of integration – which is often a euphemism for assimilation – particularly fuelled by the figure of the dangerous 'home-grown' terrorist (Meer 2010; Meer and Modood 2014). Citizenship is wielded as one part of the armoury of the securitised state 'enabling specific groups and populations to be legitimately targeted and criminalised as non-citizens or failing citizens' (Tyler 2010: 65). At the same time, the figures that are presented of the 'good' and worthy citizen and the abject intruder have often been developed on the model of older patterns of colonial binary discourses of colonized and colonizer, Orient and Occident, or North and South (Isin 2012c).

This book is concerned with the moment of 'making' new citizens – the endowing of citizenship by the state on individuals who have migrated. Thus, this approach to citizenship also has movement and mobility, as well as immobility, at its heart. These new citizens are not born to the citizenship which they are acquiring; they have moved towards it. Obtaining new citizenship is often shaped by a desire to stay, as it gives the right of residence. But it is also often accompanied by the desire to move – to be able to move across national borders with more ease and with the assurance that they can return. New citizens, how they come to be citizens, what conditions they have to fulfil to acquire citizenship, and how they are received by the state and society of their new nations can tell us much about citizenship itself. As Ratna Kapur argues, 'the migrant subject is deeply implicated in the constitution of citizenship, of who counts and who does not' (Kapur 2007: 539).

In particular, this book explores the nature of citizenship ceremonies, which have become a part of the citizenship regimes of an increasing number of countries but have rarely been researched. Ceremonies seek

to endow the moment of granting full citizenship to migrants with a public – or semi-public – ritual. The creation of a ritual to ‘make’ citizens also provides an opportunity to assert what citizenship and nationality mean in particular places and at particular times. These invented traditions take place in the context of a range of often heated public debates around immigration and the control of borders. These debates have produced their own policy responses, including testing and other means to assess the ‘integration potential’ of migrants before they are granted citizenship. In the context of this growing securitisation and the retreat from multiculturalism, this book interrogates citizenship ceremonies to ask: Who is being held up as the welcomed citizen, and who is excluded in these public rituals? What does it mean to ‘welcome’ a new citizen to citizenship, and how is migration imagined in these events? These questions are then set against the actual experiences of migration and changing citizenship of those who become ‘made’ as citizens.

The book

Citizenship ceremonies have been practiced for at least a century in the United States and Canada, and for 50 years in Australia. It is only ten years since they were first introduced in the UK, with other countries in Europe, such as the Netherlands and Ireland, following suit. Yet there has been very little scholarly attention to these invented traditions and how they construct citizenship and the state. This book is the first major work in this area. The book seeks to provoke debates around how citizenship and the desirable citizen are constructed and to consider who is excluded in these representations of citizenship and the nation. Chapter 2, ‘Bounded Citizenship’, traces some of the threads of debate in the expanding field of citizenship studies. The chapter takes a historical perspective which reminds us that citizenship is not natural and inevitable but the product of a historically constructed relationship between individuals and the state. State concerns about controlling human mobility have arisen in particular historical contexts, as a form of governmentality. The chapter argues that, in our understanding of what citizenship does and might mean, we need to acknowledge the history of exclusions from citizenship along lines of class, race, sexuality and gender, which mean that different groups have achieved access to citizenship rights in different ways and at different times. I argue for the critical, and less often acknowledged, notion that the governmentality of borders and citizens in Western nation-state citizenship developed out of a series of relationships between countries which need to

be understood within the colonial frame. This accounts for the ways in which the control of mobility and borders (both external and internal to the state) are intertwined with the racial state (Goldberg 1997). Finally, the chapter explores some of the ways citizenship is currently understood within the scholarly literature with a focus on 'domopolitics' (Walters 2004) and the reconfiguration of the relationship between home, nation and security.

Chapter 3, 'Taking the Oath', examines the way ceremonies are constructed in the United States, Canada and Australia, three former settler colonies, now nations which share a narrative of being 'built by immigrants'. The chapter examines citizenship ceremonies as rites of passage rituals which follow a pattern: separating the participants off from the rest of the public, treating them as a homogeneous group, and then, after the oaths have transformed them into citizens, reintegrating them back into society. The chapter argues that these ceremonies share a similar lexicon of citizenship, in terms of symbols of the nation and approaches to oath-taking. However, the ceremonies in the three countries also have significant differences in the ways they deal with past injustices and exclusions and continuing discrimination – particularly concerning the destruction of indigenous communities and racialised exclusions from citizenship rights.

Chapter 4, 'European Welcomes', explores citizenship ceremonies in three European countries (the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands) which are relatively recent introductions to the citizenship regimes in these countries. The ceremonies were modelled on those of the countries discussed in Chapter 3. The chapter argues that they need to be seen as part of a general trend within Europe of increased focus on controlling immigration. This has been accompanied by debates about the 'crisis' of multiculturalism and regional policies concerned with 'rebordering' Europe. The chapter also considers the implications of citizenship testing introduced in the Netherlands and the UK as part of this reshaping of citizenship. I suggest that the tests function as 'technologies of reassurance' (Fortier 2008) by showing that it is not 'too easy' to obtain rights to stay in both countries. The chapter also points out the absence of reference to the European citizenship that is being granted, alongside the different national citizenships. There appears to be no space to consider regional membership in these accounts of national and sometimes local identity and belonging. In this way, the national trumps the international. The chapter explores how the narrative of Ireland as a diasporic nation of emigrants dominates the ceremonies, with frequent reminders of those who have left the country through its history. Particular attention is also

given in this chapter to the accounts of national and local history which are given in speeches in the UK ceremonies (and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands). I make the case that the avoidance of negative aspects of history (such as histories of involvement in the slave trade, imperial colonialism and racism) in favour of accounts of ancient history – set in equally ancient landscapes – lead not only to a rather oddly imbalanced account of the UK, but also emphasise the division between the host and newcomer. The chapter observes that some ceremonies suggest that the transformation to full membership is not complete, and that the new citizens still have to demonstrate their commitment to belong. In any case, few ceremonies are able to give a very invigorated sense of what active citizenship might mean.

Having considered the ceremonies as empirical evidence that can illuminate the ways in which citizenship is being constructed at both the level of the nation-state and in local contexts, Chapters 5 and 6 turn to the views of new citizens themselves. Based on interviews across ten different sites with people who had just participated in a citizenship ceremony in the UK, I find out about their journeys to citizenship, including why they seek to become citizens of Britain and what they think of the citizenship ceremonies. Chapter 5, 'Routes to Citizenship', describes the way I located interviewees and argues that some of the reluctance I encountered in this process is indicative of new citizens' experience of officialdom in their process of coming to, and gaining citizenship in, Britain. The chapter surveys the wide range of different routes that the new citizens took into Britain and the need to understand the differences between them. In this chapter, I also consider the many different reasons that the participants gave for wanting to become British citizens. I will argue that, for some at least, a sense of increased anti-immigration discourse in the public sphere and increasing restrictions on access to citizenship have made the need to get citizenship feel more urgent than it had seemed in the past. The chapter also explores the different models of belonging and citizenship which emerged in the interviews, which contest a singular focus on national citizenship. Interviewees also stressed their sense of belonging and participation as residents or city-dwellers and the importance of cultural links – through European or postcolonial connections – which facilitated a sense of belonging.

Chapter 6, 'Welcome to Britain?' explores the interviewees' (generally positive) perceptions of the ceremonies, including how they felt about the citizenship pledge and swearing allegiance to the Queen. It also directly addresses the question of welcome, something that

the UK ceremonies claim has been a major characteristic of British history and encounters with foreigners. In this chapter, I argue that the claim of universal welcome stands at odds with experiences of racism, hostility and what many interviewees saw as a culturally cool response to newcomers or outsiders. The feeling of a lack of welcome is also enhanced by anti-immigration debates, which have a prominent position in public politics in the UK, and of which the interviewees were very aware. Based on the experiences of the new citizens, the chapter asks, what would be required for a welcome to feel more real? I maintain that hospitality needs more than merely an absence of hostility, but also a sense of warmth, care and recognition of individual worth.

Finally, the book's conclusion questions the political hopes which rest on an idea of global citizenship and the global citizen. It suggests that the idea of the global citizen fails to address the racialised, classed and gendered exclusions on which citizenship has been built. The imagined idea of the global citizen often repeats rather than challenges these exclusions. It posits that, in the context of retreats from multiculturalism at the level of public policy, and the shoring up of national sovereignty over border movements, it may be that local identities and forms of belonging are likely to have the most purchase and be the focus for challenging citizenship exclusion.

2

Bounded Citizenship

People cross borders.
It's been that way ever since
Borders crossed people.

Antoine Cassar¹

Introduction

This book is concerned with the making of new citizens – the ways in which nation-states, in various international contexts, set out to celebrate the endowing of citizenship to those who have not received it automatically by birth. However, in order to understand what lies behind the moment of naturalisation, it is important to *denaturalise* citizenship. That is, we need to understand how citizenship is neither a natural nor a static concept but rather one which has developed historically in the context of the creation of Western nation-states. The history of citizenship has been shaped by economic, racial and gendered formations and by the colonial context in which current understandings of state-membership emerged. By exploring the historical colonial context of modern understandings of citizenship we can trace some of the boundaries of citizenship, which, as a legal and social-cultural concept, are defined by the borders that are drawn around it. These borders mark not only membership but also claims to identity and rights, tracing out the answers to the questions of citizenship: Who has the right to be a citizen? What rights does that entail in the relationship with the state and between citizens? Who is excluded from both membership and rights? And what should the relationship be between the state and residents who are not citizens? As Isin argues: ‘In a way, boundedness is the very condition of

citizenship' (Isin 2012a: 20). The citizen and the state are both bound together and also define each other. The limits of citizenship are often drawn through the figure of the 'anti-citizen' (Barbero 2012), those who are situated outside the normative frame of the citizen and who may reside in – but lie outside the embrace of – the state (Torpey 2000).

This book is concerned with the normative frame positioned around the citizen and with what the processes and celebrations of naturalisation, including their symbolic nature, can tell us about state constructions of the 'good citizen' as well as the 'could-not-be citizen'. This approach is grounded in an understanding of membership of the nation-state as a historically created process with roots in colonial relations and one that is shaped by race and gender as well as by notions of classed labour and productivity in economic markets. The first section, 'Second class citizens?' will argue against claims that citizenship is about universal and 'blind' recognition of individuals and rights. The next section, 'Mobility and the nation-state', will explore how the development of the nation-state involved different state responses to the transnational movement of individuals and groups. In the third section, 'Citizenship and coloniality', the relationship between the formation of the citizen and colonial relations will be examined. The final section, 'Securitised citizenship', asks whether we have come to the point where citizenship could be understood as 'post-national' or whether the claims for the deterritorialisation of citizenship have to be revised in the light of the securitisation of both citizenship and the nation. This chapter does not attempt to give an overview of the vast and ever-expanding literature on citizenship – nor can it give a thorough overview of the history of the development of both the notion of rights and state membership. Rather, it poses a series of questions which provoke and disrupt certain narratives on the place and politics of the citizen.

Second class citizens?

One important limit to citizenship is shaped by its relationship to the national. Despite liberal claims that citizenship is a universal concept – culturally neutral and beyond cultural difference – it is often framed in national terms. The nation is a creation, involving the production of a sense of national belonging based on shared culture and identity. This manufacture results in what Hannah Arendt describes as the conquest of the state by the nation, whereby the potentially more neutral bureaucratic functions of the state are saturated by the culturally specific practices of national identity. As a result, we see the 'transformation of the

state from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation' (Arendt 1958: 275). Nationalism itself is often divided into 'ethnic' nationalism, where national identity is defined in terms of ethnicity or race, and 'civic' nationalism, defined by common citizenship rather than ethnicity. However, both frequently rest on the idea of a shared national culture, and therefore both may be exclusionary (Berger 2007). Thus, the state is involved in the construction of national culture and values, which are defined through differentiation from other nations and through the creation of national narratives and 'invented traditions' (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Rituals and ceremony can play an important role in this process. The narration of nation forms the basis of understanding what it means to be a national: to hold citizenship of the state. It is important to understand how these cultures of citizenship emerge within historically specific contexts.

T. H. Marshall laid out the classic sociological approach to citizenship, arguing that citizenship rights developed progressively from, first, the acquisition of civil rights, which guaranteed freedom, then political rights of legal justice and suffrage, and then social rights, which provided welfare and economic security (Marshall 1950). However, this approach is restricted by its failure to deal with inequalities other than those based on class.² Although Marshall's understanding of citizenship is framed by the idea of membership of a community, it fails to consider fully some critical questions of membership – particularly *who* gets to be a citizen, and what the terms are of membership and inclusion. These questions are particularly key in relation to national communities and in consideration of migration across national borders. By what criteria do residents of a particular country gain citizenship rights and what determines membership? In this chapter, I argue that, in the countries considered in this book, the criteria for formal membership have emerged in – and reflect – a context shaped by inequalities of race, gender, sexuality, class and colonial relations. Furthermore, Marshall's approach to citizenship is too focused on stasis and is inadequate for dealing with the deterritorialised rights and identities of a more mobile society (Castles and Davidson 2000; Urry 2000). Increased transnational movement raises questions about the importance of citizenship. Many rights that are associated with citizenship are being extended to resident immigrants without citizenship, particularly under the influence of international human rights discourse (Soysal 1995). Thus Seyla Benhabib argues that we are facing a 'disaggregation of citizenships' where the formerly related dimensions of citizenship (collective identity, privileges of political membership and entitlement to social rights and benefits) are being 'unbundled', at

least for those who have European membership (Benhabib 2008: 45). However, before we explore the extent to which citizenship is moving beyond the national scale, it is worth considering the historical context in which it became so closely related to the state and to national membership. Particular attention needs to be paid to the inequalities inherent in national models of citizenship. Citizenship rights are not equally conferred on all (membership is closed to some long-term residents and some people born in the country). Furthermore, social inequalities based on discrimination and exclusion shape how rights are understood and exercised in different contexts. (Walby 1994: 379; Lister 2003: 1). The progression outlined by Marshall (civil, followed by political, and finally social citizenship) only represents the experience of white men in England, not a more universalized category of citizen. Thus an analysis of citizenship requires acknowledgement that rights do not arrive at one moment for all people. Separate social groups gain aspects of citizenship in different periods (and gain access to rights in different orders). This is not merely a question of timing or temporality. Even when women, or excluded groups such as African Americans, are considered to have full citizenship rights, as Jeremy Waldron points out, 'these subjects have never come to bear those rights in the same way as their original bearers' (Benhabib 2008: 112).

In addition, Marshall's progression suggests that the attainment of different rights is permanent – that rights once gained cannot be lost. The retreat of the welfare state in Britain, as with other parts of Europe, shows the process whereby social rights can be lost – for example, rights to free higher education and other social security benefits. More starkly, in the United States, the experience of former slaves and their offspring shows how gains in rights are often followed by backlash and subsequent removal of rights. For example, Reconstruction, which followed the Civil War and the abolition of slavery, gave African American men economic and social freedoms and the right to vote for the first time in 1867. However, these gains were reversed by the enactment of the Jim Crow laws in the following decades. This same period saw the final destruction of any notion of the citizenship rights of Native Americans. Transformed from what the United States government deemed quasi-independent 'Separate Nations' to 'Dependent Nations', they were denied both birthright citizenship and any right to naturalisation. They shared exclusion from citizenship rights with other colonised groups across the world. In the case of Native Americans, this was not redressed until the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 gave them formal citizenship, however their access to rights remains weak (Glenn 2002: 25).

Many texts on citizenship start with the distinction between citizenship regimes which are constructed on a principle of *jus sanguinis* (right to citizenship by descent) and *jus soli* (right to citizenship by virtue of having been born in or residing in a territory). However, as Randell A. Hansen points out, this is really a false dichotomy: 'All liberal democracies allow citizenship by descent and most have at least some provisions for citizenship by residence' (Hansen 2008: 3). In addition, Ayelet Shachar argues that both involve birthright inheritance, which is fundamentally unequal in global terms (Shachar 2007: 371). There has been considerable research on the gendered, sexualised and racialised nature of citizenship, pointing out the ways which women, sexual minorities and racialised groups have less secure claims to the rights that citizenship supposedly endows³ (Barton 1993; Paul 1997; Donovan, Heaphy et al. 1999; Lister 2003; Lewis 2004; De Genova 2007; Lister 2007). For some women (and some racialized or socially disempowered groups), before striving to be recognized as citizens, they struggle to be recognized as human beings of equal worth and dignity to others: what Arendt calls 'the right to have rights' (1958: 177). The majority of the world's population has very little opportunity to act as citizens in 'civil society', which, in many states, is reserved for elites (Chatterjee 2005). This is not exclusively a question of difference between the Global North and South. The history of many Northern democratic states includes the exclusion of racialised groups from civil society, political participation and social protection. For example, in Australia, Aboriginals were not counted in the census until 1967 – the same time that they also obtained equal rights to vote (Tate 2009).

Citizenship, tied so closely to national identity, is often underpinned by very normative notions of belonging and loyalty which are expected of men and women in different ways and which can also be classed and racialised (Anthias and Yuval-Davies 1989). As Isin argues, 'The extraordinary paradox of the nation-state is perhaps the fact that, although it ideologically constitutes itself as a community of consent and choice beyond family and kinship, it reproduces itself as yet another kind of family through fraternization and birth' (2012b: 456). The nation as family is both heteronormative and deeply gendered – in the figure of the brother suggested by the concept of fraternity, we see the male subject of politics. The army is a central institution of the state (Foucault 2003). Participation in the military is often suggested as the ultimate sign of loyalty for the citizen.⁴ Yet the gendered rules of participation in the military, as well as the gendered construction of the military, are clear (Nagel 1998; Enloe 2000). The state is also concerned with the

production of economic value, and citizenship has often been dependent on notions of economic independence which were gendered, classed and racialised. In the context of US citizenship, Evelyn Nakano Glenn argues that 'white working men's claim of independence (and therefore of full rights of citizenship) was built on the subordination of people of color and women' (Glenn 2002: 29). The examples of both the military and the idea of the family breadwinner demonstrate the way loyalty is also constructed as both heteronormative (with only recent relative loosening of the rules on homosexuality within the military) and based on the assumption of the (male, heterosexual) able body. The notion favoured by politicians of the 'hard-working family' encapsulates this. Thus the question of the nation or state and soldiering demonstrate one way in which the body of the citizen is important. The wrong bodies (whether because of gender, sexuality, disability or ethnicity) can be shut out from the rights and duties of citizenship. The ability to work, to be politically active, and the right of mobility particularly (not only the right to enter and leave countries) are all dependent on possessing the right kind of body (Yuval-Davis 1997).

The complicated history of women's access to citizenship membership and rights, particularly in the case of married women's rights, demonstrates the continuing impact of second-class citizenship. This is heightened where marriages occur across national boundaries and where citizens of two different states have children. There certainly is no globally universal model of what should happen when citizens of different states marry. The citizenship of women has often proved to be vulnerable as marriage to a non-citizen could entail automatic loss of citizenship. Married women's citizenship rights have often been dependent on their husbands'. When they travel on their husbands' passports with no critical documents of their own – or require their husbands' permission to travel internationally, this dependence can expose them to statelessness and be life-threatening. Despite attempts by the UN to stabilise married women's rights, the global situation remains very varied and there is no effective enforcement mechanism for any provision of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)⁵ (Kerber 2005: 747–748). Even more complex is the consideration of whether men and women have equal rights to pass on citizenship in their country when they have a child with a citizen of another country.

Historically, the citizenship of children has often been (and in many cases still is) dependent on their father's, not their mother's citizenship status, at least in cases where their parents are married and citizens of

different countries. In many countries, it also depends on the marital status of their parents, with different rights being given to children born in or out of wedlock. Thus, the idea of 'inheritance' of citizenship through birth and family is one mode through which the 'ideal' of the heterosexual family as the model for the creation of the national and the citizen is upheld (Berlant 1997: 19). This ideal is frequently racialized. For example, an article on the 'Immigration Law Portal'⁶ explains the rules for people born outside the United States (when one or both parents is a US citizen). The rules change depending on when the person was born (with four different sets of regulations operating between 1935 and the present). Regulations are different for those whose mother is the only US citizen than for those whose father is the only US citizen, and for those born in and out of wedlock. The regulations reflect US military presence in wars overseas and the need to respond to the birth of children to American soldiers. Kerber argues that these practices reflect gendered norms but also arise out of the racial state, with its concern for children fathered by white slave owners 'following the condition of the mother'. So, with a similar logic, 'birthright citizenship for children born overseas to unmarried couples is transmitted only through the mother' (Kerber 2005: 738–739).⁷

The complexity of citizenship inheritance indicates the need to understand citizenship as politically constructed and shaped by gendered, racialised and classed practices. Citizenship in Western liberal states remains structured by inequality. One way to understand this is by looking at how citizenship regimes have emerged from the racial and the imperial state (Goldberg 1993). The racialisation of citizenship rights can be seen in the contemporary period with startling frankness in the case of American Indians who are allowed free movement across the Canadian-US border because the Jay Treaty of 1794. According to the website of the Canadian embassy in the United States, individuals can claim eligibility for American Indian status by providing proof that they have 'at least 50% American Indian blood' by certification from an official from an ancestral tribe – although another page on the website refers to the need to have 51 per cent American Indian blood.⁸ This association of 'blood' to rights is a very literal interpretation of *ius sanguinis* and is reminiscent of the laws in US states like Virginia from the 1920s to 1960s which applied what was known as the 'one drop rule' (Domínguez 1986; Sweet 2005). The next section will further trace the ways racialised and gendered citizenship has historically arisen, focussing on the development of controls of mobility. Although the history of citizenship can be traced through ancient Greek and Roman traditions and the

formation of city politics, this tradition will not be discussed. Instead, I will argue that contemporary citizenship must be understood as arising out of Western nation-state formation and colonialism.

Mobility and the nation-state

That nations are imagined communities, narrated as if they have ancient origins with fixed traditions passed down through generations in a fantasy of continuity, is a well-established contention (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Bhabha 1990; Anderson 1991; Ranger 1996). Acts of imagination occur not just at moments of crisis, or in a nation's 'high' formal ceremonies, but are also repeated daily at the level of what Michael Billig calls 'banal' nationalism – 'habits of nationalism which create an idea of "our" nation and produce citizens as nationals' (Billig 1995: 6). It is also worth remembering that this tying together of the nation-state and the citizen is not inevitable or natural, despite the connotations of the term 'naturalisation'. The development of the concept of a citizenship tied to a state – and a state based on nationality – arose out of a series of historical contexts and conjunctures. Thus the national citizen is not an ahistorical concept, nor as discussed above, is it neutral or universal.

Benedict Anderson (1991) has argued that the development of the idea of the nation was dependent on the technological development of the printing press. With the development of a 'national' literature and news, it was possible to create a sense of the 'we' in the imagined community – people with whom you had a sense of connection and belonging even though you would never meet. In a less well-cited article, Anderson (1994) also argues that the national was born of mobility and, in particular, exile.⁹ As people moved away from familiar homes to be educated, to labour in industry, and to colonise or be remade as colonial subjects, then the imagined 'home' of the national narration attained meaning. The nation was recognised and created from looking back at it from a distance. The development of the technological means for spreading these narratives was critical to this process of formalising membership, as were the nation-state's gradual control of birth registration and of movement across its borders.

For Foucault, the relationship of race to the state is tied into the development of regulatory power in the form of biopolitics. The state constructs race and difference so as to justify its surveillance and management of the population in defence of the *national* race which is, by definition, threatened by external, Othered races (Foucault 2003). This notion of race and racial superiority could readily be used to justify colonialism

and genocide. The national citizen is raced and gendered as well as hetero-normative, imagined as a member of an intimate conventional heterosexual family (Berlant 1997; Fortier 2008). A central concern of the state is regulating the birth rate and the general health of the population (Foucault 2003: 243). The national citizen is also required to have what are deemed to be a healthy body and rational mind, thereby excluding those with mental and physical disabilities. As citizenship is often critically concerned with labouring bodies producing for the state, differences of dis/ability, gender and sexuality are particularly important. To explore this further, this section will contend that Western nation-state citizenship developed out of a series of relationships between countries – importantly, within the colonial frame, which was deeply gendered as well as classed (McClintock 1995).

John Torpey traces the development of documentation to control movement, tracking the means by which states ‘have successfully usurped from rival claimants such as churches and private enterprises the “monopoly of the legitimate means of movement”’ (Torpey 2000: 1). The history of state control of mobility demonstrates that the motivation and means for regulation developed unevenly within and across state borders. Identity documenting processes were crucial, as was deciding who should and should not be citizens – and therefore also a member of the nation. There is a shift in focus from disciplinary power to technologies of biopolitical power which aim to control, order, enumerate and survey the population (Foucault 2003). For Torpey, ‘the notion of national communities must be codified in documents rather than merely “imagined”’ (2000: 6). The history of the construction of citizenship and attempts to control movement shows how nation-state citizenship required the creation of clear lines between the citizen and the non-citizen: lines which were also mapped onto the ‘us’ and ‘them’ of the nation.

Yet this history also reveals that this process could not adequately account for the complexities of social and economic life or for some of the counterforces and possible routes of resistance to the framing of the nation-state. Some people spend all their lives close to where they are born, meaning that their social, economic and political lives may revolve around such a small geographical circuit that ‘the nation’ is rendered meaningless (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). The politics, economies and cultures of the local, the city or the region (which may also cross national boundaries) may have much more impact on individual lives and identities than those at national level. Nation-states require a territorial boundedness, yet people cannot be readily contained within

the borders of the nation-state. They move to work and trade; they live across the borders and develop human attachments which complicate what 'a national' is. The messy and rich lives of individuals often struggle to be contained within citizenship.¹⁰ Indeed Liisa Malkki argues that, as a result of this failure to be contained neatly within the nation, the border crosser can be seen as uprooted, disturbed and therefore dangerous because of a loss of 'moral bearings' (1992: 33). Borders themselves can sometimes move or collapse, and people living in the liminal border spaces experience a sudden loss of citizenship (Kerber 2005: 729). This is particularly true in times of conflict and when empires break up. In these situations, ethnic, religious or racialised differences frequently shape the redrawing of borders.¹¹

The history of the nation-state's relationship with mobility is further complicated by the different kinds of mobility it attempts to control – or promote. For example, in an economic depression, the nation-state may encourage mobility *out* of the nation space, whereas labour shortages frequently lead to recruitment *inwards*. Moreover, movement *across* national borders was not always the primary focus of state action. As Torpey points out, 'The Magna Carta of 1215 had guaranteed to merchants from other lands the right to come into and leave England at will' (Torpey 2000: 69). Here we see the relationship between class and mobility (Anderson 2013). The phenomenon of class or wealth enabling the crossing of national borders continues in the contemporary period, particularly in situations where a sufficiently large investment can buy citizenship¹² (Ong 1999: 1). Similarly, the 'smart border' between the United States and Canada facilitates the movement of pre-cleared business travellers (Sparke 2006). In preindustrial England, mercantilist policies sought to control the movement of (some) subjects *within* a country and prompted particular anxieties about keeping peasants tied to the land and inhibiting the movement of 'indigents'. This was achieved through the 1662 Act of Settlement and Removal, which produced a form of parish serfdom which prevented peasants from moving freely from one parish to another (Walters 2002). William Walters argues that in this act (even where it may not have been easy to enforce) we see the hostility to foreign poor coming into parishes. In this context, nationality did not define foreignness or 'outsiderness'; parish or county did (Walters 2002: 270).

However, eighteenth-century Europe saw the gradual movement away from laws which inhibited internal mobility and towards imposing control of entry by foreign – as in non-national – aliens. The Aliens Act of 1793 sought to prevent dangerous French revolutionaries from

entering England, whilst in 1795, the British partially repealed the Act of Settlement and Removal of 1662, which had restricted the movement of English subjects within the country (Torpey 2000: 66). These shifts were also related to changes in welfare provision, through the Poor Laws, which tied the poor to their parish and prevented their movements around the country. By the 1830s, the necessary bureaucratic foundations were established that allowed wider-scale attempts to record and control the entry of foreigners (Torpey 2000). Strict immigration controls were first instituted in the Aliens Act of 1905, which was particularly designed to restrict the entry of Jewish refugees from repression and persecution in Eastern Europe. David Glover argues that this was 'the first recognisably modern law that sought permanently to restrict immigration into Britain according to systematic bureaucratic criteria that were initially administered and interpreted by a new kind of public functionary: the immigration officer' (2012: 1). The legislation was targeted at poorer immigrants (with steerage passengers the focus of attention) and, as Glover contends, the legislation and cultural debates that surrounded it meant that 'the word "alien" lost its old meanings derived from common law and became a national-racist epithet' (2012: 10).

As states developed the means of controlling entry and exit, as well as the technologies for identity documentation, the reciprocal and exclusive nature of state identity produced statelessness for those who were undesired. Arendt argues that the French declaration of the 'Rights of Man' was combined with a declaration of national sovereignty (Arendt 1958: 272). However, as I will contend below, the establishment of the nation-states within Europe needs to be critically understood as the action of states with *imperial* – as much as national – ambitions and scope. The developing European focus on rights of equality, citizenship and the rule of law did not preclude colonial rule, in which these rights were denied to many. Discourses of difference and the 'white man's burden' justified colonial subjugation and the idea that rational citizens should be biologically determined within a racial hierarchy. Of course, strikingly similar arguments were made to exclude women (both white and non-white) from citizenship (McClintock 1995). Nonetheless, Partha Chatterjee argues that we can only understand the development of the modern nation-state in the context of imperialism: 'It was in the course of the worldwide spread of the European empires that all forms of techniques of modern governance were developed, transported and adapted – not just in one direction' (2005: 495). Through the development of what Chatterjee calls 'the rule of colonial difference', justification for

deviation from norms of modern governance was declared for subjects under colonial rule at the very same time as the universal nature of rights was declared. In a similar way, women, the disabled and some of the working classes could also be excluded from these rights.¹³

The dominance of the nation-state as a worldwide reciprocal system became clear in the aftermath of the First World War. In the shake-up of nations, there were waves of migrants who found that no country was willing to take them in. They were reduced to refugeeedom:

Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth. (Arendt 1958: 267)

Without the recognition or protection of a state, you have, Arendt argues, no rights, no voice. This is what Giorgio Agamben (1998) calls 'bare life'. For Agamben, as for Arendt, refugeeedom exposes the way the Rights of Man were appropriated by the nation, and exclusion from the nation therefore means exclusion from rights. Refugees disturb the nation-state system 'because by breaking the continuity between man and citizen, nativity and nationality, they put the originary fiction of modern sovereignty in crisis' (Agamben 1998: 77).

The implication of the primacy of the nation-state in the protection of human rights means that, for individuals or groups who are excluded from the nation, there is no protection of rights, so, outside of any community which will claim and protect them, they are forced into the 'abstract nakedness of being human and nothing but human' (Arendt 1958: 297). The German Jews were the classic case of this: the 1936 'Law of the Retraction of Naturalisation and Derecognition of German Citizenship' was part of the movement towards genocide in Germany (Torpey 2000: 132). The first step to claiming that Jews had no right to live was to declare that they were not German – and therefore that they did not have the right to protection by the state. Cultural assimilation provided no real protection, becoming merely an obstacle to be overcome (Gilroy 2005: 146). Jews in Germany, and eventually in other European countries, were not alone in this experience of 'denationalization' as, at various points, other groups and individuals have been excluded from nations. During the Second World War, US citizens of Japanese origin found themselves placed in camps. In the early 1950s, the singer Paul Robeson was declared 'un-American' for his political beliefs. His passport was seized, and he was forbidden to leave the United

States (Perucci 2009). In the 1970s, Africa saw a series of coerced mass migrations because of the expulsion of ethnic groups, including Asians from East Africa who were brought there by colonialism and then saw their claims of citizenship questioned and contested by the British state (Joseph 1999: 6). Arendt warns us of the tendency of the nation-state system to ignore statelessness or to refuse to recognise the statelessness of individuals who are repatriated to countries which will not protect them and which are hostile to their rights. Many Western deportation regimes force the return of people to states which are unwilling to recognise and respect their rights.¹⁴ In addition, many poor and vulnerable people, particularly women, find that claiming protection from another state in the form of asylum is frequently impossible: Those who cannot leave a hostile state are forced to stay and are, in effect, stateless in their own countries (Kerber 2005).

The stranger (as well as the citizen) is constructed through technologies of recognition (including systems of identification), reception (such as medical, language or knowledge testing), surveillance or expulsion (including laws around reporting to police and deportation) (Ahmed 2000). For Iker Barbero (2012: 754), these processes create an 'anti-citizen' who is not only outside of, but also threatening to, citizenship. At the same time, citizenship and migration legislation produce 'illegality'. Those deemed illegal or dangerous are, as we shall see below, increasingly confined to zones of abject 'unliveability' (Butler 1993; Pannett 2011) where there is a denial of rights, silencing and, at times, death. At moments of moral panic about, for example, illegal immigration or the idea of bogus asylum seekers – there is heightened focus on those in zones of abjection, in ways which continue to deny them agency or voice. In both instances, those deemed illegal or with uncertain status (such as asylum seekers) are denied full civil or economic rights (Pannett 2011: 38). Furthermore, as Derrida points out, asylum seekers, as foreigners, are compelled to represent themselves and claims for rights in a legal language which is foreign to them and is 'the first act of violence' (Derrida 2000: 15). Acts of expulsion and deportation laws constitute an important distinction between the citizen and non-citizen, since only the citizen has truly permanent rights of settlement (Anderson, Gibney et al. 2011). Yet William Walters points out that there is not a clear history of when this link between citizenship and the right to settle in a state's territory emerged (Walters 2002: 256). As we shall see, this is even more complicated when considering colonial subjects and their rights to settle in the 'mother' country. Furthermore, as governments seek to deport even their own citizens, particularly in

situations where individuals hold dual citizenship,¹⁵ it becomes apparent that not all citizens can feel equally assured of their 'non-deportability' (De Genova 2010). The ways a citizen is defined, as opposed to a non-citizen can also lead to exclusion and insecurity for those who have formal citizenship but feel that they cannot claim allegiance to or identify with representations of ideal citizen. So, for example, where 'the Muslim' connotes danger and suspicion, Muslims' claims to citizenship in Western countries come under pressure: by way of calls for greater performance of citizenship identity and loyalty. For instance, when, after an act of terrorism by 'Islamic extremists', Muslim citizens and non-citizens alike are encouraged to speak out in opposition to these acts – to prove their loyalty – whilst still perhaps maintaining the idea that they are connected to, and even responsible for, all acts by Muslims.

This section has explored the relationship between citizenship and mobility. It has argued that, through the process of controlling some forms of mobility and allowing others, in a form of biopolitics which is racialised and gendered, the state creates both the citizen and the anti-citizen. The tight association of citizen-nation-territory has profound implications for those rejected by states and reduced to statelessness, or forced to flee to other states. The next section will return to the question of state and citizenship formation in the context of colonial power and the racial state, drawing on a framework of governmentality.

Citizenship and coloniality

The control of borders – who can be admitted or expelled – is related to the emergence of governmental power. For Foucault, governmentality is distinguished from sovereign power by its concern with the management of the population in order to direct the economy and maximise the productive force or well being of the population. As sovereign power is limited to the exercise of authority over the population, so governmentality is related to a range of technologies, apparatuses and knowledge (including biopower) to produce a citizenry of 'docile bodies' best suited to the government policies (Foucault 1977). Expulsion or deportation can be seen as the exercise of sovereign power, particularly when it is directed at political opponents or dissidents. However, William Walters argues that, through the nineteenth century, the targets of deportation were increasingly those who were defined as socially or economically undesirable, rather than mere political enemies (2002: 279). Deportation and immigration control increasingly targeted populations that were seen to threaten the welfare of the population because they were deemed

to have deficient social characteristics (signalled by poverty, disease or race) or because of their threat to a national labour market (particularly in times of economic downturn). They were threatening because of who they were, rather than because of any direct challenge to power.

However, I suggest that it is important to place any analysis of the governmentality of borders and the control of citizens within a post-colonial frame. This implies consideration of how such governmentality was developed by European colonial powers concerned with extending their economic and political control over geographically disparate countries and continued by settler societies. For Walter Dignolo, the citizenship born in eighteenth-century Europe was the racialised creation of an 'ethno-class' of European, Christian and white bourgeoisie who sought to replace a 'community of faith' – controlled by church and monarchy – with a 'community of birth' controlled by the nation-state. This built on earlier colonial ideas of a racial concept of humanity as developed in Europe to justify the colonisation of the Americas (Dignolo 2013). Thus, this history of coloniality and racialization is central to understanding citizenship. For Foucault, the emergence of biopolitics (which he suggests is a development of the seventeenth century), arises where governance is directed at defending 'society against all the biological threats posed by the other race, the sub-race, the counter-race that governance itself brings into existence' (Foucault 2003: 62–71). This state racism lies at the heart of biologics, where the state is the protector of the purity of the superior race (Foucault 2003: 81).

The dual developments of the nation-state and ideas about population governance through border control were shaped by and took place in the context of colonial relations. White settler colonies in the Americas, Australia and New Zealand were based on a citizenship model from which original 'native' populations were excluded. These states were shaped by openness to (the right kind of) immigration, which was needed for labour, but their histories also demonstrate the ways in which citizenship was deeply racialised. The United States, classically portrayed as a nation of immigrants, had a long history of openness to immigration from Europe (apart from some attempts to inhibit the settlement of radicals from France and Ireland) but suspicion of non-European migration. Moreover, the discourse of the 'nation of immigrants' fails to account for both the forced migration of slaves and the experience of forced migration and displacement of Native Americans. As Malcolm X argued, 'We didn't land on Plymouth Rock... we were not brought here to be citizens'.¹⁶ The freedoms and rights endowed to citizens within the United States were denied to slaves, Native Americans,

and others deemed 'too foreign' and unable to be absorbed into the nation. In the Naturalisation Act of 1790, naturalisation was limited to 'free white persons' (Glenn 2002: 24). An associate justice in Virginia described the situation of slaves just before the Civil War in America: 'This race has been by all nations of Europe regarded as subjects of capture or purchase; as subjects of commerce or traffic' (Kerber 2005: 733). These limits on the freedom of slaves included the absolute lack of the freedom of movement, a central feature of citizenship. Once slaves were freed in the United States after the Civil War they 'moved around as if to prove that they were no longer stateless' (Kerber 2005: 733).

The 1868 Fourteenth Amendment conferred partial citizenship rights on former slaves. It also gave all citizens the right to move freely (without taxation) from state to state within the nation. But American citizenship was racialised and excluded both blacks and other aliens considered too racially different, notably the Chinese. Former slaves had fewer rights, and they were subjected to segregation and exclusion from political rights. The 1868 Burlingame Treaty between the United States and the Chinese imperial government permitted Chinese nationals to immigrate freely into the country but removed any rights to naturalisation. This was followed in 1880 with a new treaty which gave the United States the right to limit the entry of the Chinese to the country. From 1882 with the Chinese Exclusion Act, the bringing in of Chinese workers as contract labourers was banned. (Torpey 2000: 97). Citizenship was frequently tied to land ownership and, in eleven states, Chinese migrants were banned from owning land. American women marrying Chinese men would lose their US citizenship (Glenn 2002: 26).

The United States continued to apply a racialised lens to the issue of immigration and its attempts to manage the population. In 1921 the first 'national origins' quota was introduced which followed the principle of preserving the racial state as it was in 1910. Thus immigration was restricted on a monthly basis to a small percentage of each nationality seen in the 1910 census (this was then pushed back to the 1890 census which was more 'white' Nordic, than the more Eastern European profile offered in the later census) (Torpey 2000: 119). Kerber argues that 'Immigration restriction had in it an element of the restoration of some notion of equilibrium, as though the balance among exotic others admitted into the American population had to be reset' (Kerber 2005: 733). This pattern of racialisation was shared in other white settler societies. A series of policies aimed at preserving 'White Australia' was implemented from the 1850s to the 1970s. As Torpey points out, this state management of the racialised population depended on both

technologies of the census and national identity documentation: ‘documents such as passports and identification cards that help determine ‘who is in’ and ‘who is out’ of the nation here took centre stage and thus became an enduring and omnipresent part of our world’ (Torpey 2000: 121).

However, Torpey and others often fail to examine fully how the modern development of the nation-state with a territorially bounded, and importantly a racialised perception of citizenship, grew out of European colonialism. Empire and colonial subjecthood relate in complex ways to questions of citizenship. Under the rule of colonial difference (Chatterjee 2005), it was possible to be a subject of the empire without many crucial citizenship rights – particularly rights to participate in the political process and rights to travel to and reside in the ‘mother’ country. Radhika Viyas Mongia insists it was in the colonial and postcolonial responses to ‘race migration’ that ‘precipitated the emergence of nationality as a staunch territorial attachment’ (Mongia 1999: 528). She argues that, in the case of the British Empire, it was concern about the ‘free’ migration of racialised colonial subjects to Britain or white settler colonies that:

generates a state monopoly over migration practices and, via the passport, gives us the specifically modern imbrications of the state, the nation and race, an imbrication that produces race as a ‘national attribute’, codified in the state document of the passport. (Mongia 1999: 528–529)

Mongia examines the political and policy debates within Canada and with the Viceroy in India, between 1906 and 1915, which discussed attempts to block the free migration of Indians to Canada in a way which could not be seen as racist or, more importantly,¹⁷ violating the idea that all British subjects had freedom of movement across the Empire. Through these debates, Mongia tracks the emergence of the category of national, both in the sense of national (as opposed to colonial) interests and also national culture – where other British subjects could be regarded as too culturally different (as well as unable to cope with different national climate, an idea which has biological underpinnings). The eventual policy solution to this perceived problem of Indian migration to Canada was a bureaucratic fix which declared that new arrivals to Canada had to come directly from their original countries (this effectively banned Indians as there were no direct ships sailing from India to Canada). Mongia argues that it was:

through a recourse to the 'national' that the principle of the 'complete freedom for all British subjects to transfer themselves from one part of His Majesty's Dominions to the other' was abandoned and the category of 'British subject' was rendered available for division and differentiation. (Mongia 1999: 553)

For Mongia, the passport 'generates nationality as the intersection between the nation and the state' in a way which also conceals how the national identity is also a racial one (Mongia 1999: 553).¹⁸

At the dawning of the postcolonial period, Robin Cohen suggests that British citizenship was given to residents of the UK through a 'legislative sleight of hand' in the 1948 British Nationality Act which established the status of 'Citizen of the UK and colonies' (Cohen 1994: 7).¹⁹ This new category bolstered 'the myth of a racially exclusive British identity' (Cohen 1994: 14) by distinguishing mostly white UK residents from the older colonial category of 'British subject', who also had rights to enter the UK and also from 'British subjects without citizenship', who were mostly from India and Pakistan and were now subject to immigration controls. Further legislation in 1962 and 1971 were used to prevent postcolonial immigration to Britain and preserve the idea of white Britishness. The 1971 Immigration Act introduced the concept of 'patriality' which constructed 'a legal boundary between the colonizers and the colonized' (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1993: 45). This Act gave right of abode in Britain only to citizens of the UK and colonies and commonwealth citizens who had a parent or grandparent who had been born in the UK – thus restructuring right of entry and abode on essentially racialised grounds (Cohen 1994: 18). The 1981 Immigration Act for the first time restricted *ius soli* as a principle for membership of the UK as people born in Britain of non-British parents no longer automatically acquired British citizenship. For Harry Goulbourne, the introduction of descent and blood asserted an 'essentially racial definition' of Britishness (Goulbourne 1993: 181; see also Tyler 2010).

In a similar way in the United States, following the Spanish-American war of 1898, the category of 'noncitizen national' was created to recognise the status of people who 'lived under the United States flag without the full range of constitutional protections that the flag normally carries' (Kerber 2005: 734). Thus colonial relations are defined in such a way that people living in some territories were fully citizens while others (especially racialised others) living in colonies were not and could-not-be citizens, they were 'designed' to be 'failed citizens' (Tyler 2010). Nation and state are entwined in such a way that those who are excluded define the

citizen. So, for example, white British residents residing in the UK were given financial incentives in the twentieth century to emigrate to self-governing parts of the empire. At times colonial citizens were drawn into Britain to work, but found that, despite being British subjects, they were not always welcome, or made to feel 'at home' in the 'mother country' (Paul 1997). In order to understand these processes of exclusion, this section has outlined how it is essential to draw out their colonial and postcolonial histories. The border is a key site where distinction is made between migrants – figured as outsiders – and citizens. The following section will examine how borders can be taken as a particularly critical location for the enactment of citizenship as a differentiating practice and also the implications of the idea of nation as a home which needs to be protected.

Securitized citizens

If the uprooted or mobile are deemed to be dangerous to the territorialised state (as suggested above), the place where this mobility is first apprehended is at the border. I will argue in further chapters that an important element of many citizenship ceremonies is the notion of 'welcoming' new citizens and of claims that particular nations or communities have always shown a welcome to newcomers (Darling 2013). Yet, at the national border there is a less 'homely' welcome – in the 'buffer zone' (Isin and Rygiel 2007: 191) in which people can be processed and where the immigrant official or border guard demands that the traveller accounts for their identity (Derrida 2000: 29). Here travellers are scrutinised as a possible threat to the state. This scrutiny at the border, as well as at the point of issuing visas and so forth, has become normalised to the extent that 'we now expect interrogation rather than welcome' (Salter 2006: 171). The culture of scepticism has become routine border practice and for some, such as asylum seekers, continued far beyond the border (Pannett 2011).

Mary Douglas' work has alerted us to the importance of borders and boundaries in creating both anxiety and identity. For Douglas, borders are particularly important in the social maintenance of purity (Douglas 1996). In this context, certain kinds of border crossings can cause fear and anxiety. It is not hard, when considering the discourse around 'uncontrolled' immigration, to find metaphors of danger and pollution. It is common for immigrants to be referred to as potentially 'flooding'²⁰ a country, leaving the citizens at threat of being 'swamped'. Undesired immigrants are often perceived to be 'dirty', failing to follow systems of

hygiene and rubbish collection.²¹ Borders can be threatened or weakened by the supposed flood of immigrants. They can also become 'leaky'. Governmentality at the border aims to make it stronger by policing the movement of people. However, borders must not be impenetrable. There is a filtering required which facilitates the passage of some, whilst it impedes others. Thus the border is a moment of producing citizenship and identifying the 'good' versus the 'bad' migrant. The state utilizes a range of technologies to 'manage' immigration, to identify 'good' migrants and to prevent potential 'bad' migrants from entering (see (Anderson 2013; Darling 2013) for a discussion of the good citizen defined in contrast to the failed citizen). Generally, the 'good' migrant is economically productive, is not perceived as presenting a burden on the state and welfare system and is not seen as 'too different' from the imagination of nation and its citizenry which has been created. Alternatively, the good migrant can be read as adding to 'multicultural' richness in a way which is perceived as non-threatening (Schinkel and van Houtd 2010). This discourse of the 'good' and 'bad' migrant maps onto other polarised narratives, such as the good Muslim/bad Muslim described by Mahmood Mamdani (2004). The famous declaration of George Bush that 'Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists' exemplifies this binary. This is both a biopower, directed at the internal population and a Zoēpolitics, primarily directed at those outside the state. Willem Schinkel argues that normative discourses of the 'good' and 'bad' citizen or migrant are also combined with processes to identify the citizen from the non-citizen – the valid member from the enemy/alien who can be cast out to 'bare life' (Schinkel 2010: 156).

The association of certain forms of mobility with danger has become heightened as a result of increased focus on terrorism and its suggested links to immigration. Mark Salter, drawing on Agamben, argues that '[T]he border is a permanent state of exception' – the place where the rule of law is suspended by the sovereign' (Salter 2008: 365). For Salter, the border is a space where the contract between the sovereign and citizen or sovereign and traveller are reconsidered and redrawn in the decision to allow entry or expel. (Salter 2008: 373). At the border, the citizen is made a stranger until documentation makes him/her sufficiently knowable and recognizable as a citizen – or alien. It is in the everyday bureaucratic acts of allowing, or refusing entry, issuing passports, visas and decisions on refugee status that the population is governed and the act of mobility is something that has to be justified and accounted for. It is worth stressing that sovereignty at the border is engaged in a racialising process (Butler 2004: 68). Acts of filtering are often shaped

by perceptions of who is dangerous and safe based on ethnic or racial models. Borders are not fortress walls which block all movement – rather they are designed to be membranes which categorise and filter the desirable from the undesirable traveller (Sparke 2006). Whilst regional agreements have made some borders appear invisible (for example the Schengen Agreement within Europe), others have been much more carefully policed.²² Wendy Brown points to the ‘fundamental tensions between opening and barricading, fusion and partition, erasure and reinscription’ in nation-state borders (Brown 2010: 7–8). She tracks this tension in particular in the ‘frenzied building’ of new physical boundaries and walls across the world. However, border work is not done only at the spatially limited external international border. States, through a process of ‘rebordering’ (Andreas 2002), have developed an increasingly sophisticated and multi-faceted apparatus of surveillance *within* and also outside of nation borders to police legal and illegal mobilities. These include identity and/or passport checking at point-of-contact with medical services, the education system and by travel companies (Walters 2004).²³ Since the UK 1981 Nationality Act which took away automatic citizenship for those born in Britain, Imogen Tyler argues that ‘maternity wards across Britain have become “border zones” through which “aliens” enter Britain’ (Tyler 2010: 69). Illegality can be conferred on babies with their first breaths. For powerful nations, border practices can be extended to the territory of other countries. For instance, the United States has border controls set up in Ireland for ‘pre-screening’ of travellers to the United States, with similar arrangements at Calais for entering the UK. The dominance of the United States means that it can also change the border practices of other states, through for instance insisting on specific documentation for re-entry, which has led Canada to adjust its own practices (Muller 2010).²⁴

Alongside the increased securitisation of internal and external borders, Isin argues that the ‘neurotic citizen’ has developed – a citizen which governs itself through managing responses to risks and anxieties (Isin 2004). Anxiety has been constructed as the norm for citizens and governance has become about managing or tranquilising those anxieties – the management of unease. As Brian Massumi puts it, ‘insecurity is the new normal’ (Massumi 2005: 31). The focus of the anxiety of the neurotic citizen is, as will be discussed further below, the homeland, the nation as home threatened from outsiders and potential enemies within. Massumi considers the colour-coded terror alert system which the United States Department for Homeland Security introduced in 2002. The colours, following a traffic-light code suggest the levels of

risk. These range from low to severe with no colour for safe: 'Safe, it would seem, has fallen off the spectrum of perception' (Massumi 2005: 32). This system was designed to enable the government to calibrate the levels of nervousness of the population and to combat fear fatigue. Whatever the colour, more or less constant vigilance is asked of the citizen. Thus the neurotic citizen's unease is managed through a range of governmental technologies which both create a sense of crisis and threat but also seek to relieve the fears that have been produced, rather than action which resolves the problem. Wendy Brown sees a similar 'Wizard of Oz' quality in the new nation-state building projects, in that they 'stage both sovereign jurisdiction and an aura of sovereign power' even while they may not achieve the protection they promise (Brown 2010: 25–26). Discomfort can also be transferred to others – by demonstrating that asylum seekers, for example, are not treated in a way which would suggest the state was 'soft' or giving comfort (Fortier 2010; Darling 2011). The home/nation and border are two critical sites of these productions of a sense of risk and the governance of risks (thus the concept of 'homeland security'). The home is constructed as the ultimate space of security and the domain for managing anxiety. But (the wrong kind of) homes can also be seen as a threat to the security of the nation, of fostering the enemy within who lacks the proper cultural attributes of 'home'. Matter out of place is dirty and polluting and this threat is transferred to the wrong kind of people in nation. Hence the need for governments to show that they can defend the nation against 'too much' immigration. This is what Andrew Baldwin calls a 'future conditional' threat²⁵ – something that *may* emerge if mass migration is allowed (Baldwin 2012).²⁶

The Australian government has been engaged in a range of activities which seek to show that they are 'managing' the threat posed by asylum seekers. In December 2013, this included the publishing of a 'code of conduct' which all asylum seekers would be required to sign. The short code largely insists that the asylum seekers abide by the law and follow instructions given to them by the police and other government officials. But it sets out three specific conditions which reveal the particular ways in which asylum seekers are perceived as a threat to intimate home spaces. The first admonishes the asylum seeker: 'You must not make sexual contact with another person without that person's consent, regardless of their age; you must never make sexual contact with someone under the age of consent' The second tells them 'You must not harass, intimidate or bully any other person or group of people or engage in any antisocial or disruptive activities that are inconsiderate, disrespectful

or threaten the peaceful enjoyment of other members of the community'. Whilst the third insists: 'You must not refuse to comply with any health undertaking provided by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection or direction issued by the Chief Medical Officer (Immigration) to undertake treatment for a health condition for public health purposes'.²⁷

William Walters calls this 'domopolitics' where the relationship between home, nation and security are reconfigured in a way which 'rationalizes a series of security measures in the name of a particular conception of home' (Walters 2004: 241). This domopolitics requires systems of classification and management – a form of governmentality which identifies some as privileged travellers or desired (good) migrants and others as dangerous, bogus, illegal and potentially polluting (Darling 2013). Amy Kaplan (Kaplan 2003), in an article which explores the emergence of the concept of 'homeland security' in the United States asks: 'Does the word homeland itself do some of the cultural work of securing national borders? Might it also produce a kind of radical insecurity?' She argues that the concept of 'home' is structurally reliant on its opposition to the idea of 'foreign'. But one might also argue that the concept of home also relies on the notion of its abject – that which is repudiated in order to define and construct the homely norm. The process of securitization and governance through insecurity enables the erasure of certain rights in defence of the home. Rather than be allowed to enter homely spaces, asylum seekers and others deemed to be a threat to the safety of the home (particularly insurgents, 'non-legal' combatants) are consigned to abject zones where their rights are suspended and they remain unseen and unheard – and rendered 'inexistent' (Isin and Rygiel 2007: 189) and non-political (Darling 2013). These include both off-shore detention facilities such as Guantanamo Bay and Manus Island in Papua New Guinea (used by the Australian government) and also unofficial transit camps where undocumented migrants gather waiting to attempt border crossings (Isin and Rygiel 2007: 193). At the same time, efforts are made to ensure the continued flow of capital, material goods and 'cosmopolitan' travellers (Stasiulis and Ross 2006). Homes are designed to be places of comfort and security – they are places into which you may invite outsiders, but you retain the right to exclude or expel them. Of course who is deemed to be the desired traveller is at least partly defined by who they are not – the boundaries of citizenship and privileged traveller are defined alike by the repudiated abject in the form of those represented as bogus asylum seeker, illegal immigrant or terrorist (Tyler 2006: 186). For

Tyler, this process of abjection is not only defining of the citizen, but also comforting:

For the creation and exclusion of this imaginary bad object brings 'us' closer together. The mobilization of the asylum seeker as 'our' national hate figure bestows 'us' with a collective identity and in doing grants 'us' the pleasures of secure identification: we are British, we have a way of life, and we must protect it. (Tyler 2006: 192)

It's also worth noting (and often overlooked in discussions of domopolitics), that the concept of home generally implies a set of gendered, heteronormative relations. As feminist theorists have long been aware, claims for who should be in and who should control the space of home and the role of the family often have an exclusionary and oppressive force. Threats to this 'intimate public sphere' (Berlant 1997: 1) can provoke anxiety. While domopolitics focuses on the state as home, it is concerned with the preservation and reproduction of only certain kinds of home. Irene Gedalof, in her examination of the UK government's 2001 white paper 'Secure Borders, Safe Havens' is concerned with how certain kinds of homes and family relations are regarded as suspicious and threatening to the national space. Even the structuring of the paper, where marriages and family visits are included in the same chapter as 'war criminals', provokes anxiety. The discussion of arranged marriages is intermingled with that of 'bogus' marriage, suggesting they are equally suspect (Gedalof 2007).

In addition to the construction of these internal and external borders, there has been a proliferation of adjustments to Western nations' rules and regulations regarding immigration and citizenship. This is part of what Brian Turner has called the 'enclave society' where literal as well as metaphorical walls surround social groups of very different scales – from the gated community or elderly residential home to the nation (Turner 2007).²⁸ Turner notes that 'while there may be an increasing global flow of goods and services, there is an emerging parallel 'immobility' regime exercising surveillance and control over migrants, refugees and other aliens (Turner 2007: 289).²⁹ This 'immobility regime' requires continual adjustment of state legislation concerning immigration and citizenship. However, it is worth remembering that, under conditions of expedited removal and extraordinary rendition, some categories of 'aliens' can be moved remarkably quickly by the state (Sparke 2006). Aiwha Ong (1999: 9) points out that immobility in terms of 'being stuck' may well be the experience of many poorer citizens of Western States with limited

capacities to move and prosper. One might consider incarceration, with its classed and raced profile as the most extreme version of this immobility. The technology of exclusion and the 'immobility regime' works also to exclude migrants from particular rights resulting in an 'immigrationalization' of social welfare and citizenship (Lewis 2004: 29).

Conclusion

This chapter has pointed out that citizenship membership, as has been developed within the legal framework of nation-states, is neither inevitable nor neutral. Rather, this form of citizenship emerges out of a specific European colonial history, which is racialised, gendered and classed. It is marked by governmentality, which is concerned with controlling the populations within the nation-state and empire and with managing regimes of both mobility and immobility across the borders of the nation/empire. Coloniality, according to Walter D. Mignolo, has overridden notions of Humanity with that of the citizen, who can only exist in the context of the exclusion of others (Mignolo 2013). The citizen has been shaped in part by who s/he is not. The chapter has explored the gendered, sexualised and racialised contours of citizenship and membership rules. It has also shown how the state has a relationship to mobility which has arisen out of economic and political concerns, as well as colonial processes. Finally I have traced how, despite increased mobility and deterritorialisation, renewed attention has been paid in the last few decades to both nation-state and internal borders and the movements of individuals across them. This has included the drawing in of new agents in the filtering and surveillance required in bordering activities (such as private landlords or healthcare providers). Justification for this state activity has relied on the formation of domopolitics, which produces the nation as a home under threat. This also involves the creation of a neurotic citizen who responds to a sense of risk and threat from the 'anti-citizen' and who is then reassured through techniques of frontier control, surveillance and expulsion.

This approach to citizenship membership will be taken forward in the rest of the book. It poses specific questions for our understanding of the moment of the celebration for new citizens acquiring citizenship. In particular it asks how the citizenship ceremonies, and other processes involved in acquiring citizenship as an immigrant (such as citizenship testing for example) function as a form of domopolitics? To what extent are these practices shaped in such a way that provides reassurance for the neurotic citizen? What account do the ceremonies give of

the nature of the nation-state for which they are awarding membership? What does membership come to mean in these ceremonies? And how is the idea of the good citizen – and the anti-citizen – constructed through the ceremonies? The next chapter will examine the ceremonies for new citizens in the United States, Canada and Australia. It will explore how these ceremonies can be understood as a form of rite of passage into citizenship as well as tracing how the idea of the nation accounted for in the ceremonies relies on particular accounts of national history in all three contexts which silence the experience of states as formed through histories of domination and exclusion.

3

Taking the Oath

Say it like you mean it!

Canadian citizenship judge

Introduction

In the impressive, highly decorative and heavily gilded art deco Paramount Theatre in Oakland, California, the host of the naturalisation ceremony welcomes the people who have come to receive their American citizenship: 'America becomes a better place because of you. Everybody, thank you for becoming citizens'. This is greeted by clapping and whoops from the audience.¹ In the less elaborate surroundings of the Brooklyn, New York courthouse, which lack the razzmatazz of the California ceremony, the presiding judge declares, 'When I look at this gathering, I see the beautiful smiles of America'.

The idea of a country built on a history of immigration is, as we shall see, a repeated theme which runs through the ceremonies observed in the United States, Canada and Australia, three former settler colonies of the British Empire. However, this does not mean that the position of the immigrant is always a valued one, free of hostility and suspicion. All three countries also have ongoing political debates about what types of immigrants should be allowed to enter the country, how immigrants' cultural differences – and potentially divided loyalties – may or may not pose a threat to the country, and how to address undocumented migration. Emphasis on immigrant contribution in the United States also denies the contributions and deprivations of those who were brought to the United States as slaves and those who inhabited the land before the 'settlers'. In a similar way, both Canada and Australia have histories

of immigration policies which exercised racialised exclusions and suspicion of migrants. Like the United States, they have built myths of the 'nation of immigrants' in ways that can silence the histories and deny the citizenship rights of indigenous communities.

This chapter will explore the different approaches taken to these issues by examining citizenship ceremonies in each of these three countries. The previous chapter argued for the need to understand citizenship in the historical context of the emergence of the nation-state out of Western imperialism. This chapter, which examines the ceremonies from three postcolonial settler nations which are often seen as classic immigration nations', will explore the ways in which these histories are represented in the ceremonies. It will also examine how citizenship and the process of immigration and naturalisation are constructed in the ceremonies. The United States, Australia and Canada have a long history of conducting ceremonies to celebrate the creation of new citizens and as a public arena for the taking of an oath or pledge of loyalty. They have provided influential models for the more recent development of such events in Europe – three of which (the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands) will be explored in the next chapter. Yet, very little scholarly attention has been paid to citizenship ceremonies in general, and no previous studies have carried out an international comparative study in these countries. Based on observations of ceremonies, and interviews conducted with officials involved in organising and presenting at them, the chapter will consider how the ceremonies function as 'rites of passage', initiating participants as citizens of a nation. It will also examine how these events reveal and/or obscure the ways in which processes of naturalisation figure in citizenship regimes. I suggest that the ceremonies and the ways they position new citizens and construct national membership can shed light on how citizenship in general is being understood as well as how immigrants to the nation are regarded. In many ways these ceremonies may be seen as rather trivial occasions in the general scheme of considering immigration, refugeedom, citizenship and rights. Nonetheless these occasions, created by states to celebrate the moment of endowing national citizenship, can shed light on the how membership and citizenship is understood. They can also tell us about the narration of nation.

The analysis in this chapter is based on observations three research assistants and I made in the United States, Canada and Australia. Having conducted extensive fieldwork in the UK, which is explored in the following chapters, I was interested to know how the UK ceremonies differed from, or were similar to, those in other parts of the world. I was particularly interested in those countries which I knew

had influenced the design of the UK ceremonies, as well as exploring ceremonies in other parts of Europe (which will be discussed in Chapter 4). I was able to get funding² for a small project in which researchers, already located in the countries concerned, observed a citizenship ceremony. The researchers took detailed notes on what they saw (having been given instructions about how to and what I was particularly interested in). They conducted interviews with officials responsible for conducting or organising the ceremonies. They also took photos, largely of the buildings in which the ceremonies were held, which gave added detail to their descriptions. The observation in Oakland California (near San Francisco) was conducted by Bethan Harries. Nadia Kidwai undertook the observation in Winnipeg, Canada and also interviewed a citizenship judge, while Katherine Jones interviewed an official and observed a ceremony in Yarra City (near Melbourne). In addition, I was able to attend two centres for the ceremonies in New York. At Federal Plaza in Manhattan, which houses a field office of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), I observed two ceremonies on a single day and had the opportunity to speak to most of the officials involved. I also attended a ceremony in Brooklyn's law court and met with officials and a citizenship judge in Mississauga, near Toronto.

Inevitably, these observations can only tell us about the conduct of those ceremonies in those places on that particular day. Nonetheless, there is sufficient uniformity in the way the ceremonies were conducted, as also confirmed by the officials, that we can take them as generally representative. In fact, in many ways, this limited survey (including the countries considered in the following chapter) demonstrates that, even internationally, citizenship ceremonies tend to follow a fairly uniform pattern. They generally take place in similar kinds of public buildings displaying familiar national symbols – flags and heads of state – with comparable officials and dignitaries presiding over them. In terms of the format of the event, all of the ceremonies focus centrally on the taking of an oath or pledge of allegiance and the distribution of certificates of citizenship. And all finish with the playing and singing of the national anthem. Whilst these elements will be discussed in more detail below, they form an internationally recognised lexicon of and often what is most interesting are the incidental remarks and practices which are wrapped around the more expected elements. The events do have varying atmospheres – which can range from fairly formal and official, to relaxed and even entertaining. They also produced a range of narrations of nation. These differences, while seemingly trivial, nonetheless

suggest varying approaches to national culture and attitudes towards immigration and citizenship, as well as national identity.

This chapter will explore how, whilst there are many similarities in the ceremonies in the three countries, there are also significant variations. These differences centre on the possibility of representing some of the more contentious aspects of national history, particularly with regard to those who occupied the land before colonial invasion and the long histories of exclusion from citizenship of racialised groups. Although all of the ceremonies claim a welcome and openness to newcomers, they deal differently with questions of diversity and the ongoing relationships that immigrants may have to their countries of origin. Finally, the oaths themselves will be examined, raising questions about what they symbolise and if they signal the ultimate transformation from foreigner to fellow citizen. It is through this analysis of both 'silences' and expressions about the value of certain immigrants that we can see national specificities about who is a good citizen, to be welcomed into the family of the nation, and who should be repulsed.

Nations of immigrants

The national narratives that are presented in the citizenship ceremonies in the United States, Canada and Australia all rely at least partially on the notion of a nation of immigrants. In many cases, the new citizens are presented as the archetypal citizen in the immigrant nation. They are regarded as those who, through what is constructed as their choice to become a citizen of a particular country, have affirmed the status of a nation in which the immigrant dream persists. As the host of the Manhattan ceremony puts it: 'Perhaps your greatest responsibility is to remind native-born citizens what being an American is about'. In a video which is shown at the beginning of the ceremonies in America, the US immigration services director starts a presentation on Ellis Island, stating:

The United States is a nation of immigrants. We have always been a nation of immigrants, we're the only country in the world that opens its arms as wide as we do to immigrants. I think the new blood, the new culture, the new experiences which come to this nation are what make us different and are what make America the country it is today.

Of course this narrative of 'arms open wide' to immigrants belies a much more complicated history that overlooks the presence of Native

Americans who lived in America before the colonialists and immigrants.³ Also silenced is the history of the forced immigration of slaves.⁴ Finally, a long history of racialised immigration policies contradicts the expansive suggestion of 'arms open wide'. In the United States, for example, the Exclusions Act of 1882 prohibited the naturalisation of Chinese immigrants and controlled their entry into the country to such an extent that they sometimes spent years living on Angel Island in San Francisco Bay (the equivalent to Ellis Island in Upper New York Bay) (Jagers, Gabbard et al. 2014: 5). In 1917, the 'Asiatic-Barred Zone', which prohibited migration from China, India, the Middle East and the Philippines, was established. In addition, there have been quotas in immigration since 1921, as discussed in Chapter 2 (Jagers, Gabbard et al. 2014: 5). It was only in the 1940s that racial restrictions on naturalisation ended, and finally, in 1952, an act was passed which removed race or national origin as a criterion for American citizenship (Bloemraad 2006: 22). The United States was also very late in signing up to United Nations provisions on refugees (which originated in 1951, but the United States did not conform to it until The Refugee Act of 1980) (Jagers, Gabbard et al. 2014: 8–9). Furthermore, the country continued stringent efforts to control migration (particularly the undocumented kind), and the ongoing debates about the 'threat' of immigration to the security and the economy of the United States undermine the notion of 'arms open wide'. As discussed in the previous chapter, the state of domestic politics is such that immigration and outsiders are continually represented as a threat to the security of the nation. The debates are often conducted in racialised terms with particular national or ethnic groups deemed to offer specific threats. Popular cultural movements, such as the Minutemen, who patrol the southern borders of the United States, also belie this image of unqualified hospitality.

Whilst the narrative of a nation of immigrants may provide a rather partial view of American history and nation building, it nonetheless constitutes an important myth. In some ways, as suggested by the quotations used in the introduction to this chapter, this myth serves to privilege the position of naturalised citizens. In a seeming reversal of some of the hostility to immigration, there is a suggestion that naturalised citizens are somehow *more* ideal citizens than those born in the United States. However, this idealisation exists alongside hostility to immigrants through the creation of boundaries of legality and illegality. Border and immigration control technology is used to determine that certain migrants are illegal – their position as 'bad' migrants is further underlined with contrasts to the 'good' migrants who are legal (De

Genova 2002). Furthermore, the discourse of immigrants as ideal citizen still marks them out as different from those born in the country. The distinction made between citizens by birth and naturalisation within the ceremony accords with the findings of Sofya Aptekar, who studied speeches at US naturalisation ceremonies in two periods: from 1950 to 1970 and from 2003 to 2008. She found a striking shift in the later period towards extolling the virtue of immigrant citizens in contrast to their potentially less committed US-born counterparts:

A strong thread that ran through many ceremony remarks is the idea that native-born Americans take many things for granted and that immigrant citizens' job is to remind the native-born what America stands for. (Aptekar 2012: 946)

In the United States, the idea that new citizens are special worked with a narrative which positioned migrants as having a closer relationship to the 'American Dream'. The idea of the American Dream is referred to at several points in the ceremonies. In the videos shown, the director of the USCIS explains how the 100 million Americans who can trace their ancestry back to Ellis Island are connected by 'the dream', concluding, 'In America, anything is possible'. The welcome video recorded by President Obama also claims, 'Always remember that in America, no dream is impossible.... You can help write the next great chapter in our great American story'.

Similarly, in their speeches, the judges in Manhattan and Brooklyn use their own or their families' histories of immigration to illustrate The Dream. The judge in Manhattan explained that she and her family migrated from Lithuania to Israel and then on to the United States:

I became more comfortable. I learnt English from the TV. The school was good, and I got into an Ivy League college. Seventeen years in a justice department: You could say I realised the American Dream.

The Brooklyn judge produced her own family's immigration story as a final flourish to her speech before striding out of the courtroom with her legal gown ballooning behind her:

All my grandparents migrated to this country. I lived with my grandmother who migrated from Russia. She came steerage in a boat and landed at Ellis Island as a 14 year old. She worked in a sweatshop making dresses. Would she have imagined her granddaughter would

be a federal judge? Have big dreams for you and your children and I wish you all the best.

These personal accounts show the power of the narrative of the American Dream and how its telling makes the dream open to all through immigration, or even somehow *more* possible for those who emigrate, or their near ancestors who have the fresh energy and commitment to make the dream a reality. As the judge from Brooklyn said after the oath and pledge had been taken: '[As a citizen], you stand here before the law *equally*, even if a person's great-great-great-grandfather came here' (emphasis in the original). In part, this narrative of the American Dream – or what might be termed in other countries the 'immigrant's dream' – is tied to families and multi-generational fulfilment; the dream may come true for the new citizens' children, or their children's children.

The Canadian ceremony offered a similar notion of a promise granted to immigrants over generations and of the impact of those immigrants on nation building. The clerk of the ceremony in Winnipeg introduced herself as a sixth generation immigrant, asking the new citizens to imagine what life would be like in six generations' time. She said that their families would now 'determine the future of Canada'. Whilst one might not agree with the biologically determinist position presented by Gary R. Johnson (1987) in his analysis of the use of kin terms in patriotic speeches, it is interesting to consider how references to family, ancestors and future generations function in these speeches. For Johnson, these familial references are used to elicit altruistic responses. They may also serve as an attempt to reassure new citizens that the beneficial results of migration will come, or continue, through generations of their families, despite whatever difficulties they personally face. In Canada, there was clear evidence of what Johnson called the 'symbolic' or 'fictive' use of kin terms – where the term 'is applied to those who are neither biologically defined kin, or to an entity like the country itself' (Johnson 1987: 171). In this way, the judge in the Winnipeg ceremony proposed that citizenship is a 'covenant between individual and country; a bond between us and those who came before us and those who come after us', and finished her speech with the line, 'We are honoured to welcome you to our "Canadian Family."' As discussed in Chapter 2, the association of the nation with family and home can also lead to a domopolitics of protecting the nation from others who are seen to be always outside the family and threatening to the home (Walters 2004). On a slightly different note, Canadian participants were told of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and of the 'Canadian Way', which included

volunteerism and the ‘willingness to reach out to others and to take responsibility for our friends and neighbours’.

A similar idea, of Australian values as a ‘fair go for all, regardless of colour, creed or age’, was declared in a ceremony there. The Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission had proposed in 2006 that the ‘spirit of the fair go’ was one of the central values which new citizens should understand.⁵ However, the idea remains within the boundaries of citizenship, rather than traversing them. Australia has a long history of immigration control which is designed to allow in only those who are considered desirable. Migration decisions remain exempt from the Disability Discrimination Act, so disability is still a factor in the assessment for entry into Australia. Historically, immigration policy was highly racialised, under what became known as the ‘White Australia policy’, but now immigrants are selected through a points system, based on their skills and other desirable attributes. At the same time, Australia has an increasingly hostile attitude to asylum seekers and, according to the Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘maintains one of the most restrictive immigration detention systems in the world’ (Australian Human Rights Commission 2013: 2).

Accounts of immigrants’ potential in the ceremonies are related to the injunctions to be active citizens and, in particular, to vote. All the ceremonies observed gave out information on how to register to vote, with the Yarra City (Australia) and Oakland (California, United States) ceremonies also having officials to help the new citizens complete the registration forms. The new citizen welcome packs in the United States included copies of the Constitution. The Brooklyn and Manhattan ceremonies took place in the last few days before the deadline to register to vote for the 2012 US presidential election, and participants were reminded to register. At the Brooklyn ceremony, they were told,

People are dying on the streets in other places to have their views heard – you must vote in every election, *take the time* to vote. Make your voices heard in this country. (emphasis in the original)

In Brooklyn, not only were new citizens urged to register and exercise the right to vote in the upcoming election, they were also given information about how to pursue their rights. In an introductory session, they were taken through what was going to happen in the ceremony, how to say the oath and how to apply for a passport. They were told about human rights law and given a newsletter from the New York City Commission on Human Rights which was specifically directed at new citizens. An

official talked them through an example of a job applicant who was disadvantaged by racism. She stressed the need to speak up quickly and told them how to pursue justice if they had experienced discrimination. They also learned about resources available to them, such as government loans, and how to contact emergency services. Here, the links between citizenship and other rights were made explicit.

At times, the greater commitment of immigrant citizens than native-born citizens to nation building was suggested in the ceremonies through the construction of a particular kind of agency – *choosing* a country to live in. This narrative has the virtue of reassuring those birthright citizens that their country is the ‘best’, a place where people choose to be. Susan Bibler Coutin, in her study of citizenship ceremonies in Los Angeles in 1996–1997, found that there was considerable emphasis placed on the idea of choosing to migrate to the United States. However, she argues that:

for migrants’ decisions to naturalize to be seen as voluntary (and therefore legitimate), one has to presume a sort of free market of citizenship, in which migrants select the nation whose social system best permits them to develop their personal talents. Such presumptions ignore the international relationships and inequities that propel migration, downplay the incommensurability of migrants’ histories, and legitimize immigration systems that constitute some migrants as illegal and therefore exploitable. (Bibler Coutin 2003: 509)

However, it is interesting that in the ceremonies observed in 2010 and 2012, there was much less reference to the choices or decision-making processes behind migration than Bibler Coutin had found. A more dominant theme was that of a difficult (and therefore heroic) journey. For example, the judge in Manhattan said, ‘As an immigration judge, I can appreciate that it has been a long and frustrating road’. Similarly, in the video clip played after the oath-taking in Oakland and Manhattan, President Obama repeated the narrative: ‘You have travelled a long path to get here’. In the Canadian ceremony, the judge congratulated the new citizens, saying, their ‘long journey is over. [Your]...perseverance and faith is being rewarded today’. These statements carry connotations of reaching the Promised Land, which, whilst they may reference some of the less welcoming experiences migrants face in navigating visa systems, also feed the idea of the American Dream. This section explored the importance of constructions of the immigrant dream in citizen ceremonies in the United States, Canada and Australia. It also traced the

construction of the nation as a family, to suggest a form of domopolitics (Walters 2004). The next section will argue that, when the dominant rendering of the nation is of one built on the efforts of immigrants, it silences two important histories: pre-colonial settlement and slavery. It will also ask what kinds of claims to citizenship this undermines.

Impossible immigrants, impossible citizens

United States

Part of the problem of a narrative in which a nation is built by immigrants is that it sits awkwardly with the knowledge that in all of these 'immigration nations', there were already indigenous people whose rights to land and nationhood were ignored and who have historically been excluded from citizenship. In the case of the United States, there is also the question of how to fit in the large community of people whose ancestors were not immigrants following a dream, or people compelled to leave their homes to escape oppression, for whom the United States provided a refuge. How can narratives of the American Dream accommodate the stories of those forcibly brought to America as slaves? African American history is tied to the denial of the rights of citizenship, including being deprived of many rights after the abolition of slavery – 'Jim Crow' laws, segregation of public spaces and of access to public services such as education and health care, and the de facto disenfranchisement of black voters – that have continuing economic, social and cultural effects (Alexander 2010).

The first US naturalisation law was passed by Congress in 1790, based on the idea that those living in the US were citizens rather than subjects (Bloemraad 2006: 21). However, citizens had to be 'free white persons'. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (1868) mandated *jus soli* for all those born in United States Territory. This Reconstruction amendment sought to address the ambiguous legal situation of former slaves and to ensure their citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment stated: 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside'. It was understood that this would apply not only to former slaves and their offspring, but to other racialised minorities, 'even', as an exchange in the Senate put it, to 'the children of Chinese and Gypsies born in this country' (quoted in Lee 2010: 5). However, it did not ensure equal rights for all, especially with the continuation of segregation and institutionalised discrimination. In addition, confusion

over the implications for Native Americans remained; the amendment makes reference to ‘Indians not taxed’ who are excluded from citizenship (Lee 2010: 7–8). The constitutional amendment did not ensure that all American citizens were treated equally, and racial segregation persisted until the civil rights movement challenged it. Racial restrictions on naturalisation were only removed in 1952 (Bloemraad 2006: 22). As discussed in Chapter 2, citizenship has a gendered history, with women often slow to receive full rights. The idea of ‘a nation built by immigrants’ is highly gendered, tending to focus on labouring and propertied men. It was not until the 1920s that (white) women got full suffrage in the United States. Until 1922, a woman automatically lost her US citizenship if she married someone who was not a US citizen.

Given the ways in which immigration and citizenship rights in the United States are bound up with a history of exclusions and discrimination, it is notable that, whilst there were references made to civil and political rights in some of the ceremonies, and considerable encouragement of registering to vote, no mention was made of any US history which might disrupt the ‘nation of immigrants’ narrative. The next section will show that, although both Australia and Canada share a narration of a nation centred on immigration with the United States, their ceremonies were slightly different, in that there was some direct reference to those who lived in the two countries before colonial settlement and who have been excluded from full citizenship.

Reconciling the past in Canada and Australia

The arrival of the British in Australia followed a probable 50,000 years of Aboriginal habitation, and the history of the effects of settler colonies on Aboriginals remains contentious. Whilst the first immigrants to Australia were brought there forcibly as convicts, in the main, the promotion of voluntary immigration was the focus of nation building there, including offering financial inducements to migrants. The popular slogan of the first minister of immigration (post-1948) was ‘populate or perish’ (Klapdor, Coombs et al. 2009: 5). However, this was based on a racialised schema, known as the ‘White Australia’ policy, which preferred immigrants from the United Kingdom, tolerated other European migration, and specifically excluded non-European migrants. The Nationality and Citizenship Act (1948) established citizenship for *all* who were born in Australia, regardless of colour. But, David Mercer argues:

in practice – and notwithstanding the lofty sentiments expressed in the 1948 Act – this piece of legislation was an ‘empty vessel’ and

Australia's Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders still remain largely 'citizens without rights'. (Mercer 2003: 422)

Aborigines were not counted in the census until 1967 and only acquired the same level of voting rights and responsibilities as other citizens in 1983 (Mercer 2003: 425). According to John William Tate, Aborigines 'were so marginal to our sense of "nation" that they were barely included as members (citizens) of the state' (2009: 101). In some states, there were also severe restrictions of Aborigines' mobility, including not having entitlement to Australian passports. In Western Australia, as recently as the mid-1970s, 'it was illegal for Aborigines to cross the State border or for anyone to assist them in this way' (Mercer 2003: 431). Domopolitics – the idea of the nation-as-family and nation-as-protection-of-family – has a very particular history in Australia, where an estimated 100,000 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children (known as the Stolen Generation) were forcibly removed from their families and raised in homes or adopted by white families, a practice that continued until the 1960s. This has become a prominent issue in the struggle for social and civil rights of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. In 1997, a report titled 'Bringing Them Home' called for an official apology from the government. The prime minister at the time, John Howard, refused. However, in 2008, Kevin Rudd made an official apology on behalf of the government. Given this ongoing reconciliation, the idea of Australia as simply a nation of immigrants requires re-examination. There is evidence of some level of recognition of this within Australian citizenship ceremonies.

The Australian Citizenship Ceremonies Code, published in 2011, recommends that 'Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander leaders should be invited to the ceremonies, alongside representatives of all three levels of government (federal, state or territory and local) and other community leaders' (Government of Australia 2011: 5). It suggests displaying Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags alongside the Australian national flag and the Commonwealth coat of arms. In sum, the code 'encourages incorporating Indigenous elements into citizenship ceremonies. This enhances awareness and understanding by new citizens as well as the wider community of Indigenous culture and heritage and the status of Indigenous people as the first Australians' (Government of Australia 2011: 29). Here we see that the politics of reconciliation has produced an attempt to engage with the claims of the 'first' Australians – something that is missing in the United States.

The ceremony in Yarra City took place on 'Australia Day' – a public holiday established in 1994 – and Colin Hunter Jr, an indigenous

Australian, led the welcome. Said to originate from former convicts' tradition of celebrating their emancipation, the impetus to establish Australia Day as a public holiday arose during the bicentenary of what many Australians think of as the country's discovery. Citizenship ceremonies are often held on the holiday, with the new citizens' pledge of allegiance followed by an affirmation (which is said by all citizens). The celebration of Australia Day has been contentious and, in his speech, Hunter Jr, pointed out that, for many indigenous Australians, it would be better known as 'invasion day'.⁶ He also paid his respects to the Wurundjeri people and their elders, who he said were the 'traditional owners of the land' and he brought gum leaves to the ceremony as a symbol of welcome. The recognition of Australia's contentious history was not confined to the Aboriginal representative. It was mentioned by both the MP who was present and the Mayor of Yarra – who specifically acknowledged that the county's history included the genocide of Aborigines as well as the transportation of convicts. Although these were simply symbolic gestures, they represent a significantly different acknowledgement of a history of conflict and repression than the US ceremonies, which entirely avoided such controversial issues.

The ceremonies in Canada also sought to recognise the tension arising from claiming a country for immigrants and abusing the rights of those already occupying land, but they did so in a way which might be regarded as favouring the colonial conquerors' account of history. Included in the welcome pack for new citizens of Canada that is given at the naturalisation ceremony is a message from the minister of citizenship, immigration and multiculturalism, who writes that 'Hundreds of years ago, French and British pioneers partnered with the First Nations and laid the foundations of Canada'. The choice of the word 'partnering' might well be seen as a problematic simplification of a relationship that brought foreign diseases, war, seizing of land, a massive reduction in population size and an imposition of what Europeans considered a 'superior' culture. Indians were not 'persons' in federal law until 1951, and they did not obtain political rights until 1960 (Altamirano-Jiménez 2004: 351). Conflicts remain over the place of Indian treaty rights in the constitution (Henderson 2002). At the same time, as in the Australian ceremony, there was recognition of the inhabitants of Canada before the immigrants. In the ceremony, the minister of culture, heritage and tourism paid tribute to the indigenous First Nations peoples of Manitoba, who inhabited the land originally, before European settlement and the formal creation of Canada. The minister explained that 'Manitoba is the Cree word for "Where the spirit resides"' and named Louis Riel, a Métis

historical figure, as the ‘father of the province’. These gestures, whilst undoubtedly brief, serve to break up the narrative of a nation built solely on the labour and enterprise of immigrants exercising free choice. Thus, I would argue that there are significant differences in the ways in which Canada and Australia – compared to the United States – deal with their nations’ history of citizenship, oppression and inequality. In Australia and Canada, there is symbolic recognition of previous injustices towards first settlers (although no account is made of either racism or racial controls on immigration). In the US ceremonies, it seems to be impossible to interrupt the celebratory account of immigration and citizenship, even with symbolic gestures to indigenous inhabitants or forced migration, in the case of slavery. The differences in approach may partly be a reflection of Canada and Australia having gained independence more recently and therefore being able to confine more of this contentious history to their colonial pasts, whereas, for the United States, the history of slavery in particular is more closely bound up with the nation as it is now, so it cannot be consigned to a colonial past.⁷ The US narration of nation as built by immigrants pursuing the American Dream forecloses the possibilities for the recognition of Native American or slave histories. Indeed, the different ways in which these contentious aspects of national history are dealt with alerts us to the importance of the symbolic register of citizenship ceremonies. The following sections will explore the ceremonies as rites of passage in order to illuminate how the ceremonies serve to symbolise the transition from foreigner to citizen as a form of initiation.

Citizenship ceremonies as rites of passage

Citizenship or naturalisation ceremonies can be understood as relatively modern ‘inventions of tradition’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) in a particular mode: that of a *rites de passage*. Arnold van Gennep first suggested the idea of social ceremonies as rites of passage in 1908, noting ‘rites which accompany every change of place, state, social position and age’ (quoted in Turner 1987: 4). Van Gennep envisages these rites as rituals associated with transition – akin to moving through a threshold – as individuals move from one life-stage to another (such as birth, entering adulthood, marriage and death) (van Gennep 1960).

Analysing the citizenship ceremonies as rites of passage enables exploration of their similarities and differences. This approach also highlights the symbolic register in which the ceremonies are constructed. Van Gennep argues that these events have three stages: one which marks the

separation of those undertaking the rite of passage from others, the next a stage of liminality where participants are affectively cordoned off from the rest of society, and finally, the transition into a new status and incorporation back into the wider society. Victor Turner considered further the nature of the liminal stage, maintaining that 'during the ...liminal period, the state of the ritual subject (the 'passenger') is ambiguous; he passes through a realm that has few or none of the attributes of the past or coming state' (Turner 1987: 5). This ambiguity, or what Turner suggests can also be seen as 'invisibility', is highlighted by the way that there is often no word to describe the liminal condition.⁸ The transition from non-citizen to citizen also has no word for those in the liminal stage and this presents a problem for those organising the ceremonies and those making welcome speeches: how to refer to the participants. There is frequently a tension in the way they are addressed: an oscillation between regarding them as 'you' – separated from other citizens – and hailing them as 'us', part of the citizenry. And, as shall be seen, there is also sometimes hesitation about when their transition should be considered complete (see also Byrne 2012). To ease this linguistic problem and to enable the precise analysis of the ceremonies, I will refer to the citizens-to-be as 'citizands' (analogous to 'graduand') while they are participating in the ceremony and are not-yet-made-citizens.

The ceremonies which were observed in the United States, Canada and Australia *did* involve the physical separation of the citizands (as did all but one of those studied internationally). Whilst this undoubtedly occurs in part for logistical convenience, it also serves the purpose of placing the citizands in a liminal space, together with other citizands and away from the general public and their friends and families. For example, in California,⁹ outside the theatre in Oakland, there was a festive feeling among the friends and family accompanying the citizands: taking pictures, holding flowers which they are going to give them afterwards. The arrivals were greeted by friendly uniformed theatre staff who ushered them to their places. In the theatre, citizands (who numbered more than a thousand) were directed to the stalls of the theatre on the ground floor, while their guests went upstairs to take seats in the balcony. Whilst some guests leaned over the front of the balcony, they could only wave down below to their friend or relation who was waiting to become a citizen. The ceremony in Brooklyn took place in a courtroom. Having passed through quite stringent security measures, including going through airport-style scanning equipment and handing in all mobile phones or recording devices, the 200 or so citizands were invited to sit in the courtroom, while their friends and

family went to a waiting room on a higher floor to watch the proceedings on large screens. In Manhattan, having also passed through the airport-like security of the USCIS building in Federal Plaza (including the removal and scanning of shoes), the approximately 150 citizens were all seated at the front of a large room, while their guests sat at the back in an area separated by a wide aisle. Films were played on a large screen and the American flag was displayed. In the United States, a sense of leaving a status behind is underlined during registration as the citizens hand in their permanent residency cards. In Canada, the cards are also taken away and replaced with a citizenship card (There is no requirement to carry either card around in everyday life, in contrast to the US permanent residency card, or 'Green Card', as it is more commonly known).

In Winnipeg, Canada,¹⁰ the ceremony takes place in the elaborately decorated 'Chandelier Room' or Speakers' Reception Room, of the Manitoba legislature building, itself an imposing and highly ornate Neoclassical building, completed as the Manitoba Parliament in 1920. The 31 citizens were seated in the centre of the large, grand Chandelier Room, which is lined with pictures of the Queen and other royalty; their guests sat on either side of them. Flags of Manitoba and Canada are displayed. In Australia,¹¹ the ceremony takes place in Richmond Town Hall, another impressive Neoclassical building, built in the 1890s, in the city of Yarra. The 60 citizens were seated facing the guests at a 45-degree angle in a room decorated with a large Australian flag and pictures of the Queen and the Commonwealth coat of arms. Thus, the separation of the citizens from their guests in all of the cases that were observed, places them in the context of a formal setting of official, often colonial, buildings (apart from the theatre in Oakland). They were also surrounded by the symbols of state and nation, a gesture towards what Michael Billig calls the 'hot nationalism' of the 'saluted flag', which signals a suspension of the everyday (1995). In all countries, the citizens were given small handheld flags and encouraged to wave them. The Australian Citizenship Code specifies appropriate symbols for the ceremonies, including the Commonwealth Coat of Arms and portrait of the Queen (which it is stressed should be placed in a 'prominent position'), the Australian national flag (with detailed instructions about the different ways it can be hung or displayed), and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags (Australia 2011: 25–26). As was discussed above, the inclusion of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander flags (which 'may' be displayed and therefore are not obligatory) is a partial recognition of those who occupied Australia before the immigrants.

Alongside the common separation of the citizands from their friends and family and other guests, in all ceremonies observed, differences among the citizands as a group were levelled, as Turner suggests. He comments on the ways those taking part in rites of passage, particularly in initiation ceremonies, are not only separated from the group, but also divested of their positions within the social hierarchy:

equality usually characterizes the relationship of neophyte to neophyte, where rites are collective...the liminal group is a community or comity of comrades and not a structure of hierarchically arrayed positions.... [N]eophytes are withdrawn from their structural positions and consequently from the values, norms, sentiments, and techniques associated with those positions. They are also divested of their previous habits of thought, feeling, and action. (Turner 1987: 14)

Those who apply for citizenship in any country form a highly diverse group in terms of country of origin, income, employment, education and ability to speak the host language. They have also followed very different routes to gain citizenship. (See Chapter 5 for further discussion of this in the context of the UK.) They come with different attitudes about the ceremony, and about the idea and experience of acquiring citizenship of the country to which they have moved. This in part is made visible by the differences in their dress. Some appear to have made great efforts – wearing clothes which you might expect at a party or wedding (including both Western and ‘traditional/ethnic’ dress – although the latter was in the minority). Others dressed very casually in jeans and sweatshirts, while many seemed ready simply to return to their office jobs after the ceremony. Different attitudes about the ceremony and citizenship itself were also suggested by the presence – or absence – of guests. As the Australian official organising the ceremonies explained in an interview, ‘Some people... just come and get their certificate, and it’s no big deal, and they don’t bring any guests. And then you get other people going, you know, “I’ve got family and friends and”, you know. I had one lady and her daughter bringing 20 guests’. However, during the ceremony, differences among the citizands are both recognised and then de-emphasised, as they are treated as a single group rather than many diverse individuals.

In all of the ceremonies we observed, there was a moment of recognition and celebration of diversity when a list of all of the countries from which the citizands came was read. The Canadian judge¹² explained: ‘I tend to do that because I think it’s interesting to hear where people

originally come from, and that diversity as a result of it'. There was a tension in the ceremonies between representations of multiplicity and unity. The following section will examine an example of this in the United States, where there was recognition of national differences among the citizens in the group and erasure of those distinctions as they prepared to become American. This might be regarded as a ritual of the removal of national difference. However, I suggest that the ritual is ambiguous and indicates contradictions inherent in having both an American identity of equality and sameness as well as hyphenated identities. The dynamics and tensions between unity and difference were similar in the ceremonies in Canada and Australia.

Stand up and cheer for your country

The naturalisation ceremonies observed in the United States emphasised cultural and national difference, whilst at the same time suggesting that the ceremonies function as a ritual involving moving from one status (the prior nationality) to another (American). They also presented the citizens as equals within the liminal space (although there was one exception, as we shall see below). The ceremonies in both California and Manhattan followed a similar format which involved both identifying the citizens' nationalities and then appearing to distance the participants from them. As the master of ceremonies, an official from USCIS in Manhattan, stated:

There are 140 people here today. You have many things in common, but you are also a very diverse group from 37 different countries. Today you will *all stand as one* and become citizens. (emphasis added)

The Oakland ceremony presented what might be seen as 'the wonder of diversity' with a high energy, show business feeling. The MC littered his announcements with jokes and interacted with the audience. To gasps and cheers, he told the audience that there were 1,399 people there representing 95¹³ countries, 'but in just a few minutes, just one'. He explained that, although it was a legal ceremony, he wanted everyone to feel able to clap and cheer as much as they wanted to. In the manner of a 'warm-up' act before a television broadcast, he got everyone to practice being loud and cheering. He said, 'Maybe we need something to cheer for. A lot of people from a small country are here', and went on to ask everyone to clap for 'Our friends from El Salvador', which they did. 'How about Mexico?' he asked, and his question was answered by very loud cheers, whistling and clapping. The celebration of diversity also

featured a jokey routine where he amazed the audience by each new language he could speak (or at least say 'Welcome' in). After speaking in Spanish, Mandarin, French ('One of America's first allies is here'), Russian (for 'our newest friends'), Hindi and Filipino, he joked,

'OK, I suppose I should stop now', which was met with more cheering and clapping. 'Besides', he continued, 'I see some faces up front looking like, "Oh no, he's not going to do this for 88 more countries is he?"' That comment elicited more laughter from the audience.

This polished performance demonstrated an embrace of difference, but care was taken to return to unity:

MC: Oh, shoot. I want to do one more. Can I?

AUDIENCE: Yes!

MC: Let's hear it for the San Francisco Giants!

As this followed an important victory for the local baseball team, the theatre erupted in the loudest cheer of the day. Here the local is referenced as a common bond which trumps differences of national origin.

This particular performance of difference and language proficiency was unique to the Oakland ceremony, but the ceremony then followed the format also used in Manhattan, in which each citizen's country of origin was called out. In all cases, the citizens cheered or clapped and stood up on hearing their country's name and then remained standing until all the countries had been named. Difference is recognised and then symbolically abandoned in the act of standing 'as one'. Interestingly, at one of the ceremonies in Manhattan, there were two male soldiers who were receiving citizenship, wearing their dress uniforms and seated at the front, one on each side of the central aisle. They were singled out by the MC, who said, 'We are honoured that in our audience we have two special guests serving in the United States military'. The audience clapped. The soldiers were asked to stand and give their names and history of service.¹⁴ So whilst the general focus was on unifying the citizens, a distinction was made to give a special place to those engaged in what is often constructed as the ultimate act of citizenship: defending the nation militarily (see Yuval-Davis 1997). Once everyone was standing, they all said the oath of allegiance, the requirement for becoming American citizens together (the oath will be discussed further below). In the Brooklyn ceremony, the ritual of renouncing difference and former solidarities was even starker as, after the oaths had been

made, the judge explained that she would call out each country and asked people to stand and clap for the countries. She then went through each of the 62 countries of origin, saying, 'Will the new citizen formerly from...please stand up?' The repetition of the words 'formerly from' served to underline the idea that a nationality has been left behind. When all of the citizands were finally standing up, the judge concluded: 'Isn't that the most beautiful thing?'

However, in all the ceremonies in the United States, there was a tension between the symbolism of what the citizands were doing – marking a departure from a particular identity for the sake of a unifying 'American' identity – and the ways it was done. The performance of this ritual, in terms of the citizands' participation, as well as remarks made by the judges or official hosts, worked against the idea of the withdrawal of different cultural identities and produced a the possibility of American hyphenated identities which could include the new citizens' former affiliations. In this model, loyalty, affection and the retention of a notion of cultural difference are preserved. This tension between renouncing former countries of origin and retaining loyalty can be seen in the enthusiastic cheering for each country – and particularly those where many of the citizands came from, such as Mexico, El Salvador and the Philippines. There was also a sense that all countries were to be celebrated. Given the political climate and the enduring representation of Iran as part of the 'Axis of Evil', it was perhaps rare in the United States in 2012 to hear an enthusiastic cheer in response to the naming of Iran. Continued loyalty to or affiliation with their countries of origin was also indicated by some citizands arriving wearing sweatshirts with the name of their homelands on them. In the Brooklyn ceremony, after the judge had gone through all the countries that people were 'formerly of', she appeared to contradict the suggestion that the ceremony had involved relinquishing an identity or a national loyalty when she encouraged the citizands to:

Be proud of your own country – you don't have to give up anything of it. Don't give up the things in your heart, don't give up your language. Teach your children your language, don't give up your customs. Carry them with you and keep your connections to the country – explain and share your customs with others – what the specific food is. This world is in a bad place and you can't expect leaders to get it better. Explain to others what's special about your home country and build bridges.

This exhortation to retain cultural heritage also serves as a rejoinder to the kind of binaries suggested by George W. Bush in the aftermath of

9/11, when he suggested that 'Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists' (Bloodsworth-Lugo and Lugo-Lugo 2008).¹⁵ Leo R. Chavez, writing about Latino immigrants (but perceived threat of Muslims would also apply), argues that current discourses about the cultural threat of immigrants need to be put in the wider context of a long history of fears about the Other within American society (Chavez 2008). The citizenship judge appeared to be referencing this climate of fear, but then allocated to the new citizens an important specific role and responsibility to overcome it. The neurotic citizen (Isin 2004), as discussed in Chapter 2, needs to be reassured by the acceptable migrant, who can become a good citizen.

The Brooklyn judge's statement of diversity as something positive that immigrants and citizens in particular have to offer was also echoed in other ceremonies. At the Yarra ceremony, the mayor spoke of how Australia had been 'enriched' in the last 20 years by 3.5 million people from many countries. She added that the citizens 'must not forget their country of birth. ... Australia is the richer for the different cultural contributions. There is strength in diversity'. While this could be regarded as a fairly bland statement about multiculturalism, it should also be understood in the context of the histories of exclusion of cultures that were deemed to be 'too different' to the host culture as well as ongoing debates in each country which question a positive understanding of multiculturalism, immigrant cultures and ties to home countries.

The timeframe given by the Australian mayor is interesting. By limiting the focus to the last 20 years, she sidesteps a highly racialised history of immigration control in Australia – the 'white Australia' policy – which sought to maintain an essentially British or, at the very least, European culture in Australia. Whilst immigration was opened up to non-European migrants after 1956, British and Irish advantage in progression to immigration was maintained until 1973, and distinct voting rights for British permanent residents were maintained until 1985 (Fozdar and Spittles 2009: 498). Legislation to remove discrimination in immigration policies was adopted in the 1970s (Klapdor, Coombs et al. 2009; Tate 2009). The date suggested by the mayor starts with the embrace of multiculturalism under Prime Minister Paul Keating in the 1990s. However, this more positive attitude towards cultural difference in Australia has not gone unchallenged. John Howard, who took aim against what he called 'zealous multiculturalism', led the initial backlash. Pauline Hanson's anti-multicultural and anti-indigenous 'One Nation' political party followed in the mid-late 1990s.¹⁶ Debates about immigration in Australia were dominated

by discussion of asylum seekers arriving from overseas by boat. Since 9/11, focus on the Muslim community's supposed lack of integration increased. For the first time, citizenship policy was directed towards making the acquisition of citizenship more difficult for everyone, for example with the introduction of the citizenship test (Klapdor, Coombs et al. 2009). Whilst no speaker at the Australian ceremony expressed any hostility to immigration, or naturalisation, State Member of Parliament Richard Wynne turned to the language of integration rather than multiculturalism when he spoke of how the state had 'successfully integrated successive waves of migrants' and stressed that new citizens should accept the principles of Australian society. Here again, it appears that there is the production and reassurance of the neurotic citizen. This section has considered some of the rituals in the ceremonies which reflected models of what it would take to become a citizen. It has argued that the ceremonies can be seen as rites of passage – an initiation – in which differences between citizens are both recognised and suppressed in order to create a sense of unity in gaining a new status. There is a tension in the ceremonies between recognising and potentially celebrating cultural difference and the sense of acquiring a new identity. Next, I turn to one key moment that crystallizes this tension: taking the oath.

Taking the oath

A key part of all countries' naturalisation ceremony is the oath or pledge: of allegiance (in the United States), of citizenship (in Canada) and of commitment (in Australia). The judge in Manhattan pointed out that she needed to see each citizen saying it, a requirement that has proven controversial in Canada, but interestingly not in the other countries that we observed. In December 2011, Jason Kenney, Canadian citizenship and immigration minister, declared that Muslim women must remove niqabs (covering of the face) throughout the citizenship ceremony. According to the *National Post*, his concern was that the citizenship judges could not see whether the women were really reciting the oath.¹⁷ The current policy is that anyone wearing a niqab must remove it for identification purposes and during the oath. However, the niqab can be worn through the rest of the ceremony.¹⁸ It is not clear how many (if any) women have actually come to Canadian citizenship ceremonies wearing the niqab. The question of concern about the sincerity of oath-taking goes beyond the question of whether someone has actually said the words, and will be returned to below.

The oath of allegiance in the United States is a good example of an invented tradition which has the appearance of a longstanding, antiquated tradition (particularly suggested by the use of archaic language) but, as will be discussed below, the pledge is, in fact, a relatively modern invention and one which continues to be subject to changes and modifications. The current oath of allegiance that citizens in the United States have to take follows:

I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince or state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen, that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms¹⁹ on behalf of the United States when required to by law, and that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, so help me God.²⁰

The commitment to renounce allegiance to former countries again stands in strong contrast to the encouragement in the ceremonies to maintain cultural ties and affiliations to countries of origin (and indeed in contrast to the cheers of support for ‘former’ countries) as discussed in the previous section. Another particularly striking aspect of this declaration is the complicated structure and old-fashioned language. This would appear to suggest that the oath has a similarly old heritage. However, whilst an oath of allegiance has always been a requirement in naturalisation, the form it took was not made uniform at a national level until 1906. This reform also set out the requirement for a public ceremony, rather than a court appearance (Aptekar 2012). The oath’s wording has undergone repeated modifications. The US Citizenship and Immigration website gives a history of the oath of allegiance which explains its origins and modifications. The account begins with this statement:

Throughout our nation’s history, foreign-born men and women have come to the United States, taken the Oath of Allegiance to become naturalized citizens, and contributed greatly to their new communities and country. The Oath of Allegiance has led to American citizenship for more than 220 years.²¹

Here again, as in the ceremonies themselves, an account of the nation is given which obscures the history before the nation existed – representing

it as a form of *terra nullis*. Despite this curtailed version, it remains true that, in the United States, the question of how to make ‘new’ citizens is a critical one and lies at the heart of nation building. Whilst the United States was part of the British Empire, and in common with Australia and Canada, a two-tiered system of naturalisation developed. The colonies could naturalise citizens locally, but England controlled the status of British subjecthood which applied throughout the empire (Bloemraad 2006: 20). However, in 1773 London banned colonial naturalisation. The American Declaration of Independence three years later criticised King George III for preventing the colony from naturalising new settlers and thereby preventing the ongoing population of the state. The first US naturalisation law was passed by Congress in 1790, establishing the idea of citizens rather than subjects, but restricted naturalisation to ‘free white persons’ of ‘good moral character’. Taking an oath to support the Constitution was required. Perhaps surprisingly, only in 1929 was a standard text developed for the oath of allegiance (after a commission pointed out there was no uniformity in the oaths made at local court level). Even this text has not remained static, with the last major alteration (the commitment to bear arms) introduced in 1952. The actual text of the oath is not enshrined in law in the United States, and the USCIS recently considered changing the oath to simplify the language. This prompted sufficient opposition, from politicians and the public, to block any changes.²² The oath begins with the requirement to ‘absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance or fidelity to any foreign prince, state or sovereignty’. This suggests hostility to dual citizenship. However, in practice, and in law, dual citizenship is not illegal in the United States, and the government recognises that naturalized US citizens may remain citizens in their country of birth.²³

The code covering the American oath of allegiance allows for the religious elements (‘so help me God’ and the word ‘oath’) to be omitted (and the oath replaced with ‘solemnly affirm’). However, this option was not exercised in any of the ceremonies we observed, and it is not clear how easy it would be for citizens to choose to avoid religious declaration. The same applies for the commitment to ‘bear arms’, which may be omitted if it can be shown that participation in the military is contrary to a person’s beliefs. In the US ceremony, the oath of allegiance is followed by the pledge of allegiance to the flag, where the audience can also join in, saying:

I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

This pledge is commonly heard in American society. For example, many schools require the teachers to lead a daily pledge of allegiance to the flag (although the children can choose whether or not to say it), and it is said at other public gatherings and sports events. The practice of saying the pledge, and particularly the inclusion of the phrase 'under God' has been questioned before and is currently under legal challenge from parents and the humanist society in Massachusetts, which has objected to the suggestion that 'good parents are God believers'.²⁴

Both the Canadian and the Australian oaths of citizenship and pledges of commitment have much more straightforward language than that of the United States. Perhaps, given their more recent history of independence, there is a desire to show the pledges as modern rather than antiquated. Until 1949, the citizenship granted in Australia was that of British subject,²⁵ although the federal government had control of all migration from 1921 on (Klapdor, Coombs et al. 2009: 4). The Nationality and Citizenship Act (1949) established citizenship for *all* who were born in Australia, regardless of colour (although as discussed above, Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders' access to rights associated with citizenship was highly constrained, if not impossible).

The Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1949 also introduced the concept of citizenship ceremonies. In 1993, during a period of the government's promotion of multiculturalism, a preamble was inserted into the Australia Act stating that 'Australian citizenship is a common bond, involving reciprocal rights and obligations, uniting all Australians, whilst respecting their diversity'. At the same time, a new oath, drafted by the poet Les Murray, was adopted (Betts and Birrell 2007: 46). Officially known as a 'pledge of commitment as a citizen of the Commonwealth of Australia', it dropped the reference to the 'Queen of Australia' and stated instead:

From this time forward, under God, I pledge my loyalty to Australia and its people, whose democratic beliefs I share, whose rights and liberties I respect and whose laws I will uphold and obey.

The Australian Citizenship Ceremonies Code allows for the words 'under God' to be omitted and in the ceremony in Yarra City, this option was taken by about half the citizens. The two versions of the oath were said separately. The religious element is particularly interesting, given that the Governments Code for Citizenship Ceremonies states that

Citizenship ceremonies are non-commercial, apolitical, bipartisan and secular. They must not be used as forums for political, partisan or religious expression or for the distribution of material which could be perceived to be of a commercial, political or religious nature. (Australia 2011: 6)

Nonetheless, directly after it states this, the code explains how individuals can bring in their own holy books, and religious organisations may also supply them, although they must not be made to appear to be a requirement of the ceremony. In 1999, Australia introduced an 'Australian Citizenship Day', which included the proposal that communities should hold:

a short ceremony where anyone can affirm their loyalty and commitment to Australia and its people by reciting an affirmation that is based on the pledge made by new citizens. It is a wonderful way for members of the community to express their national pride and spirit and to celebrate the values that we share as Australians.²⁶

The affirmation is intended to function much like the American pledge to the flag and is for both citizens and non-citizen residents (who omit the first four words):

As an Australian citizen,

I affirm my loyalty to Australia and its people, whose democratic beliefs I share, whose rights and liberties I respect and whose laws I uphold and obey.²⁷

In the ceremony that was observed in Yarra, all participants made the affirmation after the pledge taken by the citizens. The concept of an affirmation is also common in Australian society; for example, in many schools, children say one every day which does not necessarily follow the text above but repeats concepts of loyalty to Australia.²⁸

The Canadian oath of citizenship is said first in French and then in English and includes an affirmation of allegiance to the Queen:

I affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Canada, Her Heirs and Successors, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Canada and fulfil my duties as a Canadian citizen.

The Canadian Citizenship Act (1946) was the first law passed in any Commonwealth country to create citizenship separate from that of British subject. (Klapdor, Coombs et al. 2009: 6). The status of Canadian citizen was given legal and political meaning, although Canadians remained British subjects (Macklin and Crépeau 2010: 10). This law also instituted citizenship ceremonies, the first of which was held on 3 January 1947 at the Supreme Court in Ottawa (Chapnick 2011: 22). The continued pledge of loyalty to the Queen has provoked some debate and opposition. For example, in October 2012, the death of Charles Roach was widely reported. He was a civil-rights lawyer who had refused to take the oath of Canadian citizenship because of his opposition to the monarchy and had campaigned for the oath to be changed. But, as CBCNews put it, he 'died with his decades-long dream of becoming a Canadian unfulfilled'.²⁹ Some campaigners in Canada have cited the example of Australia, which dropped the reference to the Queen.

Whilst all three countries have developed practices of pledging allegiance to the nation in the everyday (in contrast to the European examples discussed in the following chapter), there are significant differences in the ways their oaths are taken. I suggest that the Australian and Canadian ceremonies, and particularly the oaths, strike a different tone to the US ceremony, where the oath is stylised to sound both grand and antiquated, with ornate language which stands out in the context of the ceremony, and belies its relatively recent composition. The oath, and particularly the requirement to swear to relinquish allegiance and loyalty to former states, also sits awkwardly with other moments of celebration of diversity in the ceremony. It directly contradicts *de facto* acceptance of dual citizenship in the United States. Although in times of securitisation and suspicion of certain categories of dual citizenship and ideas of the enemy within (as discussed in Chapter 2), this oath may take on increased significance. In contrast to the United States, both Australian and Canadian oaths – and particularly the Australian – appear more streamlined and modern in their wording. Perhaps again, given their relatively more recent independence, there is an embrace of the modern (which also allowed for acknowledgement of historical wrongs as discussed in the previous section), whilst the United States' oath suggests a more formal, historic register. The following section will consider whether the oaths should be regarded as performative – as creating the transition to 'citizen' that they suggest and argue that the ceremonies illustrate the anxieties which appear to be provoked by the intentions behind, and efficacy of, the oath.

Does saying it make you a citizen?

In the moment they take the oaths, citizands become citizens. The oaths are performative in the sense first outlined by J. L. Austin, in that they involve not merely saying something, but actually *doing* something. The words call into being an act (Austin 1997: 235), as in 'I *pronounce* you man and wife' or 'I *sentence* you to imprisonment'. According to the USCIS website, 'Taking the oath will complete the process of becoming a US citizen'.³⁰ Or, in the words of the more jocular host of the Oakland ceremony, 'This is the bit that makes you a citizen. Paying your fee didn't make you a citizen, although, don't get me wrong, we're glad you paid the fee. I really needed the money'. As the Winnipeg judge put it in an interview, 'if you don't show up, you don't become a citizen'. The Australian code of citizenship also makes this clear:

The presiding officer should ensure that each candidate makes the pledge by reciting the pledge out loud. If a candidate fails to make the pledge during a public citizenship ceremony they should be advised that they are not a citizen and should again be given the opportunity to make the pledge. Candidates who do not make the pledge do not become Australian citizens and must not be presented with a certificate. (Australia 2011: 21)³¹

As Austin pointed out, however, performative utterances can be unsuccessful or, in his terms, 'unhappy'. (Austin 1997: 237). They may be infelicitous if the necessary circumstances to give them effect do not occur. But they also depend on the right intentions of the speaker:

A good many of these verbal procedures are designed for use by people who hold certain beliefs or have certain feelings or intentions. And if you use one of these formulae when you do not have the requisite thoughts or feelings or intentions then there is an abuse of the procedure, there is insincerity. (Austin 1997: 238–239)

In the case of the oaths or pledges of allegiance and commitment (as well as in the context of 'welcomes' or 'celebrations' which will be discussed in Chapter 4), it is clear that there may be such insincurities. Whilst in the ceremonies there were no explicit means by which the sincerity of the citizands was tested, there were nonetheless friendly suggestions that it might be a concern. For example, the judge in Brooklyn stopped the citizands from pledging the oath and

then started it again, urging them on: 'Say it louder!' In Mississauga, Canada, the judge called out, 'Say it like you mean it!' In the United States, it is clear that the citizands already know the correct deportment to use when swearing the oath of allegiance (and singing the national anthem) as they make the familiar gesture of placing their right hands over their hearts. Alongside the more explicit expression of concern that the oath should be said with conviction or sincerity, the ceremonies also produced other performances of enthusiasm and patriotism towards the United States and becoming a citizen. For instance, the judge in Brooklyn began with the question 'Is everyone excited?' At each ceremony, the citizands were given small stars-and-stripes flags which they were encouraged to wave at various times by ceremony officials, who were themselves waving along energetically, in a manner akin to teachers at a school assembly. In both the Manhattan and Oakland ceremonies, a video showed a message from President Obama congratulating them on becoming American citizens. The video ended with Lee Greenwood singing 'God Bless America', a song written by Irving Berlin in 1918 which is commonly played at national and sporting events.³² The video accompanying the song shows iconic pictures of American landscapes, buildings and monuments, as well as the subtitles to the song. The citizands are encouraged to sing along and wave their mini flags. As the host in Manhattan said, 'This is your day. Be proud and sing it loud. You're US citizens, and we're seeking the next "American Idol"'. In conversations and interviews, the officials emphasised their perception that the ceremonies and the swearing of the oath are meaningful to the citizands by pointing out how frequently citizands cry during the ceremony. It is as if the outward expression of emotion is taken as reassurance that the inward intention is sincere.

This emotional display is not only performed by the citizands (and their guests), but also by officials who take part in the ceremonies and often explain how much they enjoy organising and witnessing them. In Canada, the judge and other officials organising the ceremony in Mississauga repeatedly said that the ceremonies were 'joyous' occasions where many people cry. The judge said he saw the ceremony as providing 'closure of finally being integrated into Canada. ... It is a really big deal'. The Brooklyn judge told the audience:

This is the best part of my job, and I say it from my heart.... I'm the lucky person who gets to stand here and say, 'Welcome'. We are so glad you decided to become American.

As one of the officials at the Manhattan ceremony pointed out, much of the judge's work involves deportations (the very opposite of a welcome), whereas on these occasions, people are pleased to see her. The citizands are urged, 'However you choose to celebrate this day, please celebrate it'. In the Canadian ceremony at Winnipeg, the Manitoba Provincial Minister for Culture, Heritage and Tourism, Flor Marcelino, who was herself a naturalised citizen (she was originally from the Philippines) gave a welcome. As well as reading a speech on the importance of multiculturalism in the province, she appeared to speak spontaneously about her experience of migration to Canada. She was clearly emotionally involved as she began crying, saying, 'I consider it to be a privilege and an honour to be a Canadian citizen. The Canadian citizenship ceremony is very dear to me. I am grateful to be a Canadian citizen'. In Australia, the official who organised the ceremonies explained in an interview:

Every time I do one I still get nervous before a ceremony, after five years, because it's such an important thing for many people. And some people have travelled a long, hard road to get their citizenship.... And I also sometimes still get a lump in my throat when I think about the families coming up and getting their certificates and stuff like that as well.... Yeah, yeah, so I never get tired of the citizenship [ceremonies].

As this section has shown, there is an expectation of deep emotion when taking and hearing the pledges. For many of the citizands, it will indeed be an emotional moment.³³ However, the ceremonies also reveal a level of concern that the 'correct' emotions are being felt, as well as potential doubt as to how this might be discovered. Linked to the question of whether the intentions behind the oath-taking are genuine is the question of doubts about the transformative potential – does saying the make someone a 'real citizen'. The following section will explore further the suggestion that the journey towards citizenship is incomplete even after the pledge taking and ceremony.

True citizens?

Alongside the encouragement to retain ties and cultural identity with their 'former' countries (despite the oath they have taken), the United States ceremonies do maintain the symbolism of an initiation ceremony whereby the new citizens emerge from the ceremony transformed in their status. Indeed, this is symbolised in the way that, after the pledge

has been taken in unison, the new citizens go up individually to shake hands with the presiding person (judge or other official), to receive their certificates, and to have pictures taken.³⁴ This act marks the exit from the liminal position back into society as a citizen. In Oakland, the transformation is promised from the outset. As the host apologised for delays in entering the theatre and starting the ceremony, he joked, 'Today is the last time you're going to stand in an immigration line. From now on, you're in a citizenship line'. In Manhattan, once the citizens had all made their oath of allegiance together and pledged loyalty to the flag, the host confirmed their status: 'My fellow Americans. Remember, you are no longer a permanent resident. You are all national citizens'. Once the ceremony is completed, there is an acknowledgement that this change may take some adjusting to. For example, the host in Oakland gave advice 'to those who may be worried about leaving the building and walking around the street without a Green Card'. He assured them that they should not worry because

when you leave here today, for the first time, you will be legally entitled to say, 'Excuse me, officer. I'm a citizen of the United States'. The audience clapped, and he concluded, 'You don't have to carry proof of US citizenship.

There is however, a potential hesitation in this. It is possible that new citizens may indeed still find themselves challenged to prove their identity/citizenship by public officials and others, in ways they might have been on the way to the ceremony. Legal citizenship does not, for example preclude being stopped for the offence that has become colloquially known as DWB (driving while black).

By coincidence, the second of the two Manhattan ceremonies on the day I was observing was filmed by a camera crew for NBC for broadcast after the upcoming election. After the ceremony, the film crew conducted very short interviews with some of the new citizens. It appeared that, for those who agreed to be interviewed, the transformation felt complete. The first person they spoke to was a middle-aged man who was wearing a Stars and Stripes tie. The interviewer asked, 'Where are you from?' to which the man replied, 'From the United States of America now'. Each person interviewed was asked at the end of the interview to say 'I'm a US citizen' and to wave their flag, which they all did very enthusiastically, apart from one of the soldiers in the ceremony who said the line but did not wave the flag, perhaps feeling it was a little undignified for his uniform.

Victor Turner, writing about the liminal stage of initiation rituals, largely focused on those, such as transitions from boys to men and girls to women in rural Africa, which all members of a society are expected to go through. Indeed, he discusses cases where, for example, men who have not undergone circumcision rituals will be shunned from participation in other rituals. Citizenship ceremonies play a slightly different role in society; most citizens of a country have never had to go through one, which leaves residual doubts as to when citizens *truly* become citizens: How truly performative are the ceremonies? Or, alternatively, what kind of citizen do they produce? In the Manhattan ceremony, these kinds of doubts were suggested. The judge made a fairly long speech which was, as she said, about love, although she hastily explained, 'not romantic love. I might get into trouble for that, and it's too early in the morning. But love of your country'. She went on to acknowledge that this love presents a 'complicated issue', because:

the country you came from, you may love more than before. It is the place you go for vacation and to relax. The US is the place where your daily struggles occur, and you may not necessarily be feeling much love. So how do you come to love the United States?

In this account, we get the merest hint of hostility and unequal conditions that immigrants might face, with the reference to 'daily struggles'. This had been spelt out more clearly by the pre-ceremony information that was given out in Brooklyn about what to do if faced with discrimination. The judge in Manhattan went on to explore her own history of emigration as a child from Israel to the United States and shared that she did not find it an easy experience: 'I wasn't feeling love. I was annoyed at my parents'. She described how, in her twenties, American history, the Civil War, and the civil rights movement fascinated her. She ended her speech by saying:

I learned to love the US by getting to know it on a different level. I hope that if you don't feel it then you begin to feel the love – good luck to all of you and God bless America.

This speech has a double effect. On the one hand, it recognises the ties to and affection for their home countries that the new citizens may still have. On the other hand, it potentially suggests that they are not yet fully citizens until they can 'feel love' for the US. Tension remains about when the new citizens can feel secure in their belonging and when

they will be considered to be properly American. As will be described in Chapter 4, some UK ceremonies suggest similar reservations, where there is a feeling that the citizenship ceremony is only the start of the new citizens' transformation, rather than a celebration of the end of a process.

Conclusion

This chapter has taken the citizenship ceremonies as rites of passage which are designed to initiate new citizens. The ceremonies in different countries are in many ways remarkably similar. It would seem that rituals of citizenship have a common lexicon of symbols and practices that countries draw on. These rituals are generally in accord with other rites of passage, particularly in the ways they orchestrate the separation of initiates from the rest of the public, the creation of an idea of unity among diverse initiates, and the final return to the public once the transformation into citizenship is complete. They all require a form of verbal commitment of loyalty to the country, or the head of state. These are generally commitments which citizens-by-birth do not have to make, although in all the countries examined in this chapter, there are rituals of loyalty to country which are practiced routinely by all citizens (such as listening to the national anthem and pledges of allegiance).

The chapter asked what framing the speeches and other practices give to the standard ceremonial elements? What can this tell us about the way the nation is being narrated and how new citizens are regarded? What is *not* said is as important as what *is* said. This is particularly significant when thinking of how the nation and its history are told in regard to citizenship. All three countries have settler colonial pasts which involved genocides of indigenous people as well as a renunciation of their rights to land and civil and political rights. They also have an open to immigration, but highly racialised caveats.. These histories are often silenced in the production of a narrative of an immigrant nation. Stories of nations built on the contribution of immigrants are potentially a powerful way to give new citizens a place in their new country. Such accounts enhance the idea that the immigrants have shown resilience and can now bring that strength to the country. As was seen in many of the speeches we observed, these narratives are often coupled with the notion that the cultural diversity that immigrants bring is also positive. However, this narrative can inhibit the recognition of past exclusions based on race and national origin as well as contemporary hostility and discrimination faced by many migrants. Claims of openness also fail to

account for the ways in which states identify some migrants as illegal and seek their deportation. In all three countries, arms are only ever held open wide for certain categories of migrants.

In this chapter, I have tracked how the response to this dilemma plays out differently in the United States, Canada and Australia. In all three countries, we see reference to the difficulties immigrants may face in migrating. This is largely referred to euphemistically as ‘long hard roads’, ‘daily struggles’ or ‘immigration lines’. None of the ceremonies themselves tackle questions of the racism that the new citizens may encounter, or may have faced since their arrival (although the Brooklyn court did give out information on racism and employment before the ceremony began). However, there are significant differences among three cases in the representation of history. Australia and Canada make symbolic reference to the fact that European ‘discovery’ of the New World had an impact on indigenous peoples (this was given significantly more prominence in the Australian ceremony). By contrast, in the United States, the dominance of the narrative of the American Dream and the national myth of a nation built by immigrants appears to drown out any consideration of pre-colonial settlement and its destruction, or, equally, the extent to which the nation was built on slave labour.

Taking the oath/pledge is central to all three countries’ ceremonies. The verbal commitment is positioned as performative – it is this act which ‘makes’ the citizen – which is of course not to say that this act is, in itself, sufficient to make a citizen. Even when the oath is said in the conditions which give it power to be performative – the credentials of all the citizens have been checked and passed administratively – there is space to question the sincerity of some citizens taking the oath. This doubt is not expressed explicitly but does seep into the practices of the ceremony – with exhortations to ‘Say it louder!’, to celebrate it properly, and even to ‘feel the love’. It is clear that an expression of emotional connection is expected as well as the legal requirement for the words to be said. These concerns and doubts may lead to questioning the transformative power of the ceremonies. Can ceremonies alone truly make citizens? Do citizens by naturalisation have to do and feel something more to make them *really* citizens? What does it take? These questions will be explored in the following chapter, which focuses on citizenship ceremonies in three European countries.

4

Europe Welcomes

Introduction

In his speech at the citizenship ceremony in Dublin in October 2012, the Irish minister for justice, equality and defence, Alan Shatter, explained how *The Irish Times*, in association with the Royal Irish Academy and the National Museum, had opened a public vote to choose 10 of the 100 objects that would be used to symbolise the history of Ireland. One of the objects that could be voted for was a certificate of naturalisation. The minister encouraged the citizens to vote for the certificate to symbolise ‘new Ireland’ – a country, he explained, where 12% of the population come from abroad. The certificate of naturalisation did not make it to the final list (see <http://www.100objects.ie/the-objects/>), but the choice of objects taken to represent the history of Ireland can tell us much about the way nation is narrated (Bhabha 1990). As the journalist Fintan O’Toole, who originally suggested the idea of a history of Ireland in 100 objects, put it, ‘Because Irish people have spread all around the world, they [the objects] belong to the world as well’.¹ The final list of objects which were chosen to represent the history of Ireland included an emigrant’s cardboard suitcase and tin teapot. This particular narration of nation was also reflected in the speech of the retired judge who oversaw the taking of the oaths and pledges of naturalisation at the ceremony which I observed. He explained to the citizens that ‘We are a nation of emigrants, and we understand it [the migrant experience]’. It is likely that the Irish museum project was inspired by the BBC collaboration with the British Museum in 2010 which produced a ‘History of the World in 100 Objects’.² What is striking is the difference in the scope of the two museum projects and the contrasting ways in which Britain and Ireland insert themselves into global relations. In Ireland, histories

of colonial occupation as well as participation in empire have led to migration and the creation of an Irish diaspora, who are understood to be both Irish but also beyond Ireland as a global diaspora. In the UK, a history of imperial rule creates an imagined Britain which is at the centre of global relations – a place to which all the world comes. An echo of this can be seen in the speech made in the Kingston-on-Thames citizenship ceremony in the UK, which uses the building of the Guildhall in Kingston in 1935 as a metaphor for the enrichment of British society through its position as a place to which goods are brought and to which people come:

The builders used some local materials. The stone is from Portland, the bricks come from Oxshott not far from here and the tiles are from Cranleigh near Guildford. But the timbers are from many places around the world, Africa, Asia, Australia and the Americas. This building could not exist without materials that come from the local area and from other countries. And that's what makes our community and our country flourish.

The narrative of Ireland as (until very recently) a nation largely of 'outgoers' (rather than 'incomers') creates a notion of Ireland as a homogeneous society and silences a longer history of immigration *into* Ireland (including not only Scots and English migrants, but also Huguenots, Italians, Chinese, Germans and Jews³) (Lentin 2007). It also serves to make the arrival of the current migrants into Ireland a break with history, rather than a continuation (and enlargement) of an older process of migration and emigration. The speech from Kingston, lacks any reflection on the important and continuing relationship between Britain and the places mentioned – that of colonial conquest, settlement and colonial and post-colonial migration. Many of the areas mentioned were, at the time of the construction, still part of the British Empire, and thus were inhabited by British subjects. These histories are important, not least because migration to Britain is still shaped by colonial relations and Britain's global post-colonial position. However in this narration of global links, the links between citizenship and empire are left unexamined. As we shall see, this absence was a common feature of the speeches at citizenship ceremonies observed in Europe.

This chapter will explore the ceremonies of three European countries which, at least partly inspired by the ceremonies in the countries discussed in the previous chapter, have recently chosen to mark the naturalisation of new citizens with formal ceremonies of their own. The

chapter explores the nature of compulsory citizenship ceremonies in three countries at the western edge of Northern Europe (Ireland, the UK and the Netherlands) that have long histories of people moving beyond their borders: as settlers, migrant labour, and colonialists. The Netherlands and the UK in particular have long histories of settlement of non-nationals within their borders. In all three countries, citizenship ceremonies are a recent introduction, starting in 2004 in the UK, 2005 in the Netherlands (attendance was made compulsory in 2006), and in 2011 in Ireland. It can be argued that they mark a 'citizenship turn' in all three countries where citizenship in general and naturalisation in particular have had a renewed focus in public debates. The introduction of the ceremonies has been part of a general realignment of citizenship regimes which can be characterised as part of wider public discourses in Europe over the last 10 to 20 years, which have included questioning multiculturalism and a return to more integrationist policies, with a particular focus on immigration and citizenship. In all cases, the ceremonies also mark the granting of European citizenship (for those who do not already have it). Despite all the academic (and sometimes popular) discussion of the end of national sovereignty and the decline of the national, it is interesting to see how Europeanness as a potentially 'postnational' (Brown 2010) form of citizenship is largely ignored in the ceremonies. In contrast, being a citizen of the nation-state is of central importance. The absence of discussion of the European aspect to belonging and citizenship is particularly significant because, as will be explored further in Chapter 5, for the citizens, European citizenship and the rights to travel and employment that it gives them are often highly important. At the same time, questions of local city identities are also stressed in the ceremonies in Britain and the Netherlands.

In this chapter, I maintain that the development of ceremonies in individual countries in Europe needs to be understood within the context of wider citizenship trends in Europe and the rebordering of Europe. The chapter will examine the introduction of citizenship testing in the UK and the Netherlands, arguing that these tests are one indication of the shifting citizenship regimes in Europe, which are concerned with both controlling immigration and naturalisation and demonstrating to the public that their policies are 'tough enough'. The chapter will explore the introduction of citizenship ceremonies in the UK, the Netherlands and Ireland and discuss the ways in which they represent histories of immigration and reception of migrants. It will also examine how the ceremonies represent the nature of the citizenship which is being endowed. The material in this chapter is based on observation of single ceremonies in

the Netherlands (conducted by Dieuwertje Dyi Huijg) and Ireland, as well as interviews with officials involved in organising the ceremonies. The research in the UK was more substantial, with the examination of more than 47 welcome speeches⁴ from citizenship ceremonies across the UK and the observation at 10 actual ceremonies in the UK and interviews with several registrars. The speeches were obtained by emailing 158 county and civil level register offices in Scotland, England and Wales (and Hillsborough Castle in Northern Ireland) in 2008 and 2009 with a request for the text of the local welcome given at the ceremony. The ceremony observations were conducted in 2010–2011 and these visits were combined with interviews with new citizens who had taken part in the ceremony. (These will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.)

European borders and citizenship

2013 was declared ‘European Year of Citizens’ by the European Commission to focus attention on those ‘at the heart of the European project – the citizens’ (European Commission 2012: 1). The Commission launched online surveys and ‘citizens’ dialogues’ in cities across Europe. The document which launched the Year of the Citizens made it clear that a restrictive model of citizenship was envisaged: ‘If you are a national of an EU country, you are an EU citizen’ (European Commission 2012: 3). As a critical report from the European Economic and Social Committee argued, this left third-country nationals (those from countries outside the EU) who were residing legally in the EU, “invisible” in European debates of citizenship and in participation in politics and democratic life’ (Castaños 2013: 4.6). This reflects one of the tensions in the regional block of Europe in which freedom of movement is an important characteristic of the European Union, but which is not guaranteed for non-European residents, creating a significant difference in rights between EU citizens and other residents. European citizenship is tightly interwoven with national citizenship, with only those countries that are within the EU having the power to grant European citizenship. In this way, Union citizenship is derivative of national citizenship, with the EU itself playing no formal role in the attribution of citizenship. As the ‘Declaration on the Nationality of a Member State’ sets out, ‘The question of whether an individual possesses the citizenship of a member state shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the member state’ (quoted in Vink and de Groot 2010: 729). Nonetheless, norms and principles within European law can play a potential role in shaping nation-state law, as countries have a responsibility not to violate community law,

many aspects of which can impinge on citizenship rights. For example, EU citizens cannot be deported from EU countries, even where they do not hold citizenship of that country (Anderson, Gibney et al. 2011). Yet whilst one could argue that membership of regional grouping such as the European Union has, in some instances, made membership of nations less significant, within Europe, there also has been a politicisation of immigration and a revaluing of national identity in a way which Dora Kostakopoulou suggests potentially heralds a re-ethnicisation of nationality (2010).

In many very significant ways, for its citizens, the EU represents a borderless zone. A central right associated with citizenship in Europe is the free movement of goods and people across national borders of the member states, and associated freedoms to live, work, access benefits and vote in some elections. However, national borders still remain highly significant for third-country members, because many of them need visas to enter and move around Europe. Thus, as was suggested in Chapter 2, borders have shifted both to the external edges of Europe and within national borders in ways which serve to filter and regulate population movements. Through rebordering (Andreas 2002), a range of actors have been drawn in to the control of the movement of goods, and most significantly people, across borders. For example, airlines face 'carrier liability' which requires them to transport only those who meet legal conditions for entry into a country or region. In addition, populations are assessed at other points within the state to identify those who are deemed to be 'illegal'. This assessment occurs at moments of accessing public services as well in those in the private sector (for example where landlords are required to check the legal status of migrants). As some internal borders between countries have been dissolved (particularly among those countries that signed the Schengen Agreement), the external borders, overseen by Frontex, a European organisation which was established in 2004, become increasingly significant.⁵

At the same time as advanced technologies of surveillance and movement tracking enforce processes of rebordering, physical barriers are constructed at critical points in the exterior of what has been dubbed 'Fortress Europe'. For example, the enclave cities of Ceuta and Melilla in northwest Africa both have a land border between Spain and Morocco and are surrounded by a double layer of three meter high steel walls (a height which has to be continually increased), with a large stretch of no-man's land in between the walls (Barbero 2012). On the other side of these barriers and borders, transit camps are set up as other countries get drawn into policing European borders, and migrants experience a

loss of rights (Isin and Rygiel 2007). Wendy Brown sees these walls as postnational barriers, which only appear as national, as the fortification of Europe against immigration from the East is left 'to the easternmost nation recently added to the EU' (2010: 32). As these external barriers become higher and more impenetrable, potential migrants use more dangerous routes to try to enter Europe.⁶ In the Moroccan desert, or in the seas outside the Italian island of Lampedusa or the Spanish Canary Islands, hundreds of such migrants die every year. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) had records of at least 2,360 migrants who died attempting to cross borders in 2013. Although not all of these deaths occurred at Europe's borders, the IOM estimates that 2013 may be the 'costliest year on record in terms of lives lost, for migrants seeking to cross international borders clandestinely' and Europe remains a major destination for migration.⁷ The deaths represent both the desire of many to enter Europe, and the limits of European humanitarian sentiments, as the migrants are refused entry and their fatalities are ignored.

When the barriers and surveillance fail to stop the entry of undocumented migrants into Europe, the deportation regime developed within Europe attempts to identify and remove them (De Genova 2010; Anderson, Gibney et al. 2011). The deportation regime requires an internal rebordering and a diffusion of responsibility for enforcing legality in migration. For example, efforts are underway in the UK to force medical providers and private landlords to check whether their patients or tenants have the legal right to be in the country.⁸ For Iker Barbero, the normalisation of 'wartime' levels of security, the violent, forced removal of individuals, and the acceptance of the deaths of those attempting to migrate creates an 'anti-citizen': those who are too different and too much of a threat to be integrated into Europe (Barbero 2012). This construction reworks orientalism, which often pits European civilisation against Islamic barbarism, with a focus on the need to defend European national identities (often against what are seen as the harmful effects of multiculturalism (Lentin and Titley 2011)). It is important to note that the anti-citizen is almost always a racialized or ethno-religious construction. The racialised effects of surveillance of the anti-citizens also produce scrutiny of and sometimes hostility to those legal citizens who are racialised as 'other' – who 'look like' the potential anti-citizen.

In all of the countries considered in this chapter, political debates around immigration have been particularly intense over the last 10–20 years. These have been interwoven with debates which suggest 'crises' in multiculturalism and citizenship (Modood 2007; Meer 2010; Lentin and Titley 2011; Meer and Modood 2014). For Ralph Grillo, this

is the third phase in the governance of diversity in Europe (2007). He argues that, until the 1960s, policies were shaped by national and racial stereotypes which argued for the need to abolish difference through assimilation. From the 1960s to the 1990s, a multicultural framework was generally accepted, with a recognition of that minorities had the right to maintain cultural difference. Since the 1990s, however, we have seen what Grillo terms a 'European-wide moral panic about "difference"' in both populist movements and wider public debates' (2007: 980). This panic centres on concern that there might be 'too much' difference for national unity and leads to a reassertion of the need to preserve a narrow, majority-defined, national culture. European political leaders such as Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron have all made declarations that multiculturalism has failed (Lentin and Titley 2011). In the period since 9/11, there has been a particular focus on religious difference and fear of Muslims. Multicultural tolerance and even celebration of difference has been blamed for fostering too much separation and for being weak in the face of cultural forces hostile to Christianity and Western culture. An example of this rhetoric can be seen in a speech the British prime minister, David Cameron, gave in 2011 when celebrating the 400th anniversary of the King James' version of the Bible. A central focus of the speech was this idea: 'We are a Christian country. And we should not be afraid to say so'.⁹ This suggested that core values of Britishness were under threat from both a hostile (non-Christian) other and what he called the 'passive tolerance' of multiculturalism.

As the rhetoric around immigration and multiculturalism has shifted, it is also possible to track shifts in the citizenship regimes in Europe, although the diversity of the different rules and regulations which govern migration, citizenship and processes of naturalisation mean that there will be exceptions to any general trend. Maarten P. Vink and Gerard-René de Groot identify several broad trends in citizenship policies in Europe (2010). One is a general move towards eliminating gender inequalities in the acquisition of citizenship. Thus, in general, women in Europe are more likely now than in the past to have equal rights with men in passing on citizenship to their children, and women's citizenship status is less likely to be dependent on their husbands'. Another trend identified by Vink and de Groot is the convergence of countries with *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* traditions. Countries like Germany which had an exclusively *ius sanguinis* model – meaning that citizenship was solely inherited through the parents – have begun to offer the possibility of naturalisation to second and third generation immigrants by virtue of their having been born there. On the other hand, the UK and

Ireland, which traditionally had a system that included *ius soli* – the right to citizenship through birth in a country – now limit citizenship to those born in the country, depending on their parents' citizenship status or length of residency (since 1983 in the UK and since 2005 in Ireland). The change in law away from *ius soli* in Ireland was the result of a referendum in 2004 with an overwhelming 79.8% of voters supporting changing the law. The campaign for the referendum centred on what was framed as 'abuse' of the right of *ius soli* by non-European immigrants who were accused of making use of a provision which had been largely aimed at giving those in Northern Ireland the right to Irish citizenship (Brandt 2004; Lentin 2007; Handoll 2012). Thus, *ius soli* is now limited to those who have at least one parent who is (or is entitled to be) an Irish citizen. The referendum preserved *ius sanguinis* by leaving untouched the citizenship rights of the children of those who gain Irish citizenship through having one Irish grandparent, without needing to have ever lived in Ireland (Lentin 2007).

The Netherlands is currently an exception to the third trend which Vink and de Groot propose, in that there is an increasing acceptance of multiple citizenship in Western European countries.¹⁰ In contrast to this general trend, the Dutch government has legislated to restrict dual citizenship. The country has experienced intense political debate about immigration in general in the last 25 years, and about dual citizenship in particular. Dual citizenship has become a pressure point in discussions about immigrant integration and belonging, with the renunciation of former citizenship seen as a marker of integration into Dutch society. These debates suggest an increasingly narrow approach to citizenship, national identity and cultural belonging. In 1991, the citizenship law in the Netherlands was reformed, introducing full acceptance of dual citizenship for immigrants – who no longer had to renounce their citizenship after naturalisation. However, long-term emigrants were still at risk of losing their Dutch citizenship if they lived outside the Netherlands for more than 10 years. In 2000, this situation was reversed, as long-term emigrants were allowed to maintain dual citizenship whilst the renunciation requirement for those who naturalise was reintroduced, with some exceptions (Blatter, Erdmann et al. 2009).

Vink and de Groot identify a dominant trend within Europe of a shift towards higher barriers for naturalisation. These obstacles include the required number of years of legal settlement before immigrants are eligible to apply for naturalisation, and the requirement to prove (often through tests) that integration has already been achieved (Goodman 2010; Vink and de Groot 2010).¹¹ Both the UK and the Netherlands have

introduced citizenship testing. Ireland currently does not have either a language or knowledge test for naturalisation, making it a minority in the European Union – a position shared only by Belgium, Cyprus, Italy and Sweden (Goodman 2010: 14). It is likely that Ireland will follow down the road of language and integration testing, as it has been proposed by government (Handoll 2012: 22). The testing regimes established in the Netherlands and the UK are discussed in the following section, which argues that tests practically restrict access to citizenship but also rhetorically reassure the public that attaining citizenship is not becoming too easy.

Citizenship testing in the Netherlands and the UK

The tests introduced in Europe for applicants for naturalisation or permanent residency are not merely imitations of the longer-established tests in the United States and Canada: they are distinct in the way they have been developed within the specific context of challenging multiculturalism and hostility to some forms of immigration. As Christian Joppke argues, ‘the coercive and punitive tone in some of Europe’s new citizenship tests and loyalty requirements is still noteworthy and, to repeat, a distinctly European innovation’ (Joppke 2013: 3). The Netherlands not only stands out in Europe as the only country to continue to try to reduce dual citizenship, but it has also had a particularly intense public debate about migration and multiculturalism. There has been a clear shift in government policy from one of tolerance of difference and multiculturalism to demands for integration and assimilation (Jacobs and Rea 2007). In some ways, the Netherlands can be seen as a trendsetter in this area, and the policy and legislative changes have been followed, for example by Belgium. The Dutch approach to assimilation also puts considerable emphasis on the adoption of social norms and cultural perspectives about what constitutes the ‘good life’. Migrants are required to ‘feel’ Dutch before they become citizens (Joppke 2013: 12). The extent of the hostility to migration in the Netherlands is suggested in the film which is shown to those applying for long-term visas to come to the Netherlands. The film, *Naar Nederland* (Going to the Netherlands), was introduced in 2005 as part of a ‘pre-immigration preparation package’. It presents an image of the Netherlands which is a far cry from the way one might expect a nation to represent itself. Semin Suvarierol sums up the portrayal of the Netherlands in the film as ‘cold, wet, small, overcrowded and expensive’ (2012: 215). Potential immigrants to the Netherlands are warned of poor housing in overcrowded estates and the hostility of the

native Dutch. It is suggested that non-European migrants will have to change their attitudes towards homosexuality and gender norms and will be at risk of prosecution for violence towards women. There is a focus on honour killings, domestic violence and female genital mutilation. Thus, both the Dutch and the foreigners are represented in stereotyped and homogenising ways which fit into a narrative of the 'clash of cultures' (Suvarierol 2012).

The demands placed on non-Western migrants to the Netherlands¹² to prove their willingness and capacity to integrate began in the late 1990s, when the *Wet Inburgering nieuwkomers* (WIN) scheme was introduced. Under WIN, migrants from non-Western countries were obliged to take 600 hours of language and 'social orientation' courses, paid for by central government and municipalities. The requirements have, over time, become more demanding, and there has been a withdrawal of state funding for the lessons. From 2007 onwards, the obligation to participate was shifted to a requirement to pass the tests. Those who cannot pass within three-and-a-half years (or five years for asylum seekers) cannot obtain permanent residency and have limited entitlement to state benefits. There was a suggestion that even those immigrants who had already obtained Dutch citizenship should have to pass the test. Although this was ruled unconstitutional, it reflects the potential vulnerability of naturalised citizenship compared to citizenship by birth (Jacobs and Rea 2007). The Dutch citizenship test's stringency suggests that it functions as much as a control on migration as it does for education and preparation for active citizenship. Christian Joppke argues:

The Dutch citizenship test stands out as a harsh and high-demanding extreme.¹³ [...] the test is an arduous four hours long [...] no test materials or preparations are provided by the state [...] and one can try only three times, after which one is terminally out. So daunting is the Dutch citizenship hurdle to take that after introduction of the test in 2003 the number of applicants fell to two-thirds of the previous level, while the passing rate of those who still dared dropped to 70%. (2013: 12)

Similarly, the introduction of the new citizenship regime in the UK, including the citizenship tests and citizenship ceremony, could be seen as the product of ongoing political debates about the nature of Britishness and citizenship.¹⁴ Politicians from both the left and right of the political spectrum in Britain have engaged in debates around the meanings of nationhood, often in the context of an argument about a

supposed citizenship crisis. The concern frequently voiced is that the British do not know what citizenship (or Britishness) means. This argument was particularly present, for instance, in response to civil disturbances in Oldham and Bradford in 2001 and in the declared War on Terror. Since the 7/7 bombings in London, there has been an increased focus on 'homegrown' terrorists. The new Labour government proposed various solutions to this crisis, including the introduction of citizenship studies in schools in 2002, the biannual 'citizenship survey', begun in 2001, and attention given to the endowing of citizenship to new British subjects. The focus on new citizens needs to be understood as part of a contradictory move within British legislative policy. On the one hand, the government was arguing that immigration should be seen as potentially positive (where it is good for the economy), yet this is accompanied by an increasing demonisation of 'unmanaged' immigration, and in particular of asylum seekers who were increasingly classed as a kind of anti-citizen (Flynn 2005). In the context of the War on Terror, the government also claimed the right to renege on some of the basic terms of the relationship between citizen and state (for instance, in the control orders in which the state restricts individuals' mobility and subjects them to extra scrutiny without recourse to a trial). These policy debates are often centred on what has been termed 'the crisis of multiculturalism'. Derek McGhee argues that, in the UK, there has been a 'systematic dismantling of the multiculturalism as the organising rhetoric of public policies' (McGhee 2005a: 1.4). However, it is important to note that what is at issue here is generally the way in which policies are framed and defended: whilst the rhetoric may shift, only weak forms of multiculturalism or small accommodations have ever been implemented in Britain (Grillo 2007; Phillips 2007; Pitcher 2009).

Citizenship testing was introduced in the UK in 2005 with a test based on the book *Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship*, which was written by Bernard Crick, an advisor to the Labour government who was also involved in reforming the teaching of citizenship education in schools. Passing the test was initially required for those applying for citizenship, and then got pushed further forward in the process, so that applicants for permanent residency are also required to pass the test. Initially it was possible for those whose English was not good enough to take the test to opt to take an ESOL (English for Speakers of Other Languages) course. This option has now been withdrawn and since October 2013, everyone is required to demonstrate a good grasp of English (by passing a language qualification as well as a knowledge test) before being eligible for permanent residency. The introduction of the

test in the UK attracted considerable media attention. Andrew O'Hagan, writing in the *London Review of Books*, called the study guide for the test 'the funniest book currently available in the English language', largely because of the way it produced a fictional account of an always-welcoming Britain and a 'rendition of family contentment in which everyone hangs out of the windows of their square houses to smile their clean smiles and wave hello to the dustmen' (O'Hagan 2006). The guide for the test, and therefore the test itself, has been repeatedly rewritten since it was introduced. The third edition of *Life in the United Kingdom*, published in 2013, was intended to place more emphasis on British history and achievements and reflected an increased focus on integration and participation, thus reflecting the shift to ideas of 'earned' citizenship. As Mark Harper MP, minister for immigration explained:

We've stripped out mundane information about water meters, how to find train timetables, and using the internet. The new test rightly focuses on values and principles at the heart of being British. Instead of telling people how to claim benefits it encourages participation in British life. (Brooks 2013: 23)

This shift in emphasis has also involved the removal of practical information, such as how to get medical assistance through the NHS, details of educational qualifications and how to report crime (Brooks 2013).

While the content of the tests may be debated, it is clear that in both the Netherlands and the UK, citizenship or naturalisation tests serve as a technology of reassurance (Fortier 2008: 101). They not only restrict access to citizenship but are also a public statement that citizenship is not 'too easy' and that a high bar is placed on inclusion. Another potential technology of reassurance is the introduction of citizenship ceremonies. In many cases, it appears that the ceremonies were designed to highlight not only the importance of citizenship but to provide reassurance that the creation of new citizens is accompanied not just by ritual but also reminders to new citizens of their duties and responsibility as citizens. The next section will explore the relatively recent introduction of these ceremonies in Europe by first examining how they avoid representations of European citizenship.

European ceremonies?

Debates about the nature of national identity and the role of immigration and naturalisation have prompted several European countries to

introduce citizenship ceremonies.¹⁵ The model for citizenship ceremonies has come from the 'immigration nations', especially the United States, Canada and Australia, which were considered in the previous chapter. Chapter 3 discussed how Australia was influenced by the UK experience in the introduction of citizenship tests. In its turn, the UK government white paper, *Secure Borders, Safe Haven*, explained the motivation behind the creation of ceremonies in Britain and the ways in which they were influenced by other countries' experiences:

It is symptomatic of the low-key and bureaucratic approach which the UK has adopted to the acquisition of British citizenship that, unlike the position in many other countries, there are no arrangements for any kind of public act to mark becoming a British citizen. The use of citizenship ceremonies is well established in Australia, Canada and the United States and is becoming increasingly common in European countries. There is evidence to suggest that these ceremonies can have an important impact on promoting the value of naturalisation and that immigrant groups welcome them. (Home Office 2002: 34)

Thus, ceremonies have been seen as a way of marking the acquisition of citizenship more formally, with central prominence given to the taking of an oath or pledge of allegiance. Given that the ceremonies in Canada, the United States and Australia were the inspiration, it is therefore not surprising that the citizenship ceremonies observed in Europe followed a similar structure. The European ceremonies share many features with those observed in Chapter 3, in ways which suggest that they function as rites of passage and initiation. The ceremonies we observed in Europe were also a mix of formal ritual and celebration and they produced narratives of the meanings of nation and of its relationship to immigration and citizenship.

In terms of the ceremonies as rites of passage, in both the UK and Ireland, a similar stage of liminality was produced, where citizens were separated from their accompanying friends and relatives. The ceremony in Ireland was of similar proportions to that of Oakland, California, with 700 citizens. The citizens showed that they had the appropriate documents and are then directed to the stalls of the auditorium of the newly built Convention Centre in Dublin. Their friends and relatives (including many young children) sat above them in the balcony area. In the UK, ceremonies tend to be smaller and held in town halls or registry offices, although I observed some in other locations, such as a local library in Liverpool. In Northern Ireland, ceremonies are held in

Hillsborough Castle in Belfast, as it was felt that requiring local registrars to conduct the ceremonies would be too politically divisive in the Northern Ireland context.¹⁶ However, the separation of citizands and guests was universally practiced in the UK ceremonies I attended, even when there was a small number of citizands.¹⁷

The ceremony observed in the Netherlands was held in the Amsterdam Town Hall and offered the single exception to all the ceremonies we observed, as the citizands could sit anywhere in the ceremony room, and so sat with their guests. However, when they were about to give the declaration, they were separated from the rest of the audience when they were called to the front of the hall and asked to say the declaration individually into a microphone. Before giving the declaration, the citizands were told, 'the audience is your witness, so you have to look out to the hall. Stand behind the microphone and raise your right hand'. The declaration was explained in everyday language: 'Every citizen declares two things: 1. Yes: I will respect the Constitution; 2. Yes, I promise to be a good citizen of the Netherlands.'¹⁸

As with the ceremonies in Canada, Australia and the United States, there was a range of symbols present in the physical spaces in which the ceremonies took place, and within the ceremonies. These symbols of power, citizenship and belonging ranged from a local to a national register, as will be discussed below. What was most interesting was the almost total absence of European symbols, or indeed, the almost total absence of any reference to European citizenship in the speeches or other parts of the ceremonies. The symbols and collective identity of the national were favoured over the regional. As will be discussed in reference to the experience of new British citizens in Chapter 5, for many of the interviewees, an important reason for applying for British citizenship was that it would also mean obtaining European citizenship. This offers freedom of movement within Europe, as well as the ability to work in any of the countries of the union. This mobility is particularly important in Britain, because it is not part of the Schengen Agreement, which allows for the free movement of third party citizens within member countries. Thus, European citizenship ensures the avoidance of the expensive processes of applying for visas to visit other European countries, and citizens can pass quickly through the 'European only' border lanes at entry points. It also enables employment in any country and guarantees residency rights in the European Union. Yet despite the significance of gaining European citizenship for the citizands, at no point is this acknowledged within the ceremonies. In the ceremonies, national citizenship trumps regional/European. In both the UK and

the Netherlands, the national is sometimes represented in conjunction with an emphasis on local (either city or regional) belonging, as will be discussed further below. The following section will explore a ceremony in Ireland which retained an exclusively national focus.

'Cead Mile Failte' (A hundred thousand welcomes)? Citizenship ceremonies in Ireland

In Ireland, in contrast to the Netherlands and the UK, citizenship ceremonies are conducted solely in the national register. Indeed, the ceremonies are national events, in that all citizens receive their citizenship in Dublin as part of a large, mass event. In the media, the creation of the ceremony and the oath of fidelity were taken as a direct imitation of the United States. As the news source *Irishcentral.com* put it, 'new Irish citizens will swear an oath of allegiance to the nation and Ireland copies the American system'.¹⁹ Citizenship ceremonies were introduced in Ireland in 2011 and were designed, in part, to clear the large backlog which had developed of people waiting four years or more to have their applications processed, despite their eligibility based on their length of residence in Ireland (Cosgrave 2011: 25). As Ireland does not have a visa granting permanent residency, the failure to process applications for naturalisation left people 'living in limbo', according to the Immigrant Council of Ireland (Cosgrave 2011). Prior to 2011, taking an oath of fidelity for naturalisation in Ireland was done in ordinary district courts, and individual oath-taking was mixed with other proceedings in the court, so new citizens might find themselves sworn into citizenship between the proceedings of criminal cases.

The new government which came into office in 2011 declared its intention to clear the backlog. In approximately three years since the general election, almost 42,000 new Irish citizens were created.²⁰ The ceremonies are also national events to the extent that they are covered in the national media.²¹ The ceremonial days – where there may be up to three ceremonies, creating in total two to three thousand new citizens – are routinely covered in print, television and electronic media. National symbols are also prominent at the ceremonies. At the ceremony I attended, the Garda²² band played as citizens came into the auditorium. The band stood up for the entry of the minister for justice and equality, who was accompanied by a retired judge who was the presiding officer and took the citizens' pledge. Then the whole auditorium was asked to stand for the national colours, as three soldiers marched on with a flag. (We were later told that they were under the command of Captain Neil

McMahon from the Second Eastern Brigade.) A national government minister, rather than a local official or politician, gave the ceremony's welcome speech.²³ According to Irish law, the minister for justice and equality has absolute discretion to decide who should be allowed to naturalise as an Irish citizen, as long as he or she is satisfied that the applicant fulfils the statutory conditions for naturalisation, including good character and length of residency. In addition, the minister does not have to give reasons for the refusal of an application of naturalisation, and there is no right of appeal against a ruling (Cosgrave 2011: 5). The minister, Alan Shatter, appeared to have presided over almost all of the ceremonies in Ireland.

In the ceremony, Shatter stressed his own role in pushing forward the effort to clear the backlog of cases and praised himself and the department: 'I think I can safely say that the steps that I initiated within my department to deal with the backlog of citizenship applications have been a huge success.' Shatter called the ceremony a rite of passage for those who had 'come to our country from a foreign land', and said that it was important 'for us as the host nation in bestowing this honour on you'. There was a clear separation set up between the citizen and non-citizen, summoned by the pronouns 'us' and 'you'. Shatter went on to say that he had the 'privilege' of deciding who got citizenship, and it is notable that the usual couplet of 'rights and responsibilities' were not mentioned in this context. However, whilst the language used appeared somewhat archaic, with references to 'honour and privilege', Shatter referred to what might be seen as multicultural sentiments in the idea that new citizens can be seen as 'enriching' a local culture. He also acknowledged that citizens had already contributed before they were made citizens. His speech had a strong rhetoric of choice (as discussed in Chapter 3, in the context of the United States):

You have come to our country and have chosen to live among us. ... Today we welcome you to our nation as its newest citizens, and we hope that you will continue to contribute to our communities, to our neighbourhood, and to our society. As a people, we have been enriched by your presence and, in making you citizens of our ancient and proud land, we are acknowledging the contribution you have already made.

Whilst the contributions of the citizens were recognised, at the same time, there was a continual reinforcement of an idea of an original Irish community through the repetition of the word 'our': 'our nation', 'our

neighbourhood', 'our society', and finally, 'our ancient and proud land' There is a risk that this repetition may exclude the citizens and set up a distinction between them and the community. As we shall see in the discussion of the ceremonies in the UK, the notion of an 'ancient' land has connotations which work against the idea of a changing and open society enriched by newcomers. Nonetheless, the minister went some way toward reducing this idea of the separation between the citizens and the nation, as he ended his speech by saying:

The history of this state is now your history, and the narrative of your life is now part of our history. For those of you granted citizenship today, your future is now interwoven with the future of this state, its citizens across the globe, and in particular, all of us who live on this island.

In this act of inclusion, it is interesting that the minister refers to the Irish diaspora as part of the imagined nation, reminding the participants that Ireland still has a history intertwined with the experience of emigration. Indeed, the history of Ireland as an emigration nation is relatively recent, with Ireland only becoming a nation of net immigration (where the numbers of those coming to the country exceed those leaving to live elsewhere) in 1996 (Lentin 2007: 436). Ireland's relationship to the diaspora was restated in the 1998 'Good Friday' Agreement, in which the UK and Irish governments agreed to reshape the constitution of Ireland. The agreement confirmed the principle of 'ius soli' (for those born on the whole of the island of Ireland), thus guaranteeing that people born in Northern Ireland had the right to be accepted as Irish or British or both, as they chose. The agreement confirmed an arrangement which had already been in place. As well as maintaining *ius soli* citizenship, the agreement added, 'the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage'.²⁴ Ronit Lentin argues that the emphasis on the Irish diaspora 'arguably led to enabling the substitution of the historical *ius soli* principle of Irish citizenship with *ius sanguinis* as conceptualised by the Citizenship and Nationality Act, enacted following the outcome of the 2004 Citizenship Referendum' (2007: 435). This emphasis on diaspora and inheritance of citizenship begs the question of who is more 'truly' Irish – new Irish citizens or diaspora Irish, many of whom have never been to Ireland but have gained citizenship (or have the right to gain it) through the minimum requirement of having one grandparent with Irish citizenship.

Whilst there was very little in Shatter's speech which suggested the rights which are bound up with citizenship, or the responsibilities which may be associated with it, there was a statement of the political grounding of citizenship:

For those of you granted citizenship today, you are becoming citizens of a republic, a constitutional democracy which recognises the personal rights of each of you as individuals and greatly values inclusiveness, tolerance and diversity.

Highlighting tolerance is, as we shall see in the discussion of ceremonies in the UK and the Netherlands, a key theme in discussing citizenship in citizenship ceremonies. It can function as a reassurance, but also as an injunction to those who may be perceived as intolerant. At the end of the ceremony, the minister returned to ask the new citizens (or their children) to consider being policemen or soldiers. He also stressed the importance of voting.

Once Shatter had finished speaking, a retired judge who would lead the oath of allegiance also welcomed the citizens. His welcome also underlined a particular notion of Irishness, as he began with a sentence in Irish Gaelic, which he then explained was a welcome, adding: 'This is our language, which I'm sure you're not familiar with. Your children will bring home books with pictures and words in Irish, and I hope you will assist in mastering the language.' Given that all of the citizens had lived in Ireland for at least five years before applying for citizenship, and many waited a long time for their applications to be processed, often with children at school in Ireland, it seemed odd for the judge to assume that they did not know about Irish as a language. Urging the citizens to engage with the Irish language, at least on behalf of their children, set up a particular cultural model of integration which appeared to set quite a high bar for inclusion. However, like the minister, the judge did go on to suggest an appreciation of the cultural heritage that immigrants can bring. With the use of the notion of 'the old country', he also evoked Ireland's history of emigration and the desire to maintain links within the diaspora:

The state does not require you to forget your country, your memories. Don't forget your own country, people and tradition. Your memories are not contraband – bring your music and stories. Tell children about the old country, do not deny them their legacy – remind them of that part of their story which is in another country.

The judge then went on to give an extended analogy through sport where he imagined immigrants from other countries bringing their sporting expertise: soccer from Brazil, Argentina and other South American countries, long distance running from Kenya and Ethiopia ('it would be wonderful if some of these genes made their way into the Irish gene pool') and cricket from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. He then spoke of other cultural influences, such as the influence of Russian literature and ballet on Irish culture. Finally, he mentioned what Ireland had gained in terms of 'culinary skills' from China and 'the caring nature' of many Filipinos.

Whilst these analogies may be common in many kinds of everyday multicultural and cosmopolitan talk, they risk reproducing stereotypes and, to some extent, rely on biological notions of race. By making references to Chinese cooks and Filipino nurses or doctors, the judge appeared to make a cultural attribute out of a particular structural position in the global labour market. Finally, the judge returned to the idea of Ireland as a 'nation of emigrants' which is particularly well-placed to both welcome immigrants and to understand the experience of immigration:

You will be surprised at the welcome you receive in communities. We are a nation of immigrants, we understand it. Recently we have experienced the emigration of our sons and daughters and with your help we will repair the economy and welcome them back.

Here again, the opposition of 'ours' and 'yours' was restated, as was the judge's failure to recognise that the citizens were well acquainted with Irish society and the welcome or otherwise that is given to migrants. Whilst this speech in Dublin made particular claims for the welcome given in Ireland to immigrants, as we shall see in the discussion below, the idea of welcome and histories of welcome are also repeated in the UK and Dutch ceremonies. However, as discussed in Chapter 3 with reference to the United States, Canada and Australia, discourses of welcome often obscure more troubled histories of the reception given to immigrants in the country and a history of racism and racialisation. Chapter 6 explores this idea of welcome from the perspective of interviewees in the UK. The relationship between colonialism and racism is particularly complex in Ireland. Ireland and Irishness are at least in part shaped by the country's history of anti-colonialism and the ways the British (and Americans) have, at times, constructed the Irish as a racially inferior group. At the same time, participation in the British colonial project as police, soldiers, and administrators means

that Ireland has a shared history with Britain of colonial racialisation and investment in the idea of the superiority of whiteness. Bryan Fanning (2012: 16) points out that the Irish missionaries were part of the expansion of Christianity which accompanied European colonialism in a way which was linked to Irish nation-building, arguing that '[t]his missionary nationalism drew upon colonial ideologies of racial superiority' (Fanning 2012: 16). In Ireland, migrants have not always found their arrival and settling in the country to be positively received. Ireland was an enthusiastic signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees and began accepting Hungarian refugees in 1956; they were particularly welcomed because they were fellow Catholics. However, 'within one month of the arrival of the first refugees it was decided that they should be removed' (Fanning 2012: 91). In the 40 years that followed, fewer than 1,500 refugees were accepted in Ireland, and the state relied on the voluntary sector to provide much of the support for refugees (Fanning 2012: 91–93).

In the mid-1990s, applications for asylum increased in Ireland and, although the numbers were still comparatively low, discourses of a crisis caused by the 'swamping' of Ireland were prominent. These were fostered by officials and political leaders and asylum seekers were depicted as 'welfare scroungers, in competition with indigenous groups for welfare resources' (Fanning 2012: 97). In the next few years, the Irish government introduced increased powers at the borders aimed at controlling entry more strictly. They also increased the state's powers of deportation and made it harder to apply for asylum. This resulted in the lowest acceptance rates for asylum in the whole of the EU – in 2010 Ireland accepted 1.3% of asylum claims as compared with 24% in the UK and 46% in the Netherlands (Fanning 2012: 99). These low rates of acceptance of asylum seekers have been accompanied by exclusion of asylum seekers from welfare rights in order to discourage further applicants. The policies were also accompanied by media and public hostility to asylum seekers, including violent attacks. The large backlog of applicants for citizenship is often refugees who managed to gain refugee status and then eligibility to apply for citizenship from the 1990s onwards. The mass ceremonies are an attempt to deal with this backlog. Many migrants to Ireland come from within Europe and, as they share many rights already, are less likely to apply for Irish citizenship.

Besides the speeches and the brass band, the ceremony in Ireland was broadly similar to ceremonies in other countries. However, an interesting difference was that, in some ways, the oath-taking is less performative than in other ceremonies, to the extent that the citizens have

already signed the statutory declaration of fidelity to the Irish nation and loyalty to the state and receive their legal documentation of citizenship before the ceremony and oath-taking rather than afterwards, as happened in all the other ceremonies observed. The oath-taking in the ceremony could therefore be regarded as a re-performance rather than the moment when the citizen becomes the citizen. The ceremonies in Ireland are focused at the national scale, partly for logistical reasons. They are given a high national profile, and this is maintained in part by the minister, who is responsible for naturalisation, presiding over them. The next section will discuss the ceremonies in the UK, which were introduced earlier than those in Ireland and had a local element written into them from the outset.

Ceremonies in the UK: 'If you really are to be British'

The UK citizenship ceremonies, which were introduced in 2004, are organised by local registrars and largely take place in register offices and town halls. Some are organised in different locations such as schools, libraries and museums. Register offices are the site of the official marking of other life events – more traditionally birth, death and marriage. For the registrars, alongside the civil partnership ceremonies introduced in 2005, citizenship ceremonies mark a significant extension in the function of local borough and county register offices. As will be argued further in Chapter 6, the introduction of the ceremonies received very little press coverage or attention (compared to the introduction of civil partnerships as part of the registrar's work and to other changes in citizenship regimes). The ceremonies all include what is called a 'local welcome', and the white paper which introduced the idea of citizenship ceremonies placed emphasis on this aspect. It stresses that the ceremonies should be based in local communities (Home Office 2002). Thus, local register offices and local council officials involved in the ceremony were told to make a welcome speech, but were given no instruction on its content. This openness was designed to allow a variety of practices, giving events a local character. Nonetheless, my observation of ten ceremonies around the country suggested that there is quite a lot of uniformity in terms of how the ceremonies are conducted (see Byrne 2012 for more discussion). Placing the ceremonies outside the direct role of the UK Border Agency meant that the ceremonial element of endowing citizenship would be provided by professionals who are used to providing a sense of occasion and welcome, rather than a government agency which it is likely many citizens would associate with scrutiny

and a culture of disbelief (Pannett 2011). As a chief registrar who had been involved in the development of the citizenship ceremony put it:

I don't think they [the Home Office] realised just how special we could make it, you know.... I don't think they appreciated the warmth and sincerity that we could bring to the ceremony.... And whilst the ceremony is a formal and serious one, that doesn't mean to say that the ceremony has to be formal.... Somebody actually obtaining British citizenship is a huge thing for them, but it doesn't mean the ceremony can't be relaxed.

The introduction of citizenship ceremonies has involved an expansion of the staff in register offices particularly in big cities. The ceremonies have become a source of income for the registrars, with the ceremonies paid for out of the fees paid by applicants for citizenship. This, rather ironically, involves the new citizens paying for their own welcomes. Alongside the registrars, a range of different officials are involved in giving the local welcomes – these include both elected representatives, such as city councillors, and unelected officials such as the lord lieutenants or provosts (who are directly appointed by the Queen) who have largely ceremonial roles. The registrars in Liverpool also mentioned that on occasion they have speakers who do not hold such official roles such as a local DJ who had come to see a ceremony because of the anti-immigration discourse and then was invited back to give a welcome speech. They also on occasion have asked new citizens (such as an academic from the local university) who have been through the ceremony to come back and give welcome. The ceremonial officials, such as the lord mayor, the lord lieutenant and the high sheriff, have striking ceremonial outfits. The lord lieutenants wear quasi-military dress uniforms and often large rows of medals, trousers with gold braid down the side and ornate riding boots with spurs attached. The mayors often have heavy gold chains of office and fur-edged cloaks. There is also a portrait of Queen Elizabeth displayed in the room – registrars are sent a list of suitable portraits which they can use, so these symbols of nation are centrally controlled. I would suggest that the display of these costumes, along with the portrait of the Queen, adds to the symbolism of nation and of royalty, which sits oddly next to assertions about the importance of democracy in Britain and the equality of all citizens. The uniforms are 'dress uniforms' which are purposely old-fashioned.²⁵ They can also appear anachronistic. As one child of a citizand put it before the ceremony, 'I've just seen a guy with a sword!' Those who have a ceremonial

role will often begin their speech by explaining that they are speaking 'on behalf of the Queen as her representative'. The national anthem is played at the end of the ceremony. In this way, there is a clear link between the UK ceremonies and those in other Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Canada. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, unlike Canada, Australia's ceremony does not include an oath or pledge to the Queen. Participants can choose to make a religious oath or non-religious affirmation.²⁶ Nonetheless, there is no possible avoidance of God in the national anthem (Damsholt 2008), 'God save the Queen'. In Britain, the oath or affirmation is introduced with the explanation from the set text:

I am now going to ask you to make promises and swear or affirm on oath to the Sovereign that you will be a faithful citizen. I will then also ask you to make a formal and public pledge that you will be a loyal subject and observe the laws of this country.

The European flag was not displayed in the large majority of the ceremonies I observed in Britain (nor was it displayed at the ceremonies in Amsterdam and Dublin). One exception was the ceremony in Cardiff, the capital of Wales, where, alongside the Union Jack, the Welsh and European flags were hung, although no reference was made to the European element of the citizenship that was being granted. At the beginning of this ceremony, the Welsh national anthem was played, whilst the British national anthem was reserved for the end of the ceremony. On display in the room, were portraits of the Queen and the Royal family, and a gold miner's lantern, representing a major (largely historical) Welsh industry. In Scotland, the Scottish flag of St Andrew – otherwise known as the Saltire – was presented, as well as the Union Jack, and in Edinburgh there was also the flag of the city. Here we see the representation of the multiple nature of nation in Britain, but a fairly consistent downplaying of European citizenship. Perhaps predictably, reference to multiple nations was present largely in the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish ceremonies. And even in these cases, the references are muted, as shown by the following extract from the East Ayrshire speech:

You join us at a time that is particularly exciting for Scotland. We have forged our own strong identity within the United Kingdom and, internationally, we are well known for the many discoveries and inventions that have helped to shape our world.²⁷

Thus, these representations of citizenship, whilst placed within the local context in the UK speeches, remain focused on abstract notions of citizenship and also largely at the level of the nation-state, with, as we shall see, some references to local or city identities. Whilst ceremonies are designed to reflect both the local and the national in Britain – which includes reference to the nations of Scotland, Wales and Ireland within the UK nation-state, European identity is not appealed to. This silence in part reflects the highly contentious political debates in Britain around membership of the Europe Community.

Welcome to the local

In Britain, the relationship between local and national are emphasised in ceremonies by the presence of the mandatory ‘local welcome’ speech. This had been envisioned from the start of discussions about the introduction of ceremonies. A policy paper by two senior Labour Party politicians had explained the idea:

It is in local areas that people meet, interact with others and root their own sense of identity. And when a newcomer comes to Britain for the first time, they also move to Tower Hamlets, Cardiff or Cornwall. (Kelly and Byrne 2007: 5)

The notion of a ‘local welcome’ is also interesting for the potential performative dilemma that it sets up. Can you be welcoming just by saying ‘Welcome’? And more significantly, what does it mean to claim a *history* of welcoming? The text above appears to prefer the word ‘newcomer’ to migrant, perhaps to move away from the negative associations which migrant may carry. The idea that ‘newcomers’ are – and always have been – welcomed is a theme taken up in several speeches in the UK. It accords with government claims in policy documents about migration and refugees. For example, the White Paper *Fairer, Firmer, Faster. A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum*, published in 1998, celebrates ‘Britain’s long-standing tradition of giving shelter to those fleeing persecution’ (Kushner 2003: 267). However, by the time the citizenship ceremonies were proposed, the idea of welcome had been somewhat qualified. The White Paper *Secure Borders, Safe Haven* made the argument that local communities in the UK needed reassurance – as provided by the ‘secure borders’ – before they could offer a ‘safe haven’:

To enable integration to take place, and to value the diversity it brings, we need to be secure within our sense of belonging and identity and

therefore to be able to reach out and to embrace those who come to the UK. Those who wish to work and to contribute to the UK, as well as those who seek to escape from persecution, will *then* receive the welcome they deserve. (Home Office 2002: 2 emphasis added)

It is clear that the welcome is already qualified. And as will be suggested below, the mere claim of welcoming is not the same as an actual act of welcome. Welcomes and hospitality can be eroded by the idea that too many conditions rest on them. They can also be undermined by an account of local or national history which silences more contentious issues and experiences. In addition, many speeches contained what might be seen more simply as touristic guides to the local area. This in itself is interesting, as it seems to take the new citizens as newcomers, ignoring the fact that the regulations governing the acquisition of citizenship mean that it generally requires several years of residence before citizenship applications can be made. The touristic descriptions also serve to inhibit the presentation of new citizens as 'fellow locals'. The idea of welcome also potentially suggests the positions of guests and host, inhabitant and newcomer, and makes space for judgements as to who should be offered hospitality (Darling 2013). The question of what is meant by welcome and hospitality, and how the new citizens experience it, will be taken up in Chapter 6.

In many of the UK welcome speeches, particularly those in rural areas, the image of what could be called 'deep England' or 'deep Britain' (Wright 1985) is very strong. These speeches appear to lay claim to representing the 'heart' of the nation through landscape (Edensor 2002). The speech given in a ceremony in a small market town in Suffolk notes that: 'the rural heartlands of Suffolk still support the farming traditions, which for centuries have supported the local economy'. The significance of landscape, in these idyllic representations, is that it is unchanging, yet cultural. The villages are still 'nestling in the valleys', and the implication is that they are socially and culturally, as well as geographically, static. Thus these narratives are potentially in dissonance with the representation of citizenship as inclusive, dynamic and changing, yet they also are often the point where the local takes centre stage.

In addition to landscape, over half of the speeches have some reference to local history, and this history intersects with the national in interesting ways. For many, the necessarily abbreviated account begins with ancient history. As Gellner (1983) notes, nations, 'like Everest', must be presented as ancient and always there (see also Bhabha 1990 on the temporality of nations). Of the 25 texts (out of a total of 47) which

mention history, 19 refer to a pre-Norman history, ranging from Neolithic, Bronze Age and Iron Age through to Saxons, Vikings, Danes and, most often, Romans. The logic of references to ancient history in very short speeches appears to vary. For some, it seems to establish a claim that the area has ancient origins, as in the case of the speech made in the ceremony in Gloucestershire:

Gloucestershire has been inhabited for many thousands of years, and successive generations have left behind remains that give us a glimpse of their lifestyle. Neolithic long barrows and Bronze and Iron Age hill forts are to be found throughout our region.

In contrast, other speeches mention that ancient history plays a role in accounts of diversity and difference. Thus, a speaker from the Merton register office in London says that, 'Not only recently have people come to the area – there is evidence that the Romans settled here.' However, accounts of previous settlements of 'outsiders' can be an uneasy narrative, as it may summon an image of invasion which may be less celebratory than intended. For instance in the following excerpt from the West Sussex welcome speech:

Right from the early Roman *invaders* (Chichester was an important Roman city) and through subsequent *invasions* by Saxons, Vikings and Normans (who built our Cathedral just across the street ...) to more recent times when people from all continents of the world have adopted Sussex as their home. (emphasis added)

The switch from invasion to current migration is awkward in the context of a speech which is intended to welcome migrants, but such dramatic jumps in the historical account are common. The tension between invader and settler narratives also serves to remind us that a nation-state only exists in an international context of other nations-states which help to define it. Nations need foreigners to exist, just as welcomes can only occur between occupants and outsiders (Billig 1995: 79). However, this raises the question of which 'side' citizens are on – as foreigner or insider? The reference to ancient histories is likely to position the citizens firmly as outsiders – newcomers to the ancient, long-rooted culture. In the accounts of ancient history, there are claims to origins which are familiar to the narration of nation (Bhabha 1990). The use of royal connections (mentioned in more than a third of the speeches) can serve to provide the sense of an unbroken history, omitting civil wars,

republics and the change in royal lines. The Kingston-upon-Thames speech is a good example of this claim for continuity: 'In the tenth century, Anglo-Saxon kings were crowned here in Kingston. Over the last thousand years, Kingston has had many close links with royalty.'

Importantly, the speeches significantly evade reference to empire and to histories of racism and the politics of anti-racism. There is only one direct mention of the British Empire in 47 speeches (and only one speech mentions the Commonwealth). This is particularly striking, given that relations of empire and commonwealth still influence the migration patterns of many new citizens. Also, as will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, for some of the new citizens, the Commonwealth gave them a sense of common identity and shared history with the UK, which was important to them. In addition, knowledge about the more recent history of immigration also gave some a sense of community with other immigrants to Britain.

A speech from the citizenship ceremony in Hertfordshire was the single exception to the silence about empire; it places the British Empire in the context of a history of immigration, in a way which seeks to play down conflicts. After mentioning the influxes of Flemish weavers, Huguenots, refugees from the French Revolution and Jewish immigration in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, it states, 'As the British Empire came to a close, many people from the former colonies were also welcomed. This welcome continues, as evidenced by our ceremony today.'

The selective mentions of Huguenots and Jews, but omission of other refugees, accords with Tony Kushner's argument that memories of refugees are largely silenced, apart from those two waves of what are constructed as 'genuine' refugees. Even in the case of these refugees, Kushner argues that the focus on the reception of these refugees overlooks the actual hostility with which they were originally met (Kushner 2006). This speech eradicates all of the tensions, conflicts and debates around the empire – the struggles for independence, the often-hostile response to post-colonial immigration, and continuing racism – with the concept of 'welcome'. This idea of welcome and the prominence given to a long history of welcome by many of the speeches made at citizenship ceremonies is an unhappy performative: Saying 'Welcome' does not actually perform the act. This is particularly the case in a context where past failures to welcome have not been acknowledged. The history of British immigration policy is, in fact, a history of the progressive imposition of limits on who could be considered a citizen (see in particular Tyler 2010 on the 1971 Immigration Act). Historically, there

has been persistent hostility to refugees and asylum seekers. Indeed, Kushner makes the case that, whilst the rhetoric against refugees and asylum seekers has become 'tediously familiar' since the late nineteenth century, the intensity of that hostility was at an unprecedented level of intensity from the 2000s onwards, the period which is of particular relevance for the citizands at the ceremonies (2003).

Some speeches emphasize histories of arrivals, cultural mixing and change rather than invasion or ancient settlement. The Manchester speech, which does refer to the Commonwealth, describes Manchester as 'a city full of energy and vitality...A multi-cultural and multi-racial city promoting tolerance and understanding'. The speech asserts that it is Manchester's people and diversity which make up its nature:

Each community has developed in Manchester over the centuries has enriched the cultural life of the city, which has a long history of welcoming people to settle here. The history of settlements includes the Italian, Irish, Jewish, people from the Asian sub-continent, Commonwealth countries and later from Eastern Europe and non-Commonwealth African countries. People have come to this country for a wide range of reasons, often for reasons of their own or their family's safety or because of their political or religious beliefs and have been welcomed into the Manchester community.

This abbreviated account focuses on more recent history, and it also fits with Manchester's self-presentation as a cosmopolitan city (Harries 2012). However, it passes over some of the more awkward parts of Manchester's history – not least its long involvement and profit from the slave trade (Fryer 1984) as well as a history of racist response to racialised others by some of the population. Notably, the slave trade is not mentioned in any of the speeches in the UK, despite it having happened more recently, relative to Roman history, for example. It would appear that there is a – perhaps understandable – desire to avoid the contentious or more difficult aspects of UK's history. (There are also very few mentions of World Wars.) The speeches avoid reflection on anti-immigration and anti-asylum discourse as well as the persistence of racism. However, as Chapter 6 will explore in more depth, the celebration of the British welcome given to immigrants often does not fit with the citizands' own experience.

An interesting contrast in representation of history was offered in one of the two ceremonies I observed in Liverpool. One ceremony ended with a reading of the poem 'The British (serves 60 million)' by Benjamin

Zephaniah. As with many of the speeches at UK citizenship ceremonies, Zephaniah, in his poem-as-recipe, begins with ancient history:

Take some Picts Celts and Silures
And let them settle,
Then overrun them with Roman conquerors

However, after adding more ancient groups to his recipe, he then brings into the mix an additional 25 national groups who have migrated to Britain:

Mix some hot Chileans, cool Jamaicans, Dominicans
Trinidadians and Bajans with some Ethiopians, Chinese
Vietnamese and Sudanese.

The recipe – and therefore the ceremony – ends with a note and warning:

Note: All the ingredients are equally important. Treating one ingredient better than another will leave a bitter unpleasant taste.

Warning: An unequal spread of justice will damage the people and cause pain. Give justice and equality to all.

The note and warning fit with those speeches which encourage the citizens to think about their responsibilities as citizens, but in a way which also acknowledges that Britain is not in a perfect state of tolerance and equal justice. The registrars at Liverpool also mentioned that some councillors do speak about slavery when they take part in the ceremonies. (which is a particularly significant part of Liverpool's history). The Liverpool ceremony also celebrated diversity by not only naming all the countries of origin of the citizens but also having small flags displayed of each country. The Lord Lieutenant explained:

It is a wonderful time to live and work in Liverpool – but you will want to keep in touch with your home country. The flags are a symbol of that. Keep in touch with our language and culture as well as being fully British.

The model of Britishness presented here is one which is not compromised by different languages and cultural practices. The local Liverpool

councillor who was presiding over this ceremony said she agreed with the slogan of a local Congolese organisation: 'If I am different, I don't threaten you. I enrich you.' The next section will consider how questions of citizenship and belonging were represented in other UK ceremonies.

Citizenship and belonging

Citizenship, particularly in the context of migration and 'naturalisation', raises important questions of belonging and identity. The proper inclusion and participation of those who were not born in the country, and who therefore have not received automatic citizenship, requires new ways of thinking about belonging and identity which are open to multiplicities of roots and routes. It needs a recognition of what Nira Yuval-Davis calls 'multi-layered citizenship' (2008: 169). This is complicated in a discourse of citizenship which is tied to notions of nationhood and the singularity of identity. The speech from the South Ayrshire ceremony (in Scotland) acknowledged the new citizens as active choosing²⁸ agents: 'I am fully aware that you will have thought long and hard before making the decision you did today'. However this recognition was rare. In contrast to the ceremonies discussed in Chapter 3, where metaphors of journeying were a common part of the construction of immigration nations, very few speeches made any mention of the journeys and potential difficulties involved in migration and applications for citizenship. Another exception was West Sussex:

Today we are very pleased to be able to say 'Welcome' to YOU, to thank you for the contribution that you bring with you from your own backgrounds – be it your skills, your talents, or your customs – your bravery – which it undoubtedly takes, along with enthusiasm, to embrace life in a different country – but we also want to thank you now for what you WILL contribute as you continue your life here. (emphasis in the original)

Yet, as was mentioned above in the discussion of the Irish ceremony, it is important here to be attentive to the subjects created in this speech: 'we' welcome 'you'. There is an awkward hiatus in the ceremonies. At what point does the 'you' of the foreigner/outsider to the nation, become part of the 'we' of the nation? The use of 'we' is particularly instructive. As Billig notes,

an ideological consciousness of nationhood can be seen to be at work. It embraces a complex set of themes about 'us', 'our homeland',

'nations' ('ours' and 'theirs'), the 'world' as well as the morality of national duty and honour. (Billig 1995: 4)

There is a risk that, as described in Chapter 3, the ceremony and the endowing of citizenship are regarded as somehow incomplete or provisional. The speech from West Sussex goes on to suggest that:

Today, as you finally are able to acquire that all-important British passport, it is the end of the process. It is also the real beginning of a new life with new status. And that new status brings with it some responsibilities. If you are to be really British, it will involve much more. I hope you will think carefully about those responsibilities – that you will become involved in the life of the community around you – beyond your own family and close friends – learn about that community and what makes it function – that you will, in short, join in. If you do that, it will not only make your own newly acquired citizenship more meaningful for YOU, but will also enable others to see that you really do want to be part of us.

This speech suggests that citizenship might be endowed, but full membership – 'if you are to be really British' – requires much more. The process involves further acceptance based on the right kind of behaviour and the judgement of others about 'the correct' intentions. It also suggests that there is an audience of 'real' British citizens who are yet to be convinced of the new citizens' membership. Whilst the West Sussex speech implied only provisional membership, in contrast, the speech made at a ceremony in Bradford appeared to assume that this administrative process would also involve a total severance of other ties. The speech began by welcoming the new citizens as the lord lieutenant's 'brother and sister' and ended by welcoming them to 'the greatest county of the greatest country in the world', suggesting that citizenship would automatically transfer a local and national patriotism. Here we see a form of domopolitics where their nation is produced as family.

If the ceremonies are intended to contribute to an invigorated understanding of citizenship, then they may disappoint. Whilst just under half of the speeches examined do address features of what might be expected in a consideration of citizenship (such as democracy and voting, responsibility, freedom of speech and tolerance towards others), they do so in a largely passing manner and without much depth given to the concepts, with tolerance often given the most emphasis. Islington

is a fairly typical example in that it simply supplies a list of the attributes of citizenship:

The *values* and principles that underpin British society are of fundamental importance. A respect for *law* and *order*, valuing *tolerance* and *freedom of speech*, and a *respect for one another's beliefs*, are all vital elements of being a British citizen. It is also necessary to understand and *participate* in the *democratic* process, in order to fulfil your key role in British society. (emphasis in original)

A slightly more fleshed out description was given in the Liverpool ceremony, where suggestions were made as to what might represent active citizenship and participation in civic society (such as standing for election, becoming a school governor, taking part in local politics, voluntary and community groups or hospital trusts). As will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, I interviewed two new citizens who had been to this ceremony, and they found these suggestions inspiring. Other interviewees said that they wanted more information about how to participate more in their local communities now that they were citizens. The following section will consider the ceremony which was observed in Amsterdam. Here, too, we see the emphasis on local belonging and an account of values which are shaped by national discourses of multiculturalism and immigration.

'Welkom Nieuwe Nederlanders': a citizenship ceremony in Amsterdam

Whilst only one ceremony was observed in the Netherlands,²⁹ it is nonetheless interesting to note some of the differences in the ways in which it was conducted from the ceremonies in Britain. The Netherlands is, like Britain, a country which has a long history of immigration as well as emigration. It is also a constitutional monarchy and former imperial power. The ceremony in Amsterdam was in many ways a less formal occasion than those in Ireland or the UK. There was a noticeable difference in the prominence given to national and royal symbols. Unlike the ceremonies in the UK, in Amsterdam, there was neither a flag flying nor a portrait of the (then) Queen. There is no declaration of loyalty to the Queen. This may be partly because such a declaration had negative associations with the declaration of loyalty that many Dutch citizens were required to make under German occupation in the Second World War. The ceremony took place in Amsterdam City Hall, which is the

home of the municipal government and a theatre. This is a modern public building with open access to the public. Portraits of local politicians are displayed, and the ceremony took place in front of a large screen which was used to show old footage of Amsterdam (accompanied by a pianist playing both classical music and traditional songs from Amsterdam). When the films were not playing, the screen showed the colours of the Dutch flag, but not the flag itself. By contrast, symbols of Amsterdam were more prominent, with the three red crosses visible on both the posters directing citizens where to go for the ceremony as they entered the town hall and on the paper cups from which they had tea and coffee after the ceremony. Each new citizen was given a gift of a book explaining the history of Amsterdam, again decorated with the three red crosses. They were also told that they could visit the city archives to learn more of the history of 'your city'.

The speech made to the citizens by a local politician, even though it is given before the 'solidarity pledges' have actually been made, welcomes the citizens: 'You are a Netherlander and Amsterdammer. I congratulate you wholeheartedly with this.' It would appear that the local identity – an Amsterdammer – was given equal significance to national identity. This may reflect Amsterdam's position as a global city, but could also be taken as an attempt to distinguish Amsterdam as a city from the national discourse, which is more hostile to immigration, as was discussed in earlier sections.

In the ceremony, a local politician gave the welcome, stressing the idea that citizenship is a choice. As was argued in the previous chapter, the construction of choice in migration can serve to legitimate the pride of the 'host' nation:

You have chosen to become a Netherlander. ... As a Netherlander, I may say that I feel honoured that you chose the Netherlands and Dutch nationality. With this you indicate that you want to stay here: my country and my city are now officially also your country and city.

The emphasis on choice is interesting, given the effort expended in the Netherlands to dissuade some migrants from entering the country, as discussed in the sections above. The speaker also takes the chance to set out what he thinks are the particular characteristics of the Netherlands, in terms of following rules, individual rights and good organisation.

You have been able to judge us Netherlanders. You have probably seen that the Netherlands knows many laws and rules. They protect the

rights of individual citizens. They also organise other things – such as the environment, doctor, tap water – have been organised well.

This is a rather bizarre set of values and services seemingly randomly combined. It would seem that the list was suggested by thinking of the opposite of all that might be imagined as ‘third world’ conditions – with a failure of governance, and lack of individual rights and basic services. The tone suggests that the countries the citizens have left do not have these facilities or the ability to ‘organise well’. The speaker goes on to mention that there are ‘unwritten rules’ which govern Dutch society (such as practices around birthdays in the workplace) as well as placing a particular emphasis on history in the formation of these unwritten rules. As with many British speeches, this history shifts rapidly from distant history to more recent changes:

Many norms and customs have a long history. They originate in religious conflicts, the Golden Age, the struggle over water. In the last century, the twentieth century, the Netherlands has changed rapidly.

The rapid changes in the twentieth century are attributed to war, changes in industry, secularisation and the ‘influence of young people, who demand more freedom, the emancipation of women and homosexuals’ as well as the ‘influx of big groups of people from other countries’. It is notable that, as was largely the case in Britain, colonialism and post-war decolonisation and post-colonial immigration are not mentioned in this history.

The speech does, however, give an extended version of rights and respect, with again a particular emphasis on tolerance:

We are attached to our fundamental rights, which apply to everyone who lives in the Netherlands: The right to believe what you want, the freedom of religion, to say what you want, as a fundamental right, without harming someone unnecessarily. The freedom of expressing your opinion, without personal traits being looked at. You are not allowed to discriminate, and you cannot be discriminated against. All rights ensure that you can be who you want to be, can organise your life as you want to. The freedom of religion and free speech. The right to be treated equally. This means everyone can organise their lives according to their own beliefs. [...] The more freedom we get, the more we can develop ourselves. The more freedom, the more respect.

Everyone must respect you [...] and respect you when you respect others. We all want to be respected. Also respect for others, also when they do not live as we do. And that change is big [...] Amsterdam is a city with 177 different nationalities; it can only grow if everyone respects each other, man or woman, black or white, believer or nonbeliever, homo- or heterosexual, married or not married.

The length of this part of the speech and also the tone suggest that it is a lecture to those who may be intolerant, rather than a reassurance that the citizens have the right to respect from others. This appears to accord with wider public and policy discourse which sees some migrants as a threat to freedom. This tone also fits in with what Schinkel and van Houdt characterise as an increasingly 'moralising' emphasis in integration and naturalisation policies in the Netherlands (2010). This moralising tone is, according to Schinkel and van Houdt, accompanied by reservations about when citizenship can be understood to be complete: 'Formal citizenship is now regarded as merely the beginning. Real entry into "Dutch society" is possible only through moral citizenship' (Schinkel and van Houdt 2010: 704). There is a sense of reserving full acceptance until the new citizens made at the Amsterdam ceremony show further proof of commitment. In a very similar way to the speech from West Sussex, alongside a welcome came a reminder about the need to contribute and participate in order to be fully welcomed:

You are a Netherlander and Amsterdammer. I congratulate you wholeheartedly in this. You have said that you want to be part of this city and participate; that shows willpower. You have already shown this. Hold on to it. Make sure that you will be even more a part of it, participate even more. But also stay yourself. Let's shape the history of Amsterdam together.

What is also interesting is that this welcome stresses that dual location of belonging at the level of the local city and the nation. The citizens' other identities are also suggested in the injunction to 'stay yourself'.

Conclusion

Britain, Ireland and the Netherlands have all experienced intense debates in the last 20 years around the subjects of immigration, national identity and integration. They have, in different ways, shared in the common European trends outlined above. Citizenship ceremonies, over

the last ten years, in some ways provide the decorative cherry on the top of a range of more hostile immigration controls and restrictions. Concerns about the integration of immigrants tend to represent integration as a one-way process. Integration is framed as something that is focused on the efforts of the immigrant, rather than a model which also implies adaptation from what is constructed as the host country. This sets national norms and cultures as a standard to which the immigrant must be measured, with limited changes from the 'host' society. Ceremonies, which set out explicitly to welcome a newcomer into the country (even though they may actually have been living in the country for a long time) tend to reinforce the idea of an outsider coming into a new place, rather than a new status. Citizenship ceremonies are often conceived of as a way to put more emphasis on citizenship, to mark it as an achievement to be celebrated and something worth working (and paying) for. In the cases of the UK and the Netherlands, ceremonies were introduced as part of a process which made naturalisation more difficult to acquire. They also were situated within intense debates around immigration, national identity and integration. Somewhat paradoxically, given the contexts in which they were introduced, the ceremonies are often used as a space to celebrate the 'tolerance' of the host country and make claims about long histories of welcome.

This chapter has made the case that, perhaps due to the desire to be celebratory, the ceremonies often give a version of history which evades those aspects which would not reflect well on the host countries, such as involvement in the slave trade and histories of racism. The contentious history of empire is also avoided, even though for many citizens (particularly in the UK, but also the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent, Ireland), post-colonial links can be a route into claims of shared culture and belonging. In contrast to the importance placed on history, accounts of what citizenship might actually mean and how the citizens could participate as citizens are relatively muted.

5

Routes to Citizenship

A passport does not make a person. A passport is just a book. You know, a document that you travel with.

Simone

Introduction

Citizenship ceremonies are the moment of marking a particular stage in the complex processes of migration and international mobility. For individuals, it signifies the successful navigation of the nation-states' multiple technologies of identification and filtering. As I argued in Chapter 2, the legal framework of nation-states needs to be understood as emerging out of a history of Western imperialism, which is also gendered, classed and raced. There have been suggestions that national citizenship is no longer the most critical membership and affiliation that shapes access to rights. For Yasemin Soysal, the increasing acceptance of a universal concept of citizenship which is based on individual personhood – rather than national belonging – means that resident workers share many of the rights of national citizens (Soysal 1995). Nonetheless, recently there has been increased attention given to the reassertion of state control of borders and the spread of practices of bordering from the external frontiers to locations such as medical practices and universities within the state. Citizenship status within the nation continues to have important consequences. Aiwha Ong claims that 'the multiple passport holder is an apt contemporary figure: he or she embodies the split between state-imposed identity and personal identity caused by political upheavals, migration and changing global markets' (Ong 1999: 2). Thus far, this book has examined how the ceremonies have been constructed in

different countries by the state or people acting on behalf of the state. As was discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the ceremonies seek to underline this moment, to mark as a rite of passage the moment of a perceived transformation from one status – perhaps the outsider, visitor or merely resident – to that of citizen, with the social, political and economic rights that are associated with citizenship. The ceremonies make various claims about the nature of both the countries into which the new citizens are being welcomed, and about the new citizens themselves. This is done largely without reference to the motivations and experiences of the new citizens in their migration and settlement in new countries, apart from occasional metaphors about the journey's end. The next two chapters ask what we can learn about the experience of becoming a new citizen from the new citizens themselves. The ceremonies, like other rites of passage, create the citizands as a homogeneous group without significant differences among them. At the moment they are called to stand together and say the oath or pledge as one, they are constructed as a single group of 'new citizens' who somehow share a status. As discussed in Chapter 4, the ceremonies represented the choice to become British citizens in various ways: as the outcome of strong desire; as a significant change in identity, signalling a pride in Britain. At the same time, some ceremonies suggested that they were newcomers who needed introduction to the local areas and to what it was to be a British citizen.

This chapter will consider some of the differences between the citizands and the diverse range of experiences of migration and settlement that are a product of the many differences (including age, gender, country of origin, and roots in and routes to Britain) among those who are brought together in the citizenship ceremonies. Firstly, the fieldwork will be introduced, detailing how new citizens were approached for interviews in the UK, and what implications this approach might have for what they said. Some of the difficulties of attracting interviewees will be considered and, in particular, I will suggest that the context in which potential research participants were approached – before and after the citizen ceremonies – and the apparent reluctance of many to be involved, can tell us something about their experiences with officialdom in the process of gaining entry to and the right to stay in Britain. The many differences between the interviewees and the impact of different routes into Britain will also be explored to remind us that migration is a long process which affects many personal relationships and requires adaption and adjustment from those who migrate. The final section of the chapter will explore the different reasons that the new citizens gave for acquiring British citizenship, illustrating the very different

circumstances of the citizands. For some, British citizenship is the only route open to them to obtain a passport and all the ease of travel and identification that British or European passports can ensure. For others, particularly those from Europe, logistics and convenience are less of an issue, but British citizenship can confirm a sense of belonging and possibly a commitment to stay in Britain. The reasons for applying for citizenship (as well as the reasons for not having applied earlier) suggest that different forms of belonging may be important (for example, being a resident of a city or having postcolonial attachments). These alternative connections have the potential to contest an exclusive focus on national citizenship and belonging.

The chapter will argue that the new citizens' accounts can tell us about the impact of shifting policies on immigration and naturalisation and how these influence the actions and thinking of migrants to Britain. It also throws light on how citizenship and belonging are experienced and possibly contested in the everyday. The decision to apply for naturalization has to be understood in the context of the policy regimes in which it takes place, including continually changing rules, regulations and costs of immigration, permanent residence and naturalisation. Not only has the question of citizenship been higher in the public eye since the ceremonies and testing were introduced, but also costs of applying for naturalisation continue to rise, motivating some to apply sooner rather than later, as they fear the process will become even more difficult or expensive. Interviews with new citizens can shed light on these changing dynamics.

Talking to new citizens

As well as seeking to observe the various ceremonies both around the United Kingdom and internationally, I was keen to get the perspective of those who were the subjects of the rituals – the new citizens themselves. As I went round the country witnessing the ceremonies across the UK, I also approached the citizands to see if they were willing to speak to me about their experience of coming to Britain and their response to the ceremonies. This had the advantage that we could talk about the actual event that they had been a part of, as I was also there, and it was a convenient way to contextualise the interviews. At the same time, it became clear that this approach, on the day of and at the location of the ceremony, had disadvantages. The ways in which meeting the participants had shaped their responses to me was brought home to me because, at the same time as I was interviewing new citizens, I was

also involved in a project on school choice. This looked at how parents approached the question of choosing secondary schools for their children and how factors of race, class and gender did – or did not – play a part in their choices. In many ways, the contacting and selection of interviewees was similar. In both cases, we identified a place where the potential participants would be and gained permission to try and recruit them from the institution concerned. In the case of the research in schools, we (research associate Carla De Tona and I) spoke to parents as they waited for parent-teacher meetings at their children's schools. This was an extremely effective way of recruiting participants for the research. It was easy to talk to people as they sat outside classrooms waiting for their turn to speak to the teachers. They were all generally eager to talk about their experiences of choosing schools. We would approach parents and try to set up a meeting (usually in their houses) over the next few days. We achieved a very high 'hit rate', with few refusals (which were mostly because of time constraints). At the interviews themselves, we also found the parents eager to talk about the various issues that arose when thinking about secondary schools for their children. Due to the demographic make-up of at least two of the three selected areas, we also had a relatively large number of participants who had not been born in Britain and had also not had their schooling in Britain.¹ In general, apart from those for whom language presented a real barrier, migrant parents were also easy to recruit and happy to take part in the research, as schooling was something they were concerned about and interested in talking about.²

Interviewees for the citizenship project were approached on the day of their ceremony in 10 different towns and cities³ in the UK. The registrars who organised them were generally very open to giving access to the ceremonies (which in the UK are officially private events) and facilitating my approach to new citizens. Generally, there is a period where the citizens wait either in the room where the ceremonies will take place, or in a waiting area. During this period, the registrars sign the citizens in and check that they have brought all the necessary documentation. This meant that there was a convenient time where citizens could be approached, given information about the project, and asked to consider if they might be willing to be interviewed after the ceremony. Whilst this gave easy access to potential participants, it was clear that, in other ways, this method of access was perhaps not ideal. In my introduction to potential interviewees, I would stress that I was a university researcher and that I had nothing to do with the register office or the Home Office. Those waiting for their citizenship were polite

and friendly. But they were also quite nervous, often unsure of what was to come and possibly not clear whether this supposedly ceremonial event would become another hurdle to be overcome. As a result, there was a very high rate of refusal, at least in comparison to the project on school choice. Some of the citizens I approached would say, 'Is it ok if I say no?' I would assure them that they were under no obligation, and at that point, the conversation would often end. Even those who agreed in principle to be interviewed did not always follow up with the commitment. People would not answer the phone or did not call back when I left messages. Others would ask me to call them, and then say they had changed their minds when I did. Sometimes, when I turned up to pre-arranged interviews at the interviewees' houses, they were not there and avoided making another arrangement when I called them. On one occasion, I was convinced that the woman who had agreed to be interviewed was in the house (I could see movements inside in response to the doorbell), but she avoided the interview by not answering the door.

Given that the school choice research also featured a number of migrant families, who in fact were often more recent arrivals in Britain with potentially more insecure status, I think the difference in response to the request for interviews stems from the different relationship that the potential interviewees from each project had to the institutions which gave me access. Despite any difficulties that parents may have with schools, they are generally regarded positively as service providers. The parents we interviewed largely felt that their children's primary schools provided a caring environment for their children, as well as being supportive in their education. They had also all chosen to attend parent-teacher meetings, whilst attendance at a citizenship ceremony is compulsory. For many of those who had succeeded in attaining citizenship, their experience of getting visas to enter and to stay in Britain, the processes leading to permanent residence and, finally, citizenship had been slow, often very stressful, and had involved encountering a culture of disbelief and scrutiny (Tyler 2006; Pannett 2011). Even those new citizens who had more elite forms of transnational movement – for example, those whose entry to Britain was managed by the corporations for which they worked – had often felt a sense of unease under the scrutiny of the state. Although the citizenship ceremonies are not organised by the Home Office, but by registrars who make an effort to be warm and welcoming in their encounters, nonetheless, for some citizens, this distinction may not be so clear. The ceremony and those, such as myself, who they encountered there, may well still be associated with officialdom and the scrutiny of the state. In addition, for many,

the interviews involved talking about difficult experiences, although, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, they were often downplayed. Migration and settlement in a new country can be a challenging experience, even while it may offer opportunities. It involves leaving family members behind and adapting to new cultural contexts. Thus, it often prompts mixed feelings.

Another feature of interviewing respondents around the time of their citizenship ceremonies is that it perhaps made most prominent a particular part of their experience of moving from one country to another. Here, after all, was some kind of conclusion to what could be characterised as a 'journey'. This does not mean necessarily that it could be considered an end of the road, but the ceremony did mark the end of a long bureaucratic process. Many respondents felt considerable relief that the ceremony was over and the process of attaining citizenship was finished. For some, taking part in the interview appeared to give them a way of marking that, or reflecting on it at least. As one interviewee put it, she was pleased to get citizenship 'because it is my future'. There was perhaps a tendency within the interviews for respondents to focus on the positive and minimise the negative. This was a time, as some saw it, to move on from the difficulties of the process and be positive. This is not to say that people did not give accounts of the difficulties they had encountered in coming to and staying in Britain, but I felt these accounts were somewhat muted by the circumstances in which we met. Other citizens clearly were affected by the ceremony and did take it as representing the beginning of a new stage of their life. Participating in the interview could also contribute to this. A couple of interviewees explicitly mentioned that agreeing to be interviewed was part of making a contribution; as one put it as we concluded the interview, 'Done my civic duties'.

Thus those who were willing and able to be interviewed for this research (30 in total) represent a particular subset of the new citizens, and they share some characteristics. Alongside a willingness to talk, they were sufficiently confident in their English language skills – although one interview was conducted in a mixture of English and Urdu with a translator assisting the process. The participants came from 19 different countries of origin and, apart from the absence of those originally from the Philippines, broadly match the range of countries of origin of those applying for citizenship in the UK.⁴ Their ages ranged from young adults to late 60s. Twice as many women as men agreed to be interviewed. There are slightly more women naturalising each year in the UK than men, but not enough to account for this difference.⁵ It is likely that more

women took part because of a combination of reasons. Often couples were getting citizenship at the same time, and the women volunteered to be interviewed, possibly because some of the women did not work, so they were more able to make arrangements to meet again for the interview (although many of the women I interviewed *were* working). I also think that there was a gendered response in that women were more likely to feel sympathetic to me as another woman and want to help out and perhaps also more comfortable with the prospect of sitting down and talking to me in a more private space.

The next section will explore further the differences between interviewees. At one level, they represent an elite group of migrants – those who are able to come to Britain legally and stay long enough to qualify for citizenship. However, it's also important to see the many diverse routes into citizenship that they have taken, as well as the ways in which their experiences of migration are often gendered. The accounts that the interviewees give also show that many feel the need to respond to ideas of the 'good migrant' who deserves to become the 'good citizen', as opposed to 'the undeserving migrant', anti-citizen or impossible citizen.

Routes to and roots in Britain

The diversity of the people I interviewed is in part shown by the different routes of entry to Britain, as well as differences in their length of residency in Britain before they applied for citizenship. Many of those who were interviewed had put in the application as soon as they were eligible (usually five years, although a shorter period for those on a spousal visa). However, for others, there had been considerable delay before they applied. As will be discussed below, these delays reflected both changes in their own orientation towards British citizenship, but also changes in the naturalisation regimes which made it seem more urgent to take up the status before future changes made it more expensive to apply, or even made them ineligible.⁶ In terms of the routes they took into Britain, experiences differed widely. For some of the interviewees, their entry was managed and mediated by the multinational corporations which had brought them into the country for work and who also managed the visa application process and other logistical issues. Coming as a professional worker meant not only that applying for visas may be done for you, but also that you have a ready-made set of colleagues and broadly familiar work practices to slot into. The company may also help with finding accommodation and with other

practical issues such as finding schools for children. Those who come to work in professional jobs are also likely to speak English well, and those who are white do not find themselves positioned as an Other within a racialised schema⁷ or confronted with racism (see discussion below).

Others interviewees initially made use of 'ancestral' visas which give individuals from Commonwealth countries the right to stay in Britain for 3 years on the basis of having a grandparent born in Britain. These are largely available to white people (see Tyler 2010 for a discussion of the racialisation of British immigration policy). There were several interviewees who had come on 'spousal' visas and, as will be discussed below, some found it to be a very isolating experience.

Several of the interviewees had come into Britain as asylum seekers and therefore, unlike others, did not necessarily have a choice of where they were going to live. Asylum seekers cannot work and have an uncertain status in Britain until refugee status is granted – often a long and difficult process of establishing claims to a sceptical state (Pannett 2011). Those who came by this route included children who had arrived in Britain alone or with one or both parents. Melody⁸ came to Britain on her own at the age of 15 as a child asylum seeker after the death of both her parents in Zimbabwe. Melody felt that she had been supported in the process, by social workers and her foster family. 'I felt I was treated like a special person,' she recalled. However, she explains with, one suspects, considerable understatement that:

It was...it was difficult. It was. And my experience as well, like my coming over wasn't a nice experience so, it was very hard for me because I was young and stuff. [...] leading a life on your own, like, having to go through life like on your own is hard.

Despite praising the care she received, particularly from her foster family, Melody almost burst into tears as she explained how most of her friends (both British and of Zimbabwean origin) knew nothing of her past, as she felt they wouldn't be able to relate to it and might judge her.

Others who came as adult, rather than child asylum seekers, were likely to have had less support when they arrived and had to negotiate the long and very difficult processes of applying for asylum, dealing with the Home Office and Border Agency, and eventually (after being granted refugee status, which generally takes years) finding work and/or applying for benefits. Often much of this had to be done without knowledge of English and sometimes having left family (including partners

and children) at home. Laleh described her experience of coming to Britain from Iran:

When I came here about eleven years ago my children stayed and I ran away and it was very difficult. I never forget the first six months. I used to only cry and walking around the town. My English was very very poor and I didn't understand anything. [...] I was very depressed and I was very upset for myself.

For Laleh, who was eventually joined by her children, the experience of coming to Britain was possible to tell as one with a classic narrative arc of difficulty and struggle followed by positive outcomes. Laleh explained that this time at the ceremony, 'I only cried myself to be pleased. This is my home. This is where I really feel safe and free. I like it here. It is a good country, and it feels good after eleven years'.

The pain of being separate from family is particularly difficult for asylum seekers and refugees, for whom return is often impossible, but it was shared by many migrants. Several women had come to Britain to join their husbands after a recent marriage. This might mean that, even if they were educated and spoke English well, they could feel isolated from home and family, without the already established networks that their husbands had through having lived in Britain for a long time, or through work. Madhu was a highly educated Indian woman for whom coming to Britain was associated with a particularly difficult time in her life:

Because I'd just got married and come at the beginning. Because, in India, it's totally different, you know? I had an arranged marriage and my husband was here when we fixed – I mean ... once I had seen him and he'd been to see me. We didn't know each other very well, and then I came over here and it really was good because the weather was fine. But when I conceived my daughter, it was winter. And even I was not expecting ... It was just an accident and it was a horrible time. I was just crying for all year. Finally, she got born and then I felt okay. Now I feel lucky to have her. But back then, it was, like, horrible.

A similar experience was related by Amna, who had come over from Bangladesh to join her husband:

In the beginning it was really, really difficult. The reason I ... the only problem, is everybody was in Bangladesh, so I had to come here

otherwise, because I got married with my husband. The main thing is the homesickness. Apart from other thing, everything's fine. Just the homesickness and family. Not seeing the family there.

For Rada, coming to Britain from Bulgaria as a student and then staying to work had also been a struggle with a gendered dimension:

That was more difficult. I didn't live like this before. It was a little bit difficult. It was a time when Bulgaria was not in the European Union and I wasn't a British citizen. So I was a single mum and didn't have any support. So I worked quite a few hours and I had a lady to look after him. So I paid the rent and I paid to her and I didn't have any child benefit and child support and a really tough time.

Like Laleh's story, these could be told as ones with early struggles but more positive outcomes. Whilst the interviewees often talked about missing their families, they also spoke of being more settled, with friendship networks and greater educational and work opportunities. Gaining citizenship often also meant that they hoped to be able to bring family members over for visits. It is understandable that the moment of gaining citizenship might lead to the production of classic narratives of migration: the early struggle which is endured and overcome, followed by the more secure and positive future. This narrative, which echoes the narrative of the American Dream, as was discussed in Chapter 3, did make sense for some of the interviewees. The context in which the interviews happened – on the day of, or shortly after the citizenship ceremonies, may well have helped produce this narrative for some. As Sonia (also a single mother) explained, even though she didn't think there was anything particular to celebrate about getting citizenship:

It just feels like a milestone really. You've been travelling so far and when you finally get to where you want to, because you work hard to get there, you didn't just sit on your bum and it would just come to you, you had to work to pay and you had to work hard to get everything you need and you're still working hard.

Whilst Sonia does see the ceremony as marking her journey, nonetheless, it is interesting how she also puts this in a defensive narrative which stresses that citizenship is not a gift; rather it is something she has worked for. Here we can see the need to navigate some of the discourses around the idea of 'good' and 'bad' immigrants. By stressing how she

has worked to earn her citizenship, Sonia appears to pre-empt discourses which present migrants to Britain as 'scroungers' who intend to live off state benefits (Anderson 2013).

It was not only women who felt isolation. Several of the men had come to Britain alone, and were only able to bring their partners and families to join them once they had been in Britain for some time. Habib had come to Britain as an asylum seeker and spoke of losses he experienced through this forced migration. Habib's attitude to being in Britain is positive and starts a narrative of how migration has brought positive improvements in his life, but he has to check himself, to remember that his life doesn't quite fit into that narrative: 'We are happy anyway, but...because my life is so much better than...actually, it was much better in Iran...I had my own house....I had my own house and jobs, and my family was around me.'

Thus, whilst gaining citizenship was something he felt very happy and relieved about, he reflected on the fact that his current situation, working in a corner shop despite holding a PhD, with few social networks and only his wife with him, was a significant step down from his more middle-class existence in Iran, surrounded by family and friends. Later in the interview, Habib also explained how his parents had been unable to visit him, as they had been refused a visa to come to Britain, and then his father had died in Iran, but Habib had been unable to return before his death or for the funeral. Dislocation from family was something which affected him strongly.

Parwiaz, from Afghanistan, had also come to Britain as an asylum seeker. He had been alone for ten years, until he was able to bring his wife and child over to Britain. He had waited a long time to get refugee status, and then indefinite leave to remain, and felt that both this long wait and the exploitative job situations he had experienced had an injurious effect, from which he was not sure he could totally recover:

I'm more happy now, I'm happy when I've got power as well as everyone else. But at the end of the day it makes damage, I don't know. This happens, I just forget. They've done it. [...] It is very stressful. [...] I never knew anything [would] happen to me like that.

With the phrase 'it makes damage', Parwiaz gives a powerful sense of the way in which experiences of migration and passing through the state's immigration and citizenship regimes can alter migrants' sense of themselves as well as how they relate to others. Both Parwiaz and Habib

lived in areas of the country where there were not large communities of ethnic minorities, and this may have increased their sense of isolation.

The experience of coming to Britain had also required adjustments and produced changes in other interviewees. For example, Amna said that living in the multicultural space of Britain had changed in terms of her approach to cultural (and perhaps implicitly religious) difference:

Because not many [...] foreigners lived in Bangladesh, so if just only your own people are living around you and stuff. But in this country when [...] there's loads of different, people of totally different backgrounds. So, living with them it's like I don't feel, I don't really think they are from my country but are my surroundings, my conditions, that is so – mixing with them or going out, staying with them [...] I don't face any problems to mix with some other person who doesn't believe in cultural things, so I am adjusting.

Amna appears to have an ambivalent attitude to her new context living in a multicultural city in Britain. There is a sense that this is a new experience, but also perhaps a feeling that this exposure to difference also is quite challenging.⁹ Many interviews shared this feeling of ambivalence. Migration has brought gains as well as losses, both in terms of material circumstances, opportunities and a sense of changing affiliations. For many of the respondents, wider job opportunities were a major reason why they had come to Britain, although that does not necessarily mean that it is an easy process. As Makena, a nurse from Kenya, put it:

Because there are a lot of new things to learn that gives me excitement, getting to know people, people's encouragement, to work in a different environment, different experiences, principally exciting. It's a bit tough because my family's not here, that's the tough part.

Similarly, Helen, a school teacher from South Africa, gave some of the reasons that had brought her to England:

There's better job opportunities, lovely experiences. My husband also, you know, getting brilliant experience as a builder and myself as a teacher. Amazing experience and I hope that I've learned over the last few years – just mountains of experiences.

These are narratives which, on balance, see migration as having produced positive outcomes. However, for some of the interviewees, as

with Parwaiz and Habib, the dominant feeling is one of loss. This could be the case even where the interviewees had not been refugees forced out of their home countries. Chun, a nurse, explained that she had paid a heavy price for the decision to 'come out' of China. When she left, Chun had left her young daughter behind with her parents. She now felt that she was 'mentally separate' from her own family. She wanted to bring her ten-year-old daughter to Britain, but she was settled into the Chinese system and not keen to come. This feeling of separation was also underlined by the fact that China does not allow dual citizenship (which will be discussed below). Looking back, Chun regretted the way migration had changed her life course: 'When I came out, she was young. I had my own ambitions. If I could do it again I would never do it. It's very hard. I used to look at other children playing and I missed my daughter.'

It perhaps felt to Chun, who is now married to a white British man, that leaving China and her daughter had put them on separate tracks which were not likely to converge. The decision to migrate had more consequences than she had anticipated. This section has shown how, whilst there may be positive aspects to migration, moving from one country to another can be a painful process, causing ruptures in relationships with family and potentially in one's sense of self. Those for whom return is blocked or curtailed, including for both refugees, and those in situations where dual citizenship is not allowed, appear to be the most affected. The next section will consider the reasons that those I spoke to gave for applying for British citizenship, which also reveals the differences (in rights, in experience and expectations) among interviewees. It will also explore the ways in which the interviewees constructed ideas of belonging.

Why become a citizen?

There are likely to be multiple and overlapping reasons for applying for citizenship in a country you have migrated to, some of which are more practical and others more emotional. The impact of obtaining new citizenship on individuals depends on their country of origin and the rights to travel, employment, benefits and so on that they already have. It will also be influenced by what stage of life they are in and the nature of family networks. British citizenship will have a varying importance to people depending on whether they are younger or older; whether they have children and where their parents and other family members live. It will also have an impact on those who want, and can afford, to

travel, and for those who might want to work in other countries in the European Union. Whilst ease of travel and employment in Europe was a frequently mentioned reason for applying for citizenship, it is interesting that, as discussed in Chapter 4, the citizenship ceremonies in the UK (like those in Ireland and the Netherlands) make no comment on this important aspect of UK citizenship. The next section will explore some of the difficulties faced for those without European citizenship.

Life without the 'right' passport

This section will suggest that accounts about the disadvantages of not having European citizenship illustrate the stress of certain border crossings, as well as the effect of citizenship on employment prospects. Hamed, a young man who had come to Britain from Iran as a child, explained the opportunities which he felt having citizenship would offer him:

Firstly, having a British passport certainly means I can travel freely, more freely and in terms of job applications it will certainly help because employers have less concern if you have a British passport and British citizenship, so these are the main differences it will make to my life.

Refugees have to apply for a travel document to be able to travel outside Britain, which, as Habib explained, could involve extra scrutiny at the borders, both in order to enter other countries and to re-enter Britain: 'it's definitely different [travelling on travel documents rather than a passport]. They questioned me here, questioned me there.' In addition, as Saima explained, this was not just the case with travel, but other administrative tasks: 'Without a passport it's very difficult. Other people... in everyday matters, you give your identity. So we have no other identity without a passport. ... The passport makes life easy.' For others, the question of logistical convenience which went with the legal status of being a citizen was not stressed to the same extent, with more focus on claims of belonging and membership of the community. Anuja was of Indian origin, but she had grown up in Bahrain and married a British man whom she had met there. She applied for citizenship as soon as she could:

As soon as I got my indefinite leave to remain; that's when I thought that I'll apply for citizenship as well and just because, you know, I just thought that – I felt like I was already following the norms and the

culture and everything, and I felt like a part of it already. And I think that having British – a British citizenship has a lot of benefits as well and if you – if you are kind of becoming a part of the community and the culture I thought that it would be good.

Here again, whilst the legal status of citizenship is presented as a practical resource, it is placed within a context of being ‘a part of’ society, that goes beyond the legal status. Although Anuja also suggests citizenship will enable her to ‘become a part of the community and culture’, she clearly feels that she already is fulfilling that in some ways. Here, belonging is based on a normative notion of citizenship in which inclusion depends on ‘following the norms and the culture’, which may also be used to exclude those who are deemed to be unable to fit in. For others, such as Madhu, legal citizenship might offer protection against discrimination:

I know a lot of friends who face it [suspicion], in London because, where you would find a lot of people living illegally there and then, everybody’s looked at under the, the suspicious eye by, either officials or, you know, a walking policeman – you know, somebody in the police station.

Whilst legal status won’t affect all kinds of discrimination (many of which are based on assumptions triggered by visual markers), Madhu hoped that legal status would alleviate some of the suspicion and discrimination she may face. The next section considers those for whom the legal status of British citizenship offers few extra rights (apart from voting) because they were already European citizens.

European citizens

When thinking about why people go through the time-consuming and expensive process of applying for citizenship in Britain, Europeans who apply for British citizenship are an interesting case. There are relatively few disadvantages for EU citizens living and working in Britain without British citizenship. EU citizens can travel freely across European borders, work without any restrictions, get mortgages and other financial credit, and, with some exceptions, claim welfare benefits. They can also vote in local and European elections, although not in national elections.¹⁰ So it is interesting to consider why those who have little practical advantage to gain apply for citizenship, despite the high costs: At the time of the interviews, it cost at least £700 to apply for citizenship, a price that did not include the cost of a passport itself.

Rada had come to Britain from Bulgaria, initially to study, at a time when Bulgaria was not part of the EU. She explained that, after many years, she had applied for citizenship simply because her Bulgarian passport was running out, and it seemed easier to apply for British citizenship than to make the trip to Bulgaria simply to renew her passport. She felt the need to add, 'Not that I'm disrespectful to the nation'. In some ways, this reflects the dissonance experienced by those who are undertaking an administrative act of applying for citizenship, but have a sense of other peoples' expectation that the pledge or oath of allegiance will mean something deeper. This difference in sentiment is likely to be underlined by the ceremony itself. As was outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, in some ceremonies there is an anxiety that the citizenship pledge or oath will not be sufficiently deeply felt, or that real or authentic citizenship relies on other actions and dispositions beyond the ceremony and oath-taking itself. However, this proposes a rather restrictive sense of citizenship which ignores the ways in which people as residents are already fully participating in the national life and culture.

Rada explained that to function in Britain with an EU passport was easy:¹¹

Yes, definitely. Nobody is asking you for the passport or nothing. You've got good credit score, you can have your mortgage, the doctor knows you and the school – your child does well. Nobody even asks my nationality at all. To do well, behaving yourself. Especially in London because it's a cosmopolitan city full of people.

Thus, for Rada, to be accepted in a society does not rest on the legal status of citizenship. She feels that 'to do well', you have to 'behave yourself', which presumably means complying with legal and social norms of behaviour. She suggests that acceptance is particularly easy to gain in London 'because it's a cosmopolitan city full of people'. This raises further questions about the nature of certain city spaces and the ways in which they shape ideas of belonging, which will be returned to below. In this account, the significance of legal citizenship is reduced. The ceremony was, for Rada, another inconvenience (along with the expense) in the process of applying for citizenship. However, it transpired that her British husband appeared to be more affected by the process, accompanying Rada to the ceremony and insisting on buying two official photos of her receiving her citizenship, one for their home and one to be sent to Rada's mother in Bulgaria.

Whilst for Rada British citizenship was largely a bureaucratic convenience, for other EU citizens, obtaining British citizenship could be symbolic: a way of further marking a sense of belonging. For example, Bernard, from Germany, had lived in Britain for more than 30 years. He explained that, in the context of the attention given more recently to citizenship, and as he approached retirement, the fact that his daughters were British and settled in Britain made him feel that he would also like to be British. In addition, his anger at the way the Labour Government had taken Britain into war in Iraq, and his frustration about not being able to vote against Tony Blair made him want to be able to vote in British General Elections. Only formal citizenship would give him the right to participate in this way. He had not brought his wife or children to the ceremony and, in retrospect, regretted this, as he had been more moved by it than he had expected and wished they had been there.

Adriana was a practicing vet from Spain and, in contrast to Bernard, expressed no desire to gain or use the right to vote, although notably she frames this exercise of the right to vote as a 'contribution' (I will return below to the question of citizenship and contribution): 'Well, I am not very much into politics and I'm not really much into politics in Spain either, so no, I'm not sure that I will actually contribute in that respect.' Adriana had been in Britain for six years and in fact had applied twice for British citizenship (and therefore had to pay the fees twice). The first application was rejected because she had not had sufficient years of residency in Britain, and Adriana felt that the way the rules were explained was misleading. In addition, 'I had to apply again, and it wasn't a nice thing, really. I wish they were more clear in that respect.' She was also frustrated that the home office did not take her particular circumstances into account:

I know that they, they can apply their own criteria, in certain cases, for instance if you own your own property or if you show that you have some links with the country, they regard it as fact that I, for instance, have a property and a mortgage for over five years, they just disregarded that completely and I effectively lost £700 approximately.

Despite the considerable expense, Adriana was not put off, and she applied again as soon as she was eligible. Her main motivation was a deeply felt Anglophilia:

I don't really know, I think it's a sense of pride, I suppose [...] I do really admire this country. As much as I love Spain, because I am from there, after six years I can honestly say that I do love this country and

I am proud to say that I am British as well [...] when I first came here I thought that I wouldn't last a year because it was so cold, but the job opportunities that I have in this country are immense. [...] honestly, I love English. It's a passion [...] the more I stayed in this country, the more obsessed I became with the idea of, not mastering English because I never will, but I do love my language as well.

Here again, we see an expression of ambivalence, or at least the fear that expressing a love of English might also mean a lack of love for Spanish. Part of the 'pride' Adriana felt in Britain was an appreciation of what she termed British values (which she characterised as a lack of racism and openness to foreigners): 'That's one of the reasons why I want to become British because of pride, it's pride in values being British.'

These examples of people from the EU taking British citizenship demonstrate the range and complexity of emotions (or lack of them) which can be involved in deciding to apply for citizenship, particularly in the context of the current climate of heightened attention to questions of immigration in Britain. Two of the interviewees who, like Bernard and Rada, had lived in Britain for many years before they applied for citizenship, help to demonstrate how public discussions around citizenship have changed over time in Britain and how this has an impact on those who have migrated to Britain. The following section, which considers two cases of new citizens who had applied for citizenship many years after they were eligible, sheds light on the impact of changing discourses around citizenship and belonging.

Why apply now, if not before?

Simone had come to Britain from Liberia in the mid 1980s, accompanying her student husband. She had lived in Britain ever since and now worked as a schoolteacher. She explained that, until recently, she hadn't seen the need to apply for citizenship:

Maybe because I have been here for such a long time. I came on a different status so there didn't seem to be a lot of need. So I think if you come on a different form, most folk come on a refugee status [...] you know, they see that security of citizenship. I didn't fall into that category. [...] I needed to feel that this was what I really wanted to do. [...] I could have applied earlier but I think that it's something that you just get assimilated with the society and you just keep going and then all of a sudden everybody start talking about you. [talking about] citizenship. You have to start taking the tests, you have to start

to know whereas before you could just apply because of the length of time. I think I just got comfortable and then my son said once 'you have been here for so long how are you going to apply for this thing'. I say 'ok I'm going to do it'.

Simone's account shows an awareness of the changing political and bureaucratic context in which citizenship is gained. Whilst she can see that refugees would need the security of citizenship, she felt secure and 'assimilated', at least until 'all of a sudden everybody start talking about you'. Having felt comfortable and settled in Britain, with a new discourse about citizenship being promoted, she felt she was under renewed scrutiny.

As popular constructions of the anti-citizen or of those who could/should not belong become stronger, it becomes more important to establish one's status as a citizen. In her explanation of why she enjoyed preparing for the citizenship test, we again get a sense of the risks of exclusion and of the shifting boundaries between 'them' and 'us'. Simone explained that her increased knowledge will keep her from being regarded as 'a dumb foreigner. You will know what you are talking about.' Learning about history will give her:

a sense of belonging that, maybe, I mean you'd know that, ok they might say 'well, that's not a British accent and you're not white'. But I think it doesn't really matter what your accent is. I think it has to be: you belong to something, you feel about a country. I think that is the difference. [...] I have spent most of my life here.

Despite this sense that being black and having a foreign accent may make being regarded as British impossible, Simone said that Britain was 'a country that gave me more than my own country'. She went on to explain the education and degrees she had earned in Britain, and the fact that she owned her own house. British culture had given her a sense of independence as a woman: 'It's like opening doors,' she contended. 'And to say that you're a woman, and you can be what you can be.' Simone applied for citizenship as a way to demonstrate her sense of belonging. She also hoped that it would ease the stress and humiliation of some border crossings. She had found that, particularly travelling within the EU and the United States, a Liberian passport produced extra scrutiny and suspicion:

I think you feel travelling, you feel very inferior and sometimes like you... people are trying to look at your passport. I find it very offensive

because your passport is your identity and they are trying to undermine it. [...] I think that maybe [it is in] the EU and United States where you tend to feel a little, you feel different [...] and undermined because of the country where you [come] from. I think this is very bad [...] I really don't think it is right. A passport does not make a person. A passport it is just a book, you know, a document that you travel with. Although it is an identity, it should not be an identity that undermines a person [...] It's just where you're born. No-one is responsible for where they were born. You are responsible for where you go.

This is a powerful statement about the power of citizenship to mark and exclude people and the stress involved in border crossings. It suggests a refusal to see citizenship as a central identity. The passport – that proof of citizenship identity – ‘is just a book’. What matters more to Simone is what she termed ‘assimilation’, which she elaborated as involvement in society through education and work: ‘Saying I am willing to work hard, I am willing to learn, and I am willing to make a difference’. For Simone, at particular moments, when ‘everyone’ is talking about citizenship and what tests should have to be passed before you can receive it, the formal bureaucratic process and recognition as a citizen can become important in a way that it wasn't before. Although she had felt she belonged, now it becomes necessary to prove it in a more official way. Here we see the tension between legal citizenship and other ways in which people can feel they belong and participate in citizenship acts – as people with membership and rights akin to those of citizenship.

Another interviewee who had lived in Britain for a long time without feeling the need to apply for British citizenship was Ghedi, in his mid-20s, who had come from Somalia at the age of 10 with his parents and siblings as asylum seekers. He had not seen himself as someone who needed to document and back up his claim for citizenship. In fact, he had delayed applying for citizenship for many years (despite filling in the forms for the rest of his family to apply some years before). He explained why he had not, until recently, got round to it:

We were eligible after we'd been here for, I think, seven years, we were eligible to...But it's never stopped me, you know. I was resident, I was entitled to any of the rights as anybody else; it didn't stop me from anything. So never really – never really thought it would add anything else [...] I'd see people who've been here less than I applying for it and asking me why don't I apply for it. I knew my way around the city.

Ghedi, like Simone, downplays the significance of legal citizenship. He claims rights through being a 'resident'. This proposes a different account of who should be 'at home' in Britain. Ghedi knows his 'way around the city', and this habitual presence and understanding is what, for him, endows belonging. The city, and your ease in it and knowledge of it, can provide an identity.

Ghedi went on to explain that whereas before it had been easy to get jobs with the documentation that he had, this had become more complicated when he'd wanted to apply for a job at the airport and when he had wanted to get a driving license. Whilst this might appear to be a purely practical, logistical issue, Ghedi also pointed out that he had sensed a shift in Britain around attitudes to national identity, something that had never seemed too important. 'I was a resident in Manchester,' he said. 'I was...as far as I was concerned, I never really thought of, you know, what Britishness was.' But he began to notice that in public discourses there was a shift away from the potentially more open (or less exclusively white) identity of 'British'¹² and towards 'English', which was not an identity which he thought he could easily – or 'comfortably' – claim:

I used to work in a school, I was security. I had to fill in the forms with nationality and I was thinking: 'there's no-one putting British'. And then I applied for my university place in Huddersfield, the first year I went there the lady actually told me off because government devolutions are about government and really nobody puts British down.... I don't know that I could classify myself as an English [person]. I was comfortable with British, but English: there's that connotation that you had to be white [to be English]. I've always put British.

Ghedi has been, in certain contexts, calling himself British before he had been granted legal citizenship of Britain. He based this identity claim on his residency and his sense of comfort and familiarity. Having lived in Britain since he was a relatively small child and also having spent time in Somalia where his father now lived, Ghedi had an understanding of identity which recognised its fluidity and the ways in which it depends on recognition as well as self-identification:

When I was outside the UK, I was strongly urged to say I'm British at all times. But when you're here you do kind of – it affects how other people see you, so when the majority see you as either Somali or, you know, black or...I mean I'm all those, so I don't know.[...] When

I went to Somalia, [...] I feel that I have more connections here, I don't know whether – do you know what I mean? [...] I mean my little brother [on a visit to Somalia] was looking for his mate from Manchester who lived in another city that was, what, 50 miles away. So yeah, you do – it shows – it's like the old thing that [when] you don't have it, you know how much at home you feel there. So I know how to tell them that this is where I grew up, you know.

Ghedi is acknowledging that, however he describes himself, as someone who is black and originating from Somalia, being recognized as British is contingent on how 'other people see you'. He also is aware that, having grown up in Britain, he doesn't feel at home in Somalia in the same way he does in Britain – hence the example of his brother wanting to make contact with Manchester friends in Somalia, with whom he perhaps feels he has more in common than those who live where his family 'came from'. The next section will explore further this question of what gives a feeling of belonging or connection and how the sense of being a citizen, with claims and contributions, can predate the legal acquisition of citizenship.

Belonging, citizenship and participation

Just as Ghedi's claim to belonging rested at least in part on his knowledge of and ease in the city of Manchester, it was interesting how, in other interviews, the focus was also on local, rather than national, identities. Melody had been in Liverpool since she arrived in Britain as an unaccompanied child asylum seeker. She was chatting about her friends who wanted to go and live in Manchester, and then went on to discuss the rivalries between the neighbouring cities of Manchester and Liverpool, saying, 'I think Liverpool is trying. We're, we're trying.' Here the stress on 'we' is an act of claiming citizenship in the city space, regardless of legal citizenship status (Isin and Nielsen 2008). Melody explained that:

[c]ompared to Manchester, I think the Liverpool [people] are more friendly...I hate it when it gets to London and it's the shock, you're just getting [...] In London they look at you as if you're strange. [...] Like our taxi drivers here, they'll talk to you as if you've known them for sort of ages.

Melody had a clear sense of a Liverpool that she belonged to, and which was where she felt safe: 'And I'm just, I don't know, when I leave Liverpool

I feel like I'm leaving something behind. Like I'm leaving... oh I don't know to be honest. Really I feel secure here in Liverpool.' To Melody, being Liverpudlian appeared to have a real meaning. The city also represented to her a sense of roots, of where she has affiliations or friends that would be 'left behind' if she were to go anywhere else. Whereas Britishness was perhaps more difficult to relate to, or to feel included in, having come over as a child from Zimbabwe and with no immediate family, Melody was clear that she was very unlikely to want to live in or travel to Zimbabwe, unless she had children and wanted to 'show them where I was from'. Other interviewees who had come as asylum seekers shared this inability or unwillingness to return. Although some asylum seekers had already been back to their countries of origin for visits, others, such as Habib from Iran, no longer had valid passports of their country of origin. Parwaiz explained that he had no intention of obtaining an Afghani passport for his daughter who had been born in Britain.

For others, settling in Britain is a reflection of a commitment to family at a slightly later life-stage. Prakash, originally from India, had worked in medical sales, living first in Singapore, then Bahrain, then Dubai, then back to Bahrain where he met his wife, a nurse, who was also from India. They had moved to Northern Ireland seven years ago when his wife got a job in a hospital, and he became a healthcare assistant. They had tried at one point to move to Australia but had now decided against this further move in order to secure their children's education:

My son has already got a placement in the grammar¹³ school. My daughter is going next year. So I don't want to break their education now. So we'll stay in one place and get the education.... And also, [...] there's no reason to move... because there are no jobs. So there is no change in career prospects. It's not there. So why don't we stay?

What might seem like a fairly random combination of circumstances lead to Prakash and his family applying for British citizenship. However, this has to be understood (as Prakash clearly does) within the context of the flows and blocks within the international job market for caring professionals (Arun 2010; Kingma 2005), as well as the importance he places on education. Moreover, Prakash also goes on to explain how the decision to settle more permanently in Britain had another logic of close cultural ties as a result of colonialism:

And India and Britain are considerably ... nearly the same. Practically, it's the same tradition, Commonwealth countries, corporations, and

culturally the same because... and the language. Everybody can speak English.

This was a theme that Prakash returned to at various points in the interview, pointing out, in a polite rendition of the postcolonial contention, 'We are here because you were there' (Kushnick 1993):

You see, Indians are nearly a hundred years in Britain [...]. Like the tea: all these tea leaves coming from India. So there is, culturally, a lot of relations between the two countries. All of the Commonwealth countries... And language is very... everybody can speak English.

Here, claims to affinity are made through economic ties and cultural roots, rather than genealogy, as in the case of Rebecca from South Africa, who had an ancestral visa, which will be discussed below. Others from Britain's former colonies also expressed this sentiment about a shared history. In addition, Adriana, from Spain also suggested a similar claim to cultural affinity based on region:

It wasn't that difficult at all [settling in] and probably because, at the end of the day, even though we have a different culture, it's not like comparing Britain to, I don't know, China. We Spanish and British people are similar in many, many things, more than in those that differ.

These claims of affinity challenge narrow definitions of national culture, belonging, identity and difference on which anti-immigration discourses, with concerns about people 'fitting in', are often based. Despite Prakash's account of his multiple migrations, he also makes clear that he is embedded in the community in Britain and should not be seen as a temporary sojourner, whatever his legal status. In answer to a question about how he felt about swearing an oath to the Queen, Prakash said, 'It's good. No, as far as I am concerned, I am already a citizen, whether I lived in the past, or in the present or the future. So I have nothing to worry about.'

Prakash's assertion that he was 'already a citizen' is quite a strong one to make, perhaps particularly on the day that he has gone through a citizenship ceremony. The statement contests the restriction of notions of belonging, or membership in community, to the confines of legal citizenship. As such, it may be seen as an 'act of citizenship' in that it is a claim for citizenship beyond legal status (Isin and Nielsen 2008).

Part of Prakash's confidence in his citizenship, which sat apart from the legal procedure, was his participation in the community. He had set up a local association for the relatively small community of people living in Northern Ireland from his home region in India, organising festivals and cultural and diversity programmes in schools. He had already demonstrated his involvement in the community. This activity was what made him a citizen. Prakash was not alone in the feeling that citizenship was not something restricted to legal status and the swearing of an oath. Others made claims of belonging and membership of the community where the legal status was only a small part (if any).

Running through several of the interviews are ideas of what it means to be a citizen (in terms of legal status or other claims). There is a language of what they, as individuals, have 'contributed' – either economically in terms of taxes, or socially and culturally in the way that Prakash suggests. Voting was also seen as positive involvement. Rebecca, from South Africa, pointed out her active participation in her local community, which predated the moment of receiving citizenship:

So one of the things I like to do is tweet. I'm on Twitter quite frequently and my sense of purpose on Twitter was tweeting an idea every day to make Brighton and Hove a better place. And I got up to 185 ideas – and at one stage, the Brighton and Hove council was following me. So I would love to play more of a part in the community.

For some of the interviewees, citizenship seemed to bring not a sense of transformation, but of 'coming home' in some way. Gaining citizenship can feel like they are bringing together different aspects of themselves. Both of the (white) South African women I interviewed were in some sense seeking what might be called 'ancestral closure', a feeling that they had claims to belong in Britain which were not properly recognised until they had got British citizenship. Four of Rebecca's grandparents had been English, and she explained that:

Because I was born outside of the UK even though my parents had British passports I couldn't have a British passport. So it's always been a bit of a like sense of pride I think that it would be great to have one day because I feel a bit of a connection here. [...] I think the driving factor was *this is where I come from* in some shape or form. (emphasis added)

However, Rebecca added, as a white person in South Africa, she also had fears for her long-term stability: 'Can you imagine if I was the only one

in my family who suddenly got trapped [without the right to come to Britain]?’¹⁴

Whilst, for some, gaining citizenship feels like the completion of a journey, or an attempt to resolve questions of identity, for others, taking on British citizenship may feel like it is raising as many questions as it answers. Migrancy perhaps always contains ambivalence and questions around the possibilities of return, yet new citizenship also requires a performance of certainty and permanency. The citizenship application form has a question which asks you to state whether you intend to live in Britain permanently. For some, such as Adriana from Spain, this had given her some pause for thought:

I assume that if you say ‘no’ they would refuse your application which is totally understandable, but, at the same time, it’s very easy to say ‘yes’ because you can change your mind any time, and, at the moment, actually, I’m thinking of staying here, but, God knows, I don’t know [...] I miss my friends and my family and I am in that age where you have to think what you are going to do because, I suppose you know what I mean. Either I stay here forever or I go home within a couple of years.

For others, too, there was considerable uncertainty as to whether they would always stay in Britain. Perhaps, as people who had already undertaken at least one inter-national migration, they knew that it was difficult to be certain about long-term plans and what circumstances might lead them to live elsewhere.

Can I imagine myself living in the UK for the rest of my life? No, but I also can’t imagine living anywhere else, I’m not quite sure where I’m at. I don’t know at the moment, I think the right opportunity might mean, could mean going somewhere else, but I’m not actually looking for somewhere else. (Rebecca, from South Africa)

As with Adriana, concerns about parents left in the countries of origin would often draw people back, or alternatively, hopes for a retirement back in the home country. Rada planned to go back to Bulgaria to a flat she already owned when she and her husband retired, explaining that ‘the lifestyle, for retired people is difficult [in Britain]. The social life there is more open.’ She also explained that ‘on my heart, I’m Bulgarian’. Particularly for those from outside the EU, a British passport opened up further opportunities which made a decision to stay in

the UK permanently potentially harder to make. Like others, Clare from Australia explained that applying for citizenship gave her greater flexibility about her future plans:

The primary benefit to us was being able to move around the EU and live and work in the EU if we wanted to. Also I think as the boys are getting older, moving back to Australia is becoming more and more of an option, and if that doesn't work I want to be able to come back. So it is also security and [a] safety net as well.

Here we have a sentiment reminiscent of the Hong Kong elites researched by Aiwaha Ong (1999:740). This privileged business class followed a strategy of gaining multiple passports to guarantee their ability to choose where to live and work. Although multiple citizenship offers possibilities for both permanent settlement and also return, a clear sense of ambivalence about the implications of taking British citizenship can be seen in the following interview with Neela, a woman who had come from India to accompany her husband, who was employed by a large multinational corporation.

NEELA [on getting British citizenship]: I think it's just making life more easy in some ways and tougher in others.

BB: How's it making it tougher?

NEELA: Tougher, you only have to decide when you going to go back to it, when you want to go back, settle down with your parents or that. [...] like you would think that this is a wasted exercise if you want to go back, [...] And then, I don't know, I don't know any like nobody in my friends or like, relatives are British Nationals and who are living in India, I don't know any of them so I don't know what, what life is for them, so if, if I knew from somebody's experience then maybe I could relate to it, but that's, that's one thing that I feel [...]. The thing is, you miss your parents and no matter how much you talk to them on the phone or you chat on the web, it doesn't equal to you know, seeing them once or so, whatever a fortnight or 20 days.

For Neela, having gone through the process of test, application and ceremony, it now felt as though she had in some way moved away, or delayed a moment when she might 'settle down' with her parents. Geographical distance from her family appears to have been made more permanent for Neela as she gets British citizenship. The required investment of time and

emotional energy suggests a commitment to stay in Britain (or perhaps Europe) which keeps her further away from her parents. This may be particularly heightened for Neela, given that in India she now would have the status of an 'Overseas Citizen of India'.

In the interviews with those who had come from India, there was some confusion about whether or not India allowed its citizens to have dual nationality. This is probably because in 2005, the regulations governing citizenship in India were changed; Indian citizens who gain the citizenship of another country have to surrender their passports and can then be issued a card attesting to their status as 'Overseas Citizen of India'. This card allows unrestricted travel to India, but does not confer voting rights, or the possibility of being employed by the government of India. It prohibits the purchase (although not the inheritance) of agricultural land. Some of those I spoke to were fully aware of the situation but, like Prakash, felt that the card was 'exactly the same as a passport'. Neela explained that there would be a six-month delay before she could be issued this OCI card, and if she wanted to go to India during this period, she would have to apply for a visa to do so on her British passport. She felt that it would be strange to have to apply for a visa to go to her home country. However, other interviewees from India, like Anuja, were convinced that they would keep their normal Indian passport. This confusion demonstrates how the complexities of shifting state relations with their diasporas can be hard for individuals to keep track of, and people can lose their rights without being aware of it.

Not all of the interviewees could have the flexibility of the multiple passport holder (Ong 1999). This was particularly the case for those who came from countries which banned dual citizenship and, unlike India, did not have a way of giving documentation to recognise 'former citizens'. Mya had come to Britain nine years ago from Burma and had had to give up citizenship in Burma. 'I already passed my properties in Burma to my younger sister and my niece,' she recalled. [...] 'It is quite hard, but then you can't have two residencies. If I want to go back to Burma, I have to apply [for a] visa in the Burmese Embassy, and I have to go home as a tourist'. Citizenship is, for some, more than a legal status. What passport you hold can have an impact on your identity. Citizenship can give you a sense of 'home', and the loss of status can sever you from your home. As Chun from China explained, giving up citizenship in your 'home' country in order to take up British identity could be a very difficult decision:

I have to make a choice – choose to be British or Chinese. There is no dual nationality. I've been thinking I've been Chinese all these years

but I have to lose Chinese nationality to be British. It does feel like a big deal. It's such a pity there is not dual nationality in China.

For Chun and Mya, taking British citizenship clearly gives a sense of rupture and loss, rather than the 'completion' suggested by some of those quoted earlier in the chapter. As we saw above, Chun has a sense of loss, not only of her Chinese nationality but also of family as her relations with family members, including her daughter who had stayed in China, were no longer as close as she wished.

Conclusion

The accounts in this chapter can tell us much about the varied experiences of those who find themselves gathered with others as citizands in order to become citizens. They are highly diverse in terms of their experiences of coming to and settling in Britain. Some came for job opportunities and stayed on, almost by accident. Others had come as asylum seekers and in order to achieve safety and security. Several interviewees already had strong cultural links with Britain which gave an additional logic to their coming to – or staying in – the country. These differences are shaped in part by the routes by which they came to Britain. Globalisation may have opened up the possibilities of rapid global travel, but the reality of nation-state structures means that not all can move freely. Citizenship regimes regulate the movements of different national groups across borders and shape the rights which they can claim within countries, thus setting the conditions of migration and decisions about citizenship. Experiences of long-term migration are also shaped by other social structures, including class, gender and race. Several of the women came to Britain accompanying their husbands – or to join new husbands, and they had to build a new life without the structure of work, family, and social networks. For asylum seekers, both men and women, this experience is compounded by having to prove their cases to an often-sceptical state and live a life of uncertainty (and without the right to work) until refugee status is granted. These experiences are very different for those from Europe, on professional work visas or ancestral visas, who are less likely to feel the scrutiny of the state and more likely to have support when settling in Britain.

As the following chapter will examine in more detail, the experiences of different migrants coming to Britain are also shaped by racialised responses, in the general public, in popular discourse, and on the part of the state. Just as there are many different reasons for and experiences

of coming to Britain, there are also varied reasons for and feelings about becoming a British citizen. For some, this is an administrative procedure which will make travel easier, particularly for those who find that border crossing with the 'wrong' passport can be a frustrating and even frightening process. For others, becoming a British citizen is a way of expressing something of what they feel about belonging in Britain. It can be about a desire to participate more fully in society – although for other respondents, legal citizenship status does not determine participation and contribution. Many already feel like full members of society, akin to being citizens. However, for some, the decision to take up British citizenship (something that they may have long been eligible for) comes out of a sense of insecurity and an awareness that both the citizenship regime in Britain and popular discourse have shifted in such a way that they feel the need to ensure their rights and their place in British society. As Simone put it, 'suddenly everyone is talking about you'. The following chapter will take up the question of how it feels 'when everyone is talking about you'. It will address interviewees' sense of whether they were made to feel welcome in Britain and how they reflect on public debates around immigration. It will also examine directly what they thought about the citizenship ceremonies.

6

Welcome to Britain?

They're not very welcoming people, no. That was the bit I didn't get.

Sonia

Introduction

Citizenship ceremonies were introduced in Britain in 2004 as part of a programme of legislation around citizenship rolled out by the New Labour government over several years. The first ceremony was held at Brent Town Hall in London, an area known for its high level of ethnic diversity. The home secretary, David Blunkett (who had introduced the idea of citizenship ceremonies) and Prince Charles were present at the first ceremony which created 19 new citizens. At the ceremony, Blunkett said:

I think the new ceremonies across the country will be the answer to those who fear difference, who fear the diversity which comes with migration of people coming across the world to live in our community and sends a very clear message that those who choose to be part of the family are committing themselves.

Prince Charles added:

Being British is something of a blessing and a privilege for us all...I very much hope that this ceremony has added something to the significance of acquiring British citizenship and that it's reinforced your belief, if indeed any reinforcement is required, that you belong here and that you are very welcome.¹

These statements reflect two potentially contradictory elements of the ceremonies. Firstly, Blunkett's statement reproduces a form of domopolitics (Walters 2004) where the commitment of those joining the 'family' can be used to alleviate the fears of the host population. Thus those who fear difference can be reassured with the idea that pledges have been made. Prince Charles follows this argument with the suggestion that the ceremonies can both underline the importance of British citizenship, which he sets up as a 'blessing and a privilege', as well as demonstrating how new citizens are (and have always been) welcome. The ceremonies serve to build up British citizenship as something worth having – British is here suggested to be best. Anne Marie Fortier suggests that the ceremonies are an 'example of the entanglement of technologies of reassurance with technologies of enmity within the fantasy of national unity' (Fortier 2008: 101). However, I would argue that the role of the ceremony as part of the technologies of reassurance, whilst that might have been the intention behind the introduction of the ceremonies, is less than clear. If we compare the coverage given to the introduction of the citizenship ceremonies to that of citizenship testing introduced a year later (and the ongoing coverage given to new versions of the test), the ceremonies do not appear to attract enough attention to be regarded as a reassurance. The ceremonies are relatively small and officially private, conducted on a regular (sometimes twice weekly) basis all over the country. Very few British people will have seen them (largely only when they are the guests of new citizens). Beyond press and media coverage of the first citizenship ceremony (and some local media coverage of the first ceremonies in local areas), citizenship ceremonies appear to attract very little public attention. In contrast, the introduction of testing produced a tide of media coverage debating the rights and wrongs of the test and whether the questions were appropriate. This has been repeated each time the tests are revised. The ceremonies appear to be both less controversial and less interesting to the media, particularly as the idea of testing speaks more clearly to concerns about British citizenship being 'too easy' to get and provides a means of talking about who deserves citizenship and who should be excluded (thus a technology of both reassurance *and* enmity). However, whilst the ceremonies do not necessarily function well as a technology of reassurance, they do provide a shorthand way of making the claim that Britain is welcoming and inclusive, in the way that Prince Charles suggested. An example of this can be seen in a report in *The Guardian* the day after the murder of soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich in 2013, where the

description of the local 'multicultural, multi-faith community' the day after the murder is given colour by pointing out that:

Inside Woolwich town hall, a group of immigrants were going through a British citizenship ceremony. The wood-panelled council chamber had been decked in Union Flags.²

The mere fact of the ceremony, and the diversity of those taking part, can be used to make statements about multiculturalism in Britain. They can be used as a symbol of multiculturalism that claims Britain as a welcoming space.

Rather than focusing on the intention or practice of the ceremonies, this chapter will explore the new citizens' own perceptions of the ceremonies, including how they felt about swearing allegiance to the Queen and the citizenship pledge. The chapter will also address directly the question of welcome. As was argued in Chapter 4, many of the citizenship ceremonies in Britain make claims about a longer history of welcome in Britain in general or in the local area. In this chapter, the new citizen's own experience of arriving and settling in Britain will be explored. Their experiences show that the image of Britain, local cities or regions given in the ceremonies of a universal welcome is not necessarily accurate. The interviews demonstrate that many newcomers to Britain experience a cool reception, if not outright racism and hostility. At other times, or for other individuals, Britain has been a place where newcomers have received care and warmth. Using the experiences discussed in the interviews, I will consider what is meant by a 'welcome' in more depth: What is needed for someone to feel welcomed? What are the roles of the state and individuals for providing warmth and care, to make people feel welcome? One reason why newcomers to Britain may not feel welcome is the nature of debates around immigration in Britain. The fieldwork for this book took place at the same time as the 2010 elections, and this chapter will examine what the interviewees thought of these debates, and how their responses to discussions of immigration are filtered through their own experiences.

Celebrating citizenship

As was discussed in Chapter 5, the new citizens I spoke to come from very different backgrounds and have taken different routes towards citizenship. They also have varied and multiple reasons for applying for citizenship. Thus, it is to be expected that their responses to the

ceremony were also diverse. The majority of the interviewees liked the ceremonies. Some said they would have preferred to not have to attend one, but others appreciated the invitation, like Mya:

I think it is quite good because they welcome you as citizens and then, like, it's totally different if you got an envelope in the mail and get this certificate. It's something that you're invited to and you are welcome. So it's a very good way.

Some expressed reservations about how meaningful the ceremony was, or what it meant to them (although all the people with this perspective also suggested that the ceremonies might have meant more to other people taking part). Ghedi's response is one example:

It was an attempt – I can understand a pledge, you know, a commitment to something, I don't know the parallel with marrying somebody. I could see what it was meant to be, but I don't know... I went there, I went through the motions.... Yeah, it was formal; there was someone from the mayor's office who spoke a little bit to welcome us a little bit but said a little bit about [the] diversity of Manchester, a little bit on how Manchester's a good place, but it didn't give me anything that I didn't – I put this down to me being here so long, and I know my way around.... I don't know what the difference is; it's just welcoming and making people at home. If that's what it was, it didn't come across that well in the – it was slightly, you know, that you had some official talking to you; it's not enough.... So there's other – I'm sure there's other ways of doing it, you know.

Here we see Ghedi struggling to pinpoint exactly what the purpose of the ceremony was and how it might achieve this. He understood the nature of a pledge of citizenship and why that might be important, but was not sure that this was achieved at the ceremony in which he took part. Ghedi saw little point in being told about, or even welcomed to, Manchester as a city, a place he had lived for a long time. This suggests some of the awkwardness in giving a welcome to people who have in fact already been residents for some time and, as we saw in Chapter 5, already feel that they belong. This resistance to being seen as newcomers was a view shared by others, as we shall see below.

For some, acquiring of citizenship is a cathartic moment which signifies the end of a journey, which may have been filled with stress and uncertainty. Gaining citizenship can bring a feeling of settling down

and security. Parwiaz, a former asylum seeker, after an account of the difficulties of coming to Britain and obtaining refugee status, concluded that, 'You know, I don't like living in this trap, but eventually I got the key to my happiness [citizenship]'. Habib, who had also come to Britain as an asylum seeker, had a similarly emotional response to having finally achieved citizenship. I met him for an interview the day after the ceremony, and he explained, 'I just [am] feeling so different today ... and I sleep very nice last night.' It is important not to underestimate the sense of relief felt by some of those who gain British citizenship, particularly those, such as asylum seekers, for whom routes to citizenship have been very difficult. The introduction of ceremonies to mark the granting of citizenship is likely to go some small way in marking that sense of achievement and relief. For Habib, the ceremony had felt performative, in that it had changed the way he felt. He explained that it was like getting married:

When you say 'yes' to your wife, and then [she says it back] to you. And it is just like something different from your heart and inside your heart, and just so connected ... you know, you get married, you just feel responsible for each other.

Perhaps, as a refugee, this sense that the state is taking 'responsibility' for you is of particular significance to Habib. Others spoke about how they had felt welcomed and called the ceremony 'lovely' or 'sweet'. Several people expressed relief that the ceremony had not been more difficult or more intimidating. An understandable apprehension that some have about the ceremony is that it might be another 'test' in the process. Makena admitted:

I was nervous, but I was really trying to calm down ... Yeah. Because I wasn't expecting it to be so relaxed. I thought it would be something like you had to be called in on your own. To make you say things on your own, so I was like, oh no, but then they told me that they don't do that. That we just go in all together so that makes it better, like. Makes you feel confident.

Responses to the ceremonies were in part shaped by the kind of the building in which they took place. An attractive building could add to the sense of occasion, whilst an unattractive one could detract from it: 'First of all, I think Hove Town Hall is rubbish,' Rebecca said. 'It's just as ugly on the inside as it is on the outside. So it didn't feel

particularly grand.' Hove Town Hall, which also houses the registrars' office, is a large concrete structure built in the late 1960s. The lobby in which citizands waited before going into the wood-lined chamber was comfortable, but I noted in my field notes at the time: 'grand when it was built, less so now'. In contrast to Rebecca's disappointment, Neela appreciated the experience of going to the very grand Hillsborough Castle, where all the ceremonies for Northern Ireland are held. Hillsborough Castle is a large eighteenth-century building that is the official residence of the Queen in Northern Ireland and also the residence of the secretary of state for Northern Ireland. Ceremonies are held here because it was deemed too politically sensitive to require local registrars in Northern Ireland to conduct them. Neela explained how impressive the building was:

It was very grand. We didn't, I didn't think it would be that grand, very grand – that's what I was saying. My husband, he was like, 'Why are we walking through so many rooms?' I thought, 'This is the life, with so many rooms!' It was very grand, yeah, and it was arranged very, arranged very nicely. I even liked the piano.

There also was appreciation for the warmth of some of the officials. Melody said of the ceremony in Liverpool, 'All of them were lovely people. Like, they make you feel comfortable and were dead friendly to us.' For Melody, this was perhaps an advantage of the localness of the ceremonies. As we saw in Chapter 5, Melody had a strong affiliation to Liverpool, where she felt at home.

Those who criticised the ceremony often did so from a sense that perhaps it wasn't grand enough. When I asked Claire what she thought of the ceremony she had been in the day before in Wandsworth, London, she responded, 'Honestly?' She needed a prompt to go beyond the politely positive response, but then she expressed her feelings:

CLAIRE: I think the intention is in the right place, but I found it quite cheesy, quite patronising, and very amateurish.

BB: Okay. Which bits were cheesy?

CLAIRE: The music that was playing when people were going up to meet the councillor and receive their certificate. That was not great. The way that the MC, I don't know what his name was, the MC spoke. The registrar was patronising, I felt, too, particularly to people who possibly didn't understand English brilliantly ... I thought it was very odd. I shouldn't laugh because it is a very special ceremony for

a lot of people. It was special for us, too; you know, we've been here for nine years. It's where we live. But it felt like you were boarding the plane.

Claire also commented on how clear it was that children were not welcome to the ceremony, with warnings from those organizing the ceremonies as to how they should behave, but there had been no discouragement from bringing children. By contrast, in other ceremonies around the UK, children were particularly thanked for coming to the ceremonies. While Neela appreciated the live pianist at Hillsborough Castle's ceremony, Claire listened to recorded classical music, perhaps contributing to the idea that she was 'boarding the plane'. Claire had been looking for a sense of occasion, which was missing in her ceremony. She felt that the ceremony could have been 'more real' and 'more special'. She explained:

The mayor wasn't engaging with the audience. He was looking at what he was reading. My husband said it was basically what we would imagine they pulled off in a small country town in Australia in terms of its level of amateurishness.

Others, particularly those who had ceremonies in smaller towns, were more positive about the event. Helen, who attended one in Bury, had a very positive experience:

It was lovely, actually. I quite enjoyed it. It was very sweet. I remember my Dad had his in Norwich, and it was much bigger – we went as guests – but yes, it was lovely, because it wasn't overdone. It was really lovely. It was adequate. You don't have to be standing up there and doing long speeches on your own. I think everyone feels very intimidated doing that. You know, just stating your name, just doing all the oaths as a group. You know, it makes a lot of people feel more comfortable.

Whilst Helen is positive about the ceremony, it is interesting that she then shifts from describing it as 'really lovely' to 'adequate', reflecting a level of ambivalence. For some, the lack of too much grandeur or imposing size was a good thing. The ceremony in Cardiff had taken place in the Mansion House, the official residence of the city's mayor. While this is a very impressive house built in the 1890s, it is still on a domestic scale. As Khadija explained:

I expected it to be grander ... you know, and a lot more people there, in a big hall or something. Which would have been a bit more scary. This way it was a bit more comfortable.

Given the range of different experiences that new citizens bring with them (as discussed in Chapter 5), it is difficult to get the ceremony, and the speeches in particular, right. This was recognised by Rebecca – and the point is further illustrated by the fact that others criticised the speeches for being too complicated:

It's really hard, because they're trying to cater for a very diverse, as they say, audience – from people who've only just learned English, all the way up to professional people who've been here for years. So I appreciate that they're not going to hit the spot with everybody. I get that, but there's no need to be patronising, I don't think, and to be as distant as they were.

However, for Claire, the issue of the personal pronoun, as discussed in previous chapters, may serve to create a sense of distance: 'You know it was in the third person, not "you" but "they"'. Claire went on to point out the part of the speech which stressed participation and the rights of citizenship, which she particularly appreciated:

I think the best bit was left to the end, where the MC was saying 'What does it mean to be a citizen?' I'm not sure that he had to go back to the Greek definition [of citizenship] however, to put it in context, but what it now bestows upon people – I think that's the bit that could be [stressed].

Claire was not alone in wanting to be provided with more information on what citizenship might mean and what it might be to be an active citizen. Rebecca also was frustrated about the touristic information given:

I've lived here for six years – I know all that. Why don't you tell me good stuff about how I can be a good citizen? What are the kinds of behaviours you expect from me? What can I do to make Brighton a better place? Don't tell me that Brighton's got a festival in summer I know that. [...] Yeah, really strange. And I kind of expected the mayor to say more of that as well, should be, like, 'How can you people in this room be involved in making the city a better place and

making Britain a better place?’ Tell me! I want to volunteer; I want to do all that stuff.

Rebecca expresses a strong desire to participate. As was discussed in Chapter 5, Rebecca was, like others, already engaged in ‘citizen acts’. (In her case, she used Twitter to try to improve daily life in Brighton). The ceremonies could perhaps do more to recognize these contributions. Some ceremonies did manage to give information on citizenship and participation. Both Melody and Anuja attended a ceremony at Liverpool (also discussed in Chapter 5) and were inspired by what they had been told about citizenship and participation. The female local councillor speaking at the ceremony had listed the possible ways people might participate (for example, by becoming school governors, participating in voluntary organisations and community groups, or by standing for election). Echoing the famous speech by John F. Kennedy, she stressed that it was ‘not just what the community can do for you, but what you can do for the community.’ Both Melody and Anuja reflected positively on her speech:

MELODY: [after the ceremony] You look at things in a different point of view. Like, for example, like I...I always wanted to be involved, like in a community, doing something that like, working maybe with young people and stuff like that, but I’ve never felt like I was, I could do that...Never felt like I could be a part of that, because you had to be, like, just – Well, like we, we just can’t do it. But the way they was saying things on – on – in the ceremony, I thought, ‘Yeah, I’ll go for it!’ I’m just going to try decide what I can do.

ANUJA: I like, like politics. I like listening to stuff like that, so – and when you do a talk...it makes you see that you know people are open, like, you’ve got rights, and you know you are open to stuff, like you can do whatever you want to do...So those words are quite like, quite like, how can I say it? They were encouraging words at the same time they were...it was sort of like educational to me, like...It was, like, they were pushing you like to say, in a way, you can like being a British citizen. You have to put something back. It’s not just about getting a British citizenship...And about being British but you, you can put so much of your talent, your gifts and stuff – give it, give back to the community...You never think that the community does need you. Is – you know, because you think that, “Oh, no, British people – that’s it. They can do it. But you sort of exclude yourself, but we shouldn’t be, like, we should know that we are of the community.

Here it is interesting that Anuja constructs a 'we', referring to the new citizens themselves. This was a relatively rare use of the personal pronoun which perhaps suggests the beginning of a sense of community that she had not felt before. Anuja and Melody's responses suggest that at least some new citizens would appreciate a ceremony that emphasises rights, participation and contribution more. And, as I will discuss below, such an approach might be a more productive use of the opportunity offered by the ceremonies than an emphasis on histories of welcomes. The next section will discuss the new citizens' responses to taking the oath.

Taking the oath

During the interviews, I asked specifically how the new citizens felt about having to make a pledge or oath of allegiance to the Queen. This question was particularly motivated by the knowledge that, in the context of the UK (unlike, for example the US, Canada or Australia), it is very unusual for citizens to make such pledges of loyalty to the nation in everyday life. Many British birthright citizens will never have made any kind of statement of loyalty to nation or sovereign. However, in general, the interviewees did not see any problem in making such a declaration, which was taken as a requirement for becoming a citizen. According to Rada, 'I felt like I was, how do I put it? Oh, I don't know how to put it, but showing that I respect the laws of this country and do what I am required to do'. Even those who did not really agree with the idea of the monarchy or allegiance to the Queen still largely saw it as harmless, as Rebecca explained:

In terms of swearing to the Queen, I find it a bit...I think it's kind of...Well, it's a very British thing to do, so you know, it's a funny thing. I find it a bit weird in the sense that I'm not really pro-monarchy – sorry – I'm kind of atheist and anti, not anti-monarchy. I just, it just seems dreadfully traditional.

Interestingly, for Rebecca, despite her reservations about the monarchy, the most affecting part of the ceremony was the singing of the national anthem – for which she had carefully prepared:

What I did really like and found quite moving, and it got a tear in my eye – it was quite funny – which was singing God Save the Queen – and I don't know if you noticed, but I didn't look at the words because

I'd gone to the effort of learning the words to that – so I felt that was quite special and that also it was like 'Whoa, this is quite a big thing, you know'.

Bernard, who had stressed political reasons for wanting to become British (discussed in Chapter 5) was more confident than Rebecca in putting himself firmly in the republican camp. Bernard explained that he didn't mind swearing the pledge of allegiance to the Queen as he saw that as the terms of entry to citizenship. On the other hand, now he was a British citizen, he also felt it was his right to oppose the institution of the monarchy if he wanted to. In contrast, Claire was a republican in Australia but felt that she would 'keep' the Queen in Britain.

The White Paper which introduced the idea of citizenship ceremonies in the UK argued that the oath of allegiance to the Queen and the citizenship pledge would be at the 'heart of the ceremony' (Home Office 2002: 34). Given the stated importance of the oath and pledge,³ it was interesting that quite a few of the respondents were confused either about which version they had taken, or perhaps more importantly, felt that they had been put in the wrong group (either that they wanted to say the religious version, but had been put in the other group, or *visa versa*):

I was quite surprised when I saw God on mine and then I listened really intently to hear what the next lot said, and theirs didn't have God, and I thought that was definitely supposed to be me in the red group, and then I thought, 'Oh. Okay, it doesn't matter.

In a similar way, Helen explained:

When I booked my place, shall we say, in this ceremony, they did not ask me whether I wanted to make an oath or any pledges, but I am absolutely Christian. I would not have had a problem in making an oath. However, I was put straight away in the other room by the court... They did not ask me when I gave them a call. But, quite frankly, I'm not bothered either way because I can understand that if they forget to ask you or you forget, sorry, or if you forget to mention, they will have to assume that you, by default, they will have to assume that you don't want to make an oath.

The new citizens had generally been asked on the phone which form of pledge they would like to take at the ceremony, and it's not clear

whether the mix-ups on this question were the result of misunderstandings or a reflection of reluctance to broach the issue on the part of registrars, as Helen suggests.

This section has explored what the new citizens thought of the ceremony, showing that there was variation in their responses. Most thought that the idea of a ceremony in itself was not bad – although some would have preferred to have the choice not to attend. Some of the interviewees valued the warmth of the welcome they felt that the registrars gave. They also appreciated the small gifts (such as paperweights of the city and free photos) which they were given. There was a general desire for a ceremony which was formal, in a nice setting, but not intimidatingly grand. However, in terms of the content of the ceremonies, they would have appreciated speeches which addressed them more directly as citizens who could participate (or continue to participate) in the community in a variety of ways. The next section will consider whether the interviewees had, in their experience prior to the ceremonies, felt that Britain was welcoming to newcomers.

Welcome to Britain?

As discussed in Chapter 4, one of the consistent narratives coming from the citizenship ceremonies themselves is that of Britain as a country with a history of welcoming strangers and newcomers. Designed to welcome the soon-to-be new citizens, a key feature of each ceremony is the 'local welcome' that should be given by an area representative or dignitary. The speeches often not only enacted a welcome, but also claimed that Britain, or the local area, had a long history of welcoming outsiders. In response to the claims of welcome given in the ceremonies, I asked the interviewees whether they had indeed felt welcome when they came to Britain, and whether they considered Britain to be a welcoming place in general. It is striking that, despite having just been at the ceremonies which they generally enjoyed, very few of the interviewees felt that they had been welcomed to Britain or that Britain was a welcoming place. The general feeling of a lack of welcome in Britain among the respondents, in contrast to the claims to a history of welcome in the speeches, raises the question, What does a welcome mean? What kind of response to strangers or foreigners constitutes a welcome? This section will consider how welcoming should be understood, considering whether it is merely an absence of hostility and gradual acceptance, or if it requires a more positive and engaged stance.

In contrast to the more common reservations about Britain as a welcoming place among those I spoke to, Adriana from Spain was very positive in her reflections on the welcome offered in Britain, particularly in comparison to Spain. Adriana called herself an 'Anglophile' and had applied for citizenship even though, as an EU citizen, it changed few of her rights:

I wish people in Spain were like here. We are more racist than you are here. [...], but I am sure that if it were the other way 'round, if I went to Spain being British, I would not be as welcome as I felt when I came here.

However, even Adriana reflected that, although she knew a lot of people, more meaningful relationships were harder to make: 'I've always had people to have coffee with, but friends, proper friends. They are still in Spain.' Adriana put this down to a life-course effect, where your 'proper' friends are made in your twenties, rather than later in life.

For those interviewees who were not from Europe, an early experience in coming to Britain was shaped by the need to navigate the immigration regime and the technologies designed for the regulation and control of migration. For many of the interviewees, the process of gaining visas to live and work in Britain was stressful and difficult. It required providing documentation of identity, employment, income, travel history and qualifications that could stand up to state scrutiny. There was also the prospect of intense examination of personal life, including marriage, family and relationships. This was particularly the case for asylum seekers, but many shared it. Clare, from Australia, had come to Britain on a secondment within a large multinational organisation. Even within this 'elite' route, she had experienced stress in the process, particularly at the stage of applying for permanent residence and being called to an interview:

CLARE: I was kind of lucky with the earlier ones [visas] because work did that for me. So I don't know how difficult that was. Indefinite leave to remain was hard, just in terms of getting all your documents together, and it was a grilling in terms of the questions that you got.

BB: Did you have to go to an interview?

CLARE: Yes. And I went to the Home Office in Croydon, but I always find those things quite nerve-racking anyway. [...] It was quite an intense interview. It went for about half an hour. [...] I probably

have the wrong attitude, but from day one, I've worked, I pay tax, I've contributed. I do things for charity and all that kind of stuff, and I guess they've got to do their homework as well, but it was kind of like: 'I'm a fully contributing member of society!'

Even this relatively privileged applicant felt tense about what she described as a 'grilling' by the Home Office. Here we have a sense of what it feels like to meet the scrutiny of the state in a border-like situation of applying for a visa. There is a clash of values between the state and the applicant, as Clare feels her 'contribution' has been overlooked. She was certainly not alone in her discomfort and nervousness when dealing with the Home Office; many of the interviewees suggested, in different ways, that they had been made to feel illegitimate when applying to enter Britain. As Helen explained:

It's quite a stressful thing to go through to Croydon and get all these things and documents. That's stressful. You get there early, and you feel like you're having your case prodded, and it's such a horrible building in Croydon.

Again we see the emotional effects that buildings can have, as well as how invasive it can feel to 'have your case prodded'. Jacques Derrida considers this question: what is the duty of hospitality to the stranger or foreigner. The question of ambivalence and qualifications of hospitality have been raised by theorists since Kant (Benhabib 2004). For Derrida, hospitality tends to be offered not as an absolute, but with conditions and limits. One condition is that the stranger is offered hospitality 'as a family' – as an identified person with a family name. But how does the stranger become known in this way? For Derrida, 'the question of the foreigner is the question of the question' (Derrida 2000: 29). Can the host demand of the foreigner that he gives his/her name? Derrida suggests that asking someone's name can be a loving concern to address the person as an individual. But I would suggest that it might also be an interrogation, a demand to stand as a subject before the law. It can feel like a failure to welcome. As Helen explained:

I can tell you what's not very welcoming is the attitude that faces you every time you come into the country on a South African passport with the ancestry visas: "What are you doing here?" You know, "Where do you work?" "How long have you lived here for?" "How did you get your visa?" So that's not very nice...It's just rudeness,

really, and I can understand it in one way – they process so many people, and so many people have just taken their chances. But as a first thing coming in, it's not very nice is it? Britain welcoming? I don't know if I can answer that question. I think I need to think about that a bit.

Going through the visa process requires not only that applicants answer the question, 'What is your name?' but also that they prove it before the law. As Makena (who had come to Britain from Kenya to work as a nurse) explained, this could require a range of documents and proof – such as birth certificates and qualifications – that were not always readily available:

It was difficult. I think it is difficult. Sometimes they ask for information that – we do things differently at home, and some things that they ask for is not as easy ... the culture is different.

For some, the experience of applying for visas, permanent residency and citizenship brought in a level of scrutiny and was accompanied by a culture of disbelief that they found distressing. Two male interviewees (one from Afghanistan and one from Pakistan) had to have DNA testing to prove that they were the fathers of their children, when applying for visas to allow their families to join them. Madhu, arriving from India for the first time, was held at the airport and was required to undergo an X-ray, as she was told she did not have the necessary health certificates. The spouses of British citizens who applied for visas also felt like they had been under the spotlight, and at times, faced with very blunt questioning where there was an assumption of dishonesty. As Mem, a Kurdish man from Turkey, explained, 'The visa director was not believing we were married. I had to talk to him for half an hour. He said, "I [do] not believe you are married."' This could also be upsetting for the British citizen who is subject to a similar scrutiny when their spouse applies for a visa, as Rada from Bulgaria explained:

RADA: I remember the first time I applied. They sent us a few times letters, and me and my husband were a little bit upset. We found it quite rude because the way they were treating me. You read between the lines that [they think] I married to get the passport. And I think that was the one of the reasons that put me off [applying for citizenship] actually.

BB: To show that?

RADA: Not to show – but just like – maybe a lot of other people do it, but for us it was really because we wanted to have a family. I know they read in the paper, but they can't put everybody under one sign in everything. They put everybody the same marker. She's married to him; obviously they want the visa. Suddenly, it's a little bit... it's a little bit, not silly – but too mean. [...] Yes, they asked for proof of the money. Who is going to support me, even in that moment I was studying. I worked as an audit adviser, a really strong career. They were so mean about me, and that moment I even made more money than my husband. That is something that they should be careful when they treat people. Because maybe, you know, maybe 50%–70% do this as a business, but they are not the 30%. They like to have a quality life, quality relationship and I believe there are people like this. And probably that was one thing that did not make me to rush about the passport stuff.

Thus, migrants feel not only the power of official scrutiny, but also the ways in which they are positioned as suspect in wider discourses and the media, where life choices are interpreted as fitting in a narrow schema of suspicion and hostility. The effort is then to prove that one is not the 'wrong' kind of immigrant. Rada also expressed a reclaiming of agency based on a refusal to act in ways that would be expected – that she would rush to become a British citizen as soon as it was possible.

Even when the interviewees did say that they had felt welcomed in Britain, there was often a lingering sense of a caveat. Hamed, a young man from Iran who had come to Britain as a child, appeared to want to give a positive account, but he hedged his response, delicately treading around the attitudes or actions of 'a certain group of people':

BB: And so, the ceremony is a lot about, kind of welcoming. Has that been your experience generally in Britain – that you found it a welcoming place when you first came?

HAMED: Yes, certainly. I do believe that English people are very welcoming and non-judgemental. Obviously, you get other people, you know a certain group of people, but overall my experience has been absolutely fantastic. I haven't encountered any major problems.

Hamed wants to say that he has found English people to be 'welcoming and non-judgemental', but his references to 'a certain group of people' suggests that this account has to be squared with the existence of groups

and individuals who are hostile to immigration. He appears not to want to present himself as a victim of racism, but there remains some equivocation in the assertion that he hasn't encountered 'major' problems, which would suggest that he has suffered from 'minor' problems. As I argued in Chapter 5, this history of both racism and a wider politics of anti-immigration was never acknowledged in the citizenship ceremonies.

For most of the interviewees, responses to the question about whether they considered Britain to be a welcoming country fell into two different kinds of accounts. On the one hand, there were direct accounts of racist attacks, insults and feelings of insecurity. Other accounts, often given by white respondents, were not of such bleak experiences, but contained general sense that British culture does not 'do' welcome very well or very warmly. Sonia, originally from Jamaica, gave a response which was a combination of these two accounts. She began by suggesting that cultural practices in Britain mean that people 'stick to themselves' but went on to describe a more explicitly racist response which she assumes is underlying others' reactions to her. She is also interesting in the way that she positions this account in direct opposition to some of the claims made in the ceremony she had been to the day before ('that was the bit I didn't get'):

SONIA: They're not very welcoming people no, that was the bit I didn't get. [Laughs.] Oh, they welcome you to Britain, but it's not that way. You've got different cultural people living in Britain, 99% of them stick to their self. They might try to say hello, but that's about it. They're not going to come and sit and have a cup of tea and find out how you are. If they see you fall down out there, they'll walk past you.

BB: So, what would it be – if it was better at welcoming, what would it be? People would be more friendly and...?

SONIA: I think, yes, because sometimes you go out, and you got lost or something and say, "Excuse me, do you know where such?" "No, no, no", or they totally blank you. They're just not friendly. If you see a neighbour carrying something, they need a bit of help with something, it's, "Oh, would you like some help?" They think you're going to flipping rob them. So, they're like, "Oh, no, no, no! I'm fine, thank you", and you're thinking, "Alright then, struggle. You can drop over if you want then." So, they've just got an attitude, or you think sometimes because you're one colour – or some think you're scum. You're just not good enough.

Here, the scrutiny and distrust which others feel directed at them at the border, or when applying for a visa is also felt on the street, where racialised difference becomes a feature of the encounter. Several of the interviewees had direct experience of racism and racist abuse which provided a counternarrative to the idea of Britain as a welcoming nation. Across the interviews, a picture is painted of a complex geography of prejudice, acceptance and belonging which has to be navigated in order to avoid the most brutal forms of racism and to find places of comfort. As Makena from Kenya explained, it is not possible to make sweeping references to welcomes (as in many welcome speeches) or hostility. She also suggested the need to understand 'welcome' in its cultural context (perhaps because the culture in Britain is not generally as welcoming as what would be normal in Kenya):

It's different – because I come from a different culture, people of different cultures. No, it depends. It depends on the people that you come along with, for some people are not welcoming, but some are really welcoming here, you know.

Living in Britain for extended periods meant that many new citizens had not only got used to the particular context of Britain, but they had also gathered experience negotiating the racialised geographies of Britain. Ghedi, who came from Somalia with his family when he was a child, remembers:

GHEDI: When I was young, I can remember us having a lot of problems and windows being broken [...] But after we lived there for three or four years, you know, you'd get on with it, you know? I mean some of the guys that later on moved into the area with us, one of them was hospitalised because they were hitting him in the back of the head.

[...]

BB: So not very welcoming, then?

GHEDI: No, not where I lived. I mean, it depends on where you are.

One of the practical competencies you have to acquire as a migrant to Britain if you come from a visible minority⁴ is to learn in which spaces you are more likely to be a recipient of racism and to avoid them. Simone

from Liberia, who had lived in Britain for 25 years, explained that she probably doesn't experience much outright hostility now because:

it depends on where you will be. I don't think I put myself in the places where I am going to be seen for someone to be hostile [to] or whatever. So, it's there. It's indirect. I think you have to be in an area where you are comfortable.

The welcome speeches in the ceremonies have a tendency to hail the new citizens as 'newcomers' to Britain. They fail to acknowledge either the citizens' potential experiences of racism, or their knowledge of British society. Given this already acquired knowledge, the model of a welcome (as given by hosts to strangers) is a potentially awkward element of the ceremony. The nature of racialised experience in Britain suggests that many citizens have a level of understanding of Britain which may not be shared (or may be ignored) by the hosts who welcome them. Accounts of verbal abuse and physical attacks – such as stones thrown through windows – were depressingly common. But equally common was a sense that (perhaps particularly in the context of an interview just after a citizenship ceremony) the interviewees did not want to dwell on these experiences. There was sometimes a suggestion that these incidents belonged to the past, although this might also be because narratives of racism in the interviews often arose in response to a question which asked whether they had felt welcome when they first came to Britain, sometimes with an explicit mention of the welcomes suggested in the ceremony. In any case, in no interview was there a desire to dramatise or even particularly elaborate on these experiences. Rather, there was an attempt to minimise the impact of the racist incidents. The interviewees may not have wanted to put themselves in the position of the victim of the narrative. Bethan Harries argues that, in contexts where multiculturalism is celebrated and discussions of race are avoided, it becomes very difficult for people to talk about racism without, paradoxically, seeming racist (Harries 2014). Prakash who, as we saw in Chapter 5, felt that he was already a citizen in Northern Ireland, uses the moment of talking about racism to firmly place himself *within* the community rather than as a newcomer:

Some people have thrown stones at my windows a couple of times. And calling names and all. My wife used to go to the hospital, and people were...even in the hospital, people coming and [saying]: 'I don't want this black nurse'. [...] No, that is there. But we can't get everything right, no? We can't teach everybody the right things, no?

Prakash's use of 'we' is interesting. It stands in marked contrast with Adriana's use of 'you' in her comparison of Britain with Spain above, and indeed Sonia's use of 'they'. Sonia is perhaps trying to ensure that I (as a British person) don't feel accused in her account, whilst Prakash's 'we' makes a claim to citizenship and community participation which predates the obtaining of citizenship, in what might be seen as a 'citizen act' (Isin and Nielsen 2008). Prakash here makes use of a well-understood narrative of ignorance as underlying racism. Simone shares this narrative, although she also adds a sense of Britain as an island:

I know it sometimes seems to me that it's because it's an island. It's insecurity. I mean for those who haven't travelled I will say there will be some... But usually when I meet people at work that travel a lot, you know, that [travel] all over the world, it is very entrusting to be with them because they have seen the world. [They know] that the world is not just running down to Scotland or going onto France. It's far bigger than that.

Here the familiar 'island nation' narrative about Britain is given a twist, as what is often posited as a strength is seen by Simone as a source of vulnerability. She also turns around the idea of the newcomer migrant. In her account, it is the native, unmoving British who are ignorant and need education, as opposed to those who have travelled around the world and lived in different countries and perhaps developed cosmopolitan competencies.

Hostility to difference was not just experienced around racialised difference. It was also motivated by religious suspicion and intolerance. Habib, who had come from Iran, told me that he intended to change his name from a recognisably Muslim name as he felt this was hampering his search for a better job. Without this, and the additional stigma of being a refugee, he hoped to get better work. In a similar way, Parwaiz, from Afghanistan, who worked as a taxi driver, also hoped that by becoming British, he would be able to avoid hostile questioning about Afghanistan from his clients. These responses show the ongoing influence of Islamophobia in the UK context where individuals may be discriminated against by virtue of their association with Islam and with countries regarded as extremist (Kundnani 2014).

As mentioned above, accounts of overt racism and hostility were one kind of response to the question of whether Britain was (or had been) a welcoming country. Given the nature of the racialised experience of living in Britain, these were more often present in the interviews of those

who were racialised as non-white. However, white respondents occasionally showed awareness of racism in Britain. In addition, even those of the interviewees who were white, and had not experienced aggressive racism, were not able to say that they found Britain a welcoming place to come to as a newcomer. Britain had a general cultural style which some felt lacked warmth and openness in contrast to their experience in other countries, as Rada explained:

BB: When you first arrived, did you find it welcoming or easy to settle in?

RADA: You see, they try to be respectful. For welcome, I'm coming from a country, Bulgaria, really, really warm and welcoming. I found these people quite reserved personally. I didn't find them welcoming. I think they were keeping a distance until they – which is fair enough, you're a foreigner. [...] In Spain – my parents live in Spain – they are much more...they communicated, invited you to their house, different. Everything is plus and minus. Maybe that was a polite way to behave themselves, you know.

Clare says that 'it isn't kind of the culture' to be welcoming in Britain. This question of welcome and friendliness raises further questions about what it might entail to be hospitable. It also suggests how the question of hospitality has a larger remit than the actions of the nation state. Many of the interviewees felt that British people do not show welcome or hospitality – as opposed to actually being hostile to the arrival of outsiders. Philosophical debates about the universal right to hospitality, especially with regard to those seeking asylum, tend to focus on the question of whether this right should be qualified (depending on its effect on the well-being of community) and limited (depending on some kind of judgement as to the worth of the potential guest) or unlimited (Derrida 2000; Benhabib 2004; Darling 2009). One way that hospitality is often offered, but only conditionally, is in the assessment of which foreigners are worthy of a hospitable response. The state holds the power to make that decision (Darling 2009). For Derrida, the aim should be that of unconditional hospitality, even though it may never be achieved. But it may also be that a 'welcome' is constituted by more than decisions at the border or visa office, and requires other expressions of care to feel real (Pannett 2011).

Two of the interviewees who felt most supported and welcomed in Britain were those who had received care. Margaret (Lorraine) Pannett argues that care for asylum seekers by professionals also involves

recognition – acknowledgement of the complexity and humanity of individuals, as well as a commitment to social justice (Pannett 2011: 56). Melody, who had arrived in Britain as an unaccompanied teenager with no close family, felt she had been well treated by social workers. Although the trauma of her childhood still lived with her in a way she found difficult to communicate, especially to friends, she also had found people who were prepared to give her care:

I like the UK. I've made so much like friends, family like. To me, one of my best friends – her mum's like my mum in a way because she's treating me like a daughter. [...] obviously she's, she's from here, but they just treat me like a daughter, and I feel just like one of them [...]. Anything that could happen, I'd go to her.

Similarly, Madhu, by virtue of having a baby in Britain and being identified as vulnerable, found that she received recognition and care:

When I was in Watford, I had a Home Start volunteer to come and help me once a week. She has become more of my friend, my friend now. Because I didn't have anybody – I'd just moved there and I didn't know anybody in Watford, so this lady used to come once a week and she – we didn't do anything initially, she used to just come have a cup of tea with me, we'd chat, she'd play with the baby and go back. But anyway, eventually we started going out. You know, we went for lunch, go to the park, and you know, we used to do a lot of things.

These examples show that recognition and care may come from public sector employees offering services. But they also highlight the importance of individual personal warmth and care in that engagement, and may possibly be 'lucky' exceptions rather than the rule. An important context of the giving of welcome, recognition, care and justice is the nature of public debates which surround immigration. The construction of immigrants as a drain on the welfare state and the proposed restriction of the provision of welfare services to some immigrants can only limit the 'welcome' provided by Britain to newcomers. The following section will examine both the new citizens' awareness of debates about immigration and their views on it. It will show that the new citizens were very aware of political hostility to immigration, and that they reflect on this through the lens of their own experience.

Public politics and immigration

Political discussion around immigration was particularly heated during the time of the fieldwork, partly because it coincided with party campaigns in the run up to the general election in May 2010. Immigration dominated the news agenda for some time because of an exchange on the campaign trail between the Labour Prime Minister, Gordon Brown (campaigning for re-election), and a member of the public, Gillian Duffy. Duffy had posed a question to the prime minister about immigration, and Brown's disparaging comments afterwards about this exchange were caught on a microphone (which he was not aware was on). This moment was seen by some commentators as a key turning point in the election, which Labour went on to lose. As this was in the middle of my fieldwork, I decided to add a question which asked the interviewees directly whether they had followed any of the discussions about immigration and what they thought of them.

Almost all of the interviewees whom I asked about media coverage of immigration did have an awareness of the debates, and many were clearly following them closely. As Clare explained, 'It was quite funny. We're not interested in Australian politics [but] we really follow it here.' This is an example of how experiencing migration may bring with it increased participation and interest in citizenship practices. The experience of moving from one country to another, and of having to negotiate rules and regulations that control mobility may make individuals more aware of the importance of politics and policy. The interviewees had particular life experiences to bring to the discussion. Melody, who had come to Britain as a lone child asylum seeker from Zimbabwe, explained that she thought there did need to be more controls on immigration because 'there's only so much you can accommodate as in, like a nation and stuff.' However, at the same time, this was something she struggled to totally make up her mind about, particularly given her own experience:

It's upsetting because I know that there will maybe be a young person like me who will be wanting to [seek asylum] you know? And obviously she might not get what I've got, because of things, the way things – the way things are changing. But if it's best for the country, then it's best for the country. There's nothing else... you can do.

Melody conveys the sense of being caught between the prevalent construction of immigration as a threat to the nation, and her own

experience of why asylum, in particular, might be important. She illustrates the strength of the anti-asylum discourses which seem to make it impossible for her to construct an alternative argument (Tyler 2006). Some of the interviewees did produce counterarguments to anti-immigration discourses. Hamed, who had come from Iran as a child and had grown up in Britain, explicitly made reference to his own experience. Whilst beginning with a strong 'no-borders' argument, he then felt the need to introduce some equivocation, returning to a discourse of immigration control and the demand that immigration should be economically productive:

Well, it's hard not to be biased, I guess, so I would probably be in favour of immigration because, I mean, my personal view is there are no borders. There shouldn't be any borders. But then again, I think it is only fair for some people to be against unnecessary and unproductive immigration. I think that's fair.

The question left by this argument is for whom must immigration be 'necessary' and 'productive'? For the state? For those already in the country? For those who wish to enter? Are migrants only of value if they can be constructed as 'assets' to the nation state (Marfleet 2006)? It also raises the important question of who gets to make that assessment of need and worth. Ghedi, who had also been in Britain since he was a child, argued that:

Most of the immigration comes in from the EU. It's the politicians using it as a kind of, you know, something to show the poor man on the floor, you know, saying, yeah, they're coming in, and we're going to do something about it instead of giving any jobs [...] it's been becoming kind of a bit stronger and stronger and stronger lately but [...] it's in the society; the people are always afraid of immigrants coming in. [...] the hostility, it's always there.

Ghedi indicates that anti-immigration sentiments are increasing in strength, although he sees them as always having been present. Here we see an alternative account to that of racism produced merely through ignorance, but also produced through political manipulation. Ghedi provides an account of the political context which gives an alternative explanation to why these debates around immigration are heated, or even overheated, by politicians – as a distraction from other issues around

inequality and class. Clare stressed the importance of distinguishing between EU and other immigration:

I think to a large extent it was a red herring because most of the problem – ‘problem’ – here I think is generated from European immigration. So like people coming in from Poland and they are the people seen to be taking people’s jobs and putting a strain on the benefit system and that kind of stuff. And all the pledges around the election had nothing to do, or very little to do, with the EU.

Clare also spoke about her work colleagues and their hostile attitudes to immigration. Clare felt sure that they were not thinking of her (a white middle-class woman from Australia) as a migrant. She described what she assumed was the imagined figure shaping their responses as ‘Muslims that migrate to a country and then have 12 children on benefit. You know – that kind of thing.’ Thus Clare, like some of the other interviewees, shows an understanding of the racialised and Islamophobic dimensions of the political debates around immigration in the UK.

Prakash, who lives in Northern Ireland, gave an interesting account of ethnic minorities living ‘crushed between both sides and in the middle of this [sectarian conflict]’. He described the hostility that ethnic minorities suffered in Northern Ireland and put it down at least in part to an ignorance of history. He made the case that understanding the localised history of the town in which he lived would give a different frame to views on migration:

We can’t blame them because they have had bad memories in their past, bad past memories... because of all this type of sectarian trouble and all, so they don’t trust anybody, no matter what. And if you go back to history, they should do that because most of the people in Northern Ireland came from different parts of England [...] people should know the past. We have to teach the younger generation the past. In 1700, what was the population in this county? Do you know that? Only 700 people in Lisburn [...]. So it’s all migration [...] people are moving around. People are moving around.

Again, Prakash takes on fully his role as part of the community by asserting the responsibility to teach the past to the ‘younger generation’. Teaching, Prakash suggests, will involve historically reframing understandings of history in a way which is not presented in the citizenship ceremony of Northern Ireland. Interestingly, Amna made a similar

point about understanding immigration in its longer historical context, as a defence against the hostility of others. But in her case, the knowledge came not from a localised understanding of history, as explained by Prakash above. Rather, it was a conclusion she drew from learning the historical accounts of immigration in preparation for the citizenship test. Amna explained that, despite her initial reluctance to learn for the test, she appreciated the new way it had given her of seeing her own place in Britain:

I realised that this [revising for the test] helps me feel more like – when I understand that when – back to the forties when people are invited in England after Second World War, all those things, and they helped Britain to build in different ways. [...] then I will never feel that I am someone from a different country or somewhere outside. But there are a few peoples who I can sense that they feel we're not supposed to live here. Knowing all those information from that book, I feel that I'm not here without any reason because they have invited us from previous [...] Yes, long history, that's what we have.

These counterclaims against an anti-immigration and anti-immigrant political climate are interesting because of the ways they draw on a different understanding of which immigrants are being targeted by the anti-immigration lobbies: racialised minorities, rather than the 'white' EU migrants. The interviewees also reframe the history of immigration and their own position in it. In some cases, these arguments, perhaps especially on the re-telling of history, can reshape understandings of citizenship and the place of immigrants in Britain. In Amna's account, above, and similarly in Anuja's comments discussed earlier, there is also a creation of a 'we' – a community of immigrants to Britain over time: 'long history, that's what we have'. Amna makes the long history of immigration to Britain integral to its 'building', in a way that few of the welcome speeches at the ceremonies in the UK managed to capture.

These accounts reposition immigrants as an essential part of the nation or society and central to building it. This is clear in Anuja's response to the question of immigration. She had clearly been following the election campaign closely ('the latest incident with Gordon Brown with Sarah (sic) Duffy, that was quite amusing really') and had a nuanced response to the issue of immigration:

But I know, it's a real grey area, isn't it, the subject of immigration and – because you think about, there are pros and cons to it

as well. Yeah, you do have a lot of foreign nationals coming to the UK, working there, but they're also building the economy. They are helping the country. [...] The economy is building, and the salaries will be better, and the company develops, but it's one of those things, really. And then if you say well, let's move all the foreign nationals out, but then that would probably cause a detriment to the prosperity of the country, I suppose.

Anuja then went on to say that 'I'm investing in myself through the – by educating myself, by furthering education.' Here we begin to see the claims about participation and involvement which might be taken as a reframing of understandings of citizenship, as was suggested in Chapter 5.

There were other interviewees who had a clearer anti-immigration position, or at least who found these arguments persuasive. However, this required them to reconcile their own positions within Britain as immigrants. In order to do this, there was the construction of *other* migrants who were less worthy to become citizens of Britain, through the creation of a division between the desirable or deserving immigrant and the unwanted immigrant. In creating these narratives, they are of course drawing on well-established discourses within the British public culture of deserving and undeserving asylum seekers and desirable and undesirable migrants (McGhee 2005). These narratives are what Derrida would regard as a failure of hospitality (Derrida 2000; Darling 2009). They result from a failure to recognise the Other as those who merit a welcome. The accounts also draw on the kind of argument put forward by Anuja, about the contribution that migrants should make to a society. The risk of this argument is that it leaves open the door to argue that those who are not seen to be making a contribution should be excluded. This is particularly difficult for refugees who are locked out of the labour force, sometime for several years, while they await a decision on their claims for asylum. The discourse of 'contribution' tends to make no reference to those who could be understood to have a 'right' to asylum and refuge (Tyler 2006). Key terms within this narrative, which cropped up in some of the interviews are of 'contribution', 'deserving', 'fair', 'legal' and 'tax-paying'. All of these terms have their (usually silenced) opposite terms which fit into an easily understood binary of good and bad. These opposites would be: 'wasteful' or 'draining on resources', 'undeserving', 'unfair', 'illegal'. It is possible to track these concepts in debates within the media about illegal migrants and 'bogus asylum seekers' who act as a drain on resources, particularly housing, education

and health (Tyler 2006). An important opposition in this representation is set up between the industrious (and preferably skilled) migrant, constructed as an 'asset' who makes an important economic 'contribution' and the (too large) asylum seeker family who are conceived of only as a drain on resources.

Mya had come to Britain from Burma to complete her medical education and to work as a doctor. She was also clear that there was a distinction between people like herself, who make a contribution, and other immigrants who do not:

I feel there are many immigrants in this country – some are not giving contribution to society. Since I come to the UK, I give contribution, all my skills and all my expertise to the community. Some people and they come in with big family – only one giving contribution. There are other people that don't give any contribution.

Neela, who had come from India to join her husband, who worked for a large multinational engineering company, said that she followed the debates about immigration 'religiously' and went on to explain:

NEELA: I think, yeah, some things are wrong, and some things are right. Yes you should, you should make immigration more, more strict, you should make immigration more strict. People who don't have any status to live in the country should not be allowed to live in the country [...] that's the only way I think Britain can survive [...] I mean, after some, if, if your immigration population increases beyond a certain control of a limit then, then they will tend to rule over, I wouldn't say rule over the locals but then every, everybody brings in his or her bad qualities, so you wouldn't want to have bad qualities.

BB: Really? Do you feel you're bringing in bad qualities?

NEELA: Not me as an individual, but somebody who's staying here without, like, like say somebody who comes from, somebody who doesn't know English who, so Britain is giving him the opportunity to talk to somebody who doesn't know English. That is wrong, Britain should say. No, you should know English because English is your language.

There was clearly an element of classed discourse in Neela's account, as she distinguished herself (taught in English-medium schools in India) from other immigrants who didn't know English. She is picking up on a

range of anxieties around immigration and spoken English (Alexander, Edwards et al. 2007). Neela went on to elaborate further on her image of the 'bad' immigrant, which picks up on familiar discourses of dirt and the Other (see McClintock 1995). Her account also suggests religious suspicion:

There's still, but there are still so many people who don't – I don't know, who don't really deserve to be here because they're making the country more dirty physically and because when I, (this was 4 years ago me and my husband, we went to London) and we went to an area by mistake, it was full of, I don't know it was full of Muslims, and the lady brought dirt from her house and threw it on the street. You would be shocked to see that in a place like London, wouldn't you, I mean.

Despite her strong feelings about the question of immigration (it was a part of the interview where she produced the longest responses to questions), there appears to be quite a lot of confusion about the different status of immigrants, and asylum seekers in particular. Her response to asylum seekers could be understood as an example of the changing meaning that this term now carries in British public discourse, where asylum seekers are always understood to be 'bogus' (Tyler 2006).

One of those things which I feel very strongly about asylum seekers, one, one part of my mind telling me that no, they should not, they should not be allowed to stay here – partly because it's not fair. It's just not fair to another, another person who's doing it by fair means, because obviously Britain will have let's say 5000 citizenship applications that day, will apply, and that they will grant. And one person getting it because he's an asylum seeker is closing down the door for somebody who, who has lived here legally for 5 years, paid his taxes, paid his contributions, you know.

Again, we see how the idea of 'contributing' to society in general, and paying taxes in particular, is the route to claims to citizenship. There is also the sense of a competition between immigrants for a fixed number of places. Imogen Tyler argues that '[i]t is through the production of the imaginary figure of the asylum-seeker as an 'illegal' threat to 'our' sense of national belonging that 'we' learn to desire and demand 'their' exclusion' (Tyler 2006: 191). Neela's suspicion of asylum seekers suggests that the 'we' of national belonging is also open here to those who are born

outside the country but who absorb the cultural suspicion (and also mix it with prejudices that they may already have had).

The division between the 'good' immigrant and the 'bad' immigrant was also at play in other accounts. For Habib, as with Neela, it partly rested on the question of English competency. These accounts thus reflect public debates around speaking English and citizenship (Alexander, Edwards et al. 2007; Byrne 2013). In response to the experience of being in a group of new citizens at the ceremony, Habib seemed unhappy about some of those who had got citizenship. For example, he was surprised that a whole family, including young children, were receiving their citizenship. He was also shocked that some of the new citizens didn't seem to speak English:

I heard some of the people didn't speak English very good. I don't. I must say my English is not good no. [...] that the ladies were sitting next to me. Where she just [had to] repeat after that lady. She, she said everything wrong. Not, you know, proper words. Like I believe when you come to a different country you should learn, learn then to live with different cultures, you should learn the cultures and languages. [...] But, like, you see some Pakistani who was [...] living here like 25 years, 20 years, but the parents couldn't speak a single word of English, you know? But they didn't know anything about, like, what is the knowledge living here, you know?

However, Habib is also aware of the restrictions for asylum seekers (as he had himself been) in being able to fully participate in society, and the barriers they face in learning English:

I have a friend you know, they come here, being with asylum seekers, he is asylum seeker. Like, he would love to go and speak English, he would go college but he's waiting three years [...] to get to college. [...] Which is no good at all. And go and have friends and go have a relationship in, in English. His only relationship is with Iranian people. [...] Which is not good at all. And the only thing he can say: yes please, thank you [...]. Which is not good at all.

Thus the new citizens come to the ceremonies with, as shown in the previous two sections, experience of the racialised geographies of Britain and its racialised politics, particularly the politics around immigration, language and the 'contribution' of migrants. This experience can lead them to question the welcome given to foreigners in Britain, but it

can also involve some of them in discourses of worthy and unworthy immigrants, where they need to place themselves within a frame of the 'contributing' immigrant who should be made citizen, as opposed to the wasteful and demanding Other.

Conclusion

Having explored some characteristics of citizenship ceremonies in other chapters, in this chapter I have shown what new citizens themselves think about the ceremonies. Understandably, given that they went to different ceremonies, and they are themselves very different people (as discussed in Chapter 5), responses to the ceremonies were varied. Some would have preferred to choose not to attend a ceremony (the ceremonies are compulsory), but none of the interviewees objected strongly to the content of the ceremonies. Generally, they seemed happy to make the oath of allegiance and the citizenship pledge. Some interviewees were pleased to have been invited and were happy with their experience of the ceremonies. These recently invented traditions did convey to some a sense of an achievement and a conclusion which is recognised and celebrated. However, for others, the tone was wrong in various ways, perhaps particularly where a sense of distance was created between those presiding over the ceremonies and the new citizens. This could be produced through the ways in which the new citizens were referred to as distinct from the community, and seen as tourist-like figures who needed introduction to the area. There did seem to be an appetite among some of the new citizens for a call to participation as fellow members of the community (with perhaps also recognition that the new citizens were already active residents and members of the community) while bearing in mind that not all birthright citizens make direct contributions to the community.

Further, this chapter has explored the idea of the 'welcome' given to immigrants in Britain. The question posed to the interviewees about whether they felt welcomed in Britain was prompted by the citizenship ceremonies, which claimed to welcome new citizens but also frequently referred to a long history of welcome in Britain. These claims do not fit easily with the new citizens' own experience or their understanding of political debates within Britain around immigration. For those citizens who were not European, settling in Britain had already involved negotiating the bureaucracy of visas and, for some in particular, facing a culture of disbelief and intensely personal scrutiny. Some of those who were not white, once they were in Britain, were met with racist violence

and abuse. Building on the accounts given by the interviewees, this chapter has argued that welcome means more than merely an absence of hostility and threat. It also needs a sense of warmth, care and recognition of individual worth in the reception given to newcomers. For some of the interviewees, this was felt and appreciated. However, for others, even those who had not suffered explicit hostility, there is something about the British culture which they don't associate with the idea of welcoming.

Political debates on immigration provide one context for consideration of the welcome given to migrants in Britain. These tend to present immigrants as a potential economic and cultural threat to the nation. Those I spoke to had a high level of awareness of, and engagement with, these debates. Some contested the terms of the debate, whilst others incorporated them into their thinking. The debates about immigration, about who should be given legitimacy and who should be conceived of as a threat, potentially create a sense of competition between worthy and unworthy immigrants (and therefore potential new citizens), so that new citizens, unlike citizens from birth, are required to assert their worth and contribution. This undermines the idea of a welcome. It may not be appropriate to deal with contentious politics (or the existence of racial hostility) within the celebratory ceremonies. Makena, who said that she had faced hostility in Britain, said that it would not be appropriate for that to be mentioned in the ceremonies:

I don't know how they can put it for people to understand. I don't know how they can put it. If they are going to put it bluntly...I think it would send the wrong message and especially if you have children there, you know, who don't understand.

However, the experience of racism and hostility nonetheless suggest that claims of long histories of welcome may also be inappropriate. The accounts of the interviewees would indicate that a more forward-looking ceremony which celebrates the ways in which new citizens may contribute – and may have already contributed – to the communities to which they belong would be more inspiring.

7

Conclusion

In the middle of a crisis in the Middle East and a political crisis at home, which included the kidnapping of his daughter by terrorists from 'Qumar' and a situation of 'high alert' over Washington and much of the US, the fictional President Bartlett of *The West Wing* (a US political TV drama) hears that a bomb scare has meant that a group of citizens, mostly from 'Arab countries' have had their swearing of the citizenship oath cancelled. In response to this, he says to his aide, 'We're talking folks who have been interviewed and background-checked by two agencies, taken classes to learn our language, passed exams on our history and government, and been fingerprinted twice; these are the kinds of Arabs we're talking about?'¹ When his aide says 'Yes', he is instructed to find an auditorium somewhere to hold the ceremony. At the end of a difficult day, at the end of the episode, he is called to see the ceremony in fact taking place within the White House. He leads the Pledge of Allegiance, and the words of the pledge play over shots of his wife and daughter getting into a limo to leave the White House to go to their country residence, away from the trauma of the kidnapping, the daughter with her head on her mother's lap.

In these short scenes, we have the dramatisation of the nation-as-family (represented by the actual family of the president) under threat in multiple directions from bad Arabs who must be fought in order to protect the nation-family. This is juxtaposed by the good Arabs, who must be welcomed, given hospitality and brought into the democratic family by their oaths of allegiance and citizenship. The naturalisation ceremony is used as a symbol of the idea of inclusion and democracy. The President talks to the participants about the Founding Fathers of America and the Declaration of Independence. In their desire to become citizens, having passed all the state scrutiny, they have proved their

worth and earned a welcome. They have answered the 'foreigner question', which Derrida suggests undermines absolute hospitality (Derrida 2000). Their acceptance into the nation-family also serves to prove the integrity and worth of the US state (despite the ethical quagmire that the President has recently entered into, including the order for the assassination of a 'Qumari' minister). The words of the Pledge of Allegiance, in their familiarity to the (American) viewers and to the character himself, offer a soothing sense of normality returned and the comfort of the embrace of the nation-state which offers protection.

In this book, I have argued that the moment of the making of new citizens – citizens of election rather than birth – is worthy of attention because of the important insights it can reveal about how citizenship of the nation-state is understood. These public rituals of citizenship can tell us about both who is excluded from this conception of citizenship and what forms of citizenship are valued. The ritual is not only about the making of citizens; it also marks a border crossing from being foreign to being a citizen, but still not necessarily into being 'native'. These ceremonies need to be understood in their contemporary context: as a public discourse which signals a retreat from multiculturalism, with an emphasis on loyalty to nation and integration into national culture. This discourse also shaped responses to migration and a reconfiguration of immigration and citizenship regimes.

The relationship between the citizen and the foreigner is important because, despite previous optimism about a post-national future, the global citizen has largely failed to gain material reality. The idea of global citizenship has its attractions and supporters. For instance, the 'Global Poverty Project' asks us to declare 'I am a global citizen' as a declaration against poverty and to 'change the world'.² In a similar spirit, Oxfam UK has learning packs for teachers to guide their teaching on global citizenship and to help children have 'a sense of their own role as a world citizen'.³ According to UNICEF, a global citizen is '[s]omeone who understands interconnectedness, respects and values diversity, has the ability to challenge injustice, and takes action in personally meaningful ways'.⁴ These campaigns seek to highlight the injustices of extreme poverty and to foster a sense of the world as an interconnected place. They also echo some of the more optimistic scholarly accounts of the direction in which globalisation was meant to be taking us. Here, too, we were presented with the figure of the cosmopolitan or global citizen who would move freely across the globe. This citizen's rights would be protected by universal human rights formalised by international codes and laws, rather than depending on nation-states (Soysal 1995).

Yet, in the long decade since 9/11, alongside increasing calls for 'global citizenship', we also see the rising demand that nation-states should strengthen their abilities to monitor and control national-state borders. It is perhaps at the border that the idea of the 'global citizen' is most challenged. You do not leave or enter a country as a 'global citizen', but as a national citizen. Passports, the national documents of identification, *do* matter. What passport you hold will determine how easy it is to cross international borders legally; not all passports are equal. Indeed, not all bearers of the same national passport are equal – increasingly travellers are 'profiled' by factors such as race, gender, place of birth, age and travel history, which leads to accelerated passage through border zones for some and increased scrutiny of others.

As was laid out in Chapter 2, this profiling builds on earlier colonial conceptions of who should be included and excluded from full membership of the nation-state. Despite the pressures of globalisation, which are often seen to undermine the state, national sovereignty continues to be rigorously defended and exercised by the state. As Hannah Arendt asserted: 'sovereignty is nowhere more absolute than in matters of emigration, naturalization, nationality, and expulsion' (1958: 278). All these powers remain central to state powers, and deportation in particular appears to be on the rise (Walters 2002; De Genova 2010). Nations are defined by what they are not, and the border is one way of delineating it. Wendy Brown (2010) claims that the border walls springing up across the world can be taken as failing attempts by the nation-state to shore up a power over movement that they are losing. Nonetheless, tighter immigration regimes, and the walls which are a particularly visual mode of enforcement, have very profound impacts on people's lives and life-chances.

The book has asked: What does it mean to be a citizen? What roles are immigrants and new citizens given in these national rituals? What form of participation is imagined for new citizens, and how are their experiences of migration understood within the ceremonies? Examination of citizenship ceremonies has shown that different nations share a similar range of national symbols. These are the familiar symbols of what Michael Billig (Billig 1995) would call 'hot nationalism': the flags, the anthems, the formal statements and swearing of allegiance to the sovereign or the flag. However, the ceremonies also reveal the way in which the nation is narrated in different international contexts. The United States, Canada and Australia share a narrative of being nations of immigration. However, there are some differences in the ways in which the exclusions – of histories of pre-colonial settlement and of slavery – are

dealt with. In Ireland, the national narrative is not one of immigration but of emigration, and the relationship between this history and the new era of immigration represents an interesting tension in the citizenship ceremonies. In both the Netherlands and the UK, colonial histories and post-colonial connections are largely silenced in the ways immigration, the state and citizenship are represented.

The book has also proposed that, whilst the national is clearly important, in many ceremonies, the narrative encompasses local places, regions or cities as well as the nation. With the exception of the ceremonies in Ireland, which are held only in Dublin as a national ceremony, the ceremonies are held in cities and towns and the ceremonies reflect these local spaces. It is perhaps no coincidence that the Californian ceremony discussed in Chapter 3 has a feeling of show-business razzmatazz, whilst the Brooklyn court house (discussed in the same chapter) distributes information on human and employment rights. The ceremony in Amsterdam (as we saw in Chapter 4) welcomes new citizens to their status as 'Amsterdammers', perhaps in an attempt to sidestep the increasingly hostile national debates around immigration and integration. The ceremony in Bradford (in the same chapter) expects new citizens to embrace a loyalty to the county of Yorkshire. However, although there is an expression of the multi-scalar nature of citizenship (including in the UK the nations of Scotland and Wales within the state), this does not extend to extra-national regional identity. The ceremonies in Europe which were explored in Chapter 4 are endowing European as well as national citizenship, yet make no mention of this fact – despite its importance to those becoming new citizens, as explored in Chapter 5.

More significantly, the interviews with new citizens of the UK, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, raise important questions about the nature of 'welcome' which most ceremonies purport to offer. Firstly, the interviews explored how the participants – although they are newly legal as citizens – are not necessarily new to the area and thus may already feel like they have an affiliation with, and sense of belonging in, local cities. As Ghedi (in Chapter 5) put it, until recently he had not felt the need to acquire citizenship because he was a 'resident' in Manchester and 'knew his way around the city'. The interviewees also revealed the ways many new citizens felt that relationships and ties which spread beyond the nation – through colonial and post-colonial connections or shared citizenship in Europe – mean that they also had a sense of belonging. Some were already engaged in 'acts of citizenship' (Isin and Nielsen 2008) which contest the state's claim to control definitions of who is or

is not a citizen. Ceremonies hailing the citizands as newcomers to the city or nation may create a sense of dissonance with their own feeling of their belonging and experiences and the claims they make about their social (as well as economic) participation.

In offering a welcome, the citizenship ceremonies also risk reinscribing the new citizens as strangers who are outsiders and need to be welcomed (Ahmed 2000). The offer of hospitality comes with a claim to ownership or exclusivity; it creates both the host and the guest (Derrida 2000; Darling 2009). Nonetheless, the welcome may be important in part because of the work it does in creating the nation. By asserting not only the present moment of welcome, but also (as ceremonies commonly do) a longer history of welcome, the nation is given the comforting representation of itself as a multicultural nation (Fortier 2008).

Chapter 4 discussed the single ceremonies observed in the Netherlands and Ireland and the 10 observed around the UK (as well as the texts of almost 50 speeches given at local ceremonies in the UK). The chapter also explored the development of new citizenship regimes in 'Fortress Europe', which include not only the development of citizenship ceremonies but also citizenship testing and a range of processes of rebordering. In all three countries, immigration continues to be an area of intense, and often highly racialised, political debate, often accompanied by Islamophobia. The examination of the ceremonies in Europe produced some interesting similarities as well as differences. In Ireland, the idea of the Irish diaspora (travelling in the opposite direction to the new citizens who had come into Ireland) was threaded through the ceremony. This raises questions of what it takes to be Irish and who can be considered 'truly' Irish, those who have settled in the country or those who have Irish ancestry? Exploration of the speeches given at citizenship ceremonies in the UK revealed some inconsistencies in how history was related. Many, perhaps surprisingly, drew on ancient history – of Saxon, Roman and Norman invasion; for some, this was a way of introducing the multicultural nature of Britain and the idea that foreigners had always been welcome. Others relied on more recent history to make the same claims. However, as I argued in Chapter 6, the assertion that Britain not only has a long history of being settled in by people from abroad, but also a tradition of welcoming migrants was not something that struck a chord with many of the new citizens.

For some, this idea of welcome had to be squared with direct experiences of racist abuse and attack. For others, who were white and thus not generally the targets of racism, there was still a sense that Britain was not a place where the culture of welcome was strong at the level of

everyday encounters or state reception at external or internal borders. In particular, the notion of Britain as welcoming did not accord with the nature of political debates around immigration, which the new citizens were mostly very aware of. In addition, ceremonies which gave historical accounts of Britain and its relations to those who have come from overseas failed to mention one of the key relationships that the UK has had with the global – that of colonialism. In this way, a more contentious period of history was avoided, but equally, an important and ongoing relationship, which for some of the interviewees represented real links and a sense of affinity, was silenced.

The US, Canadian and Australian ceremonies had similar areas of omission and silence in their accounts of the state, which is portrayed as a 'nation of immigrants'. A nation built on the back of immigration also has a power in creating a portrait of nations as multicultural and open, but these generally fail to account for the long history of racialised immigration controls in all three countries, as well as a highly contested politics around immigration, particularly in the United States and Australia. Additionally, the idea of the United States as a nation of immigrants was accompanied by a representation of America as *terra nullius*, in which the history of Native American settlement before colonial settlement and the forced importation of slave labour, as well as the continuing disadvantage of and discrimination against African-Americans, are erased.

Discourses and practices of securitisation and rebordering are continually reconfiguring the relationship between nationals and the state and regimes of immigration and citizenship. Because of anxiety about 'enemies from within', many states have sought to encourage a route of settlement leading to citizenship and a desire to make citizenship both more meaningful and more difficult to get – something that has to be earned. This can act as a technology of reassurance that comforts 'natives' about the credentials of new citizens. It can also provide an attractive self-representation of the nation as open, multicultural and welcoming. The emotional investment in ideas of the nation and citizenship can be seen in the ways the ceremonies produce, and in some cases require, the performance of a range of emotional displays. At the same time, these ceremonies appear unable to deal with their nations' more contentious past and present. They tend to erase the deeply racialised histories of nation-states which, as suggested in Chapter 2, need to be understood not only as a relatively recent modern invention, but also as a product of deeply unequal colonial relations. Furthermore, many ceremonies are shaped by an uncertainty about the relation between 'them' and 'us'

or 'you' and 'we'. There is hesitation about when the citzands become citizens – part of 'us' – and different perspectives about what has to happen for that to be achieved. These differences include uncertainties about what form of cultural or emotional severance from other national allegiances is required. In UK, this hesitation was also present at times in the interviews with new citizens. For some, 'the British' was a category that they still saw as separate from themselves – a 'they', although some city identities were more easily claimed – of being a Mancunian or Liverpoolian. Nonetheless, others claimed (at times even before gaining legal citizenship) a sense of community as a 'we'. The interviews showed that journeying to British citizenship was for many a long process which could have profound effects.

There is a central problem in ceremonies which are proposed as 'welcome ceremonies'. For a welcome to feel real, it has to begin much earlier than at the very late point of gaining citizenship. The book has argued that welcome requires a sense of institutional as well as personal care, recognition and social justice. This could include programs, such as those in Canada, often run by publically funded local community-based organizations, which set out to support migrants as they settle into the country, find employment and learn English and/or French (Bloemraad 2012). However, the nature of the political climate and attitudes towards immigration also influence whether a welcome is felt. A general trend of political discourse, which is becoming more hostile to immigration and multiculturalism, can have a significant impact on whether a welcome is felt. In creating the sense of a host welcoming in a stranger, the ceremonies appear unable to fully acknowledge that the new citizens are fellow residents and should also be regarded as potentially or already active citizens. Thus their new legal status recognizes an existing relationship, rather than being the beginning of something new.

Notes

1 Introduction

1. <http://mondepasrond.net/why-is-the-world-not-round/> last accessed 4 January 2013.
2. These include episodes of *Ugly Betty*, *The West Wing* (which will be considered in Chapter 7), *The Real Housewives of Orange County*, *Hell's Kitchen* and *NCIS*, which all include portrayals of citizenship ceremonies. Popular representations of citizenship testing are also common, but both are outnumbered by fiction which centres around 'citizenship marriages', where people have marriages of convenience to allow them to stay in their country of choice (these include *Green Card*, *Muriel's Wedding*, *The Proposal* and *The Wedding Banquet*).
3. In this context, securitisation can be understood as the justification of the suspension of normal political functions by the state in response to what is constructed as an extraordinary threat posed by the 'War on Terror'.
4. This mirrors the ambivalence that Homi Bhabha argues is present in any narration of nation (Bhabha 1990).
5. See Anderson 2008 for the discussion of revocation in Canada.
6. See Austin 1962; Ahmed 2004.
7. Isin and Turner argue that dual citizenship is being 'increasingly discouraged' (Isin and Turner 2007: 11). However, others have shown that in fact, empirically, dual citizenship is increasingly accepted by states (Hansen 2008; Blatter, Erdmann et al. 2009; Böhme, Bracalenti et al. 2009).

2 Bounded Citizenship

1. <http://antoinecessar.wordpress.com/2013/07/06/call-for-haiku-on-migration-and-borders/>
2. For Marshall, citizenship was important in the protection it provided for the worker from the market, as the development of social rights offered some redistribution of resources (Turner 2009).
3. Although, as Jenny Morris (Morris 2005) points out, very little attention has been paid to the ways in which disability affects the acquisition and exercise of these rights. See also Barton 1993.
4. However Vron Ware's (Ware 2012) work on 'military migrants' reminds us that participation in the military and citizenship are not as closely intertwined as the rhetoric would suggest.
5. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), established in 1979, provides that neither marriage to an alien nor a husband's change of nationality should make a woman stateless (Kerber 2005: 747–748).

6. <http://www.visalaw.com/01mar2/12mar201.html> (3 July 2013).
7. See Altan Olcay and Balta 2012 for an interesting discussion of practices of Turkish elites ensuring US citizenship for their children, creating citizenship as a market commodity.
8. <http://canada.usembassy.gov/visas/information-for-canadians/first-nations-and-native-americans.html> Accessed 19/12/13. With thanks to Lorraine Pannett for this information.
9. Here Anderson is referring to an exile caused by the mobility produced by industrialisation and imperialism rather than forms of political and legal expulsion (Walters 2002).
10. See Nyers 2006 for a discussion of the 'accidents' that systems of citizenship produce.
11. Examples of this would include populations transferred from India to Bangladesh and Pakistan at the time of the Partition in 1947, and the multiple shifting of the French/German border in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. For an examination of the post-war movement of Germans in Europe see Douglas 2012.
12. See for example, coverage of the buying citizenship in Malta (announced in 2013 to cost \$900,000) and the cost for other national citizenships <http://www.cnbc.com/id/101198433> (last accessed 3 April 2014).
13. For Chatterjee, it is the power to declare the colonial exception that defines empire, rather than direct rule or settlement (Chatterjee 2005).
14. See De Genova 2007 for an argument that the focus has shifted in the United States from one of 'illegal aliens' to 'enemy aliens'. See also Bloch and Schuster 2005: 491 on the 'normalisation' of deportation, detention and dispersal in the UK.
15. For example, Ian Cobain writing in *The Independent* reported that in the period between May 2010 and August 2011, the Home Office had allegedly revoked the citizenship of 37 people. This was done on the basis of a new law introduced in 2006. An unnamed official was quoted saying 'British nationality is a privilege and the home secretary has the ability to remove it from dual nationals when she perceives it to be in the public good' (Cobain 2011; see also Herzog 2011).
16. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ffqVJWP5OeU> (accessed 3 July 2013).
17. As Mongia points out, there were fewer anxieties about policies against Chinese appearing to be racist, as China was not a part of the British empire, and also did not have a treaty agreement with Britain (unlike Japan) (Mongia 1999: 546).
18. This is achieved through a masking of race through cultural racism, akin to that identified by Paul Gilroy in a much later period (Gilroy 1987).
19. See also Tyler 2010, 2013.
20. See, for example, the headline in *The Express* in November 2013: 'Flood of immigrants make "township ghettos" out of Britain's seashores' <http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/442169/Flood-of-immigrants-make-township-ghettos-out-of-Britain-s-seasides>. Accessed 20/12/13.
21. See for example the headline in *The Sun* newspaper in the UK in May 2012 'Dirty, drunk and defiant: meet the Roma gypsies defiling Park Lane. Sun girl goes in squalid camp' <http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/features/4323814/Meet-the-Romanian-gypsies-defiling-Londons-prestigious-Park-Lane.html>. Accessed 20/12/13.

22. One can argue that, with the Schengen Agreement, borders have been displaced. The borders between the individual nations within the agreement have become less significant compared to the collective outer borders of Europe.
23. In the UK, the government is currently proposing that landlords should be obliged to check that tenants have the legal rights to be in Britain.
24. See Salter 2006 for a discussion of the global visa regime.
25. Baldwin is referring specifically to the figure of the climate change migrant, but I think the argument can equally be made about migration in general where the argument (apart from those put forward by the extreme far-right) are frequently framed in terms of the risks of future increased or sustained migration.
26. See Sassen 2006 for a discussion of how this imagined threat is poorly related to trends and the complex processes of migration.
27. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/16/asylum-seekers-living-in-australia-forced-to-sign-code-of-conduct> 16.12.13. Accessed 20/12/13.
28. See Barbero 2012 for an examination of the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, 'protected' from migrants by three metre high walls.
29. There are also walls which attempt to restrict the spread of information, including, for example, the 'Golden Shield' through which China censors internet communication (Isin 2012a: 10).

3 Taking the Oath

1. Oakland ceremony observed 28 October, 2010 by Bethan Harries.
2. With thanks to the British Academy small grants.
3. Bethan Harries overheard an audience member in Oakland making a similar point. Referring to a video shown about the history of Ellis Island, the man of Latin American origin joked that it was supposed to show the first Americans but portrayed a version of history that made it appear 'as if Americans have been here forever'.
4. On other occasions (in speeches where he is present at the ceremonies), President Obama does sometimes (although not every time) mention these two groups. For instance, at a ceremony on the Fourth of July 2012, he said, 'We are a nation of immigrants. Unless you are one of the first Americans, a Native American, we are all descended from folks who came from somewhere else – whether they arrived on the Mayflower or a slave ship, whether they came through Ellis Island or crossed the Rio Grande'. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/04/remarks-president-naturalization-ceremony> (last accessed 2 April 2014). However, the rendition of slaves as fellow immigrants remains a very odd formulation which does not seem to do justice to what Obama, in a famous pre-election speech, called 'the original sin of slavery'. See Byrne 2011 for further discussion of this speech.
5. The other values were respect for the dignity of the individual; commitment to the rule of law; equality of men and women; and mutual respect and compassion for those in need. <http://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/submission-discussion-paper-australian-citizenship-much-more-just-ceremony> Para 26 (accessed 11 October 2013).
6. In 2005, in recognition of this ambivalence, the idea of Australia Day Dawn was introduced, to encourage 'a moment of reflection before celebration'.

- <http://www.australiaday.org.au/australia-day/history/australia-day-26-january-a-day-for-all-australians/> (accessed 4 October 2013).
7. With thanks to Bethan Harries for a discussion on this point.
 8. A prominent exception to this would be the 'bride' and 'groom' at a wedding.
 9. Bethan Harries conducted this observation.
 10. This observation and an interview with the official were conducted by Nadia Kidwai.
 11. This observation and an interview with the official were conducted by Katherine Jones.
 12. In Canada, a citizenship judge presides over the citizenship ceremonies; the judge has a quasi-judicial role and deals with citizenship cases, ensuring requirements such as residency are met and conducting oral language tests when necessary.
 13. This figure is slightly inflated as it counts countries according to how they appear on the original application form. Thus Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic are both counted separately.
 14. The US Immigration and Nationality Act allows for an expedited naturalisation process for current members of the US armed forces and those who have been recently discharged. Applicants are exempt from residency requirements. However, citizenship can be revoked if the new citizen leaves the military under 'other than honourable conditions' before five years of honourable service. Some ceremonies are conducted abroad and on US naval ships.
 15. This was not a novel concept. Theodore Roosevelt has been quoted as saying, 'Who says that he is an American but something else also, is not an American at all' (Aptekar 2012: 943).
 16. See also Tate 2009.
 17. <http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/12/12/niqabs-burkas-must-be-removed-during-citizenship-ceremonies-jason-kenney/> (accessed 29 September 2013).
 18. With thanks to Nadia Kidwai, personal communication.
 19. This can be omitted for those who have religious beliefs which oppose the taking of a combatant role <http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=facd6db8d7e37210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnnextchannel=dd7ffe9dd4aa3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD> (accessed 29 September 2013).
 20. <http://www.uscis.gov/us-citizenship/naturalization-test/naturalization-oath-allegiance-united-states-america> (accessed 31 July 2014).
 21. <http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=facd6db8d7e37210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnnextchannel=dd7ffe9dd4aa3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD> (accessed 29 September 2013).
 22. <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/208022/oath-ice/john-j-miller> (accessed 29 September 2013).
 23. See http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1753.html (accessed 29 September 2013).
 24. http://www.boston.com/yourtown/news/acton/2013/09/acton_family_takes_pledge_of_allegiance_challenge_to_supreme.html (accessed 1 October 2013).

25. The National Australasian Conventions in the 1890s did consider using the concept of citizenship in the new constitution, but 'subject' was the term used (Mercer 2003: 422).
26. <http://www.australianaffirmation.org.au/> (accessed 1 October 2013).
27. <http://www.australianaffirmation.org.au/what/affirmation> (accessed 1 October 2013).
28. With thanks to Lucy Winter and Sophia Winter, personal correspondence.
29. <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/lawyer-charles-roach-dies-with-citizenship-dream-unfulfilled-1.1292161>. The article goes on to report an unsuccessful campaign to have Roach given 'posthumous citizenship'.
30. <http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem. eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2335743ebbe8a310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnnextchannel=2335743ebbe8a310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD> (accessed 29 September 13).
31. The code makes provision for those, for instance, who have suffered a stroke, so they cannot read aloud. The pledge is read to them, and they should indicate their agreement. It also points out that a child under the age of 16 cannot make the pledge for themselves; it must be done by a parent.
32. See Kaskowitz 2013 for an account of the political history of the song, 'God Bless America'.
33. Chapter 6 considers the responses of new citizens to citizenship ceremonies in the UK.
34. This didn't happen in Oakland, however, perhaps because the large number of participants wouldn't permit it.

4 Europe Welcomes

1. See the video embedded in <http://www.ria.ie/Publications/A-History-of-Ireland-in-100-Objects.aspx> (last accessed 15 February 2014).
2. See www.bbc.co.uk/ahistoryoftheworld (last accessed 15 February 2014).
3. For an account of anti-Semitism in Ireland, see Fanning 2012.
4. See Byrne 2012 for more detail.
5. In 2004, Frontex, or The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union was created to coordinate national border security strategies. In 2013, Eurosur, a pan-European surveillance system, was established. <http://frontex.europa.eu/feature-stories/eurosur-goes-live-Z8ZM4f> (accessed 5 February 2014).
6. See Weber 2012: 486 for a similar argument about the US-Mexico border where the increased fortification leads to migrants taking more dangerous routes across desert areas.
7. <https://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/press-briefing-notes/pbn-2013/pbn-listing/its-time-to-take-action-and-save.html> (accessed 19 December 2013).
8. See Bloch and Schuster 2005; Bloch and Chimienti 2012 for the constraints on conducting their everyday lives that illegality places on those who are living in Britain as irregular migrants.
9. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-ministers-king-james-bible-speech> (last accessed 30 January 2014). For further analysis of this speech, see Byrne 2014.

10. However, Sara Wallace Goodman (2010) points out that countries of recent accession to the EU – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia – as well as non-EU countries such as Croatia, Moldova and Norway, require new citizens to renounce their other citizenship. These countries enforce their opposition to dual citizenship to different degrees. In addition, Germany, Austria and Denmark do not allow dual citizenship.
11. The other trends outlined by Vink and de Groot are the increasing avoidance of statelessness (except in cases where there has been fraud in the naturalization process) and the increasing relevance of EU membership (2010).
12. Migrants from Europe and a select group of Western countries – such as the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland – are exempt.
13. Although perhaps the place for the worst extreme should be reserved for the German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, which in 2006 introduced a test which applied specifically to applicants for citizenship from the Islamic League. The test was a ‘guide for questioning’ and provided 30 open-ended questions designed to reveal levels of integration. For example, one question asked the applicant to ‘Just imagine that your grown-up son tells you that he is homosexual and would like to live with another man’. Another asks whether terrorism is ‘freedom fighting’ or ‘killing’. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/newsnight/4717568.stm (accessed 21 November 2013; Joppke 2013).
14. This also includes increased focus on citizenship education. See Kiwan 2008; Kiwan 2008; Kiwan 2013.
15. Apart from the countries discussed in this chapter, other European countries which hold citizenship ceremonies include France, Germany and Italy – although the Italian ceremonies are often no more than the taking of an oath in front of a registry official.
16. Personal communication, anonymous official.
17. In the UK, it is possible, at an extra cost, to have a private ceremony. No private ceremonies were observed for this research.
18. The text of the declaration is ‘I swear/declare that I will respect the constitutional rules of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, her freedoms and rights and swear/declare that I will faithfully fulfil the duties that citizenship entails’. This is followed by either ‘So help me God Almighty’ or ‘This I declare and promise’. ‘Ik zweer (verklaar), dat ik de grondwettelijk orde van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, haar vrijheden en rechten respecteer en zweer (beloof) de plichten die het staatsburgerschap met zich meebrengen getrouw te vervullen’.
19. www.irishcentral.com/new-Irish-citizens-to-take-American-style-oath-of-allegiance-124062104.html (last accessed 21 November 2013).
20. www.irishtimes.com/news/4-400-new-irish-take-part-in-citizenship-ceremonies-1.143133 (last accessed on 21 November 2013).
21. For example, see <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/over-4-000-to-become-new-irish-citizens-1.1507162> (accessed 5 February 2014).
22. The Garda are Ireland’s National Police Service.
23. This was the case both in the ceremony I observed and in others covered by the Irish media.
24. Quoted in Handoll 2012: 6.

25. Women can also be lords lieutenant, in which case, they have a large brooch but no uniform.
26. Citizens can choose whether they make a religious oath or secular affirmation. Everyone then makes a pledge. The oath is 'I, (name), swear by Almighty God that on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and Successors, according to law'. The affirmation is 'I, (name), do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, her Heirs and Successors, according to law.' And the pledge that everyone says is 'I will give my loyalty to the United Kingdom and respect its rights and freedoms. I will uphold its democratic values. I will observe its laws faithfully and fulfil my duties and obligations as a British citizen'. The oath affirmation and pledge can also be made in Welsh at ceremonies in Wales. (<http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/britishcitizenship/applying/ceremony/> (last accessed 12 May 2013).
27. This speech in East Ayrshire was made before the Scottish referendum of September 2014 had been announced. In the run up to the referendum, questions of immigration and citizenship had not gained much prominence. However, the SNP have confirmed that they will maintain the Queen as head of state of Scotland, even if they gain independence.
28. Although, see Chapter 3 for further discussion of discourses of choice migration.
29. Diewertje Dyi Huij conducted the ceremony observation and interviewed an official.

5 Routes to Citizenship

1. We did not ask them about their citizenship status.
2. See Byrne and De Tona 2012 for a discussion of migrant experiences of choosing schools.
3. These were Cardiff, Edinburgh, London (Wandsworth), Brighton, Bury St Edmunds, Manchester, Sheffield, Belfast, Bradford, Liverpool. In some cases, more than one ceremony was observed in the same city or town.
4. In 2012, the largest groups naturalizing in the UK, by citizenship, were: India (15%), Pakistan (5%), Nigeria (5%) and the Philippines, South Africa and China (4% each) (Blinder 2013: 2).
5. In 2012, there were 41% adult women, 39% adult men and 20% children naturalising in Britain (Blinder 2013: 6).
6. Registrars commented to me that any proposed changes in the citizenship regulations would prompt an increase in applications for citizenship.
7. See Byrne 2006b for more discussion of racialised schemas.
8. All names of the interviewees have been changed.
9. See Byrne 2006a for further discussion of the idea of 'exposure' to difference.
10. In contrast, Commonwealth citizens can vote in all elections.
11. Bulgarians did not yet have rights of free movement into Britain at the time of this interview (it was restricted until 2014). Rada had permanent leave to remain in the UK prior to applying for citizenship.

12. See Byrne 2007 for a similar discussion.
13. Grammar schools, which have competitive entry and are often considered to be of higher quality than other state schools, are part of the state-funded education system in the United Kingdom.
14. See Andruki 2010 for a discussion of ancestral visas and white South Africans.

6 Welcome to Britain?

1. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3487892.stm> (accessed 13 March 2014).
2. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/may/23/woolwich-attack-multicultural-multi-faith-community> (last accessed 13 March 2014).
3. As discussed in Chapter 4, the oath is religious, with an oath to God, and the pledge is non-religious.
4. The idea of a 'visible' minority has to be understood as shifting rather than fixed (Byrne 2006b). In the context of debates around the immigration of Eastern Europeans, they, too, may be seen as visibly different.

Conclusion

1. The episode 'Jefferson Lives' was first broadcast in 2003.
2. <http://www.globalcitizen.org/> (accessed 20 May 2013).
3. <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/education/global-citizenship/what-is-global-citizenship> (accessed 11 June 13).
4. http://teachunicef.org/sites/default/files/documents/globalcitizen_activity_9-12_8_26.pdf.

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